Battle of Midway. Weaker, smaller, less experienced force trounced JIN due to superior intelligence and every break going against the JIN. Agincourt. Alexander v. Darius.
In the case of Pizarro there was one reason why he and his soldiers had no choice but to be victorious right there. Cortex in Mexico at least had reinforcements available in Veracruz, about 200 miles away. Pizarro could only get help from Panama, about **2000 **miles away.
measure the operation against its objectives. clearly it was a failure. but if you mean germans achieved tactical victories beyond any army before and after them, you might be right. kiev is still the biggest successful encirclement in history. the german kill ratio was simply astounding. note, the allied kill ratio during the 1991 gulf war cannot be considered due to the asymetry of the conflict.
Potential that is fully realized is the same as ability. The point is, Germany grossly underestimated what the Soviets were capable of in war-making ability, their determination to soldier on in the face of horrific losses, and their ability to not only make good even the most massive of losses and still increase the size of their forces.
This isn’t really true. The pathetic state that the Red Army was presumed to be in based on their performance in the Winter War with Finland proved not to be true by the summer of '41. Even when pocketed the Soviets continued to resist, and it was frequently noted that their resistance was much more determined than that of the Western Allies during the defeat of France and the Low Countries. Halder’s note that enemy attacks frequently meet with success on August 15th, 1941 was based on actual Soviet counter-attacks. The length of the front increased the further into Russia the Germans advanced, and it was impossible for the foot bound infantry to keep up with the panzer spearheads, and in trying to they had to endure weeks of forced marches and arrived where they were going completely exhausted. For all of the encirclement and destruction battles fought, large numbers of Soviet troops were often able to escape through gaps or weak points because of the thinness of the encircling forces.
Nonsense. The Soviets held off the Germans on their own devices during Barbarossa, eventually stopped it and launched a massive counter-offensive on Dec 5, 1941. Lend-lease aid to the USSR didn’t even begin until November 1941
, and it was initially a slow trickle. While important later on, they stemmed the German advance and survived having to fold to the Germans entirely on their own.
Again, nonsense. They may not have had much love of Stalin, but they had a great deal of fear of him. Hitler’s entire point of the war in the East was to gain lebensraum for the German people by exterminating the Slavs. Three hots and a cot as treatment for Soviet POWs would require a Hitler so drastically at odds with the historical figure that WW2 would not have occurred in any form recognizable to what actually happened. The historical treatment was
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At first the Americans were getting no breaks at all. Looked to be a major defeat for the Americans (they were having a terrible day right up to the point they got lucky…and they got colossally lucky…times like that you start believing in fate or providence or gods or something. Then the whole thing turned on a moment’s luck. A luck akin to being dealt four Aces. Hell, being dealt a Royal Flush. A Royal Flush when you were down to your last bet and then you won it all. Truly a dramatic event in every sense.
Funny how things work out sometimes.
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The German army, at the outset, were viewed as liberators by many Soviets.
Then the Germans stomped on everyone and word gets out. Didn’t take long for them to stop welcoming the German army and start fighting them in earnest.
I am just saying a decent effort at playing the part of liberator would go a long way to not have people trying to kill your soldiers.
Try to depopulate an area and every mother, child, grandma and grandpa will oppose you. Makes life hard on an invading army. They may not be effective but the Germans galvanized the resistance against them when a bit of PR would have done wonders.
I think the level of expectations in the two cases were quite different. The Japanese goal was a negotiated peace, not total victory.
I thought the German victory over France was possibly more stunning, not in terms of numbers but achievements. Knocking teo major opponents over and taking the country of one of them.
In addition to Midway and the German blitzkrieg through France, the Japanese conquest of Singapore outranks Barbarossa as a spectacular military success.
The Japanese were outnumbered close to 3:1, but using air superiority, better artillery and military intelligence, knocked off the British and their allies in a stunning short-term campaign.
Well alright, Pearl Harbor too, if one overlooks the incredible stupidity of getting into it with the U.S. in the first place.
I don’t understand a lot of things in this thread, including its main premise. Barbarossa is almost universally regarded as spectacular among the books I have read and the people I have talked to, in the same sort of way Cannae was, as you point out.
I’ll also add that the Soviet soldiers themselves (as distinct from their leadership) were not pushovers – German General Von Mellenthin praised their fighting qualities.
The Americans unquestionably got lucky at Midway, but if you read Shattered Sword, a new appraisal of Midway, it’s clear the Japanese were all-but-overextended, took large risks, and made many mistakes, and the Americans fought with almost suicidal determination.
I am not denying there was strategic surprise. I am denying the Germans achieved it. It isn’t a stellar military success to gain surprise when the other side is sitting there wearing a blindfold, with fingers in their ears, shouting “La La La La La I can’t hear you.”
The comparison I’d see would be finding out if you know how to swim by diving into the ocean. If it turns out the answer is you can’t swim, you’ll also discover you made a really bad plan.
Probably a bit of both in the two posts above. Would it have been a surprise if the Soviet Union had totally collapsed given the losses it sustained and the dislike of the people for Stalin?
I doubt it. They didn’t. Hitler may have been thinking of Tsarist Russia and what happened.
Hitler was a gambler- this time it did not pay off.
The encirclement of Kiev was pretty mind-boggling, but in hindsight it doesn’t appear to be that significant of a success. The Soviet Southwest Front had lost most of their armor in a previous battle. If Army Group Center had been allowed to keep its panzers that had been sent south, and instead made a push towards Moscow beginning in late August, I doubt that Southwest Front could have done anything to hinder them.
The Germans were obsessed with encirclements and battles of annihilation, but Hitler seemed just as obsessed with attaining strategic economic objectives. He felt it was necessary to take Ukraine in case of a long war, yet they had no winter clothes for the army and the entire strategy depended on a swift defeat of the Soviets. It doesn’t make sense.
Is it still a really bad plan if your ship is on fire?
I think that’s how much of the Japanese leadership saw it, that if they didn’t go to war they’d be essentially capitulating without firing a shot. I’ve also heard the argument that a Germany-USSR war was inevitable and that 1941 was Germany’s best chance for victory. I don’t know if anyone within the German government was making that argument in the lead up to Barbarossa, though.
Reconsider that all the early tactical disasters set the stage for complete victory later in the day. Things like the low flying American torpedo squadron drawing all the fighter umbrella down to the deck. The more you think about Midway, the more you kind of wonder about the divine taking an interest in battle.
To go back to my Napoleon example, would it really have made a difference in the long run if the German Army had made it all the way to Moscow in their initial push? The army leaders can regroup in another city and prepare the offensive from there. Wait until winter when the Russian army is usually much better prepared than its opponents.
But neither Germany nor Japan was in as desperate a situation as they pictured themselves to be.
Japan would have been better off bypassing the Philippines and just attacking the Dutch East Indies - that was the target they wanted. They attacked the United States because the American territory of the Philippines lay along the route to the East Indies. Japan felt the United States would declare war over an attack on the East Indies and would use the Philipines as a forward base. So they figured they should launch a pre-emptive war.
But, in my opinion, Japan misread American foreign policy. The United States would have opposed a Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia but I don’t think Congress would have declared war against Japan absent a direct Japanese attack against American territory. American opposition would have continued to be diplomatic protests and economic sanctions.
And this is even more true with Germany. The Soviet Union was not looking for a war with Germany and was willing to do as much as it could to placate the Germans. Germany would have been better off continuing its war against Britain, consolidating its occupation in Europe, and building up its military.
Without the Soviet Union or the United States being brought into the war, the United Kingdom would have continued to get worn down. Eventually, Churchill would have been voted out of office and Halifax or somebody would have negotiated a settlement. Britain would have remained independent but would have acknowledged German control of the continent.
Then, sometime around 1944, with no enemy on its west, a stronger army, and perhaps some bases in the Middle East, Germany would have been ready to invade the Soviet Union.
Oh, it just struck me – today is the 70th anniversary of the start of Barbarossa (June 22, 1941). Is that what prompted the OP?
What a hellish war ensued. 
It would have been a much bigger propaganda and morale victory for the Nazi if they had taken Moscow and forced Stalin and the Soviet government to relocate beyond the Urals than it was for Napoleon to take the capital from the Czar. I think the Soviets would have fought on, but they would have been in a much weaker position had they lost the capital in that first big offensive. By not taking the capital in their first push it made Barbarossa a tactical victory but a strategic defeat, and it set up the German army for the losses they sustained simply from the weather because they failed to meet those objectives, let alone giving the Soviets a much needed propaganda and morale victory and boost to continue the fight.
-XT