Let’s see if you can poke holes in this theory:
If we start with the assumption that what is most desirable is that anything be possible, isn’t then a truly chaotic universe, where quantum randomness is absolute, necessary?
Following that, is the universe (as we understand it now) perfect?
Considering the tendency for particles to spread and lose energy in the long run, is the future static, maximum entropy universe some believe we are heading towards the only absolutely peaceful one?
Well, to start:
Applying quantum mechanics to matter and energy does not entail that “anything is possible” because matter and energy are not the only things that exist.
No, I don’t even need to drag religion into this argument. You can be a perfectly atheistic person and you probably still recognize that abstract objects exist. Want an example? Logical truths.
“If a>b and b>c, then a>c”. This is a logical truth. It exists necessarily (in the philosophical meaning of “necessary”). And no mucking about with matter or energy. And it is not possible for this statement to be false. But if this statement is necessarily true, then “If a>b and b>c, a can be less than c” cannot ever be true. But this contradicts “anything is possible”
Even simpler - if “anything is possible” is true, can it be true that the statement “not everything is possible” can also be true? But if “not everything is possible” is a true statement then “anything is possible” cannot be true. “Anything is possible” forms a self-contradictory system and thus can never be true.
Next nitpick - “the tendency for particles to spread and lose energy”. No. The amount of energy in the universe is constant. Entropy just says that the amount of energy that is available to do work is always decreasing.
Even more - once the universe reaches its state of entropic death, how exactly is “anything is possible” still true? I still have to think about it, but I think you’re correct in describing this state as stasis. And how in a state of stasis can anything be possible? Nothing can change.
That’s quite a theoretical question you’re putting forward, there’s really no way to say our universe is perfect.
Is our universe “perfect” enough to support life on Earth? You bet your damn ass.
Is our universe so perfect that every living being on Earth is perfect… well, just browse SDMB for a bit and you find that’s obviously not the case.
Hell,for all we know we might be the one universe out of 20,000,000 currently in existence that is stable enough to support life. Or it could be one of 19,999,999 universes out of 20,000,000 that could support life, we just really don’t know, and might not ever be able to find out.
BTW, I want whatever drug it is that made you post such a vague, hypothetical question that you just posted. 
Couldn’t “that anything be possible” include the possibility of anything being possible in a universe where quantum randomness is not absolute? In other words, any universe in which possibilities cannot be infinite without absolute quantum randomness is not a universe in which anything is possible, and cannot be, given your assumption, the most most desirable universe.
Why should we assume this?
There is the whole free will thing and the fact that most people would rather live in a free world where people like Stalin and Hitler can destroy millions of lives than in some “Matrix”. Who wants to be fighting Agent Smith all the time? Not me…
Can you put forward a good explanation of why we should NOT assume this?
I’d like it to be impossible that I ever not have enough money to acquire whatever commodity I’d like to acquire.
-FrL-
Now that’s just a mean thing to say to someone who just woke up. My brain has been short-circuited but the horribleness of your sentence.
That’ll be $30 for 1/16th oz.
Good point, good point. Not a nitpick at all, my good sir or madam. Fortunately, in a truly chaotic system, magic is possible so all the excellent objections you’ve raised can be made to magically disappear! Yay magic!
Thank you for correcting my embarassingly inaccurate statement. It is as you say.
Quite! I asked myself that very question. It does not make sense at all, does it?
I’m not sure about that; I think there are examples of paraconsistent logics (i.e. logics that allow true contradictions) that lack transitivity, so this seems to assume an universe governed by classical logic (or at least some logic where transitivity holds), which I don’t think is necessary. Even our own universe is not wholly subject to classical logic – the quantum world lacks the principle of distributivity, for example; a and (b or c) = (a and b) or (a and c) can easily be shown to be false via example:
a: The particle is moving to the right
b: The particle is to the right of the origin
c: The particle is to the left of the origin
Thus, (a and (b or c)) is obviously true, but both (a and b) and (a and c) are false, since uncertainty doesn’t permit an exact determination of the particle’s position and momentum, and hence, ((a and b) or (a and c)) is false, too.
But I’m really no expert on the subject, so I’d appreciate any corrections to my reasoning.
As for the OP, I’d strongly disagree with the assumption that what’s most desirable is that anything is possible, basically on the grounds of the existence of things that I’d like to be impossible (as Frylock already demonstrated).
Also, tossing aside all considerations about the relativity of terms like ‘good’, ‘desirable’, and ‘perfect’, a heat death universe would most certainly not be one where anything is possible, since it lacks a consistent arrow of time, so even the notion of anything happening is a problematic one.
Doesn’t a truly chaotic universe preclude causality? And without causality we couldn’t do anything. Nothing would be possible.
PC
[QUOTE=Half Man Half Wit]
I’m not sure about that; I think there are examples of paraconsistent logics (i.e. logics that allow true contradictions) that lack transitivity, so this seems to assume an universe governed by classical logic (or at least some logic where transitivity holds), which I don’t think is necessary. Even our own universe is not wholly subject to classical logic – the quantum world lacks the principle of distributivity, for example; a and (b or c) = (a and b) or (a and c) can easily be shown to be false via example:
a: The particle is moving to the right
b: The particle is to the right of the origin
c: The particle is to the left of the origin
Thus, (a and (b or c)) is obviously true, but both (a and b) and (a and c) are false, since uncertainty doesn’t permit an exact determination of the particle’s position and momentum, and hence, ((a and b) or (a and c)) is false, too.
But I’m really no expert on the subject, so I’d appreciate any corrections to my reasoning.
[/QUOTE]
Well, the transitivity of > isn’t a purely logical question in most contexts, but, rather, just part of the definition of a partial order (a reflexive, transitive relation). But, I suppose, the most logic-oriented analogue would be the principle that (A implies B) and (B implies C) should entail (A implies C). I guess this could fail in some reasonably standard systems of paraconsistent logic [e.g., by taking A to be true, C to be false, and B to be one of the other values in Belnap’s four-valued logic].
As for quantum logic and failure of distributivity, I wouldn’t so much say that the quantum world lacks the principle of distributivity; rather, I would say, that when formal propositions are interpreted in a certain useful way as statements about quantum mechanics, then distributivity is not validated; however, other ways of bridging from formal propositions to actual claims about quantum mechanics will validate distributivity.
You could never hope to show that “the real world’s logic” is one thing rather than another, any more than you could hope to show whether real space used Cartesian coordinates or spherical coordinates; a logic is just a particular language and framework within which to describe and analyze things. Any such framework is potentially applicable, via some interpretation or another, to any system under study; the only question is whether it applies naturally and usefully. [As a very rough analogue, let’s consider the following argument that logic of “the real world” is intuitionistically-flavored: classically, we can show that for every x in [0, 1], there exists a y in [0, 1] which is distinct from it (e.g., if x is 0, let y be 1; if x is not 0, let y be 0). But one might believe that every function in the real world is continuous, and it’s easy to see that there is no continuous function y(x) from the unit interval to itself with the property that y(x) is always distinct from x. Is this a problem for the classical logician? No, it’s only a problem if one wanted to interpret statements like “for all x, there exists a y” in a certain way as assertions about the real world. It is, of course, very easy to interpret them in another (more standard) way which is compatible with classical logic, though for some purposes the one interpretation may lend itself to greater usefulness in analyzing the real world than the other. It’s the same sort of thing that happens with so-called “quantum logic”. There are various formal frameworks out there which can be used to analyze quantum mechanics, bringing out this or that aspect of it; some of these frameworks are classically oriented and some are not, but it’s not as though there’s a substantive question of which one is “correct”].
This is all a bit off-topic, and sort of “fuzzy”, for lack of a better word, but, then, this is a sort of insubstantial “fuzzy” thread to begin with, so I don’t feel particularly guilty.
[QUOTE=Indistinguishable]
Well, the transitivity of > isn’t a purely logical question in most contexts, but, rather, just part of the definition of a partial order (a reflexive, transitive relation).
[/QUOTE]
Well, I suppose more relevant would be the notion of an irreflexive, transitive relation (speaking of “>” instead of “>=”). Not that it matters.
Also, I think “fluffy” is a better word than “fuzzy”.
[QUOTE=the PC apeman]
Doesn’t a truly chaotic universe preclude causality? And without causality we couldn’t do anything. Nothing would be possible.
[/QUOTE]
I always really liked the corresponding argument of Hume’s, that free will, far from requiring full-on nondeterminism, necessitated an element of determinism, at least insofar as it involves causality.