The effect of all those qualifiers was to keep it nice and simple. Let me expand a little.
First the basic story I told about the market for loanable funds is right, but there are other important determinants of behaviour which are held constant in this crude diagram:
[sub]interest rate
!* **S**
! * /
! * /
! * /
! * /
! * /
r-------------------*/
! / *
! / *
! /. *
! / . * **I**
0 ------------------I------------------- savings, investment[/sub]
In the picture demand for funds for investment purposes varies negatively with the interest rate and supply of funds varies positively with the interest rate. The equilibrium interest rate is r and the quantity saved and invested is I. Note that the curves could be steeper or flatter. The savings function is drawn pretty steep, indicating that saving is not very responsive to changes in interest rates. Empirical evidence supports this view.
Other effects will shift these curves - a reduction in income for example will generally shift the savings curve leftwards, an expectation of good times ahead will shift the investment curve rightwards. Very crudely, the idea of expansionary monetary policy is that lowering interest rates/ expanding the money supply shifts the savings function rightwards* (because saving is a function of - amongst other things - income) and investment increases. Depending on supply conditions in goods and factor markets, this can bring you out of a slump or be a temporary effect which will be reversed by an increase in the general price level (ie inflation).
Now to address your questions, although you probably won’t find it very satisfactory: First, what’s happening in the US? Well as mentioned above, domestic saving is not very responsive to interest rates and Americans (at present) are not very thrifty. But, relaxing another of things I ignored before, the US can finance investment with foreign savings. And markets seem to think that US investments will generate returns high enough that they are willing to make up the shortfall in domestic saving at the current exchange rate.
Now Japan. First off, the Japanese are very thrifty. So thrifty in fact as to be weird. They keep on putting money in their post-office accounts despite the fact that it looks like much better returns are available elsewhere. Note - contrary to your reasonable assumption they are not investing much outside Japan (you can tell this by the fact that the Yen has not depreciated all that much in the last 5 years or so). Why they do this is beyond economists’ understanding at the moment, but it is a huge problem for the BoJ: they keep on flooding the place with liquidity and people just won’t spend it. And no-one is investing because no one is spending, so investments aren’t expected to be profitable. Also because the financial system is riddled with incompetence and corruption which the government seems incapable of addressing because (a) The LDP are deeply involved in the incompetence and corruption and (b) the fear that the whole financial system could collapse like a house of cards.
In some economists’ opinion, Japan is caught in a modern version of Keynes’ liquidity trap: below a certain interest rate monetary policy becomes ineffective because people think asset prices are too high and must fall and that therefore yields must rise, so it is best to hold money rather than buy assets. In this circumstance trying to stimulate the economy is like pushing on a string. Krugman for example thinks that the BoJ must commit itself to causing substantial inflation to get the economy going.
*This would be the end effect of what starts in the money market, which would require at least 3 more pictures in the IS/ LM framework. Anyone who wants to follow this through themselves:
- the monetary expansion shifts the supply of real money balances rightwards (M increases, P is constant, so M/P increases), which requires
- an increase in liquidity demand. This shows up as
- a downward shift in the LM curve, resulting in
- a movement down the IS curve, which is itself a summary of what is going on in the market for loanable funds.
If the economy is operating at or above the non-inflation accelerating level of output, real money balances adjust back to where they came from as the general price level rises. If there is no pressure on goods or factor prices, voila, we have stimulated the economy.