Is Iran Next?

—Yes, just like those confused American asshole pilots that killed those Canadians in Afghanistan.—

Was this a footnote somewhere in the Cheney/Rumsfeld/Perle/Wolfowitz plan? I couldn’t find it.

Of course, your Arab flub aside, I think people are being a little deliberately obtuse in calling the regional strategy a conspiracy. There is a neo-con strategy for the Middle East, and yes, it does involve completely changing the Middle East according to the US. Of course, it’s nowhere as evil as you portray it as, but for someone to go “what? who? no such thing!” is a little over-the-top.

Freedom of Information act and the three following books:

“Ajatollah Chomeine: Der islamische Staat” by I. Itscherenska
“Iran Under the Ayatollahs” by D. Hiro
“The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Revolution” by N.R. Keddie

Sweet Jesus, I am not here to teach you people about geopolitics.

If you wants cites about US terror read any non-linguistics book by Noam Chomsky.

As for CIA invlovement in bringing the extremists to power, read:

“The Death Lobby”

–Kenneth R. Timmerman

Okay, let’s clear up some miscomprehensions here:

  1. Shi’ism did not originate in Persia. Quite the contrary, until the 16th century it was usually a majority Sunni region ( a possibly exception is the later Umayyad period, but those were rather different Shi’ites - I’ll get to that ). This changed with the Safavid conquest, starting in the very late 15th/early 16th century. The Safaviyeh were a very heterodox Shi’a Sufi order, headquartered originally in Ardabil, later in Tabriz ( and later again, Isfahan ). Founded by Sheikh Safi ad Din ( 1253-1334 ), they were actually originally Sunni, but switched sometime in the late 14th/early 15th century. When I mean they were heterodox, I’m not kidding - By modern mainstream Shi’a standards they were damn near heretical, especially in their near-worship of Isma’il, founder of the dynasty, who gained control of Azerbaijan by 1501 and continued to expand until checked by the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514.

Generally speaking the commonly held notion that Islam was heavy into forced conversions is false. However Persia has the rather dubious honor of being one of the biggest exceptions. Only it was a forced conversion to Shi’ism. Well, in a sense, anyway. It was accomplished by proscribing Sunni teachings and then basically killing or driving out the Sunni “clergy” and replacing them with Shi’a “clergy”, mostly imported from southern Iraq ( and far more orthodox than the Safaviyeh themselves, which would be a source of tension a century or so down the line ). So Iran’s Shi’a history is comparatively recent and was not in any way a spontaneous conversion.

  1. While one can indeed find elements of Zoroastrian thought in Islam, particularly is some strains of Sufism, Shi’ism does not derive from any such straightforward amalgamation. Also the Shi’a community has never represented the majority, really. A short history of Shi’ism ( taken from earlier posts I made on the topic ) :

Although I think this has already been covered in part, I’ll take a stab at the question of the Shi’a/Sunni split. It was not really a doctrinaire religious split like the Catholic/Protestant rift, nor was it really a geographic split ( though there were very limited elements of that ). Rather, despite some definite religious overtones from the beginning, it was primarily a political fissure.

The central issue was the succession to Muhammed. Muhammed was none to clear on just what was to happen after he died in 632 C.E. ( in part it may be that death crept up on him sooner than he expected ). There are some ( disputed by Sunni scholars ) indications that he favored his family, personified in his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ( who was also the first male convert to Islam, though not the first male adult convert ). It seems pretty clear that Ali himself was of this opinion. However Ali was a polarizing figure with limited backing and the Islamic state was in a fragile position. In particular the situation in Mecca, just recently converted, was unstable - but it was there that the bulk of the Islamic state’s resources were concentrated ( to oversimplify vastly, Ali drew his support more from Medina, his opponents from Mecca ). Some of Muhammed’s most important Companions, led by Umar, seized the bull by the reins and quickly convened a council and had Abu Bakr, an extremely clever man and skilled politician with strong support from the all-important Quraysh tribe of Mecca, elected to the post of Caliph. The explanation given was that this was a traditional Arab way of deciding the succession of a community ( Sunnah=tradition, hence "Sunni ). This was then presented as a fait accompli to Ali, who was caught by surprise and NOT happy about it. After some resistance he acquiesced with poor grace. This began the split. As Sunni=“traditionalist”, so Shi’a=“partisan”. So the Shi’at 'Ali were “the partisans of Ali”.

After Abu Bakr died, Umar engineered his own election and sought some rapproachement with the disgruntled Ali, with some, but not complete success. After Umar was killed by a slave, Uthman of the Banu Umayya beat out Ali ( still with only limited support ) in a further election. However his twelve-year reign proved tempestuous and was marred by a certain dictatorial bent and rampant nepotism. He also ( in contrast to Umar ) pursued a policy of centralization. All of this stirred tremendous resistance and led to armed rebellions. One of these rebel parties, proceeding from Egypt, murdered Uthman in Medina in 656. The various rebel factions that now dominated Medina proceeded to place their backing behind Ali, who though he had argued against violence, was tainted by being supported by Uthman’s murderers. Further though he considered himself Caliph by legitimate descent, he was not elected by a Shura ( council of senior Muslim leaders ) as Umar had stipulated should be done and lacked the backing of the Quraysh, which Abu Bakr had proclaimed as the ruling class in Muslim society. He was thus immediately challenged by Mu’awiya, the powerful governor of Syria and Uthman’s closing living relative.

This triggered the first ( of four ) fitna , or Islamic civil war. At first Ali was successfu, winning an advantage at the battle of Siffin. But he then made a horrible political blunder by agreeing to an arbitration with his opponents that made significant concessions. Since he had been waging this war as a struggle against un-Islamic rebels that had earlier been declared unfit to hold office, this arbitration was considered heretical backsliding by a minority of the heterogenous factions that made up the early Shi’a movement. One group ( who were largely desert Bedouin with definite anti-centralizing and egalitarian tendencies ) seceded and declared a general war on both Ali and Mu’awiya - These became the Kharijites.

The Kharijites considered their allegiance to not be bound to a particular person, but rather to the Koran and the Sunna of Abu Bakr and Umar ( they conveniently overlooked or ignored those two Caliph’s elevation of the Quraysh, to which they were fiercely opposed ). They were critical of Ali’s claim to the Caliphate based on his early merits and kinship with Muhammed. In their eyes early merit could ( and in this case was ) be lost by an infraction of divine law ( as they considered Uthman and Mu’awiya to have lost it ) and kinship with the Prophet was irrelevant.

Weakened by the aftermath of the arbitration at Siffin, Ali’s position eroded as he now faced a multi-front struggle. In 661 he was assainated by Kharijites and his son and successor al-Hasan surrendered to Mu’awiya who inaugurated the Umayyad dynasty.

At this point Shi’ism was still more a political force, but it was beginning to gather religious differentiation. Ali’s second son, al-Husayn, died in an abortive revolt attempt at Karbala in 680 and became a martyr to the Shi’ite cause. A son of the fourth Imam, Zayd, died in a rebellion against the Umayyads, causing his followers to split off as the militant Zaydi Shi’ites ( “fivers” ), who only recognized the first four Imams, plus Zayd ( a non-designated son ) as legitimate - To the Zaydi’s, designation of successors ( accepted by other Shi’ite factions ) was unimportant, it was only those that struggled against oppressors that were worthy of the Imamate. The Zaydi’s today dominate northern Yemen.

By the 740’s resistance to the Umayyads, who were extremely Arabo-centric and plagued by some poor rulers ( only Umar II is uniformly praised by Sunni biographers ), began to intensify. The Abbasids, a family that was descended from the Prophet’s uncle, Abbas, began to gather steam in Khurasan in the east, drawing particular support from some Shi’ites and the mawali ( Persian converts to Islam slighted by Umayyad policy ). After being badly weakened by a serious of disastrous military defeats ( to the Khazars, the Byzantines, and North African Kharijites ) and a fratricidal succesion struggle, the Umayyads were swept from power by the Abbasids in 749.

This occasioned a further split in the Shi’ite community. Those that were content that members of the Banu Hashim ( Muhammed’s family, essentially ) were now in power, in the form of the Abbasids, merged into the Sunni mainstream ( note - This refers back to my earlier comment that Shi’ism once might have been more popular in Persia - If so it was in the form of pro-Abbasids in Khurasan that later became indistinguishable from the Sunni ). Those that contended that only Ali’s direct descendants should rule, remained as Shi’ites. From this point, that definition of Shi’ism became codified.

The true development of Shi’ism as an entirely different religious sect, with significant differences in jurisprudence and doctrine from mainstream Sunnism, solidified under the sixth designated Imam ( in direct descent from Ali ), Ja’far al-Sadiq ( who worked under the protection of the Abbasid Caliphs ). From this point forward, though there were many elaborations and one further split after Ja’far’s death into the Isma’ili/Sevener and Imami/Twelver sects ( the Imami’s are the “mainstream” sect that one finds in Iran, southern Lebanon, and southern Iraq today ), one can consider Sunnism and Shi’ism as different religious movements in the fullest sense.

For a good analysis of the reign of the first four Caliphs ( the Rashidun, or “Rightly Guided Caliphs” ) and the first fitna, I’d recommend The Succession to Muhammed, A Study of the Early Caliphate by Wilferd Madelung ( 1997, Cambridge University Press ). Note that in terms of Muhammed’s wishes, his own analysis comes down in favor of the Shi’ite interpretation - But that is not necessarily a consensus view.

Addenda ( originally a second post ): Less I was unclear, the fourth Imam, the son of al-Husayn, wasn’t named Zayd ( it was actually Ali Zayn al-'Abidin ), rather that was his son’s name. The fourth Imam’s designated heir, who is accepted by both Isma’ili and Imami Shi’ites as the legitimate fifth Imam, was Muhammed al-Baqir. He predeceased his younger brother Zayd in 731. So at the time Zayd died a martyr in 740 and the Zaydi split happened, the other Shi’a factions were already under the authority of their sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq ( who died in 765 ), whose authority the Zaydis rejected. Hope that’s not too confusing .

Ismai’il, Ja’far al-Sadiq’s original designated heir, either pre-deceased his father or just disappeared in 760 ( the Isma’ilis believe he was occultated by God ). Ja’far al-Sadiq then designated his son Musa al-Kazim ( Abdallah ) as his successor. It was he that the Imami tradition recognizes as the legitimate seventh Imam. The last Imam in that line was the eleventh, Hasan al-'Askari, who died without heirs in 874. The Twelver designation comes from Imami tradition that posits a hidden Twelth Imam ( known as Muhammed al-Mahdi ) that was occultated by God and who shall return as the Mahdi, or Messiah, at the end of days. The Isam’ilis however, believe that Isma’il will be that Mahdi.

I should note that from Ja’far al-Sadiq through Hasan al-'Askari, all of the Twelver Imams lived under the protection and patronage of the Abbasid court, where they were treated with honor as Holy Men and had considerable influence in merchant and scribal circles. This goes a long way to explaining the relative passivity and apolitical bent of the early Imamis, as opposed to the militant Zaydis and Isma’ilis.

  • Tamerlane

Oh, by the way, I do highly recommend the Keddie book in particular out of those 2Thick cited.

  • Tamerlane

Oh and whether or not there are any Iranian terrorists ( and the ayatollahs would be the first to claim that there are - all anti-regime :wink: ), they certainly have backed plenty. That, unfortunately, is indisputable.

I think any move against Iran would be foolish, but let’s not get silly and start pretending the curent regime are ideal world citizrns. They have their fingers in some unsavory pies, despite what I see as a steadily improving situation in that country.

  • Tamerlane

We’ll overthrow your repressive theocracy of a coalition of the willing is willing to stand up against evildoers in the name of international peace through brief and almost painless warfare.

Nope. Not really. :smiley: I think there will be changes from within in the not too distant future. I’m sure it will all be the CIA’s doing, however. :dubious:

Oh, and we’re a FIRST-rate UK clone, thank you very much. Australia tries. Being an island gives them a leg up. Canada, too many trees.

No US invasion of Iran. As Sam said, it is a democracy, of sorts. I expect it’ll take many years, but Iran will gradually throw off it’s theocracy. NK is another story altogether. Kim J.I. and S.H. are two peas in a pod.

Sigh…at this point it’s hard to predict which country we’ll be invading next. As long as the congress insists on being an overpaid rubberstamp, I’m sure the prez will get around to Iran soon enough.

You’re a newcomer to this forum, pal, and your slanderous language is really unacceptable–and a violation of the registration rules to which you agreed when you joined.

We haven’t had such an abusive person like you since “Chumpsky” was here. BTW, he too referred to Chomsky. Also like you, he posted a lot and had a self-deprecating username, not unlike yours.

Don’t be like Chumpsky.

Sadly it seems your user name is all too (or should I say 2?) appropriate.

Of course there is a difference between mere moral support and the actual material support (including financing, basing, and military training) Iran has given to Hezbollah and to lesser extent Hamas and PIJ. But if that’s not good enough for you, you still have not refuted my earlier explanation that the 1979 takeover was in fact terrorism.

Tamerlane: You have as always given a spectacular explanation of the difference between Shi’a and Sunna (though that is a difference with which to a large extent I was already familiar). Since you are familiar with the Keddie book and I do not currently have the time to read it, does it back up 2Thick’s claim that

?

I am not sure whether or not I agree with your assessment that US action in Iran would be foolish. While of course it would be rather silly to mount a full-scale attack and invasion as we are currently doing in Iraq, it seems untenable that the reactor at Bushehr should become operational as it is currently scheduled to in 2004 (though I’m certain that 2Thick would buy the explanation that a major oil-producing country like Iran would need a nuclear reactor for energy). Perhaps an Osirak-style attack might be necessary in the future. Further, democratization within the system may or may not be reliable, in light of the clerics’ control of the military, intelligence, judiciary, and police. I currently believe that we should be (and possibly already are) providing covert aid to pro-democratic opposition groups inside the country, possibly military aid (weapons and training) if necessary. This all could change though in the near future, as a pro-US pseudodemocracy in Iraq, along with a pro-US government in Afghanistan, could put sufficient pressure on the mullahs to sort of “break the back” of the regime. Just speculation though.

No, not really. Some authors may have drawn that conclusion, but Keddie does not:

*Until late fall top American policy makers in Washington and Tehran, misled in part by their limited Iranian contacts and their reliance on SAVAK and Iranian officials for their knowledge of the opposition, were sure the Shah’s regime would last. By fall some in the State Department and in Iran were changing their views, and from early November Ambassador Sullivan cabled home his doubts that the Shah, and later Bakhtiar, could win out. The embassy began secret contacts with the antileftist parts of the pro-Khomaini opposition, including National Front leaders, Bazargan, and some clerics, especially Ayatollah Mohammed Besheshti, a Khomaini follower recently returned from Europe. Many American policy makers thought, on the basis of Khomaini’s recent statements and political inexperience, that in the event of a revolutionary victory Khomaini might step into the background and allow moderates to rule. The State Department seems to have approved a late, abortive plan for a National Front-Clerical ruling alliance with the Shah effectively to bow out. ( The Shah’s refusal to abdicate and the opposition’s refusal to settle for less was one stumbling block.) This was the probable context of Ambassador Sullivan’s plan to send an American envoy to meet with Khomaini, which was apparently blocked by National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who opposed the State Department’s approach and actively promoted a hard line, which he thought would keep the Shah in power.

American contacts with the opposition and the lack of intervention for the Shah made many anti-Khomaini Iranians believe that the United States’ was responsible for Khomaini’s victory. It appears rather that the State Department was trying to make the best of what it saw as a bad situation; near the end trhere was no feasible way to stop the Khomaini movement, and so the Americans tried to contact it and encourage its moderates in the hope of lessening its anti-American tone. No aid was given to the opposition, and apart from one statement by Carter indicating uncertainty that the Shah’s rule would last, verbal and moral support for the Shah, including regular counsel from Ambassador Sullivan, continued until the end. Brzezinski’s hawkish pro-Shah policies could not succeed, given the Shah’s lack of internal support and his objections to using massive force at a time he feared he would not live long and thought his young son should not inherit after a bloodbath.*

Roots of Revolution:An Interpretive History of Modern Iran by Nikki Keddie ( 1981, Yale University Press ). Pgs. 253- 254

Jeez, you were doing so well with all the praise and then you muffed it :D.

Well, I’ve gone into my reasons before, so I’ll leave off the details for the nonce. But generally, while Iran has a number of serious problems and presents a number of serious problems, I think ( purely personal opinion based on watching over a period of years ) that it represents a declining threat. Potentially it rivals Turkey as model democratic regime - It has already accumulated considerable experience in that direction, more so IMHO than any other MENA country ( excluuding Turkey and Israel ), the fact that that democracy is currently still strangled by an entrenched theocracratic uppercrust notwithstanding. Intervention, in my view, would more likely serve to disrail this internal progress than help it at this point.

  • Tamerlane

And I might add, based on my one and only visit to Iran in 1985, a very handsome people too. Exceedingly fine features in many of the people.

If ever there is/was a country which ideologically should be the Western World’s pre-eminent ally in the region, logic dictates that Iran should be that country.

I’m curious why you believe Iran would be the best ally for the Western World.

Thanks, I’ve never been called ‘handsome’ before! :wink:

Oh, and thank you, Tamerlane, again for your very informative posts on this topic.

He was just pointing out that you got one of your basic facts wrong. That happens in debates.

Hey, don’t take this to the Pit. And DON’T flame people here, even if there is a war going on.

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by 2Thick *

Iran is a significant long-time spiritual, moral, financial, and military backer of Hezbollah and Hamas, among other terrorist groups. Iran is part of the Axis of Evil, for cryinowlout! But that doesn’t matter to you. You say there are “no Iranian terrorists.” Are you sure you can support such a claim? It’s a pretty blanketed claim of a country of 67 million. And the indisputable evidence of their aid to terrorist organisations doesn’t make such a claim any easier to back. On an individual person level, with only the evidence I have off the top of my head (which does not include an ethnic makeup of the groups listed), I will logically conclude that there probably are Iranian terrorists. Iran is a theocratic nation none too friendly with America; it supports terrorism; it also has a base of 67 million people to draw terrorists from. If Latin America has terrorists (and produce Carlos the Jackal, no less), Ireland has terrorists, the UK has terrorists, Russia under the early Bolsheviks had terrorists, Israel has terrorists (both Palestinian AND Zionists, oh my!), Algeria used terrorism against France to gain independence, even freakin’ Kenya gained its independence through terrorism, and America has terrorists, then with the evidence of Iran stated prior to this sentence we are to conclude logically there must be at least some Iranian terrorists.

The History Channel aired a documentary shortly after 9/11 (but produced earlier that year) on the history of terror.

And why won’t it happen? I’m just curious.

“CITE!?” is the cry of SDMB.