Is it true that the Supreme Court is not bound to respect precedent?

[sweeteviljesus]

Can the Supreme Court reach any conclusion it wants to on any matter or are they bound to respect precedents? Can they reach a decision one day and completely reverse themselves the next? Or, more probably, reach a decision one year and after a few justices are replaced, completely reverse their position a couple of years later?

As a corollary question, what decisions have been totally reversed?

Thanks,
Rob

[Giles]

The short answer is, yes, it’s not bound by precedent. (If it were, then Plessy v. Ferguson would remain a binding precedent).

[sweeteviljesus]

Is Brown a complete reversal of Plessy, or is it more like how Furman compares to Gregg?

Thanks,
Rob

[Polycarp]

There is a great quote in Lois McMaster Bujold’s SF novel Diplomatic Immunity, where the protagonist is an “Imperial Auditor,” a sort of Internal Affairs special prosecutor/investigator fo5r his government. Asked whether he doesn’t have to get a search warrant, he responds, “I don’t ask for search warrants; I issue them.”

Likewise, SCOTUS does not follow precedent, but makes it. In general, they do follow the principle of stare decisis – “let it stand decided” – if necessary, distinguishing the circumstances surrounding a given case from the case raised as precedent. Suppose, for example, that precedent from case X says that a car validly stopped by a patrol on the highway may be searched without a warrant, e.g., when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the operator or a passenger of holding illegal drugs. If a report indicates that a white Camry left the vicinity of where a guitar and amplifier were reported stolen, it does not therefore follow that the officer may search the glove compartment of a white Camry stopped pursuant to that report – since one cannot secrete a guitar and amplifier in a glove compartment, and that was the probable cause for stopping and searching the car. (This is made up by way of example, but parallels an actual set of such cases.)

When, however, they feel that a pervious precedent was improperly decided, they will reverse the holding of the previous case, setting a new precedent.

[Elendil_s_Heir]

Polycarp has it.

A related thread that may be of interest: What if SCOTUS misses a precedent? - Factual Questions - Straight Dope Message Board

[Richard_Parker]

Among the best discussions of precedent and stare decisis is the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921). Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.

Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case, see Burnet v. Coronado Oil Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-411 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ____, ____ (1991) (slip op., at ___) (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e. g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-174 (1989); or whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, e. g., Burnet, supra, at 412 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Read the whole thing for more good examples and further explication.

[Kimmy_Gibbler]

@sweeteviljesus

Is Brown a complete reversal of Plessy, or is it more like how Furman compares to Gregg?

Thanks,
Rob

Well, Lawrence v. Texas was a complete reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick, complete with the observation by the Court that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided.”

[DSYoungEsq]

@sweeteviljesus

Is Brown a complete reversal of Plessy, or is it more like how Furman compares to Gregg?

Thanks,
Rob

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not a “complete reversal” of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The relevant language from Brown:

@Chief Justice Warren

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 11 Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

So, the extent of the holding is that the Court determines that public education cannot be allowed to provide “separate but equal” facilities, which Plessy had allowed in the case of rail transportation.

[Markxxx]

The best example of the Supreme Court overstepping its bound is the Dredd Scott case