Is it wrong to not believe in free will but still believe that evil should be punished?

[epolo]

@begbert2

According to google the definition is “an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities” which suits me fine. All I’m doing is being intelligent while considering what’s doing the choosing, and why they’re choosing what they do.

@Mijin

So OK, the first part concedes determinism for determining the option space. But again, for what reasons would you choose one option over another? Regardless of what kind of universe you live in, surely you will describe such reasons in terms of personal experience / knowledge, and personal characteristics, no?

Ok, taking that definition of “choice”, what do you think is meant by “possibilities”? If everything is predetermined, how can there be more than one “possibility”? Yes, choice can be meaningfully defined even on a constrained option space. But if you take away the second part - that it is not predetermined - then in what sense is it meaningfully “choice”? If you rerun the experiment over and over and each and every time you eat a tomato, then that’s a natural law: Mijin eats tomatoes (in this scenario). Similarly, if we raise a marble above the floor and let it go, it falls down under the influence of gravity. It doesn’t “choose” between falling and floating. (Unless you’re saying that it does, in which case you’ve taken all of the problems of “moronic free will” and stuffed them into “choice”.)

@begbert2

Note how you’re drawing a distinction between “the state of the universe” and the “I” that “[has] the ability to make choices”. This is important! When you talk about an agent that makes choices, you necessarily have to define what that agent is, and draw a distinction between it and the stuff that you don’t consider to be part of the agent.

Can you talk more about this? I agree with what you’re saying here but to me it sounds like a big problem with your concept of compatibilist free will. That is, you’ve failed to define what has this quality of free will. Back to the example of stabbing someone, is the culpable entity the one that includes human+knife and as soon as the knife is put down, it’s a different, non-culpable entity?

@eschereal

No, not really. “I”, the perceptual singularity (“soul”) has not been conclusively established as an agent of effect (or even of affect). The rational brain appears to calculate with little or no direct influence from “I”, which is primarily an observer. “I” is the embodiment of the survival imperative, for which no dynamic function is evident.

And this right here is the problem. (I’m actually not saying it’s wrong per se, just that it’s a problem.) If there is no “I” or “I” is an illusion, then what’s the point of anything? “Cogito ergo sum” but if I am not, then I’m not thinking; things happen and we have no ability to choose or influence because there is no “we”. All that can happen is a description of things that are. There’s no point in holding criminals accountable for their actions because they could not have done otherwise nor can they learn to do better. But neither do we have a choice about whether we imprison them; it happens or it doesn’t. It really makes quite the mockery of the basic point of SDMB and Great Debates.

[eschereal]

@epolo

If there is no “I” or “I” is an illusion, then what’s the point of anything?

Sorry, but where did you read “there is no ‘I’” in that? The fact that “I” is an observer with little or no agency does not discount it existence. And the presence of “I” has an effect, perhaps a non-trivial effect, on the algorithms and processes that go on within the brain machine. The ascription of significant action arising out of “I”, however, is unfounded personal bias.

[begbert2]

@epolo

Can you talk more about this? I agree with what you’re saying here but to me it sounds like a big problem with your concept of compatibilist free will. That is, you’ve failed to define what has this quality of free will. Back to the example of stabbing someone, is the culpable entity the one that includes human+knife and as soon as the knife is put down, it’s a different, non-culpable entity?

Happily! This will answer your question about possibilities too.

As I said, you have to define what you consider the “agent” before you talk about whether that agent has agency. There are different ways to define the agent and you can have reasonable disagreement about it - for example, you can debate whether alcohol in a person’s system counts as part of the person’s will, or whether it’s still an external force. You could even debate whether a person’s own endorphins should be considered external influence. These are debatable positions.

However, this does not mean that just any definition of “the agent” makes sense, and some proposed definitions are clearly just absurdities intended to fallaciously cast doubt on the notion that agents can be defined at all. Like that knife in your hand - unless it’s coated with some sort of skin-absorbent mind-altering chemical or perhaps possessed by a demon or something, it’s clear that claiming that that is part of the agent is absurd. And it’s not a blow against compatiblist free will, it’s a blow against all forms of free will, because you’re literally arguing that people don’t exist as discrete entities. You’re throwing out the baby with the bathwater - you’re literally arguing that the baby is indistinguishable from the bathwater.

It’s clearly dishonest argument and it’s annoying. Stop it.

So anyway, let’s talk about choices and possibilities. Of course there’s not much to say here, since it’s plainly obvious from context that the possibilities are intended to exist in the world not counting the agent’s decision-making engine itself. They’re possibilities in the outside world. Without knowing what the person will choose, it’s entirely possible in the deterministic physical world for a person to exist who would choose the left door, and it’s entirely possible for a person to exist who would choose the right door. There’s nothing in the external physical world that limits either choice.

Because that’s the thing about determinism - it’s not determined because the doors each have pre-programmed motors in them such that the door must open at two pm the day after tomorrow. The door is physically capable of being opened any time somebody chooses to turn the handle. What makes the universe deterministic is because handles are turned for reasons, and the reasons people have for what they do tomorrow will be the result of what happened to them the day before. And in a world without randomity the dominoes will fall in a predictable pattern - not because the sixtieth domino must fall at 2pm, but because it must fall if (and when) it’s pushed.

[Mijin]

@epolo

If you rerun the experiment over and over and each and every time you eat a tomato, then that’s a natural law: Mijin eats tomatoes (in this scenario).

The whole point of me describing the tomato example was to ask you for what reason I eat the tomato under a free will model. You clearly read that question, so what are your thoughts? If not defined by experience and predilection, then what else?

<----------------->

I’m going to try a slightly extreme example, bear with me because I’ll bring it back to earth in a subsequent post.

Let’s say the universe is non-deterministic, there are souls, with free will, and even a god.
When you die, God scolds you for not curing all human disease using the magic beans he left on Alpha Centauri II. A phasewarp drive would have got you there in minutes.
I’m sure your defense to such a scolding would be that you didn’t know of the existence of such beans, and even if you did, you do not possess the requisite genius to figure out how to construct a phasewarp drive in one lifetime.

So, even in this example with spooky free will, the reason for your action (or in this case, inaction) has once again come down to past experience, and personal qualities.

And, would you agree that it was “predetermined” that you would not cure all disease? I mean that was pretty clear from the setup of that universe, even though it is non-deterministic.

As I say, it’s an extreme example, but let’s get agreement on this one first.

[epolo]

@begbert2

As I said, you have to define what you consider the “agent” before you talk about whether that agent has agency. There are different ways to define the agent and you can have reasonable disagreement about it - for example, you can debate whether alcohol in a person’s system counts as part of the person’s will, or whether it’s still an external force. You could even debate whether a person’s own endorphins should be considered external influence. These are debatable positions.

Well, they’re debatable if there exist agents to debate them…
But seriously, if all those things are (debatably) external, what is internal?

@begbert2

However, this does not mean that just any definition of “the agent” makes sense, and some proposed definitions are clearly just absurdities intended to fallaciously cast doubt on the notion that agents can be defined at all. Like that knife in your hand - unless it’s coated with some sort of skin-absorbent mind-altering chemical or perhaps possessed by a demon or something, it’s clear that claiming that that is part of the agent is absurd. And it’s not a blow against compatiblist free will, it’s a blow against all forms of free will, because you’re literally arguing that people don’t exist as discrete entities. You’re throwing out the baby with the bathwater - you’re literally arguing that the baby is indistinguishable from the bathwater.

It’s clearly dishonest argument and it’s annoying. Stop it.

That’s pretty hostile considering I asked you to elaborate. I’m genuinely interested in understanding your position. But it really doesn’t make any sense to me. I define the baby as separate from the bathwater because the baby has free will and the bathwater doesn’t. If you can’t assign clear agency to one part of the baby-bathwater system, then there is no physical reason to put the dividing line here or there.

@begbert2

So anyway, let’s talk about choices and possibilities. Of course there’s not much to say here, since it’s plainly obvious from context that the possibilities are intended to exist in the world not counting the agent’s decision-making engine itself. They’re possibilities in the outside world. Without knowing what the person will choose, it’s entirely possible in the deterministic physical world for a person to exist who would choose the left door, and it’s entirely possible for a person to exist who would choose the right door. There’s nothing in the external physical world that limits either choice.

Umm… Your definition is tautological. Possibilities exist because possibilities exist.
Let’s try this: Think of a person as a three dimensional solid, extended through the fourth dimension of time. If we could stand outside and observe this entity, we would see every place it has ever been or will go from birth to death, like a worm coiled on the surface of the Earth. With this perspective, we can clearly see that it does not exercise “choice”. It merely fits into the physical space-time where it exists. If there is spot where the worm bends left, we can with careful examination identify the physical forces that precluded it from bending right. There is no possibility that it could have bent to the right without breaking the laws of physics. In what way does this not describe your deterministic universe?

@begbert2

Because that’s the thing about determinism - it’s not determined because the doors each have pre-programmed motors in them such that the door must open at two pm the day after tomorrow. The door is physically capable of being opened any time somebody chooses to turn the handle. What makes the universe deterministic is because handles are turned for reasons, and the reasons people have for what they do tomorrow will be the result of what happened to them the day before. And in a world without randomity the dominoes will fall in a predictable pattern - not because the sixtieth domino must fall at 2pm, but because it must fall if (and when) it’s pushed.

Well, that’s definitely…a string of (mostly) English words. Don’t feel bad though; you didn’t have any choice but to post it.

[epolo]

@Mijin

The whole point of me describing the tomato example was to ask you for what reason I eat the tomato under a free will model. You clearly read that question, so what are your thoughts? If not defined by experience and predilection, then what else?

<----------------->

I’m going to try a slightly extreme example, bear with me because I’ll bring it back to earth in a subsequent post.

Let’s say the universe is non-deterministic, there are souls, with free will, and even a god.
When you die, God scolds you for not curing all human disease using the magic beans he left on Alpha Centauri II. A phasewarp drive would have got you there in minutes.
I’m sure your defense to such a scolding would be that you didn’t know of the existence of such beans, and even if you did, you do not possess the requisite genius to figure out how to construct a phasewarp drive in one lifetime.

So, even in this example with spooky free will, the reason for your action (or in this case, inaction) has once again come down to past experience, and personal qualities.

And, would you agree that it was “predetermined” that you would not cure all disease? I mean that was pretty clear from the setup of that universe, even though it is non-deterministic.

As I say, it’s an extreme example, but let’s get agreement on this one first.

First question first: Experience, predilection, and free will. Yes, I’m defining it axiomatically (as I think I implied if not stated outright earlier). I would describe free will as the subjective experience of being an agent able to make choices. I fully recognize that free will is not provable (or possibly even rigorously definable) from physical first principles. However, my philosophy of life (and as far as I can tell all philosophy altogether) not to mention my ability to choose to get out of bed and get dressed in the morning collapses without it. If it’s an illusion, then it’s one we seem to require. All of the debate on this forum rests on the idea that we are agents open to deciding what we do next (while possibly influenced by external inputs). Otherwise, why bother?

Second question second… You’ve stuffed a lot in here. In my understanding of G-d as a liberal Reform Jew, that entity would never scold me for not accomplishing something impossible. This is extensively covered each year in the Yom Kippur liturgy. “When we go to our final judgement G-d will not ask you ‘Why were you not as great as Moses’ but ‘Why were you not fully yourself’”

@Zusha

The story is told of Zusha, the great Chassidic master, who lay crying on his deathbed. His students asked him, “Rebbe, why are you so sad? After all the mitzvahs and good deeds you have done, you will surely get a great reward in heaven!”

“I’m afraid!” said Zusha. “Because when I get to heaven, I know God’s not going to ask me ‘Why weren’t you more like Moses?’ or ‘Why weren’t you more like King David?’ But I’m afraid that God will ask ‘Zusha, why weren’t you more like Zusha?’ And then what will I say?!”

If G-d were asking me about some magic beans, I would have to assume that there were some clues laid out for me that I should have been following and that I missed them through some failure to be fully myself, as G-d created me and intended me to be. I would probably ask where I went wrong and hope to learn. So, I would have to say, in your hypothetical it was not at all predetermined that I would fail to cure all disease. In fact quite the opposite!

[Mijin]

@epolo

Yes, I’m defining it axiomatically (as I think I implied if not stated outright earlier). I would describe free will as the subjective experience of being an agent able to make choices

In terms of the subjective experience of making choices, yeah, I experience making choices within a deterministic universe. *I* decide what to do next based on my past experiences and predilections.
It’s not an illusion.

In terms of your definition, I don’t think you have defined free will, and that’s the point.
When it comes to many phenomena, it’s acceptable to say we don’t know exactly what the phenomenon is e.g. dark matter. But that’s because we have evidence it exists; the model has explanatory power, even if the set of unknowns right now is vast.
But in terms of your notion of free will, what is it trying to explain that we cannot already? What details are there in fact, of any kind whatsoever? We can’t even define what it is, let alone how this makes sense in terms of what we understand of neuroscience. It’s more “vitalism” than “dark matter”.

@epolo

my ability to choose to get out of bed and get dressed in the morning collapses without it.

When you get out of bed, can I ask you the reason you decided to do that? And if so, is your reasoning going to be only in terms of past experience and personal qualities?
There’s no getting away from that, no other way reasoning can possibly work.

@epolo

In my understanding of G-d as a liberal Reform Jew, that entity would never scold me for not accomplishing something impossible.
[…]
If G-d were asking me about some magic beans, I would have to assume that there were some clues laid out for me

All this is completely fighting the hypothetical. I think you understand the point that was being made here.
But Ok, fine, not your God, some other God scolds you in this way. So your answers to the questions…?

[begbert2]

@epolo

Well, they’re debatable if there exist agents to debate them…
But seriously, if all those things are (debatably) external, what is internal?

The alcohol and the endorphins are internal. (I said they were debatable. I didn’t say which side of the debate I’m on.)

I’m finding it very tiring that you’re trying to selectively undefine terms in this discussion. But sure, let’s get absurdly philosophical. Defining things is actually hard. Not hard enough for people to actually think that knives and bathwater are a part of humans - that’s bullshit. But it is indeed hard to definitely nail down exactly what parts of a human are operating as part of their cognitive processing system at any given time. And it’s debatable where the line between sensor and carrier is - are your nerves part of your brain, or are they merely the wires carrying information to your brain? Where does your thought actually reside?

Now personally, I don’t have a nobel prize in neurobiology, so I’m not really qualified to tell you exactly which specific chemicals and cells in your body are participating in your thought processes, memory processing, and the evaluation and reaction that sustains your emotions. I am qualified to tell you that the knife in your hand isn’t doing the thinking for you, though, because that’s dumb.

@epolo

That’s pretty hostile considering I asked you to elaborate. I’m genuinely interested in understanding your position. But it really doesn’t make any sense to me. I define the baby as separate from the bathwater because the baby has free will and the bathwater doesn’t. If you can’t assign clear agency to one part of the baby-bathwater system, then there is no physical reason to put the dividing line here or there.

There is not a chance in hell that you identify was a baby is by the fact it has free will. Don’t give me that crap. You identify a baby by the fact you’ve seen pictures of babies and were taught what “baby” means in your youth.

Also, what makes you think babies have “free will” and bathwater doesn’t? You’re using the libertarian definition of “free will”, right? The one that just means “it’s not predictable”? Well, you ever predicted bathwater? No? Didn’t think so. Guess it has free will too. Also, does a baby’s leg have free will? Yes? No? How come? (Go ahead, say it’s souls, and that a baby’s leg has a soul. Go for it. It’ll be fun.)

@epolo

Umm… Your definition is tautological. Possibilities exist because possibilities exist.

Possibilities exist because the universe is a causal system. Any individual section of a causal system can have its behavior influenced by effects of things outside the system impacting the system. This is not hard.

@epolo

Let’s try this:

I’d rather you tried to understand what the word “choice” means. And seriously, you just said that because we can look at your past and observe that you traced a fixed and unchanging path through history, that we can “clearly see” that you did not exercise “choice” at any point in your past. That’s your argument - that if the path one goes through time on is fixed to a single path then “clearly” no choice occurred. And that’s a perfect description of your own history.

If you think that it’s possible that you made choices at some point in the past, then clearly your understanding of what the word “choice” means needs work.

@epolo

Well, that’s definitely…a string of (mostly) English words. Don’t feel bad though; you didn’t have any choice but to post it.

So what I’m getting from this is that you understand exactly what I said, and know that it’s right, and because you feel you can’t concede that I’m right about anything you feel your only choice is to pretend that you’re too stupid to understand it. Which you’re not.

[eschereal]

@begbert2

The alcohol and the endorphins are internal. (I said they were debatable. I didn’t say which side of the debate I’m on.)

Yeah, I disagree. From the perspective of an observer, they are internal and perhaps unobservable, but from the solipsistic view, because substances like oxytocin, adrenalin, beta-endorphin and the like are not produced voluntarily (otherwise most of us would be pumping out the good stuff with wild abandon), they are external to the brain’s function. The biochemical effects (emotions) are one of the reasons that “free will” is inferred, because the chemistry of any given creature is merely similar to any other, not identical, accounting for the small fraction of behavior that is difficult to predict.

[begbert2]

Substances like oxytocin, adrenalin, beta-endorphin would serve the same function as the neurons and the like - mechanistic cogs in the cognition machine. The machine makes choices, but it doesn’t make choices about which cogs are moved in the process of making the choice. Or to put it back in terms of neurobiology, neurons fire while thinking, feeling, and making choices, but nobody is consciously choosing which neurons to fire. So too with the brain chemicals you refer to.

[epolo]

You keep claiming that everything you’re saying is intuitively obvious (and anyone who disagrees with you is dishonest). Aside from the wisdom or appropriateness of arguing that way, my position is that it is intuitively obvious that I have free will. I am choosing to reply to you (even if I am increasingly dubious of the value of doing so). All my senses tell me that this is how the world works. I have the subjective experience of being a free agent. I suspect you do to, but I would never claim to speak for you. Your position is trying to convince me to disbelieve my senses and dispose of any notion that I exist in a meaningful way. I’m sorry, but handwaving and angry mutterings about how obvious it is don’t cut it.

[Mijin]

Nobody doubts the subjective feeling.
The important point here is that the subjective experience is of making a choice (which you do). The feeling though, does not inform you about whether you are in any sense causally disconnected from the physical universe.

That’s the claim you’re making, and how does your feeling make you come to that conclusion?
And what would a causally disconnected decision be?

[epolo]

The subjective feeling is that I am able to freely choose from a space of available options and that my choice is not completely determined by the circumstances at the time I make the choice and that further the “x-factor” that allows me to choose isn’t just a random number generator, it is the essential nature of “me”.

[begbert2]

I believe you’re a free agent. I just think there’s a mechanism for it that doesn’t involve magic. Or put another way, I believe that there’s a version of free will that’s actually possible, since all the arguments against libertarian free will in the material world are equally applicable to every possible spiritual or magical world - there still has to be an answer for “how does it work?”

The position supporting libertarian free will is a childish fantasy supported by arguments no stronger than “It happens because I say so”. It’s undeveloped and incoherent, and actively fights everything we know about how the world works and how decisions are actually made in our subjective experience. Compatiblist free will, which I believe in and am arguing for, works with reality, and also with our existing usage of terms and personal experience.

[Thudlow_Boink]

@begbert2

I believe you’re a free agent. I just think there’s a mechanism for it that doesn’t involve magic. Or put another way, I believe that there’s a version of free will that’s actually possible , since all the arguments against libertarian free will in the material world are equally applicable to every possible spiritual or magical world - there still has to be an answer for “how does it work?”

The position supporting libertarian free will is a childish fantasy supported by arguments no stronger than “It happens because I say so”.

I wouldn’t know how to argue for libertarian free will, at least not without appealing to philosophical and/or religious positions that you wouldn’t agree with. But I’m not sold by your argument against it. I’m seeing what may be Argument From Ignorance (we don’t know how this could possibly work, therefore it can’t) and/or Begging The Question (in insisting on a mechanism for free will, aren’t you insisting that it be mechanical, i.e. determined by something else?).

I also don’t know what practical difference it would make. How would one position look different from the other in the way we live our lives?

[epolo]

Don’t forget the ad hominems.

[Mijin]

Sure, and if free will was something that demonstrably existed, then saying we don’t know the mechanism would be fine. Maybe the boffins will figure out one day how we have free will.

But that’s not the situation. The situation right now is that no-one is even claiming any explanatory power by positing that free will exists above what we understand of the brain from neuroscience. So there’s no demonstration it exists. And heck, it’s not even defined.

It’s a non-solution to a problem that doesn’t exist.

So why do people even believe in it?

Well, partly it’s historical; it possibly made intuitive sense to imagine decisions apparently coming from nowhere when the entire brain just seemed like a black box.
Partly it’s psychological. For some, conceiving of our ideas being causally connected to the universe makes them draw fatalistic conclusions. As we have seen in this thread. They erroneously imagine that determinism means that our decisions are pre-baked with our conscious thoughts being merely a passenger.

And partly, as I suggested previously, it’s for theology. It’s really important that God is not culpable for evil, and playing the “free will” card – because it is so ill-defined – is a useful tool for this.

[begbert2]

@Thudlow_Boink

I wouldn’t know how to argue for libertarian free will, at least not without appealing to philosophical and/or religious positions that you wouldn’t agree with. But I’m not sold by your argument against it. I’m seeing what may be Argument From Ignorance (we don’t know how this could possibly work, therefore it can’t) and/or Begging The Question (in insisting on a mechanism for free will, aren’t you insisting that it be mechanical, i.e. determined by something else?).

My objection is more basic than that - libertarian free will is, as best I can tell, completely undefined. It’s literally a term without meaning, or at least without any meaning that can possibly describe anything real.

It seems that the current definition of it is “I feel like I’m making free choices, but I’m claiming that that is happening for methods that are neither deterministic or random. And I refuse to so much as speculate as to the mechanism of it because every method I can conceive of is either deterministic or random.”

Essentially it is people pulling nonsense out of thin air, and claiming that it is neither A or Not A. They’re trying to pull an excluded middle on something with no middle. They’re trying to pull a god-of-the-gaps where there’s no gap, and the method they’re using to do this is to refuse to define their terms clearly enough that one could point and their definition and point out that it is self-contradictory or impossible.

@Thudlow_Boink

I also don’t know what practical difference it would make. How would one position look different from the other in the way we live our lives?

Well, if you’re a theist, your position will be to freak the hell out over the notion that you don’t have a supernatural soul. Not that a deterministic system needs to exclude souls, but they’re typically described as entirely material.

And if you’re operating at a freshman-philosophy-major level of understanding of the situation you might have a hard time grokking that a person can have the ability to make free choices and still be entirely predictable. This isn’t entirely their fault - I’d say about half the philosophers who considered this subject to be stupid and/or entirely willing to bullshit, and this has poisoned the well of discussion pretty hard. The realization that future time is just past time that hasn’t happened yet, and free choices in the past and future are both part of an ongoing chain of events with specific caused outcomes (presuming that randomity isn’t significantly influential) is sort of tricky. Persons who fail to realize this will feel like they have no free will.

But yeah, to people who fully grok compatiblist free will, the end result is that everything goes on like it always has - because people have been functionally deterministic the whole time since forever.

[Saint_Cad]

@begbert2

My objection is more basic than that - libertarian free will is, as best I can tell, completely undefined .

I looked it up in wikipedia (I’ve never heard of it before) and read this.

that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe.

Considering through quantum mechanics we don’t have a deterministic universe, doesn’t that invalidate the premise of libertarianism?

[begbert2]

The reason that libertarian free will isn’t compatible with a deterministic universe is because it relies on magical unicorn farts that are not present in a deterministic universe.

It also doesn’t work in a universe that has only deterministic physics and random physics (in some combination). The problem isn’t that non-determinism is present; the problem is that non-determinism is always (by definition) just randomity, and randomity isn’t magical unicorn farts.