Its tough to speak to generalities so let me pose a specific scenario:
Say for example, as a pacifist, you were a passenger on one of the hijacked planes on its way to the WTC. Now say one of the hijackers drops a pistol by you and doesn’t realize it (I know these guys didn’t have guns, but lets just say one did). Would you use the pistol to kill the hijackers or damage the plane so it crashes? Do nothing? Pass the buck to another passenger? How would this situation reconcile with a pacifist philosophy?
My opinion is that if it is immoral to allow thousands to die because your beliefs prevent you from taking actions that could prevent it. Like it or not, your actions or inactions have an effect on other people.
Well, it seems to me that morality or ethics concern how one relates to other people. At least, that’s how I conceive of them. (This would even be true of theistic ethics, which would include how one relates to God, a “person” in the sense of being a moral actor.) So I don’t really see how one can escape consequentialism in ethics. Of course, there’s the whole “hypocrisy” factor–how do you evaluate someone who, his entire life, thinks wicked evil dirty thoughts, but, solely out of fear of social consequences, acts like a decent person? How do you evaluate someone who, out of purely noble motives–a desire to bring about a world of universal peace and justice and brotherhood–does horrible things? To which I can only say
a) I am not a telepath.
and
b) Just about everyone seems to think their motives are good.
My question was straightforward and specific. Your hypothetical does little to illuminate the issue. At what point does a pacifist (or any person) become morally responsible for the free choices of other human beings?
That’s very black and white (once you get past the limitations of human knowledge, of course). What if you knew that killing the President would prevent the next terrorist attack. Are you morally obligated to become an assassin?
MEBuckner
Not to be too blithe, but by not including it. The core of a consequentialist philosophy is that all actions must be judged by their outcomes. This is by no means the only possible form of ethical evaluation. Some common historical examples are: ethical value is determined by comparison with an established code of conduct, ethical value is determined by the intent of the actor, ethical value is determined by extension of a specific act to a general principal and then applying consequential evaluation, ethical value is determined by benefit to the active party, etc.
Most of the posts I have seen so far (including msmith537’s proposed hypothetical) rely on a strict consequentialist evaluation. It’s bad because then the nazis/terrorist/spoonbenders would continue/succeed/begin doing something bad.
Your cases (a) and (b) are simply facets of “ethical value determined by the intent of the actor”. You are not alone in dismissing these on practical grounds. However, consequentialism is also subject to attack on practical grounds since human knowledge and frames of reference are inherently and inescapably limited.
No moral stain, to be sure. But I would heartily comment that consequentialism should be a factor in deciding exactly how well a moral system holds up. This is the oh-so-common tactic used, in fact, to comment on why a particular moral system fails. People will posit hypothetical situations and then evaluate them inside the moral perspective to seek a moral evaluation of what action a person should take.
In our specific case the scenario is only a very thin hypothetical; in fact, I think the assumptions are rather reasonable and sound. We hypothesize that the terrorists will continue to attempt to eradicate us regardless of our actions (except for mass suicide, of course, as there’d then be nothing to eradicate :)).
We can also somewhat safely assume (or simply hypothesize) that there is no particular person who is somehow immune from a terrorist action.
Now we find a person that holds that violence is immoral.
As things are, the person is basically just playing an extended form of russian roulette. Now we hypothesize that the person is actively attempting to stop others from using violence.
We assume that they are doing this in an attempt to make the world they live in a more moral place in their view. Should they become successful in any way they extend the game of russian roulette.
Though their action at every step is moral in their eyes, they are asking people to gamble their life away.
NOW, we ask this same pacifist if they would play russian roulette for real.
The consistent pacifist should be happy to do so, in this bizarre hypothetical, because they are really just advocating the game anyway (by the above assumptions). If they don’t, then they are inconsistent.
This gets very complicated, especially as we begin to twine logic and morality around each other.
If we take the actual example of the one flight that was thwarted by passengers what kinds of moral and logical decisions did they make?
They knew that other hijacked airliners had been flown into buildings killing thousands. They knew that an attempt to prevent possible thousands of more deaths by taking control of the aircraft would require violence and almost certainly result in their deaths as they struggled in the cockpit.
Logically, they made the correct choice. It is almost certain that their deaths prevented the deaths of many more people. It was likely that at the point that they decided to resist, to not resist would have resulted in their deaths anyway.
Morally… well morality is a bit more subjective. Would it have been moral to do nothing? After all, a passenger on the flight that did nothing is not responsible for the actions of others. But they are responsible for their own actions.
If one sees a child sitting in the street as a car approaches, would it not be immoral to take no action to warn the oncoming car or remove the child from danger if one had plenty of time to safely do so? We would condemn as heinous anyone that idly watched as a child was run over. From the point of view that the pacifist is not responsible for the actions of others, is there really a moral imparative to do anything? This would be an easy moral test for any pacifist though, as the action that is morally required would not require a break in their beliefs.
In the case of the hijacked airliner, inaction is far more understandable as death for all aboard was fairly imminent. This is why the people who took action aboard this flight are rightly called heroes. We cannot really blame folks who would have taken no action in this case because of the sheer terror of it all.
But let’s say there was a pacifist on board who was fully in control of all emotion and thus able to act rationally in any manner he chose. What action should he have taken? I guess the answer partially depends on what kind of pacifist is this person? Is he such an extreme pacifist that he would attempt to thwart the violence of any side with interference? Is he the type that believed so fully in the idea that he is not responsible for the actions of others and so would sit idely by? Or is he an active pacifist who, as I’ve described in early threads, would seek an active non violent method of thwarting evil?
Now we venture into pure Blackclaw opinion in which I will understand perfectly if you disagree with my conclusions. In fact, please feel free, I’m open to ideas here.
An extreme pacifist who would thwart even the attempts of the passengers to revolt would not be moral if his actions prevented the other passengers from thwarting the hijackers. His actions would have let evil win and resulted in the deaths of many more people.
An idle pacifist who did nothing would not have violated his beliefs, but also done nothing to prevent evil. True, he is not responsible for the actions of others, but would he not have been morally required to save the child in the street even though the situation arose through the actions of others (child wanders into street, driver drives down street)? Are his beliefs really worth having? Are they moral?
For the active pacifist the child in the road scenario is easy. No violation for his belief system, so an easy decision to take action and save the child. But what if the child was being attacked by someone? Is he morally obligated to put his life in danger? Is he morally obligated to take action? In this case he could still hold to his beliefs by blocking the child from the man and thus giving the child time to flee. But would the pacifist then bear some responsibilty when that attacker struck again? No? Pacifist not responsible for attacker’s actions? But what if he could have stopped him the first time? Does he not have some responsibilty to do so? So I don’t know. Is the pacifist morally obligated to stop the terrorists or not? Especially in this horrible case when there really isn’t a nonviolent solution?
Blackclaw slips into pyscho mode
A part of me can admire holding onto a belief system that’s basic tenent is not to harm others, another part of me wonders why all violence is equated to being morally bad. Why should I care about the well being of someone who is basically evil? If I beat the living snot out of someone who is beating the sister of a close friend should I feel guilty? Life is precious? Sacred? Frankly the earth is infested with life and some of the human kind is particularly vile. If I had had the opportunity to turn Pol Pot into a slushy red goo before he got the killing fields of Cambodia in full swing is there any reason I should have even hesitated?
Blackclaw slips out of pyscho mode
I’ve, unfortunately, had the opportunity to engage in violence a few times. Having trained in the martial arts, I know how to do it. But in each case, once the violence became directed at me and not others, I held back. There is inside of me a definite desire not to harm others.
I don’t know if this wonderful excerpt from Gandhi’s writings* has been reproduced on the Straight Dope recently, but it’s timely given his 132d birthday today.
He may need help blowing out the candles.
*from an article in the Indian newspaper Harijan, cited in Len Deighton’s Blood, Tears and Folly.
If you personally would rather die than use force to protect yourself, there;s nothing wrong with that.
If you think you have an effective nonviolent way to incapacitate Bin Laden’s organization, that’s good - just don’t expect our troops to lay down their arms before you have proven that your plan will work.
IMO, pacifism only becomes immoral(or at least arrogant) when you demand that we let the terrorists have their way with us because you think it’s better than using violence.
Believe whatever you want. Just don’t act as though your beliefs are right for everybody.
Well, your scenario was not pertinent to my question. Since you have answered my question (albeit with, “Don’t know”) I will respond to your hypothetical.
Spiritus Pacifist would take the gun and attempt to find a tactical solution to the problem of how to prevent the terrorists from crashing the plane into a population center that did not require him to violate his deeply held moral belief.
Unstated assumptions that I judge to be a part of your scenario:
[ul][[li]I have reliable knowledge that the terrorists plan such an attrocity.[/li][li]I have already attempted to disuade the terrorists and been unsuccessful.[/li][li]I have reliable knowledge that the terrorists have secure control of the plane and are unshakeable in their determination to crash and burn.[/ul][/li]Possible tactical scenarios:
[ul][li]Use the gun to threaten hijackers–gain access to cockpit. Fire into controls.[/li][li]Take several deep breaths, shoot out window, gain access to cockpit during decompression/confusion.[/li][li]Stand, exort passengers to place themselves between hijackers and oxygen masks, shoot out window(s)[/ul][/li]Without a more detailed hypothetical, I can’t really say more. It is possible that none of these courses would seem likely to succeed, but another scenario would present itself.
Cop out much? I gave you the information for this scenario, as you gave information for yours. Assume that you will have access to the Predsident and means to end his life (You find this more absurd than having a member of a terrorist group that is using knives to hijack a plane unknowingly drop a loaded gun at my feet?)
The details of the scenario are, in this case, unimportant. Would you assassinate one or more innocent people to save thousands of lives? You have claimed that to not do so would be immoral. I am trying to determine how secure you are in that conviction.
erl
There seems to be a missing link in your chain
[/list][li]consequentialism is a common means of evaluating moral hypotheticals[/li][li]Therefore consequentialism is a necessary part of every moral evaluation.[/list][/li]
Dissents from your conclusion might be found in:
[li]Kant’s categorical imperative.[/li][li]The morality based on belief in an afterlife where spiritual values are judged and material benefits are irrelevant (or even detrimental)[/li][li]A Buddhist morality in which material concerns are viewed as irrelevant (or even detrimental distractions)[/li][li]A morality based upon an incontrovertible code of conduct.[/li][li]etc[/li][/list]
I don’t think that is a reasonable assumption at all. I see no reason, for instance, to think that the terrorists would continue their campaign if the United States immediately withdrew all troops from the Middle East, ended all support for Israel, adopted Islam as the official state religion, and replaced our representative government with a ruling council of Muslim clerics. I think it is even reasonable to suppose that any number of (relatively) less drastic measures might also convince these particular terrorists to cease their attacks (BTW–I disagree that the purpose of those attacks is not to eradicate all Americans.)
As a purely theoretical question, sure. Practically there are cost/benefit factors that explain, for instance, why Salman Rushdie is still alive.
No more so than any other person, for so long as the terrorists wage their campaign.
Okay, but we are now dealing with a special case, not with a “generic pacifist”.
No. The risk of violence is not “extended” because more people choose to eschew violence. The potential consequences to those pacifists is increased, as is the burden upon those who decide for themselves to protect the pacifists from violence.
And, since we are talking in hypotheticals, if the pacifist is successful in extending his ethos to any members of the terrorists, the threat of violence from that particular source is significantly decreased.
People are always gambling their lives. Pacifists make a conscious decision to accept a potentially greater personal cost in association with a particular set of risks. When a pacifist attempts to “convert” someone to their view, they do ask that person to accept that potentially greater cost. So do military recruiters, though the reasons for the increased risk are different.
Why? Does accepting a greater risk/potential cost in one area of life obligate someone to accept any risk you might devise? You and I both drink beer, which means we knowingly accept a greater risk for accidental injury/death and certain liver diseases. Are we both also required to play Russian roulette in order to be “consistent”?
That your conclusions don’t follow from your premises.
And I don’t necessarily agree with your premises either.
Blackclaw 1) Why do you assume that an extreme pacifist would attempt to thwart an effort by other passengers to answer the violence initiated by the terrorists? Could he not also choose to thwart any attempt by the terrorists to respond with violence of their own?
2) Since you understand that the"child in the street" hypothetical fails to address the central issue (is a pacifist morally obligated to violate his beliefs in an effort to save lives) why do you keep returning to it? It doesn’t really illuminate anything. It simply establishes a moral obligation to act to prevent harm to another when no conflicting moral element exists. Heck, if we’re going to be hypothetical, be hypothetical. What if the pacifist had time-travelled to Germany in 1900 and the child were Hitler? What if he only had a reasonable certainty that the child would grow up to be Der Fuhrer?
3) The question of moral obligation to place one’s life at risk to protect another from harm is more interesting. I know of no consequentialist justification for valuing your life over mine, in the general sense. If I have no certainty of preventing your death, even if I do sacrifice my life, am I still morally obligated to make teh effort? For myself, the question is unanswerable in teh general case, since I haven’t enough moral elements to form a judgement. I have seen a lot of arguments in this thread, though, that derive a moral value from nothing other than the number of lives lost/saved, so I would be interested in seeing what those folks had to say. What if potential trade was 2 to 1 (two young kids being attacked by a knife wielding maniac, me with nothing but my old boots and an attitude problem?)
4) Why is all violence considered evil (for some pacifists)? Why is killing considered evil for some folks? You, apparently, find only some killing to be evil. Me too. What I find interesting, though, is how often people who do not find all killing to be evil nevertheless call up incidences of mass killings when searching for examples of extreme evil. If it isn’t the killing itself that is evil, why is it always teh killing that gets pointed to rather than the element that is evil.
I think it is simply a convenient shortcut, but I am afraid that too many meaningful distinctions get lost in the hurry. Discussing morality in a relative context is challenging enough without drowning significant details under large pools of bloody hypotheticals…
Well, I have a real problem with the word “demand” in that sentence. I also have a problem with the phrase “let the terrorists have their way with us”. I don’t know anyone who practices or espouses such a mode of pacifism. Non-violent resistance is not “no resistance”, though the short-term results are sometimes identical. The same, BTW, can also be said of violent resistance. Your willingness to fight is no guarantee that your fight will be effective.
I hope you will not be offended, but I am going to use a rewording of your OP to discuss a problem that I have with purely consequentialist moral evaluations: pacifism becomes immoral when a pacifist refuses to support violent actions against shared enemies
That point seems to underlie many of the arguments in this thread, and as near as I can tell it relies wholly and unequivocally upon respective predictions for the outcomes of violent and non-violent responses. Non-violent responses are judged to universally result in more deaths. Vilent responses are judged to at least have a potential to result in fewer deaths (nobody has raised the issue of whether violent responses might in fact result in more deaths). Now, as has been mentioned before, human beings are limited in our ability to redict the consequences of our actions. thus, the consequentialist argument that “X is immoral” is reducible to nothing more than “I disagree with you about the potential forseeable results of X”. Now, I am quite comfortable telling somebody they are a fool if they disagree with my probability models for a scenario. I am far less comfortable telling somebody they are evil if they disagree with my probability models.
This issue become even more pronounced when we realize that any “measurement point” for our evaluation is essentially arbitrary. Do we evaluate the consequences over the next 5 seconds, an hour, 20 years, 3 centuries? Take the “child Hitler” example above. If we examine only the moment, then it seems we should save the child. If we examine the life of Hitler, it seems we should let the child die. this is a simplistic example, in which requisite knowledged is presumed or absent, but in the real world it is all nothing more than expected probabilities.
Mostly cause I have no idea how an “extreme” pacifist might act. There might exist those individuals who would try to stop violence by either side.
Because it illustrates that it is not possible to be moral without taking action as the result of the actions of others. I wanted to find a way to address the arguement that a pacifist is not responsible for the actions of others. While this is true, the actions of others might still morally obligate the pacifist to act. If a pacifist has the opportunity to prevent the murder of others by taking action, even if the required action is violent, is the pacifist still morally required to act?
Child in street scenario - Pacifist must act
Aggressor attacking Child - Pacifist must act?
In neither scenario is the pacifist responsible for the situation, but his or her action or inaction bears a direct result on its aftermath. If violence is the only way to save the child in the second scenario, why is the pacifist any less obligated to to act in the second scenario than in the first?
At least that was the question in my head as I rambled through my previous post. But then the question of “Is anyone ever morally obligated to risk their life?” In the car scenario there might be time enough to save the child without any significant risk. But there is no a scenario where violence is involved that does not include risk. So maybe the Pacifist in the attacker scenario isn’t morally obligated to get involved if one isn’t morally obligated to endanger oneself for others.
But then we come to the case of the hijacked airliner. They are all going to die anyway, the only thing left to decide is if they are going to violently struggle with the hijackers in order to save more lives.
It seems to me that an absolute of anything will eventually prove untenable by the curves that reality can throw at us. A pacifist view of “I will never use violence no matter what” isn’t one that can survive all possible situations whereas a pacifist view of “I will only use violence in an extreme instance where it would save my life or the life of others” is far more durable. And it helps explain the existence of the Quaker I know who has a 2nd degree blackbelt.
Too hypothetical for me, the Pacifist could simply kidnap the child to Sweden.
In a way that is my question. I don’t think one is morally required to sacrifice oneself for another but what about risking oneself? Do numbers matter?
True, but it’s hard to discuss it without hypotheticals. Even when we take real life cases, our “what ifs” quickly change the situation to theories of possibilities that we are not even sure existed. But without a situation to discuss, it is hard for many of us to gauge the practical outcome.
Well my good Spiritus, my attempt was definitely half-hearted. Didn’t want to leave you hanging without something to chew up.
Frankly, I would need to talk to a particular pacifist to see why they hold the beliefs they do. If they do, in fact, accept some manner of consequentialism then they are more than likely hypocrites (it seems to me); but as always, I would need to talk to the person in question. What is it, exactly, about violence that makes them hold its use as immoral?
I cannot get my mind around pacifism for the reason you mention. I feel that my life has inherent worth (as always, implicit to me qualifier ;)), and so anything that acts against my life is something I should actively attempt to stop in the most efficient as well as practical means necessary.
I find that in many cases, the peace process is neither practical nor efficient to solve whatever problem would face me or my country. In this, peace is simply not a viable option. If that involves a bully in school, a hostile driver behind me, or supporting my nation’s desire to eradicate terrorism with extreme prejudice then I am satisfied.
I feel that any person which does not evaluate moral actions with a consequentialist underpining is denying several areas of reality or is denying tenets of equality of mankind (Hume’s point that causality is only perceived, not necessarily true notwithstanding). I feel that pacifiststic actions create a scenario which promotes and rewards people who would intiate violence.
Spiritus, I’d be happy to do some research if you think the Ghandi topic merits further discussion or its own thread. Admittedly, I’m going mostly from memory, and reacting more to the “sainthood” conferred on him by people who so often refuse to acknowledge his complexity than to his philosophy. Otherwise, it’s fairly academic–I just feel, in response to ChasE.'s challenge that of Jesus, Buddha and Ghandi, Ghandi was the least pacifist of the three.
And as such, actually works against the tenets they espouse in the first place.
The “cycle of violence” is not a myth to me, but neither does it exist in a vacuum. Surely violence must be initiated at some point. Pure pacifism definately rewards someone who would initiate the violence.
I find similar comments apply to me, at times. I advocate strict Libertarianism and strict anarchy (depending on the conversation) and frown upon initiated force. The first two societies in many ways require that all or practically all citizens agree on some core moral beliefs for them to function efficiently. Many people consider that “human nature” requires that there will always be a somewhat significant portion of the population which would seek to initiate force in an attempt to further whatever their cause may be, and as such any society which seeks to remove initiated force is unworkable. Any system which is unworkable from any real-world analysis (consequentialistic, pragmatically, practically, etc) is not a system I feel anyone should adopt as anything other than a guiding goal. I attach no significance to adhering to any code which is detrimental to the individual, or perhaps to society.
Pacifists may find that they are moral; I disagree for a number of reasons. Just because it is possible to live without explicit force doesn’t mean one should abandon physical force.
Again, I would need to understand the rationale behind the condemnation of all physical force. I would particularly question why only physical force is immoral and not social contract-style forces, economic compulsion, legal compulsion, and all manner of way that humans have at their disposal to get other humans to do stuff.
Spiritus, you had said on page one something to the effect of “Pacifism is one of the most moral systems.” I would simply ask, in what way?
Well, this is really a separate issue. In the “child in street” scenario it makes no difference whether the car is being driven by a person or is rolling unattended down a hill. The original question was not whether a pacifist might have a moral obligation to act in a given situation (and all nearly all human situations have a component of “action by other humans”). The question was at what point a person becomes morally responsible for the freely chosen actions that other people make in response to his own actions/decisions. To use the “assaulted child” scenario as an illustration: if the pacifist shouts, “I’m calling the police” is he morally responsible should the attacker decide to kill the child (thus eliminating the witness).
Well, that’s the question. My answer is probably “no”, but it really depends upon how you determine what the “required action” is. Would you care to respond to the hypothetical question I posed to msmith537? Given a choice scenario where assassinating innocent parties would prevent the murder of a larger number, is a person morally obligated to become an assassin?
Perhaps because the life of the child is not the only element of moral value in the situation.
Is survivability the test of moral fitness? The OP asked whether pacifism was immoral, not whether it was a strong survival strategy.
Look–if you want to play the hypothetical game please play it fairly. Couldn’t the pacifist whisk the child away from the attacker in the street, thus protecting him without resorting to violence?
Alternatively, perhaps you would do me the kindness of explaining teh goldilocks test you use to determine which imaginary situations contain just the right amount of hypothetical. It would keep me from wasting effort.
Well, that was my question for the consequentialists. For myself, numbers and risk are not sufficient data for me to decide a moral course. As I said, I do not find morality in simple numerical equations of lives saved/lives lost. Actually, I do not think that many people do, but the hypotheticals in this thread kept being phrased as if only those elements mattered in determining morality. I am just asking people to clarify their positions. If it is strictly a case of numbers, then tell me where the “balance point” is. If it is not simply a case of numbers, then let’s explore what the actual moral determinent is rather than hiding behind “mountains of blood” scenarios.
erl
Well, like yourself I would prefer to have an “actual pacifist” on hand who cared to discuss his or her personal ethos. Barring that, I find myself in general agreement with your analysis, but I try to be aware that teh “passifism==inaction” scenarios are often false dichotomies. A great many situations which seem to call for violence can in fact be solved by other means. The pacifists that I have known personally have not been the “I will never engage in violence” sort, though some have been the “violence is always evil” sort. You should appreciate that “lesser evil” analysis.
One factor that I think is often overlooked in these discussions is the often powerful forms of nonviolent coercion that have always existed in human society. Where I (and I think you) feel that “pure pacifism” breaks down is in response to individuals who are not subject to the pressures of nonviolent coercion.
Can you tell me why? Is this a reflection of your certainty about causal projections based upon courses of action, or do you simply mean “anyone whose moral philosophy differs from my own is obviously not moral.” (I do not mean that to be in any way reductionist or insulting. I think it is a very suportable position. I am just trying to figure out if the judgment you mention is specific to pacifism or general to all answers that differ from your own.
Well, “one of the most moral systems” was a pretty sloppy phrase. I obviously do not consider it to be the best moral system, or I would be either a pacifist or a hypocrite. I’ll give you the short answer and you can tell me if it suffices.
Empathy is the basis of my moral valuations. I find that pacifism reflects very strongly a similar value of empathy. I disagree with some of the underlying assumptions of pacifism, but I agree with what I see as the necessary underlying assumptions. To use a mathematical metaphor, I find the “logic” sound but I disagree with some of the “axioms”.
pldennison
I am sure that Ghandi deserves his own thread, but I don’t feel compelled to start one myself. I was just curious. I am sorry if my questions to you seemed confrontational or abrupt.
Actually, I did some brief digging of my own and found some things that suport your idea that Ghandi’s pacifism was not “pure” even late in his life. Unfortunately, what I have found has been attributions without citations and the source(s) are blatantly partisan. If you come across (or remember) something specific I would be happy if you called them to my attention (either here or through email), but it isn’t a question of pressing urgency for me.
No, there can never be a moral obligation to kill the innocent. Perhaps there could be a logical obligation to do so?
What if in that scenario the targets of the assassination were not innocent?
And what element would that be?
You misunderstood me, bad use of the pronoun “one” on my part. I was refering to the survivability of the pacifist view as a moral belief, not the survivability of the pacifist person.
My “Goldilocks” test for hypothicals would bar any hypothitical in which bears talk. Basically, I prefer situations that could really happen. Introducing time machines causes all sorts of problems concerning continuality that really are not relevant to this discussion.
Do you think there could be an instance in which a person(pacifist or not) is morally obligated to use violence?
Logical obligation? I have no idea what that would mean.
Stickking to morality, would you agree, then, that the use of strategic bombing, landmines, etc. are always immoral, since there is a certainty approaching 1 that innocent people will be killed with their use?
Myriad. On the most simple level, the lives of myself and the attacker. On a more complex level, every other personal and social concern which we value as a significant factor in human health, happiness, and well-being.
I actually considered both interpretations. My point remains teh same. Is survival of a philosophy the proper test for the morality of the philosophy? Is continuance the only moral value that matters?
Okay–the child in danger was on his way across the street to kill a child who had teased him at recess.
Well, since I have stated more than once that I am not a pacifist, yes.
I am curious, though, in what way do you see this question as responsive to the issue of whether or not a simple numerical evaluation of probable casualties is sufficient for moral valuation?
But this is my biggest beef with pacifistic attitudes. there are a number of ways a person, group, or society has at its conscious or unconconsious disposal to use force. The physical aspect of force, violence, is the target, and yet other methods of coercion are apparently not only “ok” but encouraged.
As I’ve come to agree, many things about morality and knowledge are essentially arbitrary, but this particular arbitrariness seems downright contradicting. I am simply not aware of a motivation barring physical force as immoral and yet allowing other forms of deliberate force as moral (passive resistence alá Rosa Parks).
Certianly given any particular scenario we are likely to find many options available to us. IMO the morality would provide guidance toward which options are teneble, a consequentialist view would eliminate more, and a utilitarian analysis would narrow the field more. I appreciate that the moral perspective should take precidence. But I find that internal consistency demands a certain measure of defining what, exactly, is so bad about physical force and why it is always ruled out in all scenarios.
I have never personally known a pacifist so I can’t even say what some would think. Everyone I know personally rejects strict pacifism because of self-defense concerns. I can appreciate those who would seek to never initiate violence, but I’m not sure that the word “pacifist” could rightfully apply there.
No, I am somewhat coming around on such a strict dichotomy of moral perceptions. One needn’t agree across the board to be considered moral. I find pacifism to be immoral largely due to self-defense issues. I find it to be impractical as a way for a society to function, and thus (to me) fundamentally fails to be a moral system which can be asymptotically approached (because the more people that follow it the easier it is to be bad and get away with it). This makes it an impractical goal, and makes a pacifist who desires to (and successfully manages to) spread the word actively aiding criminals, regardless of intention. This means, to me, that though the moral system itself may not demonstrate that pacifism is immoral, the effects of its practice are contrary to the desires of the person practicing it. This, to me, can only represent a failure. Ask me to point where, precisely, the failure lies and I cannot, since it still boils down to what one holds to be most important. Though I doubt anyone really puts a quantifiable scale to their values, I can safely say that I am one of the most important things to me, which then requires that self-defense be an option.
You got it. This is most definitely one of the :inherent axioms" with which I disagree. Then again, it isn’t hard to find an absolute moral precept with which I disagree.
If one acts based on logic, then the equation of lives lost verses lives saved comes into play.
No, because it simply is not possible at this time to fight a war without innocents being killed. Yet some wars are still just wars.
And I still don’t think you got my point. “Survival” of the philosophy is irrelevant to whether that philosophy is moral or not.
My original point was simply this. Any belief system that takes an unyielding, absolutely nonadaptable mindset is sooner or later going to be presented with a situation in which following that belief will no longer be the moral thing to do.
My objection to your hypothetical was clearly directed at the use of time machines so I don’t know why you felt the need to add this.
It isn’t a response and I’m sorry I made it appear that way in my post. It simply got me wondering where you actually stood on the matter. I realize that you are in the difficult position of rationalizing a belief that you yourself do not hold.
