I think this points to compatibility in some limited circumstances. If the catholic church can accept evolution then I don’t see how they are not compatible.
The words that are often bandied about are “science asks how, religion asks why?”
Science can say that there is not “why” question to the universe but a lot of people are not so convinced and as such turn to religion etc to at best allow the discussion.
I would say though that once a religion says “this is the truth and cannot/will not change” then we have a problem but if like the catholics they accept new knowledge then we are ok.
First, at most this shows that plenty of people who espouse religious opinions are inconsistent in the views they espouse. But that, of course is not the thesis which Der Trihs is defending. And it doesn’t do a great deal to invalidate religion, or render it incompatible with science, when we reflect that plenty of people on the opposite side of the question are also inconsistent in the views they espouse.
The other thing is that the inconsistency is not necessarily as great as may appear. If we accept that “supernatural” involves “not susceptible of empirical observation”, this obviously precludes any kind of scientific investigation. But it doesn’t follow that we can’t know anything about a supernatural entity, or speak meaningfully about it. Lots of people - some of them non-religious! - have strong views about, e.g., a woman’s right to choose, or the ratio between the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle and the other two sides. These views are plainly not scientifically-grounded, since they relate to matters which are not susceptible of empirical observation, but it doesn’t follow that they are invalid or meaningless, or relate to matters about which knowledge is impossible.
A particular view about God may be arbitrary, self-serving, nonsensical or otherwise undeserving of any respect or consideration. But you can’t show this in general of all views about god merely by pointing out that the postulated god is supernatural, and therefore beyond scientific investigation.
I totally agree. It might be dreadfully unscientific of me, but I say: the Holocaust was wrong, wrong, horribly wrong - this is true and can never change.
It is dreadfully unscientific of you. But it is “incompatible with science”? I wouldn’t think so. And I wouldn’t think many others would think so either.
Err… Not quite. That which can be investigated by science is necessarily the full list of items which we can with any reason say exist. We certainly have no better pathway to truth than science; and indeed I have yet to hear of any valid alternative to science for coming close to the truth. Things may exist outside of what science can investigate, but almost by definition, we cannot demonstrate those things to be true and we cannot claim with any degree of rationality or certainty that they are “real”. Such a thing simply cannot fulfill its burden of proof!
I cannot name a single monotheistic tradition which truly holds that position. Every single one attributes numerous attributes to god. The idea that we can know nothing about god is directly contradictory to virtually all of these doctrines. So basically, every single monotheistic tradition is extremely self-contradictory?
I’m having trouble understanding how “above or beyond the natural” is even a coherent concept, to be honest. Literally every single thing we experience is part of the natural world. Everything we know of, every concept we hold, we can only parse through the natural world. I don’t even understand how something being above or beyond that is coherent. What does it even mean, other than that we by definition have no way of knowing whether it exists, let alone what qualities it has?
They’re fundamental, mainstream, and completely disregarded by almost every adherent. Which makes perfect sense - after all, that’s a heady concept, and elsewhere in the book God is clearly characterized as an angry parent, or wrathful, or vengeful, or loving…
Err… Nope. We are empathic animals by evolution. We can understand when we are hurting each other. Furthermore, we can empirically find certain states preferable to others in almost all cases - life is preferable to non-life, not being in pain is generally preferable to being in pain, et cetera. As a result, we can extrapolate from ourselves what is and is not right. Check out Matt Dillahunty’s lectures on morality and you’ll see what I mean. Science and empiricism have a fair bit to say about morality.
If by “higher truths” you mean truths about, or relating to, a divine realm, order, being or beings the very existence of which is non-falsifiable, then of course you can’t be sure either way.
The claim that there are any such “higher truths” is non-falsifiable. The claim that there are no such “higher truths” is also non-falsifiable.
It is not a “trivial” sense of compatibility. It is compatibility.
That’s one of the word’s definitions, see. “Able to exist together without trouble or conflict,” sez Merriam-Webster.
In all seriousness: Did you not know what the word means?
Which “reality” are we talking about, here?
Of course, those non-falsifiable truth claims which do not intend to “give rise to a serious description of” mundane reality, and intend instead to “give rise to a serious description of” an imagined higher reality, entirely outside the realm of science and scientific observation, remain - you guessed it - non-falsifiable.
“Claim to authority” meaning what, exactly? That such claims can’t be verified? If so, I agree - they can’t be verified, just like they can’t be falsified. Which is why science can’t, and won’t, and doesn’t come into play here.
We can prove the truth of certain propositions through the scientific method provided we are willing to accept as true the unproven and unprovable axioms on which the scientific method depends.
A claim that science is a “pathway to truth” involves an implicit acceptance of the axioms of the scientific method. A claim that science is the only way to truth implies that we cannot accept those axioms as true. But if we cannot accept those axioms, how can we assert the reliablity or validity of the scientific method?
I suggest that the truth of the situation is that there is a class of questions - basically, questions about empirically observable reality - for which the scientific method is the best investigative tool we have. But this does not enable us to draw any conclusions about questions falling outside that class. We may, or may not, have methods which help us to answer these questions. Euclidean geometry, for example, offers an entirely non-scientific technique for answering a particular class of entirely non-scientific questions. Formal logic does the same. And presumably at least some of those who accept the axioms foundational to the scientific method have some criterion for doing so which goes beyond “it feels right to me”.
In short, the scientific method is just one epistemology among many, and it only applies to a limited class of questions. Those who assert that it is the only valid epistemology, the only technique by which we can say what is true and what is not, are themselves making a claim which is fundamentally non-scientific and which cannot be investigated by the scientific method and which, by their own account, they cannot know to be true.
The position which I set out, BPC, is not that “we can know nothing about god”. That’s your position, because as far as you are concerned if we can’t know something through science then we cannot know it at all. (Except, apparently, we can know that without knowing it through science.) We can know nothing (directly) about God through science.
Of course you’re having trouble. What you’re saying in a roundabout way is exactly what mainstream Christian theology has been saying for the best part of two thousand years. We’re part of the natural world. That means any transcendent reality is outside our direct experience, can’t be observed by us, and is difficult to imagine. If you think about the difficulties most of us have trying to imagine hyperdimensional space - which at least conceptually is part of the natural world - then how much more difficult might it be to wrap our minds around something outside that? But our difficulty in conceiving of something is hardly an argument for its non-existence or non-reality.
And we do manage to conceptualise, and reason about, and even draw somewhat reliable conclusions about things entirely outside the natural world, like the platonic solids or the euclidean or cartesian planes. So we know that meaningful enquiry is not a priori impossible.
Only in an analogical sense.
And, look, no offence, but the bloke who asks us with a straight face to accept as true the proposition that the science is the only way in which we can know whether something is true or not is not well-positioned to accuse others of inconsistency.
I read something fascinating in a book review in the latest Skeptic. I may have the details wrong, but 6 - 8 month old babies were shown puppet shows where in one case a shape, say a yellow square, helped another puppet climb while in another a red triangle got in the way of the other puppet climbing. The babies were then allowed to play with the shapes and tended to choose the helpful one.
We do seem hard wired for empathy.
The statement that science proves anything shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what science is and what science claims. Science says, and this has been repeated over and over and over again, that this is the best answer we have so far. The scientific method is not a fact, it is a process. It would be more correct for you to have said that the premise that the universe is consistent and repeatable and that our observations mean something is unprovable. Which is true. However, we have conducted billions of experiments all of which support this hypothesis without a single exception.
Now, the scientific method works, but that is different from it being true.
Math and logic are fundamental tools of science. The difference is that science tests its premises against the real world. Math doesn’t do that. Changing the premises of Euclidean geometry to make it non-Euclidean is perfectly valid; that it seems to have some relevance to reality is interesting but not relevant. We can just as well study infinities which don’t.
I’m confident that no scientist in the world would say that math is invalid. The methods of philosophy and theology, on the other hand, can be, since they are not good at verifying assumptions. They were the methods used before the scientific method, after all, and they turned out to produce incorrect results.
Ethical questions may not have solid answers. Whether God exists and whether he interacted with the world in a certain way can.
You don’t think a time traveling scientist traveling with Moses couldn’t get all sorts of data on God?
When the topic is raised of the “compatiblity” of science and religion, what is at stake that is non-trivial is a description of truth. Of what is correct.
Socks and Math are compatible. But the compatibility is trivial, and it’s essentially meaningless to argue for or against the “compatibility” of socks and math.
The sense in which religion and science are compatible is trivial. They are only compatible as a description of the way things are when religion happens to agree with science.
Religion is not an alternate or superior way of figuring out what is correct or real.
An interesting side-note, which has echoes of other debates over the word “natural.” Some hold that nuclear reactors, jet aircraft, and the like are “natural.” If the word is the counterpart of “supernatural,” then they are, but if the word is the counterpart of “artificial,” then they aren’t.
Gods are “supernatural” in that they would be conscious, creative, wise minds other than human. The east wind, for instance, wouldn’t be driven by temperature and pressure, but by the will of Aeolus. The standard theory of weather is “naturalistic” while the Aeolus theory is defined as “supernaturalistic.”
Yes, in practice, it only kicks things back to a meta-level. The God Aeolus would be “natural,” for he would exist in the real world. But the practical definition of the word takes Gods (spirits, souls, angels, heavens, hells, etc.) to be “supernatural.”
On the contrary… all evidence is for that view, simply by virtue of being evidence. That’s what evidence is - it’s stuff you use to do empirical examinations of something.
The question wasn’t if both religion and science give rise to equally valid “descriptions of truth,” or if religion is “an alternate or superior way of figuring out what is correct or real.”
The question was, simply, if religion and science is compatible, i.e. “able to exist together without trouble or conflict.” And that they are.
The answer to the question “are socks and math compatible?” is “yes.”
The answer to the question “is religion and science compatible?” is “yes.”
In both cases, one might argue that the question is trivial, ridiculous, absurd.
Nevertheless, the answers remain entirely correct.
I didn’t say that science was true; I said it was a “pathway to truth”. And, when I said that, I was quoting you.
I have pointed out, though, that it is only a pathway to truth for a certain class of questions. Your argument appears to me to treat it as a universal path to truth. There is no evidence that it is, and common sense, common experience and common logic all suggest that it is not.
All of this is true. And all of this suggests that science is not the only way we can know something. For the kind of propositions that we examine through logic or through euclidean geometry, we have better epistemological tools than the scientific method.
They produce incorrect results when applied to scientific questions. But there remain a class of questions for which non-scientific epistemologies are more reliable than the scientific methods. Nobody thinks that going out and measuring a whole bunch of (approximately) right-angled triangles is the strongest proof of Pythagoras’ theorem. Nobody thinks that the scientific method can answer questions about a woman’s right to choose, or whether or when we are justified in telling a lie, or whether the United States is, or should be, a democracy.
Certain propositions advanced in the name of religion may be capable of scientific examination. But that’s trivial, and it’s not what the OP asks. The OP asks whether religion and science are fundamentally incompatible. If there’s a scientific proof that there are no supernatural realities then, yes, religion and science are fundamentally incompatible. There is, however, no such proof. Nor can there be, since the proposition is not a scientific one. And those who advance the proposition cannot, without inconsistency, also advance the proposition that the scientific method is the sole reliable epistemology.
Well, it may be called that by you. But reality isn’t determined by the vocabulary you choose to adopt.
If the only evidence we will accept is empirically observable evidence, the kind that science deals with, then it follows that there can be no evidence for anything not empirically observable. For the supernatural, in other words.
The supernatural may be objectively real, or it may be wholly imaginary; either way, there will be no empirically-observable evidence of it. Hence, the lack of empirically-observable evidence is equally consistent with the reality or the non-reality of the supernatural; it does not enable us to draw any conclusions, one way or the other, about its reality.
It seems to me that you’re basically defining “real” as “empirically observable”. If so, your argument is circular; you’ve just wrapped the circularity up inside your implied definition of “reality” in the hope that we won’t notice.
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