It seems to me the purpose of justice should be to reduce future crime (anti-social behavior). Deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation all help to accomplish that. Retribution does not.
Retribution seems to satisfy a human instinct for revenge that might have been somewhat useful for deterrence in past times when society had no formal legal system, but I see this instinct as a very destructive force in modern society since it often leads to cycles of hatred and revenge (most traditional ethnic hatreds seem to be based around mutual desires for revenge for past grievances). I don’t think we should dignify this source of hatred by considering it a legitimate part of our legal system.
Sparrowhawk:
Restitution is not on the list because it does not justify throwing somebody into jail. To the extent that it does, it is simply “Retribution”.
I’m not saying that restitution should not be a component of a judicial system however. Nor is anyone else.
MGibson: The (uncited) law texts that I recall indicated that retribution was advocated in ancient texts but had since fallen out favor (among criminologists? philosophers? They couldn’t have meant the public.) Sorry I can’t be more specific: the presentation raised my eyebrow as well. IANAL.
---- If punishment wasn’t suppose to be a factor then everyone would simply be sentenced until they’re rehabilitated.
Even if retribution is not a factor, longer sentences could be justified on the grounds of deterrence, both general and specific. Not to mention incapacitation: I want a killer incapacitated longer than a hub-cap thief.
bullfighter: I agree, but many of our fellow citizens do not. On democratic grounds, one may want to indulge their lust for punishment. (Subject to bans on cruel and unusual punishment, of course).
Retribution obviously sounds worse than punishment. Keep in mind Lissa’s hypothetical - the person who murders someone they know in fit of passion/insanity. A man who kills his wife is no threat to general society and generally won’t kill anyone else. He doesn’t need deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation, he’s sorry already. So is his sorrow after the event enough, can he now go unpunished?
Insanity typically is grounds for not punishing someone, although they often are still dangerous and are therefore locked up for that reason. Punishing someone for a crime of passion can serve a legitimate purpose in deterring others whose passion is not quite great enough for them to be willing to accept the punishment.
One place I feel that retribution is used inappropriately is when someone has committed a crime and then gone on to live a law abiding and productive life for twenty or thirty years. They clearly are no longer a danger and punishment after such a long time is meaningless to others who might contemplate a similar crime.
Another case was the Patty Hearst case, where the situation was so unique that few would ever be likely to be in a similar situation, so deterrence is irrelevant.
bullfighter:
The fact that there is no statute of limitations for murder underscores the seriousness of the offense and adds to the deterrent/prevention value. IMHO only. Ultimately though, this is an empirical question.
Patty Hearst: Every crime is singular in some way. The rule, “Don’t rob banks (or commit other crimes) under any circumstances”, still applies.
There is a deterrent value in knowing that if you do a crime you will be punished: you can’t depend upon making excuses. This applies especially in high-profile cases like Patty Hearst.
The way I see it is that someone contemplating a murder is likely to be quite concerned when they see another murderer arrested a few weeks after a murder, but he would be unfazed to see someone arrested for a murder thirty years earlier. I picture somebody in his 20’s that doesn’t give a damn what happens to him when he’s in his 50’s.
By the same token, someone contemplating a bank robbery would not be very encouraged to have seen Patty Hearst go free, because he knows that his own situation was not at all comparable.
But I agree that this is empirical and it is just my own guess about how potential criminals would react to cases like these.
Rush Limbaugh today burst out laughing at a pilot program that would pay probationers not to commit crimes. I understand that it might sound crazy, but it’s not altogether implausible that this could have a real benefit, given that a criminal lifestyle is a habit you have to break, and encouraging certian criminals not to fall back into that lifestyle can have real long term benefits.
I believe that retribution is a moral reason for punishment. I see nothing immoral about punishing someone for the harm they’ve inflicted on someone else.
I do have moral qualms about two of the other aims of punishment, however. I understand the practical benefits of rehabilitation and deterrence, but I’m ignoring them to address the OPs request for only moral consideration.
Regarding rehabilitation, I see no reason why victims have any kind of moral obligation to aid the people who wounded them.
As for deterrence, I see something inherently unfair in the idea of punishing someone not for what they themselves did, but for the goal of persuading someone else not to do the same thing. In any case, though, I would hope that deterrence not need to be an express goal of the justice system, as presumably retribution has an innate deterrent effect.
I don’t understand what the distinction has to do with what is just. If someone suffers some kind of material damage, shouldn’t making restitution be part of the administration of justice?
I wasn’t trying to imply that restitution had anything to do with throwing somebody in jail. My impression is that it has something to do with justice. It wasn’t on the OP’s original list and I think it gets left out a lot. I’m glad I’m not the only one who thinks it has its place.
Sparrowhawk:
Oops. I see the problem. The OP actually listed what I’ve heard referred to as the 4 theories of punishment. (Sometimes 2 theories are enumerated, though, to distinguish retribution from the other 3. Other times 5 theories are listed, by dividing deterrence into General Deterrence - punish person A to deter person B and Specific Deterrence - punish person A to deter person A.)
A google search shows that at least one taxonomy for justice is constructed differently. It lists retributive justice, therapeutic justice, restorative justice (that looks like yours, Sparrowhawk), and community justice.
I’m confused: What does rehabilitation have to do with aid from the victims? Are you thinking of an incredibly abstract definition of “aid” whereby a victim is “aiding” a criminals rehabilitation by paying for a miniscule portion of the rehabilitative programs with tax dollars or something?
I hadn’t heard about this. I wouldn’t laugh, though. I doesn’t say much for the criminal justice system if we have to resort to danegelt for protection.
Could’ve sworn I replied to this last night before going to bed… must’ve been eaten by the hamsters.
I don’t see what’s particularly abstract about it compared to the rest of this thread. I see public funds for rehabilitation as aid provided by the victim (society) to those who did it harm. I don’t believe that society has any kind of moral obligation to criminals.
I do recognize the existence of a pragmatic argument for rehabilitation, but don’t see a moral one.
We can distinguish between two types of moral frameworks: rights-based ones vs. utilitarian ones.
Under the rubric of mutual obligation, I concede that it may be difficult to argue that the criminal is owed the opportunity to become a productive member of society. Some may choose to argue this (heck, some do) but I’d rather not.
A utilitarian case for rehabilitation follows. Assuming that you don’t want to hand out life sentences for every crime, convicts will eventually be released. Investing public funds in education programs may be a cost-effective way of reducing future crime, future tax-payer expenditures and future suffering associated with those crimes. Thus there is a moral case for rehabilitation, insofar as those programs meet cost/benefit tests.
Personally, I favor judicial systems that maximize public safety in the most cost-effective way possible, subject to human rights considerations. Thus, if shifting funds from long prison sentences to larger police forces (or whatever) reduces crime, that’s what I would advocate. But that’s just me: others get an extra kick from seeing the convicted serve long sentences.
In any way? Do you believe society is morally obligated to respect criminals’ human rights? Do you believe we are obligated to give them fair access to the legal system? Do you believe we are in any way obligated to offer them social services after their release?
Either you didn’t read the post or you didn’t understand it. It’s themotivation for the punishment, one of the motivations, that is being critisised, not punishment.
You make some interesting points. I generally don’t agree with the utilitarian moral framework that you suggest; perhaps due to its proactive nature and the emphasism on cost/benefit tests.
From a practical standpoint, I will agree that reducing crime is the primary goal, and if rehabilitation does reduce crime that we should by all means go for it.
From a purely moral viewpoint, I believe that criminals, through their decision to violate the rights of others, abdicate their own rights. The more severe the violation of another’s rights, the less rights they themselves are entitled to.
To go to the far end of the spectrum, I would argue that someone guilty of 1st degree murder, having committed the ultimate intentional violation of another’s rights, has no rights whatsoever that society is obligated to respect. That includes access to the legal system.
I do believe that if an inmate has paid his debt to society and been released that they should be entitled to any social services that other citizens are. At that point they are only a former criminal.