The formation of the sun and planets under gravity didn’t happen? There wasn’t actually a moon-Earth collision? The dinosaurs weren’t real?
Put simply, if a tree falls in the forest, does a longitudinal variation in pressure propagate, through the mainly-nitrogen medium, capable of being transduced by a human cochlea into an action potential and transmitted via the auditory nerve to the thalamus and on to the primary auditory cortex in the temporal lobe?
Why then, let us moot it. I say that, given the facts we both largely agree on, it did exist for those 13.7 billion years. What say you?
But you are assuming a “gestalt”, a more than the sum of biological computational modules. If it simply is the sum of those parts, no such mechanism need be identified.
I would suggest that “There are physical objects” is not an empirical proposition. It is looking at such a sentence as an empirical proposition that has spawned the whole mess of realism and idealism. The realist says, “Yes, there are,” and proceeds to give evidence and arguments, and the idealist says, “No, there aren’t,” and proceeds to give counter arguments and possibly other evidence. And so it goes.
Rather, I would suggest that “there are physical objects” is a grammatical proposition, in the tradition of Wittgenstein, which specifies a language-game that is played with things that are “physical.”
They were real (for these purposes) if they existed independent of our subjectivity and conventions of thought or language. But both you and I have gone to great lengths to describe how language and convention are exactly what we’re actually dealing with when we deal with physical observations. The events you describe are describable. Give me an event that you cannot describe — one that is independent of your thought or language.
Let’s stick to events that are at least ostensibly real. Hypotheticals remove us to yet another layer.
I say it doesn’t matter. You know very well that ontological considerations are pertinent only to metaphysical entities. It isn’t a matter of whether the universe exists, but of whether its existence (given as true) is or is not contingent on our subjectivity and conventions of thought or language.
Then if there is no gestalt, macro world is as abstract as quantum world, and therefore not real.
Donald Hoffman is a cognitive scientist at University of California (Irvine), specializing in visual perception. He wrote a book called Visual Intelligence and I think you’d find the last chapter highly germane to this discussion. (Sentient, you might want to take a peek, too)
If thought is language-based computation, that is an A&-A, a logical contradiction in itself. To propose that thoughts and language and the things that they have so far been applied to are a subset of “all that is real” is not.
I say a tree falling in the forest is real even if nobody is around, because people being around is only a subset of reality.
Again, I say it isn’t. Our thoughts and language are all we have, but to say that they are all that exists is akin to solipsism.
Well, you know that I consider abstractions to be real, in that they supervene on the physical.
I do agree. It is merely that my linguistic set of the “real” includes many things which yours does not. I merely seek to make it plain to all what our own personal Venn diagrams look like.
Incidentally, if physical observations, thoughts and language are what is necessary to make a thing “real”, electrons and the universe are “real”, yes?
I’m sorry, my friend. I honestly don’t even know what that sentence says. It might be the lateness of the morning or my headache. Could you rephrase it?
But you’re assuming the reality before drawing an inference from it.
Well, maybe. But I don’t have to tell you what logical fallacy that is.
Then that would be your answer, wouldn’t it? Supervention is the mechanism. Now just explain how it works.
Okay. I’m not sure I understand that either, but it’s neither here nor there.
Other-wise, the Hoffman paper you cited is indeed, very interesting. I think maybe that if you avoid dualism, and the problems involved in the interaction of “mental things” and 'physical things", then descriptions of the universe as either fundamentally ideal or material are each equally consistent. I’m not sure, though whether either description really tells us anything.
And** Liberal**, I confess I don’t have that tableau to show you. I thought you had no problem with knowing things without a logical proof.
Except that in this case, I have asked specifically for analytical proof, as you can discover by review. I ask that for this because our subjective experiences conflict, and I am interested in understanding yours.
“Describe an event that you cannot describe” is a contradiction. “One’s own personal reality is only a subset of reality” is not.
Just as you assume the gestalt.
Senses, memory, emotion and language are all couchable in physical terms.
If I may ask: what is “real” about the person calling to you from the next room which is absent from those atoms which Rutherfords alpha particles visibly bounced back from?
I was aware that the common definition was circular and had been discarded (I really have read the thread. Honest. ). I was raising moderate concerns about the philosophical one being used.
I think what worries me is the notion of ‘existing objectively’, because it seems to presuppose the notion that objectivity is possible. But I don’t have a serious and coherent objection to the current working definition, so I’m going to abandon this line of thought until I do.
ok. I’ll try to curb my impulse to semantic argument. But I still feel the point I’ve raised is an important one: Any definition of real in which you can demonstrate that the universe is not real further demonstrates that there is nothing you can determine to be real.
This means that if we can demonstrate according to the working definition that the universe is not real, then we cannot in fact demonstrate that anything at all is real, which strikes me as a bad thing.
This is not to say that it follows that the universe is real according to your definition. Merely that if the universe is not real, we must be unable to demonstrate this.
Further, if the universe is real then we shouldn’t be able to demonstrate that it is not. If we could then I would be seriously concerned.
So the conclusion is that it is not, even in principle, possible to demonstrate conclusively the unreality of the universe, unless we can also conclude that there is nothing which is real.
Now, one might consider that concluding that nothing is real may be a perfectly valid thing to do. I disagree with this - I think if we have a good notion of the word real, it should be the case that there is something that is real. This is a semantic objection rather than a major philosophical one, so I won’t spend much time on it.
So, lets assume there is something real for now. Thus either the universe is genuinely real, or it is unreal but we cannot, even in principle, demonstrate it. There is no way to distinguish between these two cases.
A guiding principle in my philosophy (although I understand there are those who disagree with it) is that a difference which makes no difference is no difference. If you cannot distinguish between two possibilities, it is not meaningful to ask which of the two holds. Thus `we cannot even in principle demonstrate that it is unreal’ must in fact be the same thing as real.
Hence the universe is real.
I do apologise for arguing on the meta-level, and I’m aware the above argument isn’t entirely water tight. I’ll have a think about the slight flaws I’ve noticed in it and post more later about them if no one has remarked upon them before then (and will of course respond if people have remarked on them before then.)
It is always useful to stop and read through these kinds of threads again, and having done so I think that whatever disagreement me and Lib might have is, as he suggests, in our interpretation of certain facts and language, specifically this:
But, of course, I’ve just described them! Terrible lizards, who roamed the Earth when there were no bald little apes running around making odd squeals and grunts. Does that mean that they are suddenly not real under this definition? If so, nothing is safe from the ubiquitous might of language, which reaches across time and space zapping things into unreality. The simple phrase “The pipkin is, was, or will be schnurf” could describe anything. Does it therefore quash the independence of even of future things which haven’t yet been described by language?
This is, surely, absurd cart-before-horsemanship. We all recognise that thought and language are only part of the story - that there is something else which we are thinking of, that we are talking about. This is the real thing: that which stays there when we close our eyes, or when nobody is around. The sun, Earth and dinosaurs were real, and not just because we have a language which happens to use a past tense, thus reaching into the past to encompass those things. To suggest otherwise is, IMO, to stretch that philosophical definition way past the breaking point of what it is supposed to mean.
If this is completely off track, Lib, I sincerely apologise. I am just still a little uncertain why atoms are specified in the OP in place of everyday objects or other people, if the reality of things outside our own heads is central to the debate.
But within the restrictions of uncertainty it is possible to describe precisely equivalent states. Quantum teleportation, for instance, depends on this. To say the two states are not the same “below” this level is to suggest there is something going that is shrouded from us by uncertainty (e.g. a hidden variable), rather than there is no physically meaningful difference.
Local hidden variables, at least, have quite likely been entirely disproven (e.g. the Aspect experiment), and so-called non-local hidden variables (a la Bohm) theories yield a descriptions of QM that are, so far as I know, indistinguishable in their predictions from any other formulation, appear rather contrived, and hence are essentially trivial. It is possible to exchange one particle for another, such that they have the same quantum state (though not simultaneously, in the case of fermions, obviously), and there is absolutely no way to distinguish them from one another. I can excite a hydrogen atom and wait for the orbit of the electron to decay over and over, using the same energy photon to excite the electron to the same energy level, and I cannot predict with certainty when the electron will return to its ground state. The description of the state of that electron prior to the transition can be exactly the same in each assay, but I can only discuss in terms of probabilities what will happen next.