Is there a God? I'm still not sure, Cecil.

[Learjeff]

Well, I wanted to avoid diving into free will, but that seems to be all that’s left.

My reply was tongue-in-cheek. Characters do indeed seem to have minds of their own, according to novelists. But that’s irrelevant once the novel is finished, or rather, once the author has made up his mind about it.

So the question becomes, for God, does reality unfold in time, like a novel, or is it “already written”? The author might say he didn’t actually choose a given character’s actions, that originally he’d intended something different, but the character simply wouldn’t do it. That argues for free will on the part of the character, but we can’t use that analogy for an unchanging God.

If God is omnicient and unchanging, then it seems to me that it has to be already written. That would seem to imply that there is no free will. It certainly did, to me.

But there’s the dodge that we do have free will, but what we will choose is already known. Every time we set up the pieces and play the game, the outcome is the same. And yet we were able to freely choose.

I haven’t made up my mind on free will, but I think that defendig it is by far the harder case.

Regarding an omnicient and unchanging God … I really can’t come up with anything that makes sense and is in any way meaningful. That doesn’t mean it’s impossible; I just have no idea what the words mean, when strung together like that.

[Learjeff]

@Measure_for_Measure

I’ve wondered about whether mathematicians create proofs or discover them. Neither option seems especially satisfying.

It’s an age-old question, and you’re in good company not being able to answer it.

And when you consider fractiles, which go on pretty much infinitely, the creation hypothesis seems impossible. But discovery implies that mathematics exists independently of the human mind. How can that be?

I think I can come up with a sort of answer, though not a particularly satisfying one.

Consider the possibility that the axiomatic system is invented, but the consequences are discovered.

An alternative to this is that all possible axiomatic systems already “exist”, and we discover them.

What’s the difference between the two propositions? IMHO, there really is no significant difference. Axiomatic systems are ideas. Do ideas exist before they’re thought of? Well, sort of … yes and no.

Platonists say they exist. Existentialists disagree. Very different world views. Does essense precede existence, or vice versa? I definitely side with the latter, and believe that “essence” is invented more than discovered. Still, it’s a sticky wicket. Bertrand Russell couldn’t even decide whether all math was simply a list of tautologies.

[colonial]

@Measure for Measure

Try googling “characters take on a life of their own” if you’re curious. Here’s one link, but there are many.

“The poor novelist constructs his characters, he controls them and makes them speak. The true novelist listens to them and watches them function; he eavesdrops on them even before he knows them. It is only according to what he hears them say that he begins to understand who they are.”

– André Gide
That’s a quote from here: http://www.timothyhallinan.com/write...apter&partid=3

I did not realize that at least for Gide and Hallinan a fictional character seems
to be a virtual homunculus in the mind of the author, exercising something resembling
independent behavior, with a mind of its own, and a *will *of its own. So perhaps
I was putting it too strongly when I said: “Shakespeare dictated his characters’
every thought, word and deed”.

However, NB a fictional character is nevertheless still an illusion, lacking the real
flesh, blood, mind and will of a real human being. At least I think so. If any neuroscientist
or philosopher of the mind thinks otherwise I would sure like to know about it.

So illusion v reality is a monumental difference between fictional characters and human beings.

There is also a monumental difference between the capacity of a human author and
that of an omnipotent God. While an author may be unable to consciously direct the
behavior of his creation, no such restriction may be applied to God.

Given these monumental differences I remain unconvinced that the analogy human author:God
could lend support to a philosophical theory of compatibilism, any more than the analogy
atomic nucleus:Sun could lend support to a physical theory of gravitation.

[Irishman]

@Measure_for_Measure

I’ve wondered about whether mathematicians create proofs or discover them. Neither option seems especially satisfying. And when you consider fractiles, which go on pretty much infinitely, the creation hypothesis seems impossible. But discovery implies that mathematics exists independently of the human mind. How can that be?

It can be thought that the relationships exist and thus are discovered, but the language of expression must be created.

@Learjeff

But there’s the dodge that we do have free will, but what we will choose is already known. Every time we set up the pieces and play the game, the outcome is the same. And yet we were able to freely choose.

There’s the seeming paradox. How can the results be known if the choice hasn’t been made? How can the choice be free if it has already been made?

One can try to argue that the paradox is the result of our perspective of linear time and that God isn’t similarly constrained, but that just becomes an exercise in ungrounded philosophy.

[Powers]

@Irishman

One can try to argue that the paradox is the result of our perspective of linear time and that God isn’t similarly constrained, but that just becomes an exercise in ungrounded philosophy.

Sadly, so it must remain, by my reckoning. If there is a God who created the universe, then God cannot possibly be constrained by time, which is a property of the universe.
Powers &8^]

[John_W.Kennedy]

@Powers

Sadly, so it must remain, by my reckoning. If there is a God who created the universe, then God cannot possibly be constrained by time, which is a property of the universe.

…which has been standard Catholic doctrine at least since Aquinas.

[Learjeff]

Bingo, and it doesn’t really solve the argument either way. Fascinating to ponder, though.

[Powers]

Believe me, I’m no fan of admitting some things are unknowable. And I believe most definitions of “God” to be self-contradictory (and if not self-contradictory, then unworthy of the title).
Powers &8^]

[Learjeff]

@colonial

So illusion v reality is a monumental difference between fictional characters and human beings.

Right – I doubt anyone here is arguing that fiction is an argument for free will. On the contrary, someone brought it up as an argument against free will, which is funny, because if you do ask almost any good novelist, they’ll tell you their characters do have wills of their own, and refuse to be cowed into doing what the author wants to serve the plot.

So, it’s just funny, not convincing.

[Learjeff]

@Powers

Believe me, I’m no fan of admitting some things are unknowable. And I believe most definitions of “God” to be self-contradictory (and if not self-contradictory, then unworthy of the title).

That’s how it seems to me too. But I’ve been dead wrong on far simpler issues, so I try to have respect for those who feel otherwise.

I believe everyone should question their beliefs, but in the end, you have live your life with whatever result you come up with.

The thing that I find most annoying (and this is a weakness on my part, no doubt) is when others profess absolute certainty. I can understand feeling absolutely certain, but there’s a big difference between feeling certain and being certain.

I feel pretty darn certain that I can’t doubt my own existence without contradicting myself. Things get hazy when I try to go past that.

[colonial]

@Learjeff

Right – I doubt anyone here is arguing that fiction is an argument for free will. On the contrary, someone brought it up as an argument against free will, which is funny, because if you do ask almost any good novelist, they’ll tell you their characters do have wills of their own, and refuse to be cowed into doing what the author wants to serve the plot.

So, it’s just funny, not convincing.

The issue was not the existence of free will, it was whether free will
and divine foreknowledge are compatible.

The relationship of authors to the fictional characters they create was
offered as an analogy in support of the compatibilist side of the argument.

[gamerunknown]

@Learjeff

On the contrary, someone brought it up as an argument against free will

If you note my usage, it’s not comparing an author, it’s comparing someone observing a storyboard where the character’s entire involvement in the plot has transpired. After observing such a storyboard, the particular storyboard cannot be altered (ignoring Heraclitus’ paradox and squabbling about quantity and quality). Except for an omniscient being, all “storyboards” are observable and all actions are as certain as actions occurring in the past are for us.

I cede the possibility of an illogical God. If logic, too, is merely a means of describing this universe, then God could be a square circle.

[Irishman]

@Learjeff

The thing that I find most annoying (and this is a weakness on my part, no doubt) is when others profess absolute certainty. I can understand feeling absolutely certain, but there’s a big difference between feeling certain and being certain.

:dubious: If I feel absolutely certain, then I am absolutely certain. There still remains the possibility of being wrong, but I would be certain in my wrongness.

Certainty is a feeling, so there is no difference between feeling certain and* being* certain.

[John_W.Kennedy]

@Learjeff

Right – I doubt anyone here is arguing that fiction is an argument for free will. On the contrary, someone brought it up as an argument against free will, which is funny, because if you do ask almost any good novelist, they’ll tell you their characters do have wills of their own, and refuse to be cowed into doing what the author wants to serve the plot.

What I’m saying is that it is an argument against a certain class of arguments against free will—which is not precisely an argument for free will, because it’s only intended as a rebuttal.