Inspired by the thread on whether or not the truth should ever be censored. Let’s say someone confesses to a priest that he murdered someone. Let’s say this priest then reports the confession to the police. What would happen at that point? Is the priest’s testimony admissible in court? Are there any legal consequences similar to a physician breaking physician-patient confidentiality or to a lawyer breaking attorney-client privilege? I understand any such priest would be automatically excommunicated from the Church, it’s the legality that I’m wondering about.
It would be hearsay, so would not be admitted into evidence in any case. But befre the trial, any information imparted could be used by police to aid them in their investigation of the case, and probably lead them to discoveries that miht not otherwise have been known to them. That might raise questions about the admissibility of that evidence, comparable to the police obtaining evidence without a warrant.
It would be incumbent on the defense attorney to raise all these objections and have any such evidence declared inadmissible. .
Privileged communication (the term for the information covered by confidentiality) isn’t admissible in court, and the privilege is owned by the confessor/client/patient, not the person providing spiritual/legal/medical counseling. The only way to make it non-privileged is for the defendant to release it or the court to rule that privilege doesn’t apply, which they don’t do very often. So the priest’s testimony would absolutely not be admissible in court, and could actually compromise a police investigation - they couldn’t use it as a basis for a warrant and the defense could argue that any warrant after the priest revealed information was based on what the priest said.
I don’t think there’s any specific laws making it illegal for a priest to reveal information, there are definitely laws preventing a doctor from releasing medical information (HIPAA laws for example), and I’m not sure about criminal law for lawyers, but they will face sanctions from the Bar for unethical behavior.
No, it wouldn’t be hearsay. It would be direct testimony of what the defendant said. Though it’s not direct evidence of what the defendant actually DID.
If that were true, wouldn’t the testimony of jailhouse snitches also be be inadmissible hearsay? You know, the ones where a prisoner testifies that his new cellmate admitted to all kinds of crimes.
Not legal, in the sense of the priest could face charges for divulging confessional information.
On the other hand, the religious penalties are pretty dire; they’re not allowed to divulge such information for ANY reason, under pain of automatic excommunication.
It’s complicated and of course depends on where you are,this is good read on general circumstances in several countries.
If by “legal prohibitions” you include those laid out by the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church, then yes, violating the seal of confession is very much illegal. This is covered by Can. 983–984. The prohibition applies not only to the confessor but also to any interpreter who may have mediated the communication.
Wrong.
And wrong. (But a possible nuance, so better to say, “Almost certainly wrong, but discussion follows.”)
Isn’t this GQ?
Hearsay is: an out-of-court statement, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
Now that we know what hearsay is, we can see that the statement offered as evidence against the declarant at trial in order to prove he committed the murder would be hearsay.
Boyo Jim: if you’re talking about this evidence being used at the murder trial to convince the jury that because he said it, he probably did it, then the statement is hearsay.
However, we might imagine another proceeding in which it would not be hearsay. For example, let’s imagine that the declarant confessed to murdering the priest’s sister, and the priest flew into a rage and beat the declarant unconscious. At the priest’s trial, the statement would be offered into evidence, but NOT to show the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Instead, it would be offered to show what made the priest react as he did. The truth of the statement wouldn’t be relevant – just the fact that the words were spoken. In such a case, the statement would not be hearsay.
OK?
That’s just the hearsay part of things.
Now, is the statement admissible?
Normally – that is, without a priest in the mix – the statement would probably be admissible even though it’s hearsay. The reason is that there are some well-recognized exceptions to the rule against the admission of hearsay, and this almost certainly falls into one: the admission against interest.
However, since the admission is made to a priest, it’s possible that the priest-penitent privilege would apply. Different states implement this privilege slightly differently, but it’s relatively certain that such a statement, made to a priest in the context of a priest-penitent conversation, would NOI be admissible against the declarant.
I’m not aware of any secular penalty against the priest for revealing such a confidence, though. It’s just that his testimony couldn’t be used.
as has been said, no it wouldn’t. “Hearsay” is “third party,” e.g. “someone told me the defendant said this.” someone testifying about what the defendant said to them is not hearsay.
Look, if you don’t know what the heck you’re talking about, then in GQ wouldn’t it be better to not post your guesses as though they were fact?
Hearsay is NOT "someone told me the defendant said this.
If Bob says to you, “I wear size 7 hats,” and then you go into court and take the stand, and the party that called you to the stand wants to prove that Bob wears size 7 hats, and asks you, “What size hats did Bob tell you he wears?” THAT QUESTION ELICITS HEARSAY.
It’s not third party. It’s a question about what Bob directly told you, and yet - gosh and golly! It’s still hearsay!
Hearsay is an out of court statement that is offered in evidence IN court in an effort to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
OK? Got it?
It may be admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule. But it’s hearsay. It’s the freaking definition of hearsay.
Much as I hate to nitpick Bricker, even his answer is arguably incomplete. Section 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (i.e., the rules in federal court) explicitly says that an out of court statement by a party to the case (such as the defendant) simply is not hearsay. It’s admissible not because it’s an exception, but because it’s not hearsay. The practical effects of this distinction are rather technical, of course. And state court rules may differ such that Bricker would be wholly correct there.
As others have noted, the next step is priest-penitent privilege, and the defendant would be able to exclude the statement on that basis. As an aside, the priest cannot get around the prohibition by telling his housekeeper and suggesting that she testify, because his statements to her are definitely hearsay.
I agree with others who have said that there does not appear to be any secular legal punishment facing the priest.
Well, not to trade nitpicks… but FRE 801(d)(2) refers to the case where the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and then testifies inconsistently with the prior statement, or consistently and the statement is offered to rebut recent fabrication. (In which case it wouldn’t be hearsay anyway).
Anyway, since the hypothetical crime was murder, and since murder is often (although by no means always!) a state crime, I did not delve into the federal vs. state evidence code morass.
But you’re right that there are differences which made my answer incomplete. In my jurisdiction, Va Evidence Code 2:803(0), “Hearsay Exceptions Where Availability Of Declarant Need Not Be Shown,” provides in relevant part:
This is analogous to FRE 804(b)(3):
OK, so where does this priest-penitent privilege come from? Client-lawyer makes sense, abrogating that cuts into the legal process and the pursuit of justice. Priest-penitent makes no sense other than being a particular society’s way of embracing part of a religion’s culture. Are there equivalent other forms of privileged conversation? Student-schoolteacher? How about owner-slave?
Right now here in Oz, as in many other places, we are still seeing the fallout of church based sexual abuse scandals. We are facing the prospect of senior members of the church being charged with various offences in obstructing justice. Mostly information about the abuse came from channels other than the confessional, however I find it hard to imagine that information provided in a confession could be afforded legal protection in such cases.
Then again, what happens if the priest is then arrested for the murder?
The short answer is that it comes from the relevant evidence codes; in my jurisdiction it’s found in Rule 2:503, “Clergy and Communicant Privilege:”
If you’re asking, from a historical standpoint, why the evidence code permits such a privilege to exist. . . . that’s a longer post than I’d care to compose unless there’s a real interest in the backstory, but I think it’s fair to say that it has a long ancestry, arising at common law as far back as James I and arguably even to the Norman invasion.
No to both. But there’s spousal privilege, which protects private communications between husband and wife – and, one supposes, now between husband and husband and between wife and wife. Patient-physician privilege protects communications for the purpose of medical treatment between a patient and his healer. And the interpreter privilege binds any translator who facilitates an otherwise privileged communication between a deaf or non-English speaking person and another is bound by the same privilege that attaches to the original communication.
I don’t know what the law in Australia is, but my view is the opposite: I find it hard to believe that information provided in a confessional would NOT be afforded legal protection. It certainly would in the United States, in both federal court and every state court I’m aware of.
It mostly traces back to Church doctrine (Catholic, because that was the only one back circa 400 AD).
There are also such privileged communications between doctor-patient, covering all kinds of physical & mental health workers. (Even your massage therapist – I’ve heard of cases where one such could not be forced to testify in a worker comp case). And of course, spouses have the same privilege.
The justification for these is that society is better off if such intimate, personal communications are honest & truthful, and being able to force them to be revealed in Court would threaten that. For example, a patient might be hesitant to talk to his doctor about fear that he may be becoming dependent on prescription painkillers and ask for treatment, if the doctor could be forced to testify about that conversation.
I’m sorry, but you’re looking at 801(d)(1).
FRE 801(d)(2) does not require that the declarant have testified; it simply says that a confession, under any circumstances, is not hearsay.
:eek:
Whew! I feared the worst there back at the “I hate to nitpick…” followed by the “not to trade nitpicks…”, but thankfully rhetorical nicety yields to GQ best practices.
D’oh! Right you are.