Is this A380 OK (after a crappy landing)?

Yes. With some caveats.

Once on the ground most of the technology is gone, it’s just you and the rudder pedals keeping it straight. It appears in the video that the pilot is out of sync with the aircraft. He/she is just reacting to what is happening and failing to anticipate. A taildragger won’t let you get away with that the way a tricycle undercarriage aircraft (of any size) will. Once the CofG starts swinging out past the line of the main wheels you go past the point of no return and there is absolutely nothing you can do to stop it. A taildragger is unstable, you have to work to keep it straight and on the runway. If the A380’s pilot was thinking about controlling the jet the way a taildragger pilot does, then the big swings would not have happened.

Does that mean that if that particular pilot had flown a tail dragger the previous day they would’ve landed the A380 better? Not necessarily. But if the pilot was in the habit of flying aeroplanes rather than just managing the flight and if they were awake to the fact they would have to really fly this aeroplane all the way down to taxi speed they would be much more likely to be on top of things.

Agreed with LSLGuy’s comments on pilots who are just airplane steerers.

I think he unruddeddered too much for that plain.

its got massive height , and basically the windage overpowered what tyre grip he had.
Maybe the skidding tyres also contributed toward sideward slide… if they are skidding in the forwards direction they loose grip for holding off sideways skid too.

Anyway the basic fact is that the wheel struts are weaker than the frame. If they land one wheel down too hard, far better that strut buckles than it breaks the frame and breaks open a fuel tank. Did you ever see a plane with the wheel strut shot up through the frame ? A co-pilot with a wheel strut up his butt because they dropped the nose a bit hard ? No ? Well thats because the struts are designed to avoid damaging the frame to which they attach. When the strut folds over, then the fuselage hits the ground… The outer layers again designed protect the frame from damage in various ways… eg by folding the fuselage instead of folding the backbone.

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My brother recently transitioned to the A320 after 20+ years in various USN, McD-D, & Boeing products.

He said that one of the truisms they repeat at the training center is “An Airbus will make a poor pilot into a mediocre pilot. An Airbus will make an excellent pilot into … a mediocre pilot.”

You simply have to operate the airplane the way the computers expect you to operate the airplane. If not it’ll bite back. They programmed in what they thought was enough finesse. Any pilot attempt to add more finesse backfires. Usually not much, but sometimes a lot. C’est la guerre! :shrug:

I may have a concrete example of this regression to the mean. I did a lot of FEA on the pilot controls for the Boeing 787 back in the mid-aughts. The 787 is fully fly-by-wire, and I was a little astonished at how much expense and added weight Boeing was putting into making those controls seem like traditional hydraulically-actuated ones.

The yoke is essentially on a ~1 meter long lever, and there’s a big, somewhat complex linkage from that long lever to an actuator which provides feedback, simulating the “feel” of hydraulic controls. This is a good idea because it gives the pilot an idea of what’s happening at the control surfaces.

It’s analogous to power steering on a sports car: Porsche tries to leave as much “steering feel” as possible because it’s useful information for the driver, helping indicate that the car is about to oversteer or hydroplane.

The actuators and linkages add a whole lot of extra weight compared to Airbus’ sidestick, which is essentially a fancy joystick. When I did my little bit on the 787, the program was in big trouble for being overweight. It would be madness to redesign the pilot controls at that point, but it was clear that even though low mass was central to the 787 program, Boeing was willing to add significant extra weight to provide feedback through the pilot controls.

When you engage the autothrottle (cruise control, essentially) on a Boeing, the throttle levers move as the computer adds or removes thrust to match the autothrottle setting. The pilot can put a hand on the levers and feel what’s going on as the autothrottle adapts to small changes in wind conditions (or large changes such as wind shear).

My understanding from a pilot friend who flies A320s is that when you engage the autothrottle on an Airbus, the levers don’t move at all, so the pilot doesn’t get this haptic feedback about throttles and, by extension airspeed/wind trends. As far as I know, Airbus sidesticks don’t provide force feedback either.

So I can see why LSLGuy suggests that Airbus products make excellent pilots into mediocre ones. Excellent pilots make use of the yoke/throttle feedback to understand the state of the aircraft in a way that’s otherwise unavailable.

As an engineer, I dislike both approaches. Boeing builds a fly-by-wire plane while retaining much of the weight and complexity of a pure-hydraulic control format. Airbus “protects” the pilot from information it decides he/she doesn’t need to know about (and filters out pilot inputs it thinks the aircraft doesn’t need to know about).

The Boeing/Airbus divide is a false dichotomy; either could have the best of both worlds by implementing force-feedback sidesticks and moving autothrottles. That would be a lot lighter and (mechanically) simpler than Boeing’s approach while providing all of the haptic information Airbus throws away.

In reality, Boeing’s got a strong argument for using giant actuators and linkages to simulate its older controls: it makes it much easier for pilots to switch between different Boeing aircraft, reducing training costs and minimizing the opportunity for interface-based pilot error. Plus, since both yokes are mechanically linked together, both pilots know immediately if the other is trying to fly the plane.

I think Airbus is on shakier ground for not implementing force feedback/moving autothrottles. Consumer force-feedback joysticks have been a thing for decades; adding force feedback to sidesticks would be really easy (as aviation upgrades go). And although many Airbuses will sound an audio “DUAL INPUT” warning when both pilots think they’re flying the plane, stressed pilots often don’t process audio warnings. If Airbus made both sticks vibrate under conflicting inputs (or, better yet, used actuators to make both move synchronously) this wouldn’t be a problem.

A typical sports car at least has a solid mechanical connection between the steering wheel and the tires. My Q50 (not exactly a Porsche, I know…) has dispensed with that altogether, and has a system much like the 787: It’s truly steer-by-wire, with sensor/actuator redundancy built into it. Sensors tell the computer the steering wheel position, and the computer commands commensurate front wheel steer angle via electric servo motors. “Steering feel” is provided, presumably through other servo motors installed for the express purpose of providing such feedback. I don’t know whether it’s real feedback based on force transducers in the steering linkage, or whether it’s just some speed-appropriate level of steering wheel counter-torque that ignores what’s actually happening at the car’s front wheels.

When the car is turned off, or when the computer determines that the steering system has gone well and truly nuts, it engages a clutch that does in fact give you a direct mechanical link between the steering wheel and the tires.

Even relatively small aircraft with mechanical linkages have artificial feel, particularly in the elevator circuit. I remember the Dash 8 had various contraptions designed to increase the loading on the control column based on both speed and G. The faster you went the harder it would be to pull back on the column and also pulling more g forces would increase the forces on the column. The goal is to make it physically difficult to over stress the plane.

Superb post overall. IOW it matches my understanding and prejudices perfectly. :slight_smile: Seriously, its very insightful and flows from your place on the inside of all this stuff where you can see what’s going on.

Ref the snip above, you’re spot on. But first a bit of history for the rest of our audience:

When the A320 first came out and Boeing was real proud of their latest invention, the 767, that dichotomy was very real and very stark. Other than using an IRS + FMS for navigation and CRTs for instruments there was nothing in common between the two manufacturers’ design. This was the mid 1980s.

Over time on their newer airplanes Boeing has gone about 95% of the way to Airbus’ approach to what’s going on in the innards. While going zero percent of the way towards Airbus’ cockpit design.

Meanwhile, Airbus’ newer planes have moved exactly zero percent of the way towards an airplane that behaves and pilot-interfaces like a traditional airplane. I don’t know how much that’s a matter of preserving fleet commonality, Gallic pride, and German hidebound engineering. I’m pretty sure all three have a big role.

So the dichotomy has largely been resolved in the guts but is still real stark at the UI level. And of course, humanity loves a narrative, so the dichotomy story has a real following in both the trade press and the user community.
Meantime the bizjet makers, particularly Gulfstream, and now Bombardier with their CS series of big small jets (or is that small big jets?) have split the difference and come up with a better system than both. Which is, as you suggest, autothrottles that move the thrust levers and side sticks that provide force feedback and appear to be mechanically connected even though it’s all done with software, electricity, & magic.

There are other subtleties in the flight control laws where IMO Airbus chose something that made sense on 1980s paper but hasn’t proven to be a good idea. These other folks (and Boeing) are choosing different hierarchies of behavior and getting a machine which is both easy to fly and which make it hard(er) to paint yourself into a corner when it’s a really bad day at work. Meantime their cockpits provide the needed haptics to so the pilot isn’t struggling to get the feedback to grok what’s going on when shit gets dynamic.
When and how Boeing takes the first jump into sidesticks and when/how Airbus decides to … evolve … their UI & control laws will be interesting. Both teams are just now sidling up to their first clean-sheet design since these issues have come to the fore. And their first design since other manufacturers have shown them a middle way that preserves corporate face while working better IMO than either extreme.

Airbus having just bought Bombardier’s CS series will force them to confront a different approach to flight controls and cockpits. Whether they choose to learn from it or ignore it will be instructive.

The omens are not good; when Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas there was some expectation Boeing might absorb some of Douglas’ approach to airliners as they continued to build and sell the MD90 & 717 (nee MD95). Nope. They cancelled them both as fast as they could get away with ignoring all the promises made before the buy-out to local Congressmen about keeping the factories open. While studiously ignoring the several design things Douglas did well that Boeing didn’t. NIH & corporate politics carried the day.