And some inverse is often the cause of their conversion. I have another friend who dresses daily in Libertarian Party colors, who became a flaming Libby because (25 years ago) California would not let her bring her non smog-compliant car into the state. So all gummint became oppression and she never shuts up about it.
Frankly, I am daily thankful that Libertarians weren’t in charge when it came time to start implementing pollution controls. We’d all be wandering around the smoking wasteland postulated for our future around 1970.
This is the final argument of Libertarians who can’t be held to an accountable answer - that no Libertarian THEY know of would say such a thing. Which means, in my experience, that Libertarianism is a party of individuals who don’t agree on anything except that non-Ls are too stupid to understand.
Well, if I may suggest, why not wait until someone actually makes a “let the weak perish” argument in this thread before you get to your 15th post about how you see it all the time?
Isn’t the question: Is the desert contract enforceable? So it is a legal question. The common law has long had a doctrine of undue influence, which in parts states that a party who purports to make a contract in the face of exceptional, (generally) short-lived stressors, and would renounce that contract once the stressor is removed, will be found not to have genuinely accepted the terms of the offer.
The desert scenario would probably be one of undue influence. The excessive demand in light of the actual cost of the rescue would also be avoided as unconscionable.
Instead, the court would likely conduct its own factual inquiry into the cost of the rescue and hold the rescuee responsible for those costs (plus perhaps an overhead) on the doctrine of quantum meruit.
The question presented in the OP is: In general, would a libertarian regime adopt defenses to contractual performance such as undue influence and unconscionability.
There’s an interesting concrete example: many states have laws against profiteering in emergency events. If a hurricane is approaching, the law prohibits selling bottled water, or batteries, or plywood, or bandages, at grossly marked-up prices.
Many libertarians have argued against these laws, saying that the government has no business regulating “free trade.” Supporters of the laws point out that having a hurricane looming over you is, in itself, a severe limitation on “freedom,” and that the purchases of emergency supplies is not a part of the natural, organic free market.
On the other hand, by disallowing the price to increase to match demand, one also promotes gratuitous purchasing by risk-averse, but perhaps not very imperiled, consumers. So by forcing the price of batteries to stay low, the suburbanite who’s not in the direct path of the disaster doesn’t have to weigh seriously the trade-off between buying now-expensive generators versus the actual risk he faces — because he no longer has to confront this trade-off at all.
It also removes the salutary effect of negatively encouraging those suburbanites to purchase emergency supplies early on. This is desirable because these suburbanites are usually better able to afford stocking up on emergency supplies early, and then those who are less able to afford them are not confronted with as bad a supply shock when the looming peril of disaster is no longer capable of being deferred.
So by implementing price controls, we fail to direct resources to those who value them most highly in favor of those who tend to have more ready access to the marketplace (i.e., richer people). We also fail to take advantage of the coordination advantage that price gouging creates: rich people buy earlier in order to avoid high prices immediately preceding the disaster; this, in turn, means that fewer people are buying generators when they are needed most and in shortest supply. Other people pay high prices, but they are less likely to faced cleared-out inventories. (And as noted, low inventory situations themselves favor rich people).
I used to consider myself a libertarian (note the lower-case l); I’m sure many libertarians are intelligent, good-spirited, with good ideas. The problem is sophomores who, like a child with a hammer, seize on one idea and apply it everywhere. We saw this just a few days ago: A certain Rob Rock, or such, mentioned computers as products where free-market worked well, and extrapolated that Food Safety should be privatised. Or Republicans who note that decreasing tax on the rich from 70% to 60% increases their incentives and therefore conclude that no tax on the rich can ever be too low. (Again, thank Rob Rock for this brilliant analysis.)
In these forums we have definitely heard from people calling themselves “Libertarians” who have proposed blatant absurdities. I’ve asked Libertarian Dopers to start their own thread “Let’s Agree on our Platform – Libertarians ONLY Please.” Until they do that, the rest of us will continue to poke fun at their self-caricatures.
And of course it means that people who would otherwise be able to afford one, can’t. And it increases the likelihood of people taking what they need by force, and of revenge killings if the price gouging gets people killed.
Genesis 25:
[29] Once when Jacob was boiling pottage, Esau came in from the field, and he was famished.
[30] And Esau said to Jacob, “Let me eat some of that red pottage, for I am famished!” (Therefore his name was called Edom.)
[31] Jacob said, “First sell me your birthright.”
[32] Esau said, “I am about to die; of what use is a birthright to me?”
[33] Jacob said, “Swear to me first.” So he swore to him, and sold his birthright to Jacob.
[34] Then Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentils, and he ate and drank, and rose and went his way. Thus Esau despised his birthright.
Not that Libertarians should care for Scripture . . .
Price gouging’s a great example of what’s wrong with libertarianism. For most people, a disaster’s an opportunity for people to pull together, cooperate, and support each other. For libertarians it’s a chance to exploit each other.
On the other hand, my dad couldn’t afford to buy local gasoline last year when the derecho hit. It wasn’t that the price went up, it was that the wait time shot way up. Had he had the option of paying for the scarcity with dollars rather than hours, he would have been able to afford it. (It was also a good example of the market having imperfect information. There was wait-free gas 20 minutes down the road, but people panicked and waited for hours at the first open station they saw.)
If they were not able to afford it before disaster was looming, why would they suddenly be able to once it was imminent? If they could have, but did not, then you see why the coordination effect of increased prices is valued: we want to encourage preparedness before it becomes necessary.
Increased access to funds has not ever been a hallmark of an impending disaster or its recent aftermath, in my experience. That is to say, people don’t magically fund more money during a crisis. So either these people could have afforded it long ago, or they can’t afford it at all.
Yes, there are some people who can’t afford emergency supplies at any time. How do price controls help them? By hypothesis they can’t even afford non-disaster rates.
Price controls are little more than subsidies for the adequately-funded indolent.
:rolleyes: What makes you think they couldn’t? People tend to buy things when they are needed.
Or they just can’t afford to buy every single thing for every single possible problem.
Ah, libertarians; they just can’t resist sneering at those they consider “inferior”.
How about, “Price controls are to keep the vulnerable from being exploited, and to keep would-be exploiters from being robbed and killed”. Like many libertarians, I note that you assume that your victims will passively take unlimited amounts of abuse without retaliating.
I agree with this. Say a natural disaster wipes out the power in a particular area, but just outside the affected area, there is a hotel. Under the price controls, they can’t charge more than the $70/night they were charging prior to the disaster.
Everyone wants to stay there including,
1: Grandma, who needs power to her oxygen supply or else she would die.
2: Partiers who want to drink booze and have air conditioning.
Under the “no price control” scenario, the partiers would see the increased cost as not worth it and stay home. Grandma would see it as an absolute necessity and a room would be available for her.
Under the price controls, she has to stand in line behind guys with their crates of liquor and may not get a room.