J'Accuse!! Let's talk Dreyfus!

It’s been a long time since I studied Sociology at Uni, so I may be a bit rusty, but I’m trying to stay current, so here’s my FWIW.

The issue of individual versus state rights has been the core of most philosophical arguments for more than 400 years, and can be seen primarily as trying to define the concept of citizenship.

In the modern analysis, you come ultimately down to three possible readings (points taken largely from the same source)

1. The liberal citizenship. The individuals, as bearers of universal, equal and publicly affirmed rights, are the sovereign authors of their lives, pursuing their private advantage or conception of the good without being beholden to the community. The role of politics in this approach is negative : only to aid and assist individuals from interference by others. This definition conforms to the concept of “the unencumbered self”.

The major critique of this approach is that the “citizen” becomes by definition an abstract, stripped of all particularity. It can be argued that by stripping citizens of their particularity, liberal theory has also stripped them of their identity, and therefore of their ability ot form communities. It is said that citizens of a liberal state are, and must remain, strangers to one another
2. the republican citizenship. A community can be formed only by a conception of the good that overrides the individual choices of its members - the priority of right over good. Republicans foster the view that a moral community should foster civic virtue - politics is a communal affair and citizenship is an enduring political attachment. Members experience their citizenship not merely as protective individual rights but rather as active participants in the common good.

3. the nationalist citizenship (also called ethno-nationalist or volkisch). With the same concept of the common good as the republican concept, the nationalist approach says that citizenship is not an expression of individual rights, but of descent from a homogeneous group. In this approach, the conflict between the individual and the state (liberal), or between the community and the state (republican) is absent. The community is a nation with distinct cultural markers such as language, religion and history.

So, enough of the theory - how does all this relate to Dreyfus.

It seems to me that the essential question in the OP is whether the rights of the state are essentially superior to the rights of the individual - IOW does the common good of the community strip the individual of his/her citizenship. I don’t think there’s an exact mathematical solution to this question. Each one of the models has strengths and weaknesses and most are present to some degree in all societies. The mix essentially defines the character of the community. IMV, a sudden shift within any stable community toward one of the three elements is most dangerous. The nearest match to a pure liberal society was the Weimar Republic, and its failure lead to the creation of the other extreme, a pure nationalist nation state in which indivdual rights were totally obliterated by the perception of the common good.

In the case of France the tradition of the post-revolutionary liberal society, strongly rooted in all layers of society, was being attacked by reactionary forces, which explains why the case had such a strong influence on the public for so long. If in the long run France emerged as a better society then the damage done was justified.

However, it’s hard to see how this relates to something like the OP’s questions

so maybe I’ve missed something.

Rampisad, excellent post; I wish that had been my OP.

Now that the compliments are over with, the criticism. :wink:

I would strongly disagree that liberal society was “strongly rooted” in all, or even any, layers of French society at the time of the formation of the French Republic, or even at the time of the Dreyfus affair, 20 years on.

From the time of the French Revolution to the foundation of the Third Republic, France had experienced only 6-10 years of democracy (depending on how democratic one considers particular periods during the Revolution itself); 2/3 of the delegates to the National Assembly that founded the Third Republic were monarchists; a republic was a compromise brought about because the monarchists could not agree who to put on the throne, the Bourbon heir, the Orleanist pretender, or another Bonaparte. The vote to found the Republic was passed with a majority of only 1 vote.

As for the relevance to the death penalty and DNA, etc., the relevance is that a theme in the debate over whether retesting should be permitted in this or that case is what is the greater good, respect for the finality of verdicts rendered by a jury of peers (and thus respect for our system of criminal justice), against a post-trial determination of actual guilt or innocence.
While rarely expressed so starkly, the underlying issue is whether to expose a legally-determined “fact” as incorrect causes more harm than the execution of an innocent.

Sua

SuaSponte

My knowledge of French history is as thin as the hair on top of my head, so I’m bowing to you on that. However, I’d like to continue the debate on what you said

**.

In my post, I was trying to come to grips with the concept of citizenship, which can be seen in one sense as the definition of the individual in relation to society. I don’t necessarily believe that democracy in and of itself has specific merits in this regard (although in practice it can be shown that a democratic society is more likely to honour the relationship).

I can think of many instances of democratic societies that have swung too far over to the non-liberal model while still retaining their essentially democratic foundation. A good example would be USA in the McCarthy era. Similarly, I could cite Jordan under King Hussein as an example of a non-democratic regime where a “benign dictator” ruled essentially in liberal mode. (That said, I guess I would always opt for living in a democracy, since it offers the option for self-correction of temporary aberations.)

Finally, now that I understand better the relevance of the OP’s reference to DNA, I can put in my 10 cents worth. The fear of wrongful conviction underpins my fundamental opposition to the death penalty. Any legal system that cannot sustain constant review and revision of its processes and decisions in the light of fact is not worthy of support.

It really all boils down to whether you would give up your red pants.

“Les pantaloons rouge, ils sont la France!” - Members of the French Army