The difference is that armies grew enormously in size during this era. What used to be a burden became a disaster for the local population, where the armies, raised by conscription, attempted to live off the land.
The 30 years war was not typical of warfare in the following century.
It is also worth pointing out that the English did not attempt to live off the countryside - even in France. There is an amusing anecdote about how, when Wellington moved into France, the locals would more readily accept French money - so he collected a bunch of forgers (easily found among his troops!) and “made” some - which was better in silver content than the real stuff!
In Spain, this strategy proved absolutely disasterous for the French (let alone the Spanish), as it roused the entire countryside against them - requiring the French to dispurse their troops to hold the country, and allowing the British, numerically inferior, to defeat the French “in detail”.
To quote another maxim - “he who defends everything defends nothing”. If the French require control of the countryside to feed, concentration of troops becomes impossible where that countryside is hostile …
Yes; but, between the end of the religious wars in the 17th Century and the beginning of the French Revolution in the 18th, armies in Europe had evolved into small-to-medium-sized forces of salaried career soldiers, employed by national kings/governments, with a much higher standard of discipline, who could always depend on their supply train. Plundering the civilians in the countryside they passed through fell out of practice, and, in Napoleon’s time, seemed like a shocking and untraditional innovation, fit for an amoral age. I recall a story of a general in Spain who begged Napoleon for funding, and Napoleon wrote back that he was growing weary of a general “who, at the head of 50,000 men, asks for things instead of taking them”; which paradigm-shifter hit that general like a 2-by-4 upside the head.
Robert E. Lee’s troops marching north during both the Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns would offer payment to local merchants and citizens… in near-worthless Confederate currency.
All true - but again, I emphasize that this habit of just taking stuff from the Spanish did not serve the French well as a tactic (in addition to being horribly oppressive).
Excellent point. I’ve recently been reading about the Thirty Years’ War and some of its notable commanders – Turenne, Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Maurice of Nassau, and all their homies. In battle after battle, their forces seem smaller than I would have expected – 15,000 men vs 20,000 men, for a typical example of a major battle. So far in my reading, the battle of Breitenfeld seems to have been the largest, at 41,000 vs 35,000.
Contrast that with Napoleonic France putting 600,000 men into the field. It was certainly an order of magnitude more pressure on any population in the path of foraging parties.
Compared to the French monarchy, as a ruler of France, most likely Napoleon was better than the old French Kings. Compared to some of the revolutionary governments he would have been superior as well. Yes, as a conqueror he probably wasn’t great for the conquered peoples. But as a ruler of France he’d probably rank as the most benign European ruler of a major power in his era after George III / Parliament in the UK. Definitely better to live as a Frenchman under Napoleon than a Russian under the Tsars.
An army larger than 50,000 is awkward to the general who commands it, to the soldiers who compose it and to the munitionaires who supply it.
Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne ( aka Turenne ).
During the Thirty Years War the average French field army numbered 14,700. By the Dutch War that had risen to 24,500. By the Nine Years War, 39,000. Those are averages. The largest army ever fielded during Louis XIV’s years was ~80,000, which was probably about at the upper practical limit of field command and control at the time and kind of represented a plateau.
Malplaquet in 1709 was probably already about the largest engagement in that century with about 86,000 allies vs. 75,000 French. I don’t think you’ll find a bigger one until the 1800’s, through all of the major 18th century European wars including the Austrian Succession and Seven Years wars. And though that massive battle was fought with a very high degree of professionalism, much of that was probably down the exceptionally high quality of senior generalship on the field and the fact that there were two very good commanders to a side ( Marlborough/Savoy vs. Villars/Boufflers ) working unusually well together in a period when petty rivalries between touchy, aristocratic, egocentric commanders compromised more than a few engagements.
OTOH, not so great to be a soldier in Napoleon’s army, he considered them all lavishly expendable, and abandoned an army in the field more than once. In fact, he was always psychopathically indifferent to how much blood might be spilled, French or foreign, soldiers’ or civilians’, to achieve his ends.
It wasn’t until roughly the turn of the 20th century that deaths from combat became the leading cause of deaths in war, prior to that deaths from disease exceeded deaths from combat, often by a very wide margin. For example, Union battle deaths in the Civil War were ~110,000 while disease killed ~250,000. As late as the Spanish-American War US combat deaths were 332 while death from disease totaled 2,957.
I think it’s fair to say that Napoleon’s domestic agenda was considerably more enlightened and benign than most of his contemporary European rulers. And to a certain extent, Napoleon tried to expand this agenda to some of the places France conquered. However, the practical hardships of war often negated any good will that Napoleon’s reforms might have brought. It’s hard to be grateful to someone for granting you equality in the court system while his soldiers are stealing your sheep. I do agree that France didn’t initiate those wars, so I’m not sure how much personal blame Napoleon should get for that.
I don’t think Napoleon should be viewed through rose colored glasses. He was a man who was quite willing to kill large numbers of people to advance his own position. But once again, that describes a lot of Napoleons contemporaries, and I do think Napoleon should get a bit of credit for laying the groundwork that would ultimately lead to Europe being wrested from the control of hereditary aristocracies.
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