BTW, Ryan, why do you keep referring to Coalition troops as “MNF”? What’s that stand for?
:dubious:
Knowing how the “legitimate” government had to spike the original leader the Shiites wanted thanks to pressure from the US, and Bush ignoring on purpose requests by the new leaders to set a time line to leave. Then I have to say that a comment like in this quote is the one that deserves to be laughed at.
You implied that the majority don’t have to be factor in the nature of a resistance organisation, only a section of the populace, which implies that that section of the populace is the only patriotic element of that country, and the rest are traitors to ‘the cause’ because they don’t want to participate in resisting the ‘occupier’ even though that occupier has enabled 2 thirds of the countrys population to elect people they want into office.
Of course they support attacks against foreign targets, but it’s surprising they don’t want attacks against Iraqi security forces, forces which those foreign occupiers have created.
Sadr rebelled in 2004, launched numerous attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF in general, however his party is now a part of the Iraqi government, a government in part created by those occupying powers which he was against.
Nice try, but that kind of political decision making has to be made within in the Iraqi Parliament, and voted on, it cannot be made arbitrality on the request of a vice President and President, both which have less powers than that of the PM.
Nice tap dancing there.
Backing up a little:
Last time I heard of them he (and almost all other Shiites) demanded the US and coalition forces to cede military control of operations (or leave). (at the same time that Iran was in the middle negotiating the impasse that Iraqis had when deciding the composition of the “legitimate” government.) Guess what the US did?
I think I’ve said all I need to say to you in the Pit.
No, i’m saying *both * those groups can be patriotic. They likely have the same end goals, but they see different means of getting to them.
Not really. There’s a big difference between fighting occupiers and fighting collaborators. Sure, there may be dislike (even hate) for those who work with the coalition, but it’s a lot harder (especially when power is at a local level, as is the case here) to attack people you know rather than people you don’t.
So? In both cases he was (presumably) acting in the way he thought best to get the end result he wanted. I notice also you mention that the government was in part created by the coalition troops; and as such not by Iraqi voters.
If I am not mistaken, it is Patton. Really, they used the music from Patton. It was on last week, so I am pretty certain.
I’ll also have to point out, that it is simply a flash animation that shows where an operation occurred. It comes complete with troop movement arrows, as if they are manuvering against a formation. I think they are really thinking it is WWII they are depicting. Since there are no results of any of the actions, and Baghdad is considered a “Clear and Hold” operation, which remains on the map after its first action, it seems that they are listing any action, successful or not. Not much of a cite for anyone being driven from anywhere.
This site has a breakdown of US casualties by period and location. The most recent period (Dec 15 - present ) shows that soldiers are still dying in those areas, and soldiers are dying overall at roughly the same rate. So, if they did drive them out of those areas, into Baghdad, it does not seem like it really did much good. Since, it seems clear that now, they really do not control Baghdad to a meaningful degree.
As for an 80% voting rate meaning a 20% support rate for insurgents, or any variation on an 80% voting rate meaning anything:
In Lebanon, the warring parties often formed “national unity” governments. They did not do much to stop its civil war, for the most part. In fact, their first civil war was started due to one of the parties having a hard time in the polls. Even if the support rate of the various insurgent groups did total just 20% (which I do not think is the case), that percentage of the population can tear the rest of the population a new one, if they are being armed from outside, which is likely the case, wouldn’t you say?
One frame for thinking of the separate Iraqi ethnic and religious groups would be Spain, with its Catalans, Basques, and so forth. Here’s a piece from yesterday’s Sydney paper about the Catalan autonomy vote. It would be silly to say that one can’t be a Catalan patriot simply because Catalans are a minority within the larger nation of Spain, which has a legitimate democratic government.
Stephen Maturin might be a fictional character, but his creator, the late Patrick O’Brian, clearly would have thought it silly too. 
One final rebuttal to Ryan_Liam as he slides into persona non grata status:
OK, it wasn’t the wording: the underlying question was stupid.
And the lessons of this example are?
This doesn’t change the fact that Ryan’s ‘cite’ is a flash animation at somewhere called billroggio.com. IOW, he has no cite.
And this is a good thing how?? If AQ in Iraq (not AQ itself) can cause “the Capital [to] suffer extraordinary amounts of violence”, that’s unequivocally bad news.
Even if it means they’re not fucking up lightly-populated Anbar while they’re doing it.
Aside from the Pitted statement, the fact that Ryan “do[es]n’t see that situation coming” doesn’t make it any less likely. The track record is, security’s been going downhill in Iraq, despite the presence of 138,000 US troops and 227,000 quality Iraqi security forces. He has no evidence for why this trend should reverse itself.
Sounds like Ryan is just unwilling to acknowledge an unsupported assertion as an unsupported assertion.
If it’s not happening in 3 years, that leaves unanswered the question of exactly how long it will take.
And the results are what we see. Oops.
How long will they be there? Will they be doing anything useful, or just terrorizing the citizenry? Are they still there? (I haven’t heard anything about them in several days.)
And the German Army in 1944-45 was undoubtedly “carrying out countless counter” US-UK-USSR “operations throughout the country every day” as they were losing the war.
If the government is losing Baghdad as the result of a rational decision about resource allocation, what lesson does a rational person draw from that?
Bolding mine.
The situation in Kirkuk has been stabilized since mid-2003?? I don’t think there’s a cite for that. (Ryan’s cite doesn’t support that. He can go back there and figure out why, if he wants. :rolleyes:**)
It’s a simple enough question, I’ll dumb it down further if you like
Given the population of Iraq now, what percentage do you think it has influence over compared to militias and insurgents, it’s a simple enough question, estimates welcome.
Iraqi Government control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established.
Bill roggio has been to Iraq, he’s been to the Anbar province
If that isn’t enough, the Times (a UK paper) has an article on him going to Iraq.
Of course it is, but it’s also indicating of how much time and energy Al Queda in Iraq and numerous other insurgent groups are spending to disrupt life in Baghdad, but it’s large scale violence is not representative of the entire state of Iraq.
*Al-Qaida in Iraq has been increasingly focusing its attacks on Baghdad rather than on U.S. targets in western Iraq. “Baghdad is divided according to geographical area, and we know the al-Qaida leaders in each area,” al-Gharrawi said. *
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060614/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_060613183208
Of course :rolleyes:
Because Iraqi Army Police and Troops need more time to establish proper logistics and capable offensive ability independent of MNF support? Not to mention waiting until the fruits of NATO officer training south of Baghdad and support from British and US military institutions to build up a capable Iraqi military leadership comes about. These things take time, and in an insurgency, you know for a fact they’ll throw everything they can at these nacisent security forces to make sure they fail.
You made the assertion that I implied more people joining security forces = less insurgency, when you know that training and ability to be effectively put out into the field are other points to the question.
Yes it does, but since a country like Iraq has an ethnic, sectarian and religious dimension to it, most of which are violent, then one can assume it’s going to take more than three years to ‘get the job done’
Oops, I’m glad you see the incompetence of the Iraqi Army amusing or cause for sarcasm, but they’re doing an excellent job in the field even though they’re plagued by inefficiencies and bad equipment. ARVN they’re not. Basic officer training takes nine months at most (for Iraq) and we’ve been in the country for 3 years, you do the math.
Iraqi troops arrest leader of insurgent murder squad
Yes, the Iraqi Government is comparable to the Nazi Government in Berlin fighting 3 superpowers in 1944-45 in which millions were killed for the ideology of one dictator.:rolleyes:
In every war, insurgent or otherwise, there are limits concerning what a government can do with the resources it’s got, if however, the resources it has increases and they have the ability to increase the success of pacification, then of course the favour will turn to that of the Iraqi Government. Intelligence gathering takes time.
We’re talking about the ethnic tensions right? Well, what it’s describing is the stabilisation of Kurds (most of whom are still camped outside the city) being unable to forceably take over homes, and the PUK and KDP have taken action to prevent foreable relocation by Kurdish returnees.
Bombings and attacks are by insurgents who want to increase the ethnic tension within Kirkuk to make it perpetually unstable. I don’t see large scale insurgent activity being committed by angry Arab residents or rogue Peshmerga units wanting to kick the other side out.
I’m getting this flashback to 1969 here. (I think my hair is about to grow down to my shoulders again. ) Vietnam had a democratically elected government, and the Vietnamese forces kept taking on a bigger and bigger role. One difference - if I recall, Saigon was fairly safe to move around in.
Insurgencies on the run tend not to flee to the very center of power of their opposition and then function effectively there.
As for the security forces, I wonder what percentage of these new recruits are insurgents who have infiltrated. It appears that if you are living in a Sunni area, a Shiite government policeman is not a welcome sight.
That’s because Saigon had an army with the ability to secure the capital through ruthless military suppression, Diem anyone? One difference though, there is no Iraqi equivalent of a North Vietnam for it to be invaded by.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Vietnam#Politics
Not unless the population is large enough for them to hide within.
Well considering the majority of Iraq’s insurgents were within Sunni Areas, it obviously made the recruitment of local Sunnis into Government forces more difficult, which therefore forced the Governments hand into relying on Shia and Kurdish security forces until this could be compensated.
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Daily/May/060501.htm
Taken from Wikipedia
April 30, 2006
The first entirely Sunni class of Iraqis graduates from army basic training at Habbaniyah, Iraq[16]. It is the first visible sign of a new coalition strategy aimed at recruiting Sunnis in particular, hoping that a greater inclusion of Sunnis into the army will help quell the insurgency as well as sectarian violence. These group of graduates from Al-Anbar province are scheduled to serve in the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions.
It was already too dumb to make sense.
And RTFirefly control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established. And I’ve provided as much evidence for my assertion as you have for yours. But seriously, once I’m in full control of Iraq, it’ll be in great shape.
Afer reading about this damned war for three years, I’ve never heard of this guy. So Anbar trip or no, I’m not buying into his authority. But even if he speaks ex cathedra, that map doesn’t prove anything.
Sure, it’s taking a lot of time and energy. But if we were making progress, they wouldn’t be able to do this at all, no matter how much time and energy they were investing. Because they weren’t able to do this last year, or in 2004 or 2003.
Well, yeah. I’ve agreed for the sake of argument that the insurgency is all too successfully concentrating on Baghdad at the expense of Anbar. We just draw different conclusions as to what that means.
We’re their logistical support now. Will they provide better logistics than we do? I kinda doubt it. And their offensive capability with our logistic support should similarly be at least as good as that without it.
And again, you just assume that things will get better as a result of some future event. I’m getting kinda tired of Ryan_Liam’s Church of the Presumptuous Assumption.
OK, let’s roll tape:
Admittedly, that isn’t extremely intelligible, but that’s what it appears to mean.
A shame we didn’t know this before invading.
Oh, wait: lots of people discussed that problem at considerable length. But the Administration didn’t pay much mind.
At any rate, the sectarian and ethnic violence has been increasing over time. We were closer to having dealt with it last year than this year. And closer in 2004 than in 2005. And so forth.
You see, there are these things called ‘metrics’. The idea is, you measure how much time, money, etc. it might take to achieve a goal by measuring how much progress you’ve made and at what cost, and how much progress you still need to make. Then you can estimate how far you’ve come, and how far you still have to go.
But given that we’re getting further from our goal, depite our time, money, effort, and lives spent, the presumption is that it will take us an infinite amount of all of the above to get to where we want to be.
Yet another unsupported assertion.
Are you really that obtuse? I guess so.
The point was that the number of operations run doesn’t mean jack shit as far as progress towards a stable security situation goes.
Another of your patented “If things get better, then they’ll get better” arguments.
[/quote]
We’re talking about the ethnic tensions right? Well, what it’s describing is the stabilisation of Kurds (most of whom are still camped outside the city) being unable to forceably take over homes, and the PUK and KDP have taken action to prevent foreable relocation by Kurdish returnees.
[/QUOTE]
What it’s describing happened years ago. It’s not current. Your cite is dated August 2004. You’re using it to describe what’s happening there now.
I really can’t see any point in continuing this discussion. Presumptuous assumptions, two-year-old cites to describe the current state of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk, repeated “if things improve, they’ll improve” arguments, unintelligible comments…enough.
I don’t have a specific figure, but I am fairly certain that they can be recognized on sight; here’s a Flash animation that proves my point.
Ok, again I will ask the question, what’s your estimate of the Iraqi Governments influence of the population of the country, compared to insurgent and militia influence.
Given the fact no Iraqi army bases have been overrun by insurgents, or large amount of Police stations (you can never count on all Police Stations not being suspectible to being overrun) either, I can count on Iraq security forces being increasingly up to the challenge to counter the insurgency. Only a matter of time.
So you’re willing to believe what Madmonk has been talking about in Iraq, willing to believe what other people who aren’t in favour of this war are experiencing, yet you’re unwilling to take note of someone who’s travelled with US troops in one of the most dangerous parts of Iraq?
No, that’s because they had taken over Fallujah, Mosul, Tall Afar, Samarra, and didn’t need to place emphasis on the capital when they were doing so well in destroying Government order in the Sunni regions of Iraq.
The map shows the US and Iraqi forces moving into Anbar to establish themselves, since Anbar is sparsely populated, it makes it more difficult for insurgents to move around freely, so the concerntration would be Baghdad, where there is a relatively large population, cover, available arms, and a population which is at best suspicious of Shias.
Their support network only has to be better than the insurgents.
Then that’s fine then, but don’t expect a well trained first class Iraqi military in only 3 years of us invading the country.
All I was saying that those thousands of people who apply to the Iraqi Army are doing it more than for just money or food, patriotism can come into play.
Yeah, that’s why those Kurdish, Shia safe havens were set up.
Oh, wait: lots of people discussed that problem at considerable length. But the Administration didn’t pay much mind.
And 2003 to 2002, oh which brings us to the already sectarian deathhole that Iraq already was, but then that was State Terrorism comitting those acts, not insurgents.
Then lets have a look
Iraqi Elections 3 times
Iraqi Constitution
Iraqi Army and Police taking up more responsibilty
Iraqi Army and Police taking far more casualties than MNF forces.
Quote:
Oops, I’m glad you see the incompetence of the Iraqi Army amusing or cause for sarcasm, but they’re doing an excellent job in the field even though they’re plagued by inefficiencies and bad equipment. ARVN they’re not.
You’ve said it in another thread.
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=7478030&postcount=169
Quote:
Yes, the Iraqi Government is comparable to the Nazi Government in Berlin fighting 3 superpowers in 1944-45 in which millions were killed for the ideology of one dictator.
You’re claiming that 1944-1945, Nazi Germany is comparable to Iraq being able to fight off insurgents, in my view I don’t see the correlation.
It does if it brings about any meaningful results.
Quote:
In every war, insurgent or otherwise, there are limits concerning what a government can do with the resources it’s got, if however, the resources it has increases and they have the ability to increase the success of pacification, then of course the favour will turn to that of the Iraqi Government.
No, I was pointing out the limitations of security forces being able to prevent every terrorist attack. Since Iraqi intelligence services are being rebuilt as we speak, it’s going to be difficult to limit terrorist attacks no?
If there was evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kirkuk, it would of surfaced in the news plenty of times, my cite provided the facts of what the Kurdish leadership is doing in conjunction with the MNF to prevent this.
Too bad that ruthless army wasn’t so good fighting outside the city. Are you saying the South Vietnamese army was more effectve than the Iraqi one? Probably true, but it doesn’t bode well for the future. The old Iraqi army was, but a lot of them were Sunnis and on the other side.
As for the election, I’m sure you are too young to remember the optimism about them - the light at the end of the tunnel. As for the power grab, do you really think an awful lot happened without the tacit approval of the US? Guys who didn’t play ball got themselves deposed or worse.
Large and supportive enough, you mean. There were a few people in Saigon also.
Not quite what I meant. More like they’re going to disappear you - even if you’re a big name attorney. Some may be insurgents in stolen uniforms, true.
Of course disbanding the army, another clever BushCo move, didn’t help.
The reasons as to why Saigon was reasonably safe for US personnel was because by the time US forces landed in SV, there was already a sizeable security infrastructure in place. Not to mention, the most loyal and effective ARVN forces were stationed in the Capital.
As for the Iraqi Army, since it’s predecessor was disbanded, we’re building it from the ground up, one which doesn’t rely on loyalty of a particular ethnic group to get the job done.
An election that Iraqis can participate in and elect who they want undoubtebly eases the tension of maintaining an Iraqi Governing Council no? If we’re winning ‘hearts and minds’ we have to make sure we at least let Iraqis vote for who they want?
Yeah, I know about Tet and ‘mini Tet’ but you’re forgetting, in Vietnam there were different rules applied, such as disregarding civilian protection for one, and the ability of the SV to suppress the population.
Disbanding the army was a mistake yes, but what was a bigger mistake was not intiating a full demobilisation and disarmament of Iraqi Troops, not paying them, or providing pensions to retired military officers.
Based on the Altice-Breven Order Metric (developed in the late 40’s and used throughout the Cold War to measure political/military/social stability of nations/regions/cultural blocks), Coalition Forces currently control about 47% of Iraq (down from 52% in April). The number is lower if you weight for spatial diffusion as opposed to population density, but in Iraq the former metric seems largely irrelevant. It should be noted there’s a 3-5% degree of error due to (known and unknown) timing latencies in gathering data. P values within groups are constant, but values across groups must be measured in the same time slice (generally less than three days is considered optimal), but hat hasn’t always been possible in some regions of Iraq. This means it’s possible (although unlikely) the visible decrease in Order over the last few months is capricious (The August numbers should resolve the issue). In any event it’s safe to assume the number is in the upper 40s or low 50s.
Over 65% is considered the threshold for a region to be considered a ‘State’ by the scale. Most of Europe (for reference) is in the 85%-95% range. Under 30% is considered anarchy. Somalia is around 27% by the last measure (further testing will probably be impossible there).
Thank you, would it be safe to assume that this point seems to be a point of transistion? Where the options of total state collapse and state being strengthened could be chosen?