Not exactly … that was a plan (and certainly, the Nazis fulminated often enough about the Slavic hordes).
The Nazis were perfectly capable of cynically supporting some nationality they despised. What they could NOT do, was keep to any single coherent plan.
So, it may well have been in Nazi best interests to cynically support Slav minorities (only to betray, enslave and murder them later perhaps), but they could not muster the uniformity of purpose necessary for such a deception - some Nazi general or official, attempting to pursue such plans (and they did exist) would find their efforts undermined by others pursuing a “murder everyone” plan.
In these situations, the lowest common denominator wins out - a “support the nationalities” plan stands no chance.
See Hitler’s Empire - very good account of this process.
But do you recall why they were driving on Moscow? It was because the German generals were concerned that the Red Army would keep withdrawing and refusing to make a stand.
This was the traditional Russian strategy famously used against Napoleon and Charles XII. The Russians would keep their army on the move so the invader couldn’t bring it to battle and let the invader chase the army around the vast spaces of Russia until it outran its supply lines, was worn down by the terrain and weather, and had left its forces spread out in garrisons across the country. Then the Russians would gather their army together and attack. They would defeat the now-weakened invading army in battle and chase it out of Russia.
So the generals wanted to head straight for Moscow. Their plan was that the Soviets couldn’t afford to lose Moscow so they would have to gather their armies there to defend the city. This would allow the Germans to meet the Red Army in battle and crush it. The city itself wasn’t that important to the Germans (they planned on demolishing once the fighting was done). Moscow was only a goal for the Germans because that was where they expected the Soviets to make a stand.
Then Stalin did something unexpected. When the Germans invaded he decided to try to hold Kiev (which was the third largest city in the Soviet Union). He sent a massive amount of troops to defend the city.
The German generals wanted to bypass Kiev and stick with the original plan of heading to Moscow. But they had lost sight of the reason for doing that. The point of going to Moscow was that they expected to find the situation there that now existed at Kiev instead. They had the opportunity to win the kind of battle in Kiev that they wanted to win in Moscow. Hitler was the one who saw this and ordered them to redirect their attack to Kiev.
So the Germans attacked Kiev and won a huge battle. Over half a million Soviet troops were lost. It was exactly the kind of battlefield victory the Germans had been hoping for.
Of course, we know the Soviets survived this major defeat, kept fighting, and eventually won the war. But that doesn’t show the decision to delay the drive on Moscow was wrong. In terms of the German strategy, Kiev was Moscow - the Germans won the battle there that they expected to end the war. The problem for the Germans wasn’t that they went to the wrong city. Their problem was that their plan for winning the war by fighting one big battle hadn’t worked.
This is incorrect. Guderian was so opposed to the diversion south that he stormed uninvited into Hitler’s HQ to protest. Hitler brushed him off with some comment like “My generals know nothing of economics” and the diversion was on.
No, the WW2 Soviet official strategy from day one was to contest every inch of ground. The Red Army never authorized tactical withdraws of any size for the duration. It was the opposite of Russian Empire 1812 strategy, and was the main reason the Germans took millions of prisoners in 1941.
I doubt the Army Group South generals were opposed to the Kiev operation. Moscow’s importance was in that it was the USSR’s greatest industrial center, and was also the focal point of the European USSR’s railway system: all RR lines radiated from Moscow and Soviet logistics would have been badly disrupted by loss of the city.
It was not unexpected, and the Soviets were sending massive amounts of troops everywhere.
Those opposed to the Kiev operation did not want to bypass the city, but only not to divert forces from Army Group North to capture it. Army Group South would have kept pressing on Kiev, and would probably have captured it eventually.
Moscow did not enter in to German thinking a propos the Kiev operation. Those in favor of the Kiev operation assumed Moscow could be taken later. The idea behind Kiev was that it would tear the southern Soviet front wide open, and allow AGS to pour through and quickly capture the rich agricultural and mineral resources of Ukraine.
Whether it was worthwhile to postpone the advance on Moscow by about a month is the central debatable point of the 1941 war in the East
The Germans were under no illusion that the Kiev operation would end the war for them. It was clear by the start of the operation that there would be plenty of heavy going left even the operation was a complete success.
Apparently the desertion rate for German soldiers remained very low throughout the war. Desertion was considered outrageously shameful and a deserter could count on no aid from family and friends, and the government went to great lengths to catch and usually execute deserters, so the possibility of getting away with it was very small. Stephen Hart, The German Soldier in World War II.
Uh, regarding the weather / rasputitsa delaying Babrasossa, that claim is not unique to Keegan, not new, and as far as i know mainstream consensus.
Also, years ago I was under the impression that (as Dissonance suggests) self-justification by British proponents of the Greek intervention was the primary reason for claiming Marita delayed Barbarossa in the first place.
Really, this is credible, sourced, and uncontroversial.
As for wanting primary sources…seriously? Most people in this thread are not poring over WWII operational data, but repeating what they’ve read in secondary sources, including the person asking for this cite.
I’ll ask Sylvia Browne to conjure up a dead Nazi general for us, will that work?
So as I wrote, the Germans expected the Soviet strategy would be to withdraw. But the Soviets didn’t do what the Germans expected. And that’s why the German strategy needed to be changed.
I’m sorry, but this is so full of errors that it demands correction.
Bullshit. In 1941 tactical withdrawals were rarely (not never) authorized, but this was not the strategy in following years of the war. Their withdrawal in the face of the '42 summer offensive was why there were no huge bags of prisoners being scooped up, much to the dismay of the Germans.
I’m assuming Little Nemo meant the size of the force sent to the Kiev area was unexpected in relation to that sent to all other sectors of the front. It was. That the size of the forces being sent front wide was quite massive (and all of it unexpected, note Halder’s comment about reckoning on 200 divisions and already having counted 360 by August) does not change this fact.
It’s clear from context that Little Nemo meant bypassing the operation to take Kiev and stick with the main goal of Moscow rather than diverting forces. This is exactly what you are trying to ‘correct’ him to mean. You also mean AG Center, not AG North. Nothing from AG North was diverted to AG South for Kiev; in fact AG Center had to give up some of it’s panzers to AG North to aid in their operations in the direction of Leningrad at the same time as it had to give up the bulk to AG South for the Kiev encirclement.
Again it is clear to that Little Nemo wasn’t implying that Moscow would never be taken if the operations aimed at Kiev took place. The fact that the Germans subsequently undertook further operations towards Moscow makes this pretty obvious. The goal of the operation was not economic, it was, as Little Nemo has stated, to destroy the Soviet military in the field. The aim of Barbarossa was not to take particular pieces of ground, it was to deliver a body blow to the Soviet military, defeating it in the field and ending major operations before winter arrived. It proved an unfeasible goal, but that was the goal clearly laid out in Führer Directive 21:
AG Center wasn’t going anywhere further east until the logistical network caught up. Whether they could afford to then leave their left flank blowing in the wind with such a large Soviet force able to attack it at will anywhere on a hundred mile or longer front was a more important question; and as noted there was nothing mythical about Moscow. The German aim was to destroy the Soviet military in the field, not to take particular cities. The importance of Moscow in the operation was that the Soviet Army could be expected to stand and fight for it. The importance of Kiev was not the surrounding wheat fields of the Ukraine, it was that the Soviets had massed a large for to defend it.
In reading the responses, I wonder how the mighty German Army came to have such poor intelligence regarding Russia? I mean, they had the opportunity to plant agents inside Russia (in the "cooperation period of the 1920’s). Plenty of Germans spoke fluent Russian, and German technicians were in Russia supervising joint venture industrial projects. When General Halder says that they expected to be opposed by 200 Russian divisions (and met over 360)-this is a massive failure of intelligence. Time and gain, the Germans would receive big (and unpleasant) surprises:
heavy Russian tanks that no German anti tank guns could destroy
-tough, rugged fighter planes
-excellent tanks like the T-34-better than the MK-IV panzer
And also the excellent Russian espionage network (the “Red Orchestra” delivered accurate information of German military plans, often before German unit commanders got their orders.
Or did Hitler purposefully understate Russian capabilities? (if his generals knew the truth about the Red Army, they would have opposed Operation Barbarossa")?
It is reasonable to interpret this passage as meaning that the 1941 RA had been withdrawing and refusing to make a stand from the start of Barbarossa, in conformance with Russian Empire 18th and 19th century strategy.
It occurs to me at this point the consider whether large-scale planned withdrawals were part of much more recent WW1 Russian strategy. I don’t think so. Rather, withdrawals were earlier in the war forced by enemy breakthroughs and later the result of revolutionary tumult.
This passage could only mean that the Germans did not expect the1941 RA to make a serious effort to defend and hold Kiev.
I do not believe the Germans expected the USSR to yield any large tracts of ground without a fight, and certainly not a great city like Kiev.
This is actually a matter of considerable discussion and debate. German intelligence in World War II was guilty of a wide variety of rather astounding failures.
In general, I think it’s just the case that, systemically, Germany handled intelligence much worse than their opponents. To use the appropriate terms of art, a country or military gathers *intelligence information *(pieces of data and evidence) which through collation and analysis becomes intelligence (an understanding of matters of military interest.) The Germans were capable of gathering intelligence information just as well as the Allies, at least for the first half of the war. However, they consistently demonstrated a failure to correctly turn intelligence information into the correct intelligence. The reasons for this are numerous, but to cite some of the more obvious ones:
Nazism. Like it or not, the character of a nation’s leadership affects its ability to process intelligence information into intelligence. Many of the fundamental features of authoritarian, fascist leadership are precisely identical to the features of poor intelligence handling and military incompetence in general; contempt for one’s enemies, a disregard for long term consequences and trends, an obsession with minutiae in apposition to strategically important things, and a tendency to reject information that contradicts one’s assumptions.
The Germans put far too much emphasis on human intelligence - field agents - and not enough on other forms of intelligence, such as signals intelligence, aerial surveillance, and the like. Not that they didn’t do those things, but they were clearly not a big enough part of the German intelligence apparatus. Germany’s primary intelligence group, Abwehr, directed operations solely through field agents; other methods of gathering intelligence were delegated to subagencies, the Luftwaffe, etc., and tending to be less regarded by Abwehr analysts. In turn, the SS would conduct its own intelligence, and it and Abwehr would often not share over a turf war, with all the confusion and inefficiency you’d imagine that would involve.
It is noteworthy that there are several known cases where Abwehr made operational recommendations to the German military. As a former military intelligence professional, I cannot begin to explain to you how monumentally, colossally disastrous that is. Intelligence should NEVER make operational recommendations; that way lies madness. It is the job of an intelligence organization to be directed to what information the military needs to know, seek out the information, and convert that information into intelligence. Once the intel guys are driving the bus, you have an excellent idea of how you’re getting there but you don’t know where you’re going.
There is of course the fairly significant point that the head of Abwehr, Wilhelm Canaris, was at least a part-time traitor.
Another factor is how politicized Germany was under the Nazis. Hitler encouraged this. He deliberately gave people vague and overlapping areas of responsibility and let them compete against each other. The result was that these people were more concerned about beating each other than producing the best results. And part of this was telling Hitler the things you knew he wanted to hear rather than telling him the things he needed to hear. If you tried telling him a truth he found unpleasant, there would be some rival eager to gain influence by telling him something he preferred.
Other than that the Nazis weren’t around in the 1920s to plant agents?
Many of the Soviet’s spies were communists, and the country had many more years to weed out the fascists there.
I wonder if differences between the ideologies made a difference. It would seem much easier to find Germans committed to communism than Slavs committed to a party which wanted to err, kill them all.
So when General Halder finds out that the Red Army is actually 3 times the size that the Abwehr had predicted, what does Hitler do? This must have been a very scarey time to be a German Intelligence chief-the army is angry, Hitler is angry..and you realize that Germany (despite its superhuman efforts) will lose the war!:eek:
German military cooperation with the Soviets predated the Nazi regime. German Army intelligence was also interested in assessing the Soviet Army..long before Hitler came to power. German tank engineers worked under contract to the Russian government, as did aircraft manufacturers. Germany should have had a tremendous database on Soviet military developments-funny how this was mostly ignored.
Although I suppose he was, literally, a traitor, a better, and fairer, characterization of Canaris and his efforts in this regard would be “hero”. He took huge risks and would ultimately pay with his life.
I would of course agree, but in the context of German intelligence failing, the suggested reason is Canaris’s betraying his own side; it should be obvious what I meant.
By “authorized retreat” I mean Stavka permission before the fact for withdrawal by a USSR unit from the continuous front line . Surrounded units would not be required to obtain permission, except in exceptional cases such as the defenders of the Brest-Litovsk fortress.
I was considering giving you partial credit due to reference to enemy retreat in none other than the following Gold Standard of all Axis primary sources, which I discovered online only since my last reply to this thread:
However, exemplary citation though he may be, Halder is no authority for the motivation behind any Soviet retrograde movement, any or all of which may have been routs or (potentially fatal) countermanding initiative by commanders on the spot acting in the perceived best military interest of the moment.
Also, I came upon the following entries:
Vol VI 7/8
(ie an aggressive, attacking forward defense rather than one of sit-and-wait or deft maneuver)
Vol VII 9/15
(IOW the Soviet strategy has continued to consist of counterattack rather than maneuver)
Vol VII 10/2
Vol VII 11/15
All these passages are enough in tension with the concept of Soviet tactical retreat to make me decide against giving Mr. Dissonance any credit for the year 1941 after all.
No retreat of any kind was authorized after Stalin’s 7/30 “Not One Step Back Order.” Googling provided the following modern cite which made me considering giving you a full point credit.
(from link, and talk about doing your opponent’s work for him):
However, note the qualifiers “appears to have been” and “I guess we might say.” If, after all these decades there is still not enough information to answer with a definite yes or a no then the issue will be forever in doubt, and for all we can tell the only “authorized” retreats were after the fact Stavka concessions the reality of a rout in progress. So no point here after all for our Mr.Dissonance.
That would be a reasonable interpretation only if LN had not said in the previous sentence that “… Stalin did something unexpected. When the Germans invaded he decided to try to HOLD Kiev” (my Caps, and I hope no one contests what the word “Hold” ordinarily means) clearly indicating that the Germans expected him to give it up.
“Bypass” in a modern military context means to “avoid attacking.” It does not mean to “stick with an original plan.”
Yes I did mean AGC, and yes I know nothing was diverted from AGN to AGS.
PzGr3 prsumably? That I had forgotten, if I ever encountered it, and I am having trouble finding any mention of it aside from this 8/27 comment by Halder: “Push tanks on the northern wing in direction of Toropets and keep them in readiness for a thrust to the north.”
I did not say he implied that.
FD 21 was issued 12/40, and its content re destruction of enemy forces was often repeated by Hitler in the ensuing months. However, Hitler was not consistent in emphasizing it; see the famous 8/23/41 confrontation between Hitler and Guderian (Guderian speaking, quoted by Shirer in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich):
Also Halder (op cit, 8/22):
So obviously economics was often at least tied for the lead in Hitler’s mind during the stages of the war in the East when Germany had the initiative.
Halder frequetly mentions logistical constraint, but not with regard to continuing the AGC drive on Moscow in late August.
As for the weather unfortunately Halder was absent on medical leave 10/7 – 11/3, and so does not relate the full story. He mentions paralyzing mud 11/3-5-7, but on 11/11 quotes Von Bock was advocating an immediate resumption of advance.
The closest I can now document that the Germans got to the center of Moscow was Istra ~50 miles due west on 12/5 (per Werth, Russia at War). Elsewhere I recall reading of 35 miles; perhaps that was a rural location. IMO it is reasonable to suggest the Germans might have taken the city had they been that close a month earlier.
You mean their right flank.
Which large Soviet force? The one locked in combat with AGS had its hands full, and the one facing AGC tried but was not able to put a dent in the German advance until December.
As noted Moscow possessed industrial and logistical features of great importance.
Also, with Moscow gone resupply of Leningrad by rail might have become impossible, perhaps dooming the garrison there without further expense to the besiegers.
Guderian and Halder tells us that economics was weighing most heavily on Hitler’s mind at the moment.