Lack of Freewill doesn't mean lack of choice

I think there’s a misunderstanding. I don’t intend to redefine anything, the sort of free will I’m talking about is all-out ‘could have done otherwise’-freedom. My point is that the ‘standard problem’ of free will (that it is ultimately incoherent because it leads to circularity and regress) is a problem for every story of how stuff happens, and thus, doesn’t pose any special issue for such a notion of ‘free will’. We’re just more used to not questioning notions of causation or randomness, but if we do, we find just the same explanatory gap lurking there.

That’s not to say that I think we do have that sort of free will; ultimately, I’m not even sure it’s a terribly interesting question, and I have no strong feelings either way. But I don’t think the usual arguments are as conclusive as they’re made out to be.

  1. You honestly don’t believe that survival is the primary goal of pretty much every human being on the planet? I find that astounding. Trust me, I’d grill your liver with onions if it would keep me from starving to death.

  2. Exceptions never disprove the rule, and emotionally ill people who want to hurt or terminate themselves are definitely the exceptions.

No, I don’t. It’s a strong goal, but not “the primary goal of pretty much every human being”, because…

When vast swathes of the population are dedicated to self-harm through drugs and other unhealthy practices, and we’re headlong bound to killing our entire environment, the exceptions can’t be quite so easily dismissed.

If your thesis were true, we’d overwhelmingly be regularly-exercising, good-diet-having, environmentally responsible Straight Edgers. But we’re not.

And that’s just leaving aside how unexceptional suicide is. It’s not the norm, but it’s hardly some rare thing. And attempted suicide is even more common. And the kind of mental illness that can lead to it is not exceptional (leaving aside all the non-mental illness causes of suicide). Hundreds of millions of people suffer from the kinds of syndromes that engender suicidal ideation.

It’s even more complicated that an identical Mijin. Just a copy of you will diverge its status from you since it cannot have identical inputs. It must be a continuously adjusted copy.

Of course this looks impossible. Therefore I cannot see anything being able to unfailingly predict your actions at each step. I would say that this precludes non-free will in the same way as a hidden-variable theory might predict quantum behaviour.

I’ve always been fond of this take:

Sure; I also think it’s impossible.

But note my latter point too; I would dispute that even if it were possible to somehow make “Identical Mijin” and “Identical World” that that would preclude free will.
To me, it no more precludes my choice than, say, looking at your gran’s old wedding photos precludes her choice whether to say “I do”.

I think intuition can lead us astray on this topic. I think when people hear of the notion of someone predicting their future actions it seems scary because they imagine that:

  1. It means that their decision is somehow wholly separate from their conscious thoughts – something just dropped down by “fate”
  2. That someone could even tell them what they will do, and they would be powerless to resist.

But both of these things are a misunderstanding of neuroscience and Determinism which say no such thing.

Well, if we may refer to the real world now, this is scary. It is uncanny to have FB or Google pick up my inclinations and serve me an ad or a YouTube video that is uncomfortably close to what I might choose by myself. Their power to predict our wishes is frightening and has an immense negative influence on the society.

I suppose; but how often are they absurdly wrong?

Quite, but not enough for my comfort. I block ads wherever I can and run Privacy Badger on the desktops. Still, the combined data of my smartphone and the desktops I have, is enough for them to have a pretty good understanding.

“The lack of free will” is not a truth, it’s an opinion, so your entire argument is philosophical manustrupation.

I feel that free will is one of those situational things on more than one level.
Of course it depends on what the choices are. The cost / benefits of the various choices. But it is you who calculates the cost benefits. You are a complex sum of your life experiences and how your thinking has evolved from those experiences. Another person faced with the same choices may calculate the cost / benefits differently. But there are more levels. What is your current mood? Is it a calm or dire situation? Your mental processes can vary greatly for many reasons.
Seldom is it completely free will. There are various constraints.
I do not agree that the lack of free will is a truth. But it is often true that you you are coerced to choose against your will. Or have been coerced to believe what is your will.

If free will as a concept is incoherent, then ethics and moral responsibility are also incoherent.

Well, as the OP itself points out, choice =/= free will.

That is to say, concepts like “choice” and “decision-making” are perfectly cromulent. It’s only when we’re saying choice needs to be in some sense causally disconnected from the universe, or “could have chosen differently” – where we require our decision-making process to deliver a different output for no reason whatsoever (and yet be based on intention, so quantum randomness is usually ruled out) – that the whole concept becomes completely incoherent.
Unfortunately, intuitively, it feels like free will should refer to something meaningful hence centuries of this nonsense. But note the silence when we try to get anyone to pin down exactly what is meant by “could have chosen differently”.

But note also that even if we were just automatons or whatever, concepts like “ethics” would still be meaningful. We could say that a doctor prescribing drain cleaner would be unethical, and establish penalties and deterrents just fine. Even a clockwork universe is not the same thing as Fatalism.

So, it is far, far from obvious that what’s commonly meant by “choice” actually has anything to do with the mathematical concept of “Choice” (see, the Axiom of Choice). Actually making such a case is probably beyond my limited abilities, but I’m intrigued by the possibility. And if we assume that there is some equivalence, we might notice that the Axiom of Choice is irrelevant on finite sets and we appear to be finite creatures in a finite universe. Maybe the answer is that “free will” and “determinism” are completely indistinguishable except at transfinite scale.

How is choice not equal to free will? I’ve never been able to understand how those concepts are separated. If a person living in a deterministic universe can be said to choose A over B, then surely a falling pachinko ball “chooses” its path as well.

I also reject your assertion that “ethics” would be meaningful to automatons. Sure, we might go through the motions of punishing the doctor, but there’s no meaning behind it. The doctor wasn’t free to choose otherwise and neither were we free to choose not to punish. In a clockwork universe, “meaning” and “reason” are as incoherent as “free will” is in this universe. In such a world you could only make statements about what is or is not, never about what “should” or “could” be. (Well, of course, you might make such statements, but only if the initial conditions required you to.)

Nothing about choice implies being causally disconnected, that’s the difference.

In terms of the pachinko ball, the difference is the pachinko ball doesn’t think or reason where to go. I know it’s weird to think of your brain being a machine, but it is, and your conscious thoughts are how you make decisions and the result of an electrochemical process in a physical universe.

To be honest I don’t know why this bothers people so much.
Am I free to take a wormhole to Andromeda? Well yes, but I have no idea how to do that. Am I free to cut my leg off? Well yes, but I’m hardwired to find that deeply unpleasant. At any given moment I am applying my limited reasoning ability to fulfill goals that are part of my physical makeup.
My thoughts are “real” but also very much a part of this universe, not separate to it.

I reject the idea that there has to be “meaning”.
The legal system should be about rehabilitation, deterrence and public protection. All of these things are quite compatible with Determinism, it’s only semi-religious ideas of punishment that are incompatible. Such notions originated in the bronze age, before we understood anything of neuroscience.

Is “should be” compatible with determinism?

Yes. It’s just a statement of opinion.

I guess you were trying to allude to “ought to” statements, i.e. morality.

I don’t see that as a problem for determinism either; the only problem comes when trying to “punish” bad behavior because the person “could have chosen differently”.

What I’m saying here is that “free will” is a psychological concept, an emergent effect of consciousness, rather than anything physical. It’s completely independent of physical manifestations like determinism, or super-determinism, or the lack of any thereof. The conscious mind cannot possibly perceive any difference.

I’m going to take another stab at explaining my position:

Forget about humans, let’s say I’m an angel. :angel:
I have no brain; only a soul / spirit. And I can interact with the physical world but I’m not part of it.

Now I’m presented with a choice: I can go bowling today, or play golf (I never said angels can be in two places at once). How will I decide?
Well, I’d consider which appears more appealing to me. Have I played either game before? Do I want to be outdoors? Who else is coming to those activities? Based on questions like these, and my personal preferences, I eventually decide to go bowling (obviously).

But look what’s happened here: my decision was just the product of the situation, my memories and my preferences, the same as it is for humans. And these things are just as outside of my control as they are for humans. Conceiving of a “soul” made zero difference.

None of this should be a surprise because this is what we mean by choice.
This is why we so trivially reject quantum indeterminacy as being free will because it is outside of this framework of what we mean by “choice”.

It’s a complete red herring to blame any of this on Materialism or Determinism.
It would be like blaming Materialism for being limited to 64 squares in a chess game. In any reality with chess it would be limited to 64 squares because that’s what (standard) chess is. And any reality that includes decision-making, those decisions will be the product of a situation, innate preferences and memories, because that’s what it means to make a decision.