But that’s just it: you can’t just ‘replace it with empty space’. That’d mean setting the whole thing up entirely differently from the start, because whether that cog is there or not is itself a part of the setup of the mechanism.
Perhaps you could say that it’s a sort of transmission—say you’ve got a hand-cranked mechanism, so that the motion is translated through some sort of gear train. Then, the rotation of gear B is still not originating anything—i.e. as an active element, it’s essentially inert; but it does have the role of transmitting the motion to cog C. But as an answer to the question ‘Why does cog C move?’, to say ‘Because cog B moves’ still fails to explain anything at all.
But of course, this is still grossly misleading—it invites thinking about the universe in a way such that an external agency could reach in and manipulate its parts; but any manipulation of the parts of the universe must originate from within the universe, and thus, in a strictly deterministic reality, be itself set at the beginning—by the cranking hand, or chance, or whatever you want to appeal to.
Anyway, though, this is rather a digression from the main discussion. If you object to the term epiphenomenon, fine; but I think it’s clear that there’s no explanatory power to your intention, to the movement of cog B—it just kicks the can further down the road.
The real issue is that the idea that cog B moves cog C ultimately isn’t any more sensible than the idea that cog C moves of its own accord. Indeed, the analogy showcases it well: if it can’t be cogs ‘all the way down’, then what was the prime mover? And what’s the difference between that moving cog A, or cog C of its own accord moving, driving cog B, driving cog A, and then, the supposed first cause? And if it can be cogs all the way down, then what’s the trouble with the will willing itself, and the infinite regress that incurs?
Lots of ways. One is a physical universe of spacetime and energy and the other is…a sequence of images.
A crucial difference here is that the spacetime universe has cause and effect – this is crucial for intelligent agents to make decisions.
Whereas a sequence of images does not inherently have that – image 1 could be a picture of a dandelion and image 2 could be super mario. If the images are actually linked by physical laws then we’re on our way towards having a physical universe.
Whether it could actually host intelligence I believe is essentially equivalent to “Strong AI”, since we’re questioning whether the syntactical information of a mind is just as much a mind as a physical mind. An interesting question, but it takes us down a whole other tangent
It’s not circular it’s that those things are coupled. An entity needs to be able to recognize a particular state of affairs and take action in light of that state to behave intentionally.
Of course we can take it out – it’s a thought experiment we can do what we like. Unless…the conclusion makes us uncomfortable?
Let’s say at the big bang I set up the universe such that on Christmas day 2021 Half_Man_Half_Wit will decide to have Christmas dinner with Angela Merkel.
However, then, on Christmas eve I simply remove Half_Man_Half_Wit’s brain. Just with magic. We have this kind of thought experiment often on the boards, don’t claim it’s not allowed or something now.
What happens to Christmas dinner? Does Half_Man_Half_Wit somehow still attend because it was prescribed earlier?
Or is it the case that the thoughts in your mind, the idea of “Gee, I bet Angela Merkel must be bored after all that time in power, I’ll call her up” was actually integral to what happened next?
A thought experiment still has to obey basic logic. Unless… logic makes us uncomfortable?
Again—this just says two contradictory things. Either you set up the universe such that I have dinner with Angela Merkel, or you set it up such that something removes my brain at some point. If there’s something external reaching in to remove my brain, you’ve simply not taken the whole universe into account.
It is if the line of dominoes is supposed to represent the whole universe. Because then you’re saying, let’s set up the universe as a closed, deterministic causal system, and then let’s have something from the outside come in and change something.
But again—this whole diversion is just dodging the real issue.
Sure, and why not. Call it a demon or whatever.
It’s a simple demonstration of what should be obvious here: that even a cog in the machine can be integral to the functioning of the machine. Both determined by prior causes and that which partially determines future events.
I agree with that.
Like I say, I don’t even particularly think that the universe is Deterministic, and don’t think that a Deterministic universe is the problem with free will. The problem with free will is that it doesn’t really define anything coherent at all.
Anyway, I’m just going to dip in and out of this thread about once a week from now on.
What do you think instead? (Specifically, about where our actions and choices originate.)
If the universe is completely deterministic, then everything I do, every “choice” I make, is entirely determined by the state of the universe up to the point I make that choice or take that action.
If the universe involves true randomness, then some of the decisions I make might have been determined randomly.
Free will, as I understand it, is an alternative to these. Free will means that at least some of the things I do are because I choose to do them, in such a way that my choice was not completely determined by the state of the universe at that point, nor was it determined randomly. My choice may have been influenced by things such as my preferences and my state of mind, but given these, I was still free to act otherwise.
The “real universe” may well be a sequence of images. If something like the Planck time is real, the universe may well be a set of static, discontinuous, three dimensional frames embedded in a four dimensional solid, much like a filmstrip.
The way you know that the “real universe” has cause and effect is that you observe it to be so. Right?
The “film universe” could have non-sequitur images, but in our hypothetical, it doesn’t. What it has is a copy of events from the “real universe”. By detailed observation of the “film universe” you should be able to observe that cause and effect holds there exactly to the extent that it does in the “real universe”. You should also be able to deduce from the “film universe” what physical laws it obeys. They will be very similar to those of the “real universe”. If the film includes epolo copy dropping a spoon, we will observe it to fall at 9.8 m/s^2.
Not what I’m talking about at all.
It’s circular because you’ve coupled two definitions. Do you have a definition of “intention” that doesn’t make reference to brains? Or alternatively, a definition of “brains” that doesn’t make reference to intention?
I think you’ve gotten yourself stuck in exactly the same place that proponents of “free will” get stuck. Which (I think) is exactly the point @Half_Man_Half_Wit and @Thudlow_Boink have been making.
So if you’re fine with pointing to cog B as explaining cog C’s motion, then are you likewise fine with pointing at the will (will1) for explaining the determination of the will (will0)? I.e. with the will as originating the decision ultimately made?
I have to admit, this reads a little like you’re just going to ignore the points I raised regarding the fact that there’s no special problem to free will that doesn’t apply, mutatis mutandis, to causality and chance, as well, even after asking me to repeat them, and continue pretending that there’s no trouble with claims to the effect that free will alone is incoherent.
In brains. My brain, including my preferences and understanding of the world is how I make choices; no-one can guess my choice without first and foremost simulating me.
Sure. But what else is there? If I give you a choice, what else is there other than the state of the universe up to that moment and your personal characteristics and preferences (whether those be entirely neural, or somehow involve a “soul” or whatever; no-one’s ever demonstrated how it would make a difference).
You’re asking for a reasoned decision to involve something other than reasons.
Not really no. For one thing, there is not one simultaneous instant of time, so it’s a stretch imagining it as a set of static frames.
Also even if some particular conception of the universe was consistent with a scientific understanding, I would still reject the declaration that that is what our universe actually *is*; there can be multiple conceptions consistent with our understanding.
Sure, and so you’re describing a film of a universe.
You have to pick one: either cause and effect is an intrinsic property of the flickbook you’re describing: in which case it has one of the key properties of a universe, but your point about our universe just being a sequence of images is lost.
Or, the flickbook is merely images and happens to look like cause and effect because it contains images of a universe with cause and effect: in which case we have a clear answer on what the difference between the flickbook and an actual universe is, and your point again doesn’t work.
My definition of brain included being able to make decisions but that is not the sole characteristic. So it is not circular at all.
“Fine with” is a strange way of putting it: I have confidence in claims based on their explanatory power.
A potentially-infinite stack of “wills” (where “will” is not defined adequately in the first place) doesn’t even make sense let alone allow us to understand anything better.
Also, are you now conceding the point about my brain being the proximate cause of my actions? Because you’ve described the cog analogy in terms of me being OK with it, when it was an illustration of why your point didn’t work.
This paragraph is a word-salad. It sounds like snark but I can’t fully parse it, so let me make it simple:
I’ve said, from my very first post here, that the problem with free will is intrinsic to the concept itself and nothing to do with whether the universe is Deterministic. Do not imply I am suddenly retreating from Determinism.
In terms of your takedown of Determinism, I was embarrassed by it. To claim that Determinism means we cannot even say my brain is the proximate cause of my actions shows absolute desperation to maintain a conclusion.
But a potentially infinite chain of causes is all fine?
I am claiming, and have always claimed, that you brain, your intention, is not the origin of your actions (on your view), and hence, has no explanatory power regarding them. Just like ‘because cog B moves’ is no explanation of why cog C moves—it just kicks the can down the road.
I’m referring to this argument, which you haven’t addressed, despite asking me to repeat it:
In short, you’re claiming that there’s a special problem that makes the notion of ‘free will’ uniquely problematic. There isn’t: the notions of causality and chance are at least as problematic; somebody appealing to them isn’t any better off than somebody appealing to free will. You can validly say, well, then we just don’t know how things happen; you can also hold that in that case, appeal to either is equally valid; but you can’t, for example, appeal to the causal connection of your intentions to the universe and maintain that you’re saying something that makes any more sense than appealing to free will.
I’m not sure what you’re trying to say here. If the idea that our universe is something like the “block universe” mentioned upthread (i.e. a four dimensional solid with the “present” time just being a slice) is one of those multiple conceptions, then I think we’re ok.
Again, not quite sure what you’re on about here.
You believe the “real universe” to follow rules of cause and effect and laws of physics and such because you observe it to do so. For example, if you hold a one kg sphere two meters off the ground and release it, it will accelerate towards the center of mass of the Earth at 9.8 m/s^2 as long as it is unimpeded. You can repeat this experiment again and again and you should see the same results. Therefore we deduce “Gravity”. We can’t be absolutely certain that gravity will work the same way tomorrow as it does today or in that location the same as it works in this location. Nor can we test a counterfactual - maybe if you had dropped a two kg ball, it would have floated. All of this is in the realm of theory; that is, we hold it to be true pending disconfirmation.
If the “film universe” included a representation of me holding up a ball and releasing it (etc) you could make the same observation and conclude that gravity applies in that universe as well. Actually, we would probably conclude that something like “Copy of Gravity” applies to “Copy of Ball” and “Copy of Earth”. But the effect is the same. We could extrapolate that if “Copy of epolo” had dropped a second “Copy of Ball” it would have fallen the same way. We can’t actually run that test but we can still hold “Copy of Gravity” to be true pending disconfirmation.
Similarly, we can observe that “Copy of epolo” exhibits “Copy of Intention”. My question is (and has been): what distinguishes “Intention” from “Copy of Intention”?
So, brains are things that can form intention (as well as doing other things) and intention is something that is formed in brains. You find these definitions satisfying but reject free will as incoherent?
I haven’t read the responses yet; I’m coming back to this in a week’s time again.
But I wanted to say my last post got a bit too rude to Half man half wit.
So, sorry about that, I hope we can have a productive discussion.
Both infinities were posited by you, so I’m quite fine with saying neither has anything to do with the real world.
This is a fundamental misconception of what is meant by “explanatory power”.
A model has explanatory power when it can be used to make verified inferences and predictions. The model that the neurological structures of my brain result in decisions makes many (useful) predictions and inferences.
It’s irrelevant that causes outside of the brain are responsible for that neural structure; no existing scientific model claims to be a theory of everything. They all start in some context.
But this is not an argument though; it’s simply an attempt to handwave one of the problems with free will by saying there’s an equivalent issue with causality.
Yes, ultimately a start point for all causality is a significant unknown. Indeed, I would say it is the most profound problem in all of science and philosophy. However, I disagree that it’s the same of the infinite stack of wills because we see at least a chain of causality going back billions of years, and we don’t see any chain of wills. And secondly, “free will” has not even been defined concretely, so it’s not a thing where we’re trying to fix one problem with it, it’s not even a concrete thing at all yet.
There is no single “now” in the universe; clocks are entirely relative to one reference frame.
Let’s say we take a reference frame of planet earth. The slice which is at 20th Dec 2021 as we go out in space extends out into an ever younger-looking universe and at the edge of the slice is the big bang. Indeed the edges of every slice converge to the big bang.
For some applications, this can be a useful way of conceiving of space time. But not as a rhetorical thing of saying it’s just like a movie or picture book.
I think your analogy illustrates itself why the question is misguided.
I have a flipbook here of a ball bouncing. I’m a good artist, so as long as I flip the book at 20 pages per second the ball falls at 9.8 ms-2 relative to the scale in my drawing.
What distinguishes “gravity” from my “drawing of gravity”?
The difference is that one is an actual physical universe where objects acted according to gravity and the other was just a set of drawings where the notion of gravity was implied (and inferred). Likewise with intention; in the physical universe brains perform calculations, predictions and deductions and make reasoned decisions. In a set of photos that can only be implied and inferred.
Once again, the best “defence” of free will seems to be to claim that other things are poorly defined too.
In any case, I did also state what is meant by “intention”, so the idea that it is circular is false.
Intention is defined, brains and computers are defined. The two things are coupled in the sense that we don’t know of anything that’s neither a brain nor a computer having intention. That doesn’t make it circular.
Sorry, I didn’t see this earlier. I appreciate the sentiment, but it’s fine—I understand that this can be a very emotional topic if you’re deeply invested in your opinion.
I didn’t posit them, I merely pointed them out; that you continue to ignore them doesn’t mean they’re not there.
That’s an apt notion when we’re talking about conflicting hypotheses, such as whether the Ptolemaic or the Copernican model of the solar system is a better fit; but that’s not what we’re doing here. Rather, we’re looking for reasons—for something that answers a ‘why’ question (which scientific models don’t pretend to do). And as a reason for the movement of cog C, that of cog B simply falls short.
Talking about the movement of cog B does not, in fact, carry any information that isn’t already supplied by the mere fact of the movement of cog C, and thus, in particular, can’t explain the latter—it’s just vacuous in the logical sense. From the fact of the motion of cog C, that of cog B is a given. It tells us nothing new.
Now you might say, but cog C might have moved for a different reason, say, due to a sudden gust of wind or what have you; in that case, pointing to the motion of cog B would eliminate several alternatives, and increase our knowledge of the reason of cog C’s movement, and hence, be explanatorily relevant. But that’s why I said this is a bad analogy: it allows us to posit variability where there is none. Usually, physics is formulated in such a way that the initial data determines all future data, in a deterministic world. But there’s nothing special about the initial data, there. It’s equally as true that the present data determines all data to the future—and to the past. So once you know the conditions at any one given point in time, the conditions at every other point are a simple logical implication of those, and thus, tautological. So, if you know the data at any one point in time, nothing is added by the data at any other point in time.
But then, in particular, if you know the data now, whatever happened one second ago does not add any information—it’s just a restatement of the same information in a different way, a mere tautology. So it can’t be explanatorily relevant to the data now. In fact, if you think it does, consider that you could just as validly point to the data a week from now as explaining what you’re doing right now—so if you were to say, it’s my intention, a second ago, to grab the cup of coffee on my table, that explains my doing so right now, I could equally well say, no, it’s your intention, a week from now, to have a slice of pizza that does so. Both statements are logically equivalent. But then, your intention is wholly inert as an explanation of your actions.
An explanation of cog C’s movement might come from the fact that I rotated cog A, or indeed, I rotated cog C directly, or maybe, I rotated cog D, or even that I rotated all the cogs simultaneously in correct proportion to their gear ratios—but it can’t come from within the chain of implications linking the physical facts at different points in time, because they add nothing. But of course, if you insist on explaining everything in causal terms, that’ll just kick the can further down the road.
I’m not handwaving the problems with free will away—I fully accept them (well, in sensibly stated versions, that is). Again, my agenda isn’t to argue for the reality, or even possibility, of free will. I just point out that the same problems also afflict the notion of causation (and that of chance): in each case, you have to either accept some infinitary notion, or hold that the idea just isn’t sensible. But what you can’t do is to sweep the problem under the rug for one (e.g. causality), while claiming it is terminal for another (free will).
My problem with your line of reasoning isn’t the stance you take that free will is problematic, it’s that you take it to be problematic in a special and absolute sense, and that anybody not following you there is objectively wrong. But really, all you’re doing is expressing a metaphysical preference—which is fine—but presenting it as if it’s an objectively correct choice—which isn’t. It’s all well and good to say that you like red wine better than white, but once you go and then claim that those preferring white wine are objectively wrong, you’ve simply overextended the reach of your position.
That’s not true, of course. We see the state of affairs now; we infer a chain of causality going back billions of years. (It might’ve started just last Thursday…) That’s the same thing as seeing a willed action right now, and inferring the process necessary to bring it about as such. It’s perhaps easier to understand with chance: either you accept that random things happen ‘just so’—thus not appealing to any sort of mechanistic model—or you have to accept some infinitary process bringing it about, if you think a mechanistic explanation is indispensable. Similar with free will: you can either accept that the will determines itself ‘just so’—have it be a causa sui, like initial conditions determining themselves—or you can point to an infinite regression of the will setting itself, if you feel only that sort of thing could be satisfactory.
So, either has the same claim to being ‘the most problem in all of science and philosophy’ (although of course it’s a problem on which science simply has no say)—they’re all the same problem. It’s merely your preference, or perhaps your familiarity with the notion, that makes you look at causality and assume that the problem there isn’t that fundamental, while you take it to be fatal for free will.