Jonathan Chance,
Currently, under Art. 125 of the UCMJ, both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy are criminal. Under the Gates case I cited to in the second post of this thread (no link, sorry), the Court of Military Appeals (the highest appeals court under U.S. Military Law, subject only to U.S. Supreme Court review) upheld a conviction for “private, nonadulterous, noncommercial, consensual, heterosexual fellatio.” So with regard to an equal protection challenge to the law on its face, the law applies equally to all persons.
There is, however, a question of whether the law is applied equally. The answer is obviously not, but it’s really hard to get statistics that could be used to challenge it on an as applied equal protection ground.
If your two servicemen are caught getting oral sex, one from a man and one from a woman, they both face equal criminal penalties. However, from the start, the discretion inherent in the system will most likely permit the man getting oral sex from a woman to avoid conviction. The police (MPs, Shore Patrol, etc.) are probably unlikely to report the heterosexual conduct to the prosecuting authorities, and the prosecutors are less likely to make any charges or charge heavily.
Further, if convicted of the heterosexual conduct, the only penalty is what is given at the court-martial (or non-judicial punishment), and it is likely to be light. If convicted of homosexual conduct, however, the penalty will probably be equally light as a result of the court-martial, but there is the added issue of discharge.
I believe that the Lawrence decision invalidates ALL sodomy laws (whether applicable to same sex or opposite sex couples), though this is not entirely clear. However, by overruling Bowers, and more important, recognizing a due process right to private, consentual sexual conduct, I think that invalidation of all sodomy laws, including Art. 125 of the UCMJ, must follow (Gates relied in part on Bowers to uphold the conviction for “private, nonadulterous, noncommercial, consensual, heterosexual fellatio”).
SuaSponte’s argument is that the U.S. Supreme Court, under Goldman gives extraordinary deference to the military, which may impose conditions on service members that would otherwise be unconstitutional by invoking military necessity, without further explanation. Although that is Goldman’s holding as to the question it faced, does a service member have a First Amendment right to wear unobtrusive religious regalia in violation of the uniform regulations, I don’t think that it is applicable too much beyond its facts. Specifically, I don’t think that Goldman would be controlling here.
There are two important difference that I see between the situation in Goldman and a challenge to the military sodomy law under Lawrence, the historic pervasiveness of military uniform regulation and the fact that private, consentual sodomy is a due process right, not a First Amendment right.
The Goldman majority briefly addressed the rather obvious facts that service members are governed by detailed uniform regulations (the Air Force’s 180 page uniform manual was mentioned) and that there is an extensive history and awarness of the requirement of uniform military dress. They also discussed that military service necessary impinges on certain First Amendment free expression/free exercise rights. Based on this, they concluded that the military’s right to impose uniform regulations superceded Capt. Goldman’s possible free exercise interest in wearing a yarmuke while in uniform.
The Goldman dissenters did not appear to challenge the overall right of the military to impose uniform requirements or to restrict service members First Amendment rights based on military requirements. However, they challenged the majority’s seeming unquestioning deference to the military in setting the uniform requirements above free exercise/free expression rights. In particular, because the regulations permitted certian personal variations in uniform (rings, jewelry, etc.), the minor deviation of wearing an unobtrusive yarmulke should have been permitted.
Goldman can be distinguished because, as the Lawrence majority held, the prohibition against homosexual sodomy is not as deep or long-standing as Bowers suggested it was. The military’s restrictions on private, consentual sexual conduct has with less history than uniform regulations, and certainly less general public awareness than the fact that service members serve in uniform (is that a ppppledge ppppin on your UNIFORM).
More significantly, Lawerence held private sexual conduct to be a due process right. Although the free expression and free exercise rights of service members have been historically curtailed, I’m not aware that the due process rights of service members have been likewise curtailed (absent exigencies of combat or operational situations). If someone has some citations as to where entry into military service restricts due process rights, I’d appreciate them.
If private, consentual sexual conduct is a due process right under Lawrence, I don’t see how the military can claim that it is necessary to be limited for military reasons.