- Notice Cannot Be Defeated by Willful Failure to Accept Certified Mail
Edwards claims that Bear Creek failed to comply strictly with Civil Code section 1367, arguing that “there is no presumption of notice absent a signed certified receipt,” citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1020. This argument is again disingenuous. Code of Civil Procedure section 1020 provides that, “Any notice required by law, other than those required to be given to a party to an action or to his attorney, the service of which is not governed by the other sections of this chapter and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by law, may be given by sending the same by registered mail with proper postage prepaid addressed to the addressee’s last known address with request for return receipt, and the production of a returned receipt purporting to be signed by the addressee shall create a disputable presumption that such notice was received by the person to whom the notice was required to be sent.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1020 is permissive; where a notice is required to be sent by mail, compliance with the mailing requirement may be satisfied by sending the notice by registered mail with a return receipt requested. Code of Civil Procedure section 1020 does not require mailed notices to be sent by registered mail. Likewise, while a signed return receipt may create a rebuttable presumption that the notice was received, the absence of such a signed return receipt does not negate any other presumptions concerning mailed items. Under Evidence Code section 641, “[a] letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.”
Of course, a presumption of receipt is rebutted upon testimony denying receipt. ( Slater v. Kehoe (1974) 38 Cal. App. 3d 819, 832, fn. 12 [113 Cal. Rptr. 790]; accord, Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 421–422 [100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818].) The presumption of Evidence Code section 641 properly applied here, unless rebutted by a denial of receipt. Attorney Enriquez did not testify, and thus never denied under oath that she had received the lien notices mailed to Edwards at her address. Edwards was in no position to deny receipt of the mail at Attorney Enriquez’s address.
Even if we accept for the sake of the argument, however, that the tenor of Edwards’s evidence was the intent to deny receipt of the lien notices, “the disappearance of the presumption does not mean there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding [i.e., of receipt of notice].” ( Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 421, italics in original) “ ‘ “*f the adverse party denies receipt, the presumption is gone from the case. [But] [t]he trier of fact must then weigh the denial of receipt against the inference of receipt arising from proof of mailing and decide whether or not the letter was received.” ’ ” ( Id. at p. 422, italics in original.)
Here, the evidence was uncontradicted that Bear Creek mailed the lien notices both by certified mail, as required, and by first class mail. Attorney Enriquez refused to sign for the certified letters, and those letters were returned by the post office. The first class letters were not returned, however. The correspondence from Attorney Enriquez, on Edwards’s behalf, plainly demonstrated knowledge of the disputed assessments. The inference is inescapable: Attorney Enriquez in fact received all the notices, but simply refused to accept the certified mail.
The requirement to send the lien notices by certified mail cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of refusing to sign the return receipt. “Where a statute provides for service by registered or certified mail, the addressee cannot assert failure of service when he wilfully disregards a notice of certified mail delivered to his address under circumstances where it can be reasonably inferred that the addressee was aware of the nature of the correspondence.” ( Hankla v. Governing Bd. (1975) 46 Cal. App. 3d 644, 655 [120 Cal. Rptr. 827].)