Libertarianism: the baseline problem.

Great Debates
1

Two quotes, first:

–Robert Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution?, p. 133 (emphases in original)

–Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p. 22 (emphasis in original)

When implementing new systems of government or strictures of the market (or new contexts in which governmental systems or market strictures might be variously conceived), it’s really tough to start from scratch. That’s because in the real world, on real property heretofore existing within the aegis of a real government, we have to begin not only with a) a preexisting bundle of legal norms, structures, rules, and expectations but with b) divergences in property ownership occurring directly as a result of those preexisting norms and structures.

To take an extreme example: In China, there exist many public officials who have amassed wealth through corruption and abuse of station, yet who are dealt with leniently (when they are caught) by communist party discipline inspection committees. In a very real sense, their corruption is sanctioned by the state. Were China tomorrow to reinvent itself within a libertarian context, these corrupt officials would find themselves with property to which they would not have been entitled had the libertarian reinvention occurred, say, fifty years ago. More broadly, the scope of anyone’s property ownership today under any non-libertarian context has been shaped and described by the terms of their present context. Any transition to libertarianism must, absent the kind of redistribution anathema to consensus conceptions of liberty, begin with a landscape of wealth and property distribution dependent upon the government that came before. Like I said, we can’t start from scratch.

Therefore, equal liberty given to all peaceful and honest citizens–specifically, protection from the initiation of force and fraud–would, given existing distributions, result in vesititure of rights which, while commensurate with the extent of each person’s ownership of property, would be predicated on circumstances established under a previous, non-libertarian regime: equal liberty (allowing the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to paraphrase Anatole France) building upon unequal conditions to result in unequal outcomes.

How to resolve the problem of the existing baseline, in order to transition to a libertarian context? Is it a problem? Do we need to ask, not only “What kind of liberty?”, but “Liberty for whom?” Or, y’know, not?

2

I think an important question is: just because someone doesn’t “deserve” what they have, does that mean its then more justifiable to take it? Kids born into rich families didn’t deserve to be born into rich families anymore than poor people deserved to be born into poor families. But does that lack of desert justify taking away what they have at whim?

Clearly, riches gained by theft are due their victims… but sometimes the theif and the riches are both long gone by the time any justice catches on. What then? Should other previously uninlvoved parties have their wealth taken from them? When Paul steals from Jim, and then Paul dissappears, does it become justifiable to take from Mary to reimburse Jim?

The major argument here is Rawlsian, and I think it is the biggest serious challenger to the moral core of libertarian ideas.

3

I was actually thinking about this topic just a few days ago as I was reading a wonderful essay that mentioned land reform in occupied Japan.

I don’t think your China example is a very good one. I think that the new libertarian government would be quite justified in stripping property from the corrupt official. The man is a thief, and has absolutely no right to his stolen property. A better example would be the case of the son of such an official who has inherited all those tainted goods. I don’t think there’s anything immoral about the son keeping those goods provided he returned those things that others had a personal claim to.

I personally believe that ‘unequal conditions’ will not result in ‘unequal outcomes’ if the governmental and legal systems remain honest and libertarian. I think that it would take perhaps a few generations, but that as long as there were no unfair mechanisms in place to facilitate the maintaining of wealth that eventually the status of wealth in the country will become, perhaps not equal, but at least fair.

4

It seems to me that in most cases when both the thief and riches are long gone, the victim most likely is as well. The victim’s descendants or relatives may still be around, but I don’t seem what claim they have to anything. If the victim himself is still around, then I can see him having a claim against the thief’s descendants, however, provided they are still in posession of what was his property. To do otherwise would seem to buy into concepts of collective identity and responsibility that I can’t accept.

5

Well, in general, no moral or political system seems to have much of a handle on what is owed to the unborn. Adding in their interests, along with the almost always involved “woulda, coulda, shouldas” tends to lead to extremely wacky outcomes for just about any system of ideas. Unfortunately, not taking them into account at all ends up with even more wacky results. It’s a real problem…

6

Apos

Keeping in mind that libertarianism is not a political system, but a political philosophy upon which any arbitrary system may be based, I’d like to know what you mean exactly by this:

Are you suggesting that Rawls is somehow more moral than say, Locke?

7

Of course, if we consider that we cannot ex post facto try someone under Libertaria’s laws for what they did under the previous regime I don’t see what affect the OP has. Unless I am missing something.

8

erl, I think the specific “affect” questioned by the OP is that the equal liberty sought by adoption of a libertarian political philosophy, because it is “predicated on circumstances established under a previous, non-libertarian regime” would be:

(NOTE to Gad: Sleeping under someone else’s bridge without permission is coercive. Tsk.)

9

Woops; didn’t mean to immediately hit “submit”.

I believe that the thing which makes Gad’s Baseline Problem critically important could be termed the Resource Problem. There’s a limited amount of real property available, and without either an equitable division of formerly public property or some program of wealth redistribution (anethema, as Gad noted, to libertarian philosophy), then the opportunities which present themselves to the new residents of Libertaria will not only be greatly disparate, in a manner predicated on the injustices allowed (or missed) under the previous system, but will also be made semi-permament due to enforcement of the idea that rights derive from property.

10

Without wanting to cut Apos’ lunch, how about this:

The notion of constitutional choice from behind a veil of ignorance - which has a long history, but is frequently associated with Rawls - presents a challenge to (broadly defined) liberals, since it is squarely based on (admittedly hypothetical) agreement.

Libertarians are left in the unfortunate (although not original ;)) position of either having to defend starting from - and effectively entrenching - the unjust (from their PoV) status quo or coming up with some scheme to figure out how to redistribute property from the ruck of history.

Sure. But what’s your reform programme? As James Buchanan always says, “We start from here.” Without a reform programme you’re a crop in search of a virgin field.

11

(Damn recaclitrant hamsters… obstinate little rodents.)

[Previous Post after intended editing:]

I believe that the thing which makes Gad’s Baseline Problem critically important could be termed the Resource Problem. There’s a limited amount of real property available, and without either an equitable division of formerly public property and some program of wealth redistribution (anethema, as Gad noted, to libertarian philosophy), then the opportunities which present themselves to the new residents of Libertaria will not only be greatly disparate, in a manner predicated on the inequalities allowed (or missed) under the previous system, but will also be made semi-permament due to enforcement of the idea that rights derive from property. –Those who begin with a “high value”, the advantages of much property, regardless of how that property was previously obtained, will be able to safeguard their advantages at the expense of those who begin with only the property of their persons. It is a self-sustaining system of inequality.

12

Very well-articulated, xeno; that’s exactly what I’m talking about.

hawthorne:

Right. A position made particularly poignant (more so than many other new contexts) because the goal of libertarianism–equal liberty to do what thou wilt, peacefully and honestly–conflicts so precisely both with the existing, entrenched status quo and with most programmatic reforms. Or maybe I’m being too consequentialist–perhaps liberty qua liberty is the point, and actual outcomes don’t matter. If this is the case, then it wouldn’t matter where we started. Or perhaps cckerberos is correct here:

Could you explain this, though? Your statement indicates that in Libertaria, fewer “unfair” mechanisms would exist to facilitate the maintaining of wealth. How do you mean, exactly? And what do you see as the “more fair” status of wealth towards which libertarianism would settle (like a house rather than a defendant) in a couple generations?

Also from cckerberos:

Well, your example of his son is just as good, but the thing about the Chinese official is that functionally, under Chinese law–well, communist party discipline, but the point remains–he’s been punished for his crime, yet still retains much of his wealth. As erl says, you’d be ex post punishing him a second time following the regime (sorry, context) change. I’d be happy abandoning the specific example, though–all I know about Chinese corruption is what I read last night for my Law & Economics Seminar; besides, xeno’s fleshed out my larger point masterfully.

Lib, now that you’ve made an appearance, you’ve gotta know that I want to hear your take on this. :slight_smile:

13

But I still don’t get it.

Are you people talking about how to divide the spoils of a nation-state libertarianly? If so, that’s a bit like asking what is the Christian way to split the money from a robbery.

14

Well…okay, yeah. Except that the analogy is imprecise–presumably, the Christian way to split money from a robbery (assuming the Christians aren’t the robbers, but acquired the money after the fact–I dunno, found it by the side of the road) would be either to return it to the victims of the robbery (the “rightful” owners, so to speak) or, should that prove impossible, to donate it to charity. Neither of which can practicably be done with the, um, spoils of the nation-state (and I prefer the more neutral and cumbersome term “existing distributions of wealth and property (and therefore rights),” myself).

So I guess we’re talking not about how to divide the spoils of a nation-state libertarianly, but how to deal with the fact that there are spoils left over from a nation-state even after the libertarian transition has been made. Or, more to the point: is there anything, other than the instant fact of liberty itself, that is a desired goal of libertarianism? If so, how is this ancillary goal or goals obstructed in a libertarian landscape which retains from the beginning the substantive wealth and property (and rights) inequalities promulgated by the previous, non-libertarian system of governance?

15

Exactly the point! A libertarian context introduced (or transitioned) (if you’ll forgive the “verbization” of a noun) onto an existing society where inequality of wealth exists would create a new and possibly ineradicable system of inequality of opportunity precisely because libertarian philosophy prohibits any possible means of correcting the initial inequalities of wealth.

16

I suppose I should have put the word “correcting” in quotes, to indicate that the very need for correction is an open question. Wealth distribution is not a clear cut moral dilemma.

17

Okay. I really don’t mean to be so dense, but I’ve charged into some of these discussions before only to find that I’ve upset people by making unwarranted assumptions. I’d like to avoid that this time around.

Can anyone explain to me why you would expect a libertarian government to address anything other than suppression of coercion on behalf of those who have freely given it consent to govern? Why would it be concerned about who is wealthier than whom? Or whether there is material equality among its citizens? And especially why would it be concerned with the distribution of property previously owned by someone else whom it did not govern?

18

The point that could also be made, however, is that some of the wealth is had now by anti-libertarian principles; should Libertaria come about, that method of maintaining this wealth would vanish.

xen

This argument can be made with or without appeal to redistribution of wealth or libertarian ideals, though. The notion of rights deriving from property doesn’t just include real estate, and it isn’t limited to Libertaria.

I, for example, have bad credit. This means I cannot purchase a home. However, for what I am very clearly paying in rent I could be using for a mortgage; in all likelihood it would be almost cheaper for me to own my own house (at least for the tax deduction the interest payments would present me!). And yet I cannot own a house. Barring a rather miraculous increase in income I will be renting for a long, long time, living right on the edge of bankruptcy and lower, lower class.

See, the banks in our fabulous redistributive society feel that I am too risky to invest in for property purchase, much like they would in a libertarian society now. That I pay my rent each month doesn’t phase them. That what I pay in rent each month would account for a mortgage payment doesn’t phase them.

I don’t know what definition you have of “opportunity”, but I don’t see it where I live. I can think of more than a few dopers (who I won’t name) that have agreed with me both on and off the boards on this count.

It is not enough that Libertaria would in some ways maintain the status quo, it must make things worse. I think the case can be made for education becoming poorer (at least, you’ve convinced me here on the boards), but I’m not that comfortable in believing this charge of stagnacy and missed opportunity.

Same shit, different day, to this Discordian. You make it sound like the instant Libertaria happened all welath would stagnate. But the motivation to sell property, purchase property, and so on, wouldn’t really have changed. So why would the behavior with respect to it?

19

—Are you suggesting that Rawls is somehow more moral than say, Locke?—

Sometimes I don’t understand you Lib. I’m not even sure what you’re asking, or why what I said confused you. I wasn’t talking about comparing Rawls or Locke personally as moral beings.

I was suggesting that the Rawlsian concept of justice provides a major philosophical challenge to both utilitarianism and the various libertarian philosophies as far as considering both the “baseline” of distribution as well as what to do afterwards. I’m of the mind that the Rawlsian ideas don’t ultimately hold up under scrutiny, but at this point in the discussion it’s probably important to get a lay of the land, and Rawls and others in his tradition are a major factor in this “baseline” problem.

20

Fair questions, Lib. Before I tackle them, though, do you grok me well enough to answer my questions above (I’ll reprint them for you)? That’ll tell me the degree to which you and I will be at cross-purposes.

To supplement the question, or put it more plainly: What does a transition to libertarianism hope to accomplish, other than liberty for the sake of liberty? Anything?

I hope you realize the inquiry is meant sincerely as an attempt at dialogue; I’m not taking the piss.

Oh, one more question: Are you familiar with the Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823)? If not, take a look at it. That case may help to explain what I’m talking about, and I’ll address it more fully the next time I post.