Eesh. Here’s how I think of the pirate riddle, for interested parties. Please, though, try and think on it more.[spoiler]Imagine it was just pirate #1. He would obviously assign 100 gold to himself and vote yes, so there you go.
#2 knows that a tie wins, so he proposes 100 to himself and 0 to pirate 1. Though 1 disagrees, a tie wins and 2 gets the whole enchilada.
#3 knows that pirate 2 has a chance to win 100 if he disagrees with everything, so there is no way to bribe him. But he also knows that #1 won’t get any money all if it comes down to 1 and 2, so he says “ninety-nine for myself, and one for 1.” 3 and one vote yes, overrulling 2.
#4 knows that 2 will never agree to anything. He also knows that the greediest way for 3 to win is to offer 1 only one measly gold piece. So he must either offer the same proposal that 3 would, or take 98 for himself and offer pirate 1 two gold. Being the greedy pirate he is, this is his offer. 1 and 4 assent, 2 and 3 dissent, tie wins.
#5 knows he can’t bribe #2. He can attempt to bribe #3, however, since #3 will know that if #5 gets tossed 3 gets nothing (see above). So he will offer himself ninety-six, 3 he offers one and 1 he offers three (to ensure he beats out the two 1 would make on #4’s proposal and thus guarantee a victory).
#6 knows he can’t bribe #2. Assuming #6 were to lose, then #5’s most intelligent offer would be to stiff #4. So he can bribe #4 one piece. With his own vote an obvious affirmative, he only needs one more vote to tie (and win), and so needs to bribe #1 more than he would get with #5’s most intelligent offer, meaning #1 gets four gold, #4 gets one gold, and he offers himself the remaining ninety-five.
#7 knows he can’t bribe #2. He also knows that [such and such will get stiffed, bribe them, etc].
No one should have to be thrown overboard. The final bid should be something like (from pirate 1 to pirate 10):
10, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 87.[/spoiler]