Lovers of Logic and Judgers of Debate, Help me out!

Ahh, Apos, nice. But what do you think these “choices” we make are?

It seems to me (and I think others that I’ve talked to) that we have a sense that we’re piloting the ship. At every point that we see a “choice”, we feel there are at least two alternatives and we could elect to do either. Unfortunately, we choose one or the other, and never actually know if we could have done the other. In the Betty world where everyone is a Bettyite, do the denizens feel like they’re choosing to be so? I imagine they do feel that way according to your argument (they’re the sort of people that would choose Betty if they could), so this seems to be what I would call a choice.

But it also seems to me that part of what colors our perception of what we could possibly elect to do (or do not) is observation that others have done (or done not). Is this present in the Bettyite world where everyone chooses Betty? Even people who wrestle titanically with reconciling Betty’s nature with what is written in the great Cookbook still end up believing. We can nowhere observe a person who manages to elude believing in Betty. Thus, this doesn’t seem to be quite what I would call a choice, after all.

It’s a little like jumping 30 meters in the air (on Earth, unassisted). I don’t ever see anyone do it or know of anyone who has done it, so I consequently don’t feel like I ever “choose” not to do it. If we lived in a world where we didn’t observe any non-Bettyites, we might even dream up a “physical law” or a “biological law” that explains why it is actually impossible to go against Betty. This would remove belief in Betty from the realm of choices (or illusions of choices).

NIGHTIME –

First, I have no intention of dealing with you in two threads, so I will be brief. I am more interested in seeing other’s responses to your argument. Second, I don’t see you saying anything new, so I will respond to this post of yours (but probably only this post of yours) in order to flesh out the argument for the others.

I did not add this. It is the crux of your argument. You clearly said, in the other thread, “God could simply predict which free willed people would eventually convert to christianity and create only those people.” (My emphasis.) That is what you said.

Because in B he can do no other than believe. It may appear to him as if he is making the same decision for the same reason, but in fact in one world he is freely choosing to do something, while in the other he is doing it because he must (as a precondition for his very existence), regardless of what his personal “reason” is. This goes to the issue of where the illusion of free will intersects with actual free will, and what we mean by the term “free will.” But those worlds are not the same, and they do not become the same by you parroting “yes they are, yes they are, yes they are.”

They are not exact duplicates! One can freely choose to believe, the other cannot! Christ on a crutch, this isn’t that hard! You cannot make them be exact duplicates by repeatedly insisting they are. They are not. They make look identical, they may act identically, they may have the same internal motivation for their actions, but one has free choice, while the other does not. One is acting volitionally; one is acting without volition – because he can do no other – even if he thinks he can.

[quot]I asked you to explain what was different about them, and instead of answering you said that one was only created because they would eventually believe. How do you know both weren’t created because they would eventually believe?
[/quote]

Because that’s the assumption underlying the very hypothetical: In scenario A, Xavier is not created based on his belief or unbelief, and therefore has free will on the issue. In scenario B, Xavier is created only to believe, and therefore has no free will (no choice) in the matter. Now you say "Well, maybe the first Xavier didn’t have free will either; maybe so, but (again) that leads to the conclusion of NO free will EVER – not your conclusion of free will existing in those created predestined to belief.

Because you are conveniently leaving out the fact that not only do no unbelievers exist, no unbeliever could ever exist. Ever. You consider a matter that prevents very existence to be “insignificant” compared to things that might influence (but not override) choice? If you do not exist unless you do A, your choice to do B has been overriden. Removed. You have NO CHOICE. If you exist, you must do A, because if you would not do A, you do not exist.

Jesus. Y’think?

Very well put. Whether you consider the passage of time to be a glorious gift from TGAPB or merely the mechanism that keeps everything from happening at once, that is where free will lies (if it exists at all, of course) ( :wink: ).

[sub]Thanks for the link, erl![/sub]

IMHO, predestination negates the free will of an individual if the being with predestination is also the creator of the individual. She/He/It/Them(no acronyms, please!:)) creates someone, while at the same time knowing with absolute certainty that this person will never make it into Heaven. Thus, free will is negated.

APOS –

True choice. Actual choice. As opposed to the appearance of choice.

  1. Wanda has total volition – free will – to choose between what’s in the box and what behind the curtain. She has “true choice.”

  2. Xavier believes he has total volition to choose between the box and the curtain (because so far as he knows, he does), but in reality the Great Betty has created him so that he can only choose the curtain. He has the appearance of choice, but does not truly have choice.

It doesn’t matter if Wanda a Xavier both choose the same thing, and for the same reason. One has true choice, the other does not.

The question then becomes, how do we tell between Wanda and Xavier? And looking out from the inside, of course we can’t. That does not change the fact that if we know of Betty’s interference (as we do in the hypothetical “Betty creates only those who choose the curtain”), we can discern who has choice and who doesn’t, even though if we didn’t know of her interference, we wouldn’t be able to tell.

The question is: Did you have the option to choose B? If yes, then “choice;” if no, then “no choice.” If you nature was not merely that you were inclined to choose A, but that you could never choose B, when would you have the choice to NOT choose A?

We don’t know if you were “forced” to choose A or not, unless we know that you could NEVER choose B. That is what is brought in to play by “Betty creates only A-choosers.” If so, then B may never be chosen and choice does not really exist – regardless of whether everyone “choosing” A thinks that it does.

Once again, with feeling: If Betty creates only A choosers to exist, and you exist, when could you choose B? You couldn’t. You must pick A.

“Choice: The power, right, or liberty to choose; option.” Note the lack of influence, such as inherent in only creating people who will do one thing and not the other.

“Free will: The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.” Dictionary.com. Note that the very definition of “free will” reflects that it must be free from “fate or divine will.” This, of course, begs the question: Do any of us ever have free will? Are any of us ever free from fate or divine will? But that leads to the conclusion that no free will exists ever – not that free will continues to exist in the presence of fact or divine will.

You do not know if you were compelled by anything other than yourself, because you don’t know if Betty made you choose as you chose. None of us know, here in the real world. But in the hypothetical, we know that Betty only creates curtain-choosers, and by so doing she prevents anyone from not choosing the curtain.

Perhaps the definition above will be helpful. Regardless of whether any of us can truly be said to have free will (in the presence of fate or divine will or influence unseen), I don’t think the concept itself is that hard.

As it currently stands, this most definitely not a question of logic. For it to be a question of logic, you would have to present a definition of “choose” and provide a logical proof of how the actions in question do not fulfill that definition.

Some questions for you, Jodi:

  1. TGAPB creates a world with only one person in it. This person either believes or doesn’t. If he does, then we have the situation in which TGAPB creates only people that believe, in which case he did not choose to believe. If he doesn’t believe, we have the mirror image. He therefore has no choice no matter what. It seems to me, therefore, that your position leads to the conclusion that free will is impossible in a world in which only one person exists. Is that correct?

  2. Suppose TGAPB creates only believers, but does not start out with that intention, it just happens to work out that way. Are people still without choice?

  3. I think that it is obvious that there is at least one action which no one, in the history of humanity, has performed (but let me know if you disagree). Call that action A. If only people that don’t perform A are created, does that mean that we, in fact, do not have the choice to perform A?

Thank you, CZAR. I kiss you!

Nice points, Ryan.

Blah blah blah blah blah…

Who cares who’s right…I wants to see me some spankin’ :wink:

–Newton: It seems to me (and I think others that I’ve talked to) that we have a sense that we’re piloting the ship.—

Note a very important point here: this utterance uses a rather unhelpful circular reference to “we.” What “we” is is EXACTLY what we are discussing. Who is piloting the “ship” of the pilot? And who pilots that pilot’s pilot? It’s been a longstanding question in philosophy that I don’t think has ever had a very satisfying answer.

—We can nowhere observe a person who manages to elude believing in Betty. Thus, this doesn’t seem to be quite what I would call a choice, after all.—

But what do you offer as a definition of what a “choice” would be if not this? That is, are you sure you are not turning up your nose at one possible and clearly explicable (at least in theory) understanding of choicemaking in favor of a wholly undefined and unexplained alternative “understanding” of “choice?”

I wasn’t saying that they didn’t have it , I was responding to what I thought was your position.

Betty creates everyone existence whether or not they have free will. Why does it matter whether or not she creates people that don’t believe in her?
Why should that affect the free will of those that do?

So betty creates all of these people that believe in her, and you say that means shes predestined them . Ok what if she changes her mind one day and makes someone that doesn’t believe . Does that mean that all of those people have free will now?

—True choice. Actual choice. As opposed to the appearance of choice.—

Re-stating the problematic term doesn’t help resolve the problem. The problem is that any litteral portion of the conceptual action of “making a choice” that I can think of involves a decisive will towards a particular option. That is, after all, what a will is. So what exactly is one’s will free FROM? Itself?

—1. Wanda has total volition – free will – to choose between what’s in the box and what behind the curtain. She has “true choice.”—

The problem is that this claim, as it is, is unintelligible. What is going on here when “Wanda” chooses? Why does she choose as she does?

The concept of Free will seems, to me, to be an self-contradictory oxymoron of which I cannot concieve. When we ask WHY a particular choice was made, what options are there other than that some characteristic of some particular state was decisive (in which case it is not “free”) or it was uncaused (in which case it is not anyone’s will)?

In the course of making choices, I never consult any device known as “free will.” Were it taken away from me or anyone, what, if anything, would change about my choices? Would they be any less my choices? I don’t see how they could be, since I am still the one making them. Would I make different choices? I can see no reason to suppose that I would. So how can an idea be both meaningful and yet devoid of any substantive implactions?

—Did you have the option to choose B? If yes, then “choice;” if no, then “no choice.” If you nature was not merely that you were inclined to choose A, but that you could never choose B, when would you have the choice to NOT choose A?—

The problem with such questions is that they covertly slip from the logic of posing an external quandry to an internal one without noting what has changed, especially concerning what is meant by “choice.” How can one say that “His determinative nature is to choose A.” and then claim that he did not choose?

—If Betty creates only A choosers to exist, and you exist, when could you choose B? You couldn’t. You must pick A.—

Yep. I CHOOSE A. I CHOOSE not to pick B. Choosing is an action performed by beings with wills. I am disagreeing not on this point, but on the presumption that it is meaningful to speak of a “truer” sense of “choice.”

—Perhaps the definition above will be helpful. Regardless of whether any of us can truly be said to have free will (in the presence of fate or divine will or influence unseen), I don’t think the concept itself is that hard.—

It is simple because it is noncognitive (most noncognitive terms are simple to define: a square circle is simply a 2D shape with four corners, four sides or equal length, and no corners. See? Simple.)

The “definition” above answers none of the questions I raised about the concept of free will AS IT IS USED in this sort of debate. What it does it state the “trivial” sense, in that we are free to choose when our actions are not forced. But this answer does not touch on what “Free Will” means as an inherent quality of a being in regards to its actual act of choosing. This is the sense we need to discuss, and this is the sense for which I see no viable operational definition. It is a sense that MUST delve into the “our actions” bit that the trivial sense of “free will” simply takes for granted. It cannot keep playing the game of “hide the action in the actor” in endless circular references to an undefined, unexamined subject “I” who “chooses” (how? along what criteria? Who is my “I” and why is it different from other "I"s and why do different "I"s make predictable choices at all if they are free, or why don’t all the "I"s make the same choices?)

PERSPECTIVE –

Because if they believe in her because they cannot do otherwise, then they do not believe in her through free will. They believe in her because they have no choice.

Think of two mice, identical in every way, and in identical mazes. Tom works his way to the cheese by taking a series of right turns until he gets there. (Note to nitpickers: Don’t tell me a series of right turns is a square, because it’s not necessarily; elogate the sides to get a squared-off spiral.) Jerry works his way to the cheese by taking the exact same path. Both believe they are choosing their paths freely. And from every observable context, they are.

But we can step outside the mice’s world and know that Jerry is genetically engineered to turn only right. Due to an outside force beyond his control and without his knowledge, he can only turn right. Therefore, he has no choice but to turn right. Tom has free will; Jerry does not – even if Jerry thinks he does.

Obviously not. The question of whether the outside force dictates how the mouse acts is individual to each mouse. Is each mouse “predestined,” because it can only go right, never left? Each mouse for which that is true has no free will regarding that decison. It doesn’t matter if there are a billion other mice that can go left and right freely and choose to go right, because they have at least the option of going left, and it is the presence of another real (not illusory) option that defines a true choice. That is Tom’s situation. But if there is only one real option (even if the mouse thinks there is two), then there is no choice. One option = no choice. That is Jerry’s situation.

BEAGLEDAVE –

First the spanking . . . and then the oral sex! [sub]gratuitous Grail reference[/sub]

APOS –

Hey, I know a lost cause when I see one. If you claim that the assertion that a person may act without volition is “unintelligible” and you “cannot conceive” of the concept of free will, then I am confident there is nothing I can do to explain any part of this to you. Though I appreciate your honesty; it’s saved m a lot of time.

I think that, as pointed out by others, this ultimately comes down to your definition of “choice”. But I also think that Jodi is being unfair in treating Nightime as though s/he were obstinately refusing to see reason. His/her position seems to me to be entirely reasonable. Let me admit right now, though, that I have not yet looked at the other thread where this discussion began. Perhaps this will allow me to see the issue with greater clarity, since I won’t be distracted by the other issues being discussed in that thread. Or perhaps I’m just lazy. Anyway, just to throw my own dog into the ring, as it were, I submit the following analogy.

Suppose that I run a nightclub. Every night, I admit many patrons, many of whom are regulars. But every night some of my costumers get a little too rowdy, and start causing trouble. They throw their drinks, intimidate the other costumers, and generally make things unpleasant, until I throw them out. Of course, I refuse to admit these particular trouble-makers on following nights, but I get a lot of new costumers every night, and on any given night, some of my costumers will choose to by trouble-makers, while others will choose to behave themselves. Let us suppose further that, by whatever definition of “choice” that you use, the costumers choose freely to be, or not to be, trouble-makers.

Then, one day, I am given, by my uncle the inventor, a wonderful gadget: a Trouble-Maker Detector (TMD). The TMD (my uncle says) can scan the brain of a person and instantly state whether that person will be a trouble-maker that night. I give it to the bouncer at the front door to my club, and he scans every patron before admitting them, though the costumers are not aware of the TMD’s existence.

Now, at first I’m skeptical of my uncle’s invention. Though the TMD is telling me that some of the people will be touble-makers, I am not yet sufficiently confident in its results to risk losing costumers by refusing to admit them. I do, however, note who they are, and, sure enough, these people often become trouble-makers later that night. Moreover, all of the people whom the machine said would not become trouble-makers, in fact do not become trouble-makers. In other words, though the TMD occasionally gives false positives, it never gives a false negative.

Over the course of several nights, as I become more and more confident in the results of my uncle’s gadget, I start admitting fewer and fewer of the people to whom the TMD gives a positive result, indicating that they may be trouble-makers. Finally, after a few nights, I am completely confident in the machine, and only admit those whom the TMD indicates will be non-trouble-makers.

Now, if I understand Jodi’s reasoning correctly, those people who enter my club no longer behave themselves by choice at this point. Rather, once they’ve entered the club, they are compelled to be good, because were they to choose otherwise, well, then they would not have been admitted in the first place.

Recall that many of my costumers are regulars. These regulars always behaved themselves, even before I got my TMD, and did so (we hypothesized) of their own free will. My question is, when precisely did these regulars’ good behavior stop being their own choice? Was it when I first began scanning patrons with the gadget? Was it when I first began refusing to admit some of the people to whom the TMD gave a positive result? Or was it when I finally refused to admit anyone to whom the TMD gave a positive result?

It seems to me that my regulars never stopped making a free choice. Every night they make the same choice to behave themselves, of their own free will. The presence or absence of others who might, or might not, choose otherwise has no bearing on whether or not a given one of my regulars used free will in deciding to behave himself.

Now suppose that, unbeknownst to me, the back door to my nightclub occasionally remains unlocked, and some of the people who are turned away at the front door (because of a positive TMD reading) sneak into the nightclub through the back. As it turns out, these people who sneak in never actually cause trouble, so I am never aware of the fact that people are entering my club without being cleared by the TMD. Does the presence of these people somehow return free will to my regular patrons? If so, why does merely having these “illegal” costumers in the room grant free will to the others? If not, why then did my regulars have free will before I started refusing people at the front door, but no longer have free will now?

Jodi,

Fine, then we have a standard free will/determinism debate based around a novel example.
The choice whether or not to believe in Betty is trivial compared to the choice that none of them have: whether or not to exist.

What if they believed in her because she gave them ice cream cones? There are many reasons why people make decisions and none of have anything to do with whether or not they exist.

It’s just like any free will argument. Is limited freedom any kind of freedom? If can’t choose X how can we really have free will? The examples are largely unimportant.

If a TMD can scan brainwaves and predict their behavior with 100% accuracy, then I would say that their behavior is determined by their brain waves and that they don’t have free will.

To me, “predetermination” means that certain events will occur, with no possibility of a decision branch that avoids those events. “Free will” implies that there is one or more decision branches where I can choose to follow different paths. If the probability of my choosing a path is 100.000%, then I have not exercised free will in choosing it.

Therefore, I think that free will and predetermination are mutually exclusive. And if predetermination does not exist, then you can’t predict the future accurately. So I conclude that a perfect TMD can not be built.

Don’t ask if predetermination makes free will impossible. Why are we starting out by assuming that anyone (even GAPB) can accurately predict the future? I start with free will, and conclude that predicting the future is impossible.

Jodi:

We are clearly using different definitions of free will, now that you are arguing that free will does not exist in the individual. The question is, if free will does not exist in the individual, then why is it imporant? By your definition, no one should even care if free will exists or not. It is irrelevant.

heresiarch:

These are interesting points, but I disagree with your definition of free will. If free will is the power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will, then it does not imply that there is a possibility of choosing different paths. That would mean that your will was changing, which is not necessary. You could easily make a choice and stick with it.

What you are in fact describing, and what Jodi is describing, is not free will at all, but chance. Chance implies that different paths are possible. Chance implies that the future is impossible to predict. But here is the problem: chance is the exact thing that denies free will! Think about the very meaning of the word. It is a negation. It means that something happened with no cause. If there is no cause, then free will cannot be the cause.

So if chance, then no free will. But what if there is no chance? What if there is only one possible outcome? Then can free will exist? Again, think about the meaning. If there is no chance, then everything has a cause. If everything has a cause, then if you knew all the causes you could predict the future. And since everything has a cause, free will could be the cause. Therefore free will is compatible with (no chance), meaning there is only one possible outcome and it can be predicted, but free will is not compatible with (chance), meaning there are many possible outcomes.

And now for a word from my sponsor, Hume (thanks eris):

“It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions, Let any me define a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connection with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole controversy.”

Tyrell McAlister:
I think that the notion of a machine which separates out well-behaved people with perfect accuracy presupposes that the people in question do not have free will, at least with regard to their behavior in your nightclub.

I think this is also an issue with the original scenario: the fact that the GAPB can separate out believers from non-believers implies that each individual is fated to a life of either belief or non-belief. If they are really making choices, then how does Betty tell a priori which will be believers and which will not?

I was thinking in terms of the idea of a branching universe theory. Let’s say I’m thinking of buying a Coke. Free will say I have the power to buy it or not. Let’s say I buy it. This would set me on a path that might involve near term results of increased energy and long term results of high dental bills. Or I decide not to buy it, choosing a path which involves slightly better health. Whichever decision I make I move down some path, because I can’t help moving along with the flow of time. And it doesn’t just affect me. My dentist, my spouse, all the shareholders of Coca-cola inc. and, ultimately, the whole universe, are affected by my choice. (That’s how important I am :slight_smile: )

Now chance, IMO, is another factor that sends the universe down one out of many possible paths. The best example is Schrodinger’s Cat. One path is the universe with a cat, another path is universe with an ex-cat, and the universe branches depending on something random.

I think both free will and chance co-exist in the universe. Since both have the result of sending the universe down alternate unpredictable paths, both make it impossible to know the future with certainty. But chance doesn’t completely negate free will, it just makes it harder to see what the results of our decisions will be. I might drink this Coke and avoid dental agony.

I gotta admit, though, the whole mind-body question has me stumped. If my mind is just the sum of brain functions, and the brain is a machine governed by physical laws, is my free will just an illusion? Do I act or not act according to determinations of my will or according to the firing of my neurons?

I think that “mind” is a concept on a level of abstraction, while the brain is a physical thing. Can a concept direct the actions of a physical object? Sounds absurd, yet it appears to me I have free will. So I guess there must be something wrong with my concept of mind and free will.

All this thinking makes my teeth hurt.