Lovers of Logic and Judgers of Debate, Help me out!

Great Debates
41

Analogies analogies … The problem with them is that they aren’t exact representations of the origininal premise.

Having said that …

Suppose there is a world. Ours, in fact. The one we live in. In this world, there is no way to test conclusively that an object, say a rock, has occupied the same physical location for any period of time. In other words, if I find a rock, I can test it for a number of properties, but I can’t test it and know that it came from the moon or was formed on earth.

Now, some astronauts bring back a rock from the moon. I have the same limitations in testing this rock.

Let us assume that I can compare the 2 rocks for every other property possible, but for where they came from. I do this and conclude that they are exactly the same. To all extents, they are exactly the same.

In another world, however, I can test for this additional property. I do, and conclude that they are not exactly the same. One was formed on the moon, the other on earth.

The only difference between these 2 rocks therefore, is in my ability to test them for a property.

Suppose that in Bettyworlds, I can test for the property. In Bettyworld A, Betty creates only believers. They have no free will to be nonbelievers, or they wouldn’t be created. In Bettyworld B, Betty creates free will’ers who all choose to believe in Betty.

If I can test for the property, I will find these worlds not the same. If I can’t test, they are exactly the same.

I believe Jodi is saying that I can test for the property, and even though the result is the same in both worlds, they are different worlds.

42

The Great and Powerful Betty has given you free will. If you choose to exercise it, and not believe in Her, she will destroy you.
You are allowing yourself to be confused because she decided to destroy you first, and then allow you to make your choice. This is only logical, since it takes her far less effort to destroy you before you exist, than after.

It’s logical. Logic dominates all other things,

Well, except the Great and Powerful Betty.

Tris

43

Let’s dump alll the analogies.
If you believe that your god is all-knowing, then as he creates you, he knows ahead of time what you are going to do every second of your life from birth to death. If he looks ahead and sees that you will eventually decide not to believe and will die condemned for eternity, and goes ahead and creates you anyway, what are your chances of going to Heaven?
Zero.
You cannot then decide to believe, because that would prove your god wrong.

44

Is Betty required by some law above Her to collapse the worlds of choices that She has created by observing them?

45

Sure you can, but it would prove him right. Whatever you decide is what he knew you would decide, so go ahead and make the choice. :slight_smile:

46

But given the proposition, he isn’t looking ahead, he’s looking back at what you already decided. He’s only looking ahead if you’re viewing it from where you’re standing; from where he is, it already happened.

47

TYRREL –

Of their own free will, yes. Because the precondition you’ve put in effect – the TMD – was not in effect when they came in. But also recall that if the TMD is a precondition from the very beginning for every single customer, as it is if the customer’s existence depends on it, there is no “regulars” who have “always behaved themselves.” Every customer gets scanned with the TMD, every time, from the very beginning.

Here the analogy breaks down, because by existing, we enter the nightclub one time only. We don’t get to live again (come in again) based on our behavior on other nights (in other lives) – so far as we know. (Yes, yes, karma, reincarnation – let’s just not go there). So each customer standing on the threshold of the nightclub (world) is scanned by the TMD (Betty), and only if he or she will behave (believe) is he or she admitted. And once inside the nightclub, no person within the nightclub has the option of misbehaving – even if they think they do – because if there was any chance they would misbehave, they would not have made it in in the first place.

Again, there is no “every night;” there is only one night. One opportunity to enter. You will either behave or you won’t, and the TMD will tell me that and on that basis alone, you’re either in or out.

Right. The TMD scans every person individually, and every person will be judged and either allowed in or not. So there might be a mix of people who have the option of misbehaving or not (not TMD-scanned) and people who don’t (TMD scanned) – a mix of the free-willed and the predestined. But if you say in advance “only those who will behave will be allowed in,” then we know you have selected only the TMD-approved (because only by using the TMD will you know for sure who will behave) and, under those circumstances, we know that no one in the club has the option of misbehaving. But the option or lack therefore exists for each person individually and some may have it and some may not – so long as we are not told in advance “TMD in use.” If we know “TMD in use,” then we know that no one in the club can “choose” to misbehave. Similarly, in the Betty hypothetical, we know that Betty only creates believers – no one in her club has the choice to not believe.

No. Now you have a mix of the TMD’ed and the not TMD’ed and, from inside the club, you can’t tell the difference (unless they misbehave) – i.e., you can’t tell the difffernce between those who behave by choice and those who behave because the TMD confirms they absolutely will not do otherwise (and therefore cannot do otherwise, because the TMD cannot be wrong). The first group has free will in choosing to behave; the second group does not, even if it thinks it does. But, again, the concepts of “multiple nights” and “sneaking in” are not analogous. Betty knows when everyone comes in her club, and each customer can only go in once.

The TMD’ed do not have free will, because their presence in the club is conditioned on their predestined behavior – they will behave because they have to behave, because they TMD tells us they will behave and it is never wrong. They do not have the option of misbehaving; none of them may choose to misbehave.

PERSPECTIVE –

This begs the question, which (again) is: Do people predestined to believe “choose” to believe? Saying “the ‘choice’ of whether or not to believe is trivial” merely begs the question, because it assumes a “choice” is being made – we have not established that one is. That’s what we’re discussing. Regardless of whether you consider this issue “trivial,” it is, in fact, the issue under discussion.

If my aunt had balls . . . . There may in fact be “many reasons why people believe” that may or may not “have anything to do with whether or not they exist,” but in the question under discussion we know that belief is a precondition of existence. So the question is whether that belief is freely chosen or not. If the reason a person believes is because he or she has no option to ever not believe, then he or she is not believing by choice.

NUTMAGNET – Yes.

TRIS –

Surely you see that this cannot be. “Choosing” implies existence, so Betty cannot take someone out of existence and then have them choose. Who would be choosing? Nothing exists to make the choice. Rather, Betty fails to create anyone not believing (and thereby makes belief a condition of existence). She is making the “choice” for you, and if you exist you will believe – must believe. This is different than a Betty that allows people to choose and then zaps them out of existence if they choose wrongly. Those people may be short-lived, but they had free will to choose.

CZAR – Yes.

Thanks everyone for playing. I think I’m done here. :slight_smile:

48

Well, I guess I might be turning up my nose at a clearly explicable understanding of choicemaking, but I prefer to think I’m just doing a bad job explaining why I am dissatisfied with that understanding. (Why did your understanding not get scare quotes but mine did? Is it because yours has the self-proclaimed property "clearly explicable (at least in theory), while mine has the property “wholly undefined and unexplained”?) Or maybe I’m actually just poorly restating exactly what you said when you wrote:

(Emphasis mine). I was ready to claim yesterday that it was not enough for you to claim you chose A (over B) because something in your nature made you choose A. It was essential that you believe that a different person with a different nature could have chosen B. I thought choice requires that we detect something in our “personal” nature that is not shared universally by all people.

You’ve seen the bumper stickers that say “Betty is a Liberal”? Well, they’re true. What if she created only people she knew would join the Democratic party (or their whatever are thier countries more liberal mainstream political parties)? In our world, we perceive our political beliefs and party affiliation (if any) as choices, but my thesis is that’s because we observe that that affiliation is not universal. In the world I just posited, I don’t think any person would see liberalism as a choice.

This morning, though, I’m dissatisfied with all this. What about sexual orientation? First, it seems to be something in our personal nature (is that enough for you to call it a choice?). Second, we can observe (whatever our orientation), that there are others with a different nature, so it’s possible to believe that others differ on this aspect of their nature. Thus, we both ought to agree that sexual orientation is a “choice” made by every person. Yet, few I’ve talked to of any orientation feel that way, and I’m not ready to ascribe “choice” to sexual orientation.

kg m²/s²

49

Hume: "“It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary.”

Everything has a cause. If you could look back at all the causes for a belief, then you would come to the conclusion that that belief was necessary. That, in fact, it was inevitable. This does not mean that free will was not the cause.

Free will: the power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.

Free will logically has it’s origin in the will of the individual. But some are arguing that even if individuals are exactly the same, even if their wills are the same, one has free will and the other does not. This implies that free will does not exist in the individual. Then what is free will? How can it be said to ever cause anything? By this definition free will becomes simply the possibility of alternate things happening, though there is no actual cause for them to happen. There is a word for this, but not free will. The word is chance.

It is important to realize that “because the TMD confirms they absolutely will not do otherwise” is not a cause. It explains how we know what the choice will be, but it does not explain the causes of the choice. Confirmation is not a cause. But there is a cause. Maybe the person just doesn’t like misbehaving. Maybe they are scared to misbehave. They do not misbehave, because to do so is not in accordance with their will.

The point is, to say that there must be a possibility of alternate choices is to DENY free will. Because acting in accordance with your will will leads to a certain choice. Therefore the possibility of alternate choices implies chance. But chance is the absence of a cause! The absence of free will. If everything was understood, every cause would be seen as necessary, and therefore there would be only one possible outcome. The possibility of alternate outcomes implies the absence of causes.

Therefore if you believe free will is capable of causing anything, then there is not a possibility of alternate choices. If you define free will as some higher concept that does not actually cause anything, then it is irrelevent and you are probably really describing chance.

I knew you would come around :wink:

50

Nightime,

What universe are you posting from?

Because while you may have tied yourself in metaphysical knots to arrive at that “logical” conclusion, any random person over the age of 12 asked to define “free will” would express it in the exact opposite of your conclusion.

In case you haven’t gathered this, we’re not having a bull session where you attempt to impress people with your witty reasoning – for many of us, the question of God’s will and free will is a serious issue that involves how we live our lives.

51

Yes, I’m willing to admit that you have caused me to see your position, and I think I agree with it (for whatever that’s worth).

Still, I get the feeling that you and Jodi are talking at cross purposes, and you both know it but won’t admit it. I’m not suggesting you should give up an inch of your position, but if you do you might get a kiss (and a spanking).

52

—Jodi: If you claim that the assertion that a person may act without volition is “unintelligible” and you “cannot conceive” of the concept of free will, then I am confident there is nothing I can do to explain any part of this to you. Though I appreciate your honesty; it’s saved m a lot of time.—

Way to dodge the issue. I didn’t SIMPLY note that I found it unintelligible, I pointed out exactly why the concept involves what appears to be a number of internal contradictions. This is not a novel philosophical position: the idea that “free will” is a non-concept that exists purely to avoid problems with morality. If you want to use a term like “free will” in a sense other than the trivial one, I demand that you explain the implications of this claimed property.

But the fact is, you have not given a shred of discussion as to WHAT is happening when a person “acts without violition.” You are defining it wholly as a negative: you are telling me what is NOT happening. This is unacceptable for any discussion in which “free will” itself is exactly what’s under question.

How can we even BEGIN to ask whether or not a being has “Free Will” before the term is given an operational definition? How will we know when we’ve found what we’re looking for?

53

FWIW I think I side with Nightime as well. Whether or not god allows people who would choose to believe in him live does not negate the fact that they would, in fact, make that choice (given an omnipotent creator).

I think that makes me agree, anyway…

54

—Why did your understanding not get scare quotes but mine did? Is it because yours has the self-proclaimed property "clearly explicable (at least in theory), while mine has the property “wholly undefined and unexplained”?—

It was not so much as to insult the conception, but rather because until some explanation of WHAT is going on, I don’t see how we can call it a “choice” or indeed anything. But I probably should have put quotes around both, because the problem we are having is figuring out which concept is viable, and which is not.

—In the world I just posited, I don’t think any person would see liberalism as a choice.—

I agree, and your theory of why we psychologically see certain things as choices, and other things as not being choices seems to have good face validity.

—Second, we can observe (whatever our orientation), that there are others with a different nature, so it’s possible to believe that others differ on this aspect of their nature. Thus, we both ought to agree that sexual orientation is a “choice” made by every person. Yet, few I’ve talked to of any orientation feel that way, and I’m not ready to ascribe “choice” to sexual orientation.—

I would simply argue that this is due to the way in which we experience these things internally. Sexual orientation is a strong compulsion that we feel towards a particular person or class of persons in many rather glaring ways, sometimes whether we choose to feel it or not. Like our heart beating, our internal dialouge seems to have little control over it. And, more importantly, sexual orientation appears to be fairly consistent: we consistently are attracted to the same sorts of people.

When deciding whether to turn on a stove or a TV, however, I may decide different things at different times. We feel that we are selecting from a range of potential options without a particularly strong compulsion to do either. But ultimately, either SOMETHING internal to us must be deciding the issue between one or the other, or the chocie is random. In the latter case, how can it rightly be called “our” choice, since we did not definitively decide the matter? And in the former case, what could that something be, other than our present characters?

The very concept of responsibility seems to require such a causality via character. Think of it this way: otherwise why would a being standing before you now rightly be held responsible for the choice he made two seconds ago? The persent being has as little control now over what that previous choice was as anyone else did. Two seconds ago, it made a “free” choice. If it is truly a “free” being, then it could well choose to make an entirely different choice, given the same options again. How can it be held responsible for any particular choice? Doesn’t the concept of responsibility imply that the being has some sort of character that is responsible for the PARTICULAR nature of the choices it chooses?

This is what has always seemed incoherent about a concept like divine judgement of “free” beings. What, exactly, is being judged? If two identical people with this thing called “free will” start off and make two different choices, one good, one evil: WHY? The concept of “Free Will,” whatever it really is, seems to demand that they be able to make different choices, even if they are created otherwise identical. But to even speak rationally of judging one for being evil, SOMETHING needs to explain why that one choose to do evil. Otherwise, the difference seems utterly arbitrary, and the “judging” is no different than judging the results of a coin flip as being either good or bad.

Interestingly enough, studies on the brain have revealed several effects that I find a little disquieting and might suggest possibilities along these lines.
The first is that the readiness potential (that is, what we believe to be the first spark of an actual and effective decision to act) appears to come BEFORE the point at which we actually experience “making a decision” in our internal dialouge. That is, the decision appears to be made before we are aware that we have decided. This experiment is not conclusive, but certainly a little odd, considering how I normally percieve “myself” as being my inner dialouge.

The second is that the experience of “deciding” appears to be reproducible in the lab. We all know quite well that electrodes attached to skeletal nerves can be used to cause our muscles to crudely move at the behest of the person running the electrodes. This is not surprising. What IS surprising is that in some cases (stimulating some higher nerve clusters), the movement is actually accompanied with the subject claiming that THEY had made the decision to move (despite the fact that they had moved right when the nerves were stimulated).

55

Poly:

I defined free will simply as the power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will. As Apos said, if you want to define free will as something different than that, you have to tell us how you are defining it! Because I have no idea what you are referring to. It seems to me that you are defining free will as the possibility of alternate choices. This is not a workable definition, because it does not explain what is actually causing the choices. In fact it is the definition of chance, the absence of cause, and therefore the absence of free will by any definition I know.

I’ll try to simplify this. You can argue that actions are caused, in which case if you knew all the causes you could predict the action. This means that actions are necessary, not because god is forcing them, but because they are the natural result of all the causes. One of the causes is free will.

Or you can argue that actions are not caused, in which case it is impossible to predict actions. This means that alternate actions are possible, because they are purely based on chance, the absence of cause. Now, if you define free will as a cause, then free will cannot exist in this world.

Which brings me back to my conclusion, which is that if free will causes anything, then it is only consistent with a world in which things actually have causes. I have yet to see you state a meaningful definition of free will which does not allow for free will to cause anything.

Ask yourself this: if there is a possibility of choosing different paths, despite all the causes for the decision, including your own will, being in one particular state, then how can the decision possibly be attributed to free will, or indeed anything else?

56

Oh come on Polycarp! I am accustomed to your posts being much more fair and reasonable than this. Do you really think that a “random person over the age of 12” is the best person to ask to define free will, a concept about which philosophers have been unable to achieve consensus after millennia of thought and debate? Do you really believe that the position that Nightime is defending would only be taken by someone motivated by a perverse desire to show off how cleverly they can defend an absurd thesis? “In case you haven’t gathered this,” Nightime’s conclusions are similar to those of many who have given the nature of the relationship between free-will and chance serious and honest thought.

57

I don’t have much problem with your definition. I would just modify it to say “Free will is the power to act in one way, or another way, or not at all according to the determinations of the will.” That way I can choose to buy Coke, or Pepsi, or 7-up, or nothing at all. I think that’s what other people mean when they speak of alternate choices. At least when I speak of alternate choices I don’t mean to imply that randomness comes into play.

You seem to be saying that our decisions are based entirely on our brain states, and our brain states are based entirely on our past experiences, so when we make a choice, there is a 100% certainty what that choice is going to be. And whether we take half a second to decide, or spend two weeks agonizing over our choice, it doesn’t matter, because God knew yesterday what we were going to choose. Do I understand you correctly?

Would you also agree then that all our decisions were pre-determined on the instant that God created the universe and set it in motion? If the universe is controlled by cause and effect, and every cause can be traced back to a previous effect, I think you have to. The only thing that could alter the path of the universe would be a prime cause, like God, that is not determined 100% by previous events.

Well, that worldview makes me feel like a cog in a clock, unable to alter events. Any choice of exercising my free will is an illusion, as if I were the second hand, deciding whether to go move forward or not. I say, “Hmm, I think, according to the power of my will, that I will move forward.”

and God says, “I knew you were gonna do that.”

If God wanted our choices to be more meaningful than that, then God must have granted each of us a little prime cause of our own. It’s not omnipotence, or the power to create something out of nothing, it’s not randomness; it’s just a little independence.

58

It isn’t bad being a cog in a clock if you like keeping time.

59

Ah. Now I comprehend your stance, Nighttime, and it is a much more reasonable one than I had misunderstood it to be.

Let me examine this a bit more carefully, though. I proceed to type in this message, and decide that the next letter I type, to complete this sentence will be a Q. Now, I had 26 choices from which to select a letter, and in fact as I typed the words leading up to that letter I had planned to use an N and then changed my mind.

I exercised what I perceive as a totally free choice of what letter I would type.

From the perspective of a God existing in eternity, that choice may have been mandated by the state of my synapses, the question of what I read in the Pit before opening this thread, and a variety of other things. But in my own frame of reference it was a free choice.

Perhaps what you’re saying is that I will choose what I want to choose, and that is, if you knew my every motive completely as God is supposed to, predictable.

But that only examines it from God’s perspective, or from an ideal objective perspective equivalent to His, if you don’t want to get theology into the issue.

And all frames of reference are equally valid when they give plausible results. And from mine, I was exercising a free choice of what letter to type.

60

It clearly depends on what “freewill” entails.

Does freewill mean I can make a choice in contravene of casuality? Does it mean that my choices are non-deterministic, that is, if the total state of the universe at any given moment can be known and all the laws of physics are known, my choices still cannot be determined by calculations? Does it mean that I may take courses of actions that cannot be foreseen even by an omniscient being?