There are several ways this idea has potential problems.
The most obvious is that it encourages Hollywood-style accounting, designed to shift costs in an opaque, uninformative way in order to disguise profit to avoid paying profit-percentages. Countless ways this can work. What if the workers are employed by a company which regularly loses money, but that company has fixed contracts with another company which is insanely profitable and – surprise! – has almost zero employees.
Even with sophisticated and highly costly tax enforcement, there will essentially always be tax workarounds that avoid it by legal means. And then what have you gained in the end? The cost of enforcement is pure deadweight loss. The cost of avoidance is more deadweight loss. And for what? Only a marginal redistribution of “profit” in a manner that could be done in other fashion?
Another way this doesn’t work is that it fails to address the actual market for labor. People work at firm instead of firm [Y] because they feel it’s the best alternative to them available, given wage and working conditions etc. Suppose it’s a 30k salary for a certain employee. Profit sharing pops up, and there’s a bonus 1k that’s mandated by the government, rather than enforced naturally and voluntarily by mutual agreement of the two parties. Then why wouldn’t the salary drop to 29k, plus a 1k profit-sharing bonus?
Net change of zero. This seems to be the point Cheesesteak is making.
If you haven’t done so, you ought to look into the difference between the legal incidence of a tax, vs the economic incidence. Just because the government collects a “tax” from the firm (and from their perspective, it absolutely is a tax) rather than the employee, doesn’t mean that the firm pays the whole incidence of the tax. It’s quite possible that the net change after profit sharing – even in the absence of accounting tricks – would be zero. Nothing. Exceptions to that would be sudden shifts in the profitability of the company. Companies that were going bankrupt would receive a cushion, as they offload their expenses by a sudden cut in their employees profit-sharing portion of their wage. Only in the subset of companies that saw sudden increases in profitability should we expect (again: in the absence of accounting shenanigans) the employees to actually benefit.
If that actually happened, then it’s conceivable that the firm would not be able to expand as quickly. Profits don’t just disappear into the ether. An unexpectedly profitable company might be hiring new workers. Is it really a good thing that those new hires should potentially get shafted, in order to benefit the current employees?
One final point here is just… why?
Why would you want to do this?
If you’re an employee for a company, do you want to buy stock for the same company? So that if the company goes under, you lose both your wage and the value of the financial savings? Really? If you work for and receive a wage from company , then presumably you want your savings to have some protection from the vagaries of fortune of that one company. I think it would be an absolutely excellent idea if more people had a sort of “mandatory saving” system. But there’s no way in hell I’d have their savings subject to exactly the same risk as their wage stream.