Morality . . . where do you think it comes from?

Great Debates
101

There is no absolute morality, if for no other reason than because there are many things that are morally good that conflict with one another. It is a “good thing” for people to be free, just as it is a “good thing” for people to be safe, but you can’t have complete freedom and complete safety. There’s no way to prove that the line must be drawn in the sand in a certain way. You can, however, provide a justification as to where you think the line ought to be drawn, and the validity of your justification determines the validity of your moral opinion.

Murder is objectively wrong, because it is defined as “unlawful/unjustified killing, especially with malice aforethought.” Look in any dictionary, and you’ll find a definition similar or identical to this one. It is impossible to justify murder–by the very nature of the word, murder is always unjustified.

Murder is not universally wrong, because there is no concept of “murder” that exists in a vacuum. Without communicative activity, you can’t have the implicity reciprocation that creates the distinction between “justified” and “unjustified” killing.

Why? Do you honestly believe that all justifications are equally valid? If not, then what’s the problem?

If there exists two moral assessments (“It’s okay for me to randomly kill people, but it’s not okay for others to randomly kill” and “Random killing is wrong for all people,” for example), then the first assessment is inconsistent (unless the person is somehow able to offer an acceptable justification as to why they have the priviledge to kill while others do not) and irrational, and the second is consistent and rational. An irrational justification is not equivalent to a rational justification–therefore it is false that all moral assessments are subjective.

Two problems with this counterexample:

  1. Person B needs only to point out the many examples of women who have suffered long-lasting psychological trauma as a result of rape. Person A will not be able to point out sufficient (if any) examples of women who were better off as a result of rape. These justifications are not equivalent.

  2. It is not sufficient to point out one example in which two moral assessments differ but are both equally valid–I have already stated that such situations exist. You must show that all moral assessments are incapable of being objectively compared to one another.

You’re misapplying the term “morality.” According to my dictionary, the very first definition of the term is “The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct” (emphasis is my own). If nothing else, one’s morals can be objectively compared to the society’s moral standards, which would clearly place person A in the wrong.

Also, you’ve already admitted that assessments as nebulous as who is the “greatest basketball player” are subject to objective standards. Why is it so difficult to believe that assessments that have been in existence for far longer, such as declaring an action to be “righteous” or “wicked,” would also be subject to objective standards?

I fail to see how somebody can want to be raped, and still have it be considered rape. Again, checking the dictionary, the very first entry is “The crime of forcing another person to submit to sex acts, especially sexual intercourse.” If person C wants to have intercourse, then where does the “force” part of the definition come into play?

Not everybody has the same assessment as to who is the greatest basketball player. That still doesn’t mean that I’d be correct in saying that my beer can is the greatest basketball player of all time.

Fifty different people measuring an object with a meter stick might come up with fifty different measurements, but that doesn’t mean that the term “meter” is subjective, nor does it mean that the object’s dimensions are subjective.

102

Can’t edit so I’ll have to make yet another post.
But my question for you loinburger, is; Exactly what moral assessments are objective? Considering my post above.

103

I can judge justifications in general, without having to specify moral justifications. To “justify” something is to “demonstrate sufficient reason” for something, and reason == rationality.

Ah, gotcha. He’s not talking about Locke, he’s talking about spiritual mumbo-jumbo.

104

Now you’re just being obnoxious.

  1. What’s your justification as to why hammering the baby is a moral (or amoral) act? Remember, no “because I say so.”

  2. Would you object to being hammered about the arms and legs? (Or, since hammering the child is likely to cause more damange than hammering you, would you object to being made into a quadripelegic?) If so, then your behavior is inconsistent.

  3. Would you object to having a loved one grievously injured? If so, then your behavior is inconsistent with regards to the child’s mother/father/guardian/whatever.

Now are you through being contrary, or do you have more foolish hypothetical dilemmas with which to stump me?

No moral assessments are absolute (which is how you’re misusing the term “objective”), since without communication one cannot ever form morals. All moral assessments are objective, in the way that I have defined my use of the term.

105

Well, I dunno if I should argue my point or just give up.
However I do see your point, and it’s a strong one.
I do feel that I have made several good points as to why morality is purely subjective though.
I will conclude this and ask you; If no moral assessments are absolute, how can there be objective moral tenets?
IMO ‘objective’ means a moral truth that does not change no matter what the person thinks subjectively.
Like, murder is objectively wrong, no matter how you justify it, it will still ultimately be wrong.
This is imo an absolute moral assessment.

106

Sorry, loinburger, I’m perfectly fine with the “because I say so” argument about most moral statements (probably all of them). I’m not the one trying to say that I can defend moral statements without it.

Your job to defend your system, my friend.

Um, how is this inconsistent in any way whatsoever? I consistently want to beat babies, I consistently don’t want to be beat. How does this clash?

Um, perhaps you need to instruct me on consistency.

Preferential treatment of myself is not inconsistent with anything except pure, exacting egalitarianism or altruism, neither of which you seem to be espousing.

107

The reason that “murder is wrong” is not absolute is because the term “murder” does not exist in a vacuum. An absolute will exist regardless of what form human society takes (or even regardless of whether human society forms at all). So a term like “murder,” that cannot exist without a society (or at least a pre-society with a common form of communication), cannot be in any kind of absolute. “Murder is wrong” is only absolute insofar as one assumes that society has formed, thus necessitating the creation of a term like “murder.” Nature is amoral, but humans don’t live in a state of nature so this is irrelevant.

So if somebody robbed you, and said “I’m allowed to do rob you because I say so,” you wouldn’t be at all indignant over having your property stolen? Or if somebody murdered one of your loved ones, and said “I’m allowed to do murder your loved ones because I say so,” you wouldn’t be at all indignant over having your loved ones murdered?

If you don’t accept this kind of justification from others, then how can you possibly think that it’s reasonable for others to accept the same justification from you? Are you “special” in some fundamental way such that you do not need to reciprocate with others?

In what fundamental way are you different from other humans such that they ought to follow rules that do not apply to you? What makes you so special?

Consistent: "Holding true as a group; not contradictory

It is contradictory for you to expect others to behave in a manner in which you are not expected to behave, unless you can somehow prove that you’re “special,” i.e. by showing that you’re such a vastly superior person that others ought to worship the ground that you walk upon. Note that it is not sufficient to make an obtuse statement like “I have a different set of DNA than everybody else, therefore my morals are fundamentally different from theirs,” without also showing the causal relation between “having a slightly different DNA sequence yet still belonging to the same species as the group” and “having fundamentally different morals from everybody else.”

By participating in society, you imply that you are capable of reciprocation. Society would cease to function if everybody held themselves to a different standard than everybody else. Furthermore, it is a performative contradiction for you to behave such that others must reciprocate, yet fail to reciprocate yourself. An example is this debate–you are behaving as though your opinions ought to be considered as relevant (which requires reciprocation on the part of the other debate participants), yet you apparently fail to reciprocate by completely ignoring what others say in response (a prime example being the way that you countered my post, which could be summed up as “People must give rational justifications for their actions,” by a post that can be summed up as “I will not give you a rational justification as to why this hypothetical action is moral, but I still expect you to give me a rational justification as to why this hypothetical action is immoral;” you apparently expect reciprocation without reciprocating yourself, which is both contradictory and potentially self-destructive).

Note that it would be sufficient for you to show that you are a psychopath (something that is not beyond belief at all, seeing as how you claim to see nothing wicked about maiming babies), because it is unfortunately true that there are some people who are fundamentally incapable of functioning in a society (since, for example, some people really do think that others ought to worship the ground that they walk upon). Many psychopaths are able to function in society (since the threat of punishment causes them to behave as though they were rational human beings), though, so it’s not as though you’d automatically be locked up indefinitely for your mental disorder.

108

I feel like you’re making an unecessary nitpick of the definition of ‘absolute’.
Objective = absolute as far as I’m concerned.
So yes, if two aliens accidently hyperspaced into the same area in space and the other killed the second it would be murder.
But that’s not the point, the point is how can murder be objectively morally wrong yet you accept the fact that some people do not find it morally wrong, and even more you say it can still be subjective but not completely subjective.

So I’m asking, except your vacuum theory, how is objective moral truth != absolute moral truth?

109

Murder itself is not a morally subjective term–it is always morally wrong. However, there can be disagreement as to whether a killing was sufficiently or insufficiently justified. So while “murder” is always morally wrong, it is possible that a “killing” does not necessarily qualify as a “murder.”

The fact that some people think that murder is moral does not change the objectivity of the situation. They’re definitively misapplying the term “murder.” There is disagreement as to whether given food items are “delicious,” but somebody who claims that “this food item tastes terribly and so it is delicious” is simply misapplying the term in much the same way as somebody who claims that “murder is justified” is simply misapplying the term.

Absolute moral truth == there is some ultimate moral truth, although we may not know what this truth may be.
Objective moral truth == there may or may not be some ultimate moral truth, but regardless we are capable of ascertaining the superiority/inferiority/equality of different moral truths.

I personally don’t believe that it is possible to have a perfect system of morals–there will always be ambiguities and conflicts that prevent the formation of such a system. Hence, I do not believe in absolute moral truth. However, some systems of morals are objectively superior to other systems of morals. The fact that there’s no absolute perfect moral standard doesn’t prevent us from making objective judgments about moral standards.

Another way to look at the difference is that “perfection” is impossible, but “excellence” can still be achieved.

110

I agree, but I still think for murder to be always morally wrong, it also has to be objectively morally wrong, always.
You argue that we do not live a nature way of life, so that view is irrelevant, but the discussion was if objectively murder is NOT morally wrong, maybe subjectively there are cases where murder is also not morally wrong.
Because ultimately it’s the objective ‘view’ that determines what is ultimately the ‘correct’ subjective moral stand.

Now I understand your last post, but I can’t quite agree with it.
Because there has to be an ultimate moral truth, one that superceeds all other subjective truths.
And the way I see it, that truth can only exist on the objective level(my objective level :P) and it must be ‘none’, as in no morality.
How can we apply this moral system to an alien species that is completely different to humans?
Is this system not meant for anyone but humans?

111

Hi, I’m new.

loinburger said:

“my post, which could be summed up as “People must give rational justifications for their actions,””

Of course, before you can start justifying anything you have to have a system of axioms to base everything on - in other words; a Moral Schema.

“It is contradictory for you to expect others to behave in a manner in which you are not expected to behave”

It certainly is not!
->

“unless you can somehow prove that you’re “special,” i.e. by showing that you’re such a vastly superior person that others ought to worship the ground that you walk upon.”

How is it more rational to assume that one is equal to everyone else than to do the opposite? Why should I follow Western moral laws (which has as an axiom that “all men are created equal”) untill I can prove that I am special, instead of assuming from the start that I am special?

It is of course impossible to prove (in any meaningful sense of the word) that you are either special or equal to anyone else, because proving something requires a system of axioms - which obviously you’d have to create first (wholly based on your personal opinions - or at least “nonrational” elements), before you would be able to “deduce” from this your value compared to J. Average.
.
.
Also remember that the Western, i.e. Christian, moral view is relatively new, and that prior to it we have had several horrific - by our standards - societies. So don’t be tricked into thinking that our current moral system, with its emphasis on equality and caring is more “natural” or “human” - not to mention more rational - than others.

As a final pompous declaration (disregarding your dictionary’s definition, which evidently explained another use of the term “morality” than the one we are discussing here (if indeed we are discussing anything meaningful at all, that is, which I am beginning to wonder)):

Even if every human on earth signed a contract saying murder was immoral, and they got every conscious being in the universe to sign it too, and God revealed himself - and signed. Murder still wouldn’t be immoral “objectively” (whatever that means…).

112

Murder is always morally wrong. The thing is that the term “murder” does not always exist, which is why it doesn’t count as an absolute.

I don’t see why there has to be an ultimate moral truth at all. Somebody can strive for excellence as a basketball player even if there is no such thing as a perfect basketball player, just as somebody can strive for moral excellence even if there is no such thing as moral perfection.

The question of whether moral perfection exists is irrelevant, though, because even if it were to exist it is still highly unlikely (if not impossible) that it could ever be achieved. Excellence can be achieved regardless of whether perfection exists.

I agree that it is “pure” to have no morals, but it isn’t feasible. Morals are an inextricable part of communicative behavior.

Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game series (in particular the later books, Speaker for the Dead, Xenocide, and Children of the Mind), addresses this question. (I doubt that anybody but science fiction writers has addressed this issue, but who knows.) The humans in his books learn to distinguish between two different types of sentient alien species, raman and the varelse. Species that were raman were species with which humans were capable of communicating, and (by necessity of communication) humans and species that were raman were capable of reciprocating with one another, and that therefore must reciprocate with one another (in order to behave morally) once communication was established. Species that were varelse were species with which no communication was possible, and the only resolution possible between such encounters was the annihilation of one or both species. Without communication it is impossible to implicitly subject oneself to reciprocation, and so without communcation you cannot have morals interchange. You might want to check his books out–the later books in the series get a bit dense/loopy at times, but Ender’s Game is good clean sci-fi.

113

In this case the Schema is based on communicative presuppositions. In order to communicate with somebody, you must engage in some degree of reciprocation with one another (often quite high). The Schema is simply that in order to maintain consistency this reciprocation must be implicitly extended to all forms of interaction, unless one can reasonably justify an exception to their communicative presuppositions.

-It is impossible that everybody is superior to everybody else, but it is possible that everybody is (more or less) equal to everybody else, so the assumption of equality is extensible while the assumption of superiority is not.

-In order to communicate with somebody (i.e. in order to participate in society) you must presuppose a high level of reciprocation (particularly with regards to arguments/debates and the like, obviously less so with regards to orders or commands). In order to maintain consistency you must therefore either maintain reciprocation at all times (except where you’re reasonably justified in ending reciprocation) or you must withdraw from society completely. The second is not really a valid option, except for a hermit.

One of the major differences between modern society and ancient society is the advent of global communications and the end of the concept of the “divine right of kings”. If you’re not communicating with the tribe next door (because you never see one another, or because you speak different languages, or whatever have you) then there is no reason why you would reciprocate with them. If you believe (and your subjects believe) that you rule with God’s favor, then there is no reason why you would reciprocate with your (seemingly Godless and inferior) subjects. The idea of reciprocation hasn’t principally changed over the years, the only major difference is that it has been greatly extended in recent years–so it’s not that modern societies have inherently better moral systems, it’s just that modern societies tend to draw less of a distinction between “us” and “them.” We still fundamentally realize that even though we disagree with “them,” we have (perhaps unwittlingly) included “them” into our communications structure and must now attempt to reciprocate.

114

—To “justify” something is to “demonstrate sufficient reason” for something, and reason == rationality.—

But this is just useless for morality. One’s reason for wanting to kill could be “hey, I want to kill you, and my will is absolute.” There’s nothing IRRATIONAL about that.

Nor are irrational, contradictory morals bad if you don’t care much about being irrational. You might not think that a person can rationally justify such morals… but can anyone justify their moral system purely using reason? I don’t see how: at some point you have to start from having particular values.

115

It certainly seems unreasonable for somebody to claim that their will is absolute. That’s akin to claiming that you’re God or something, and all of the people I’ve met who claim to be God are also wearing hats made out of tinfoil (to block the mind control rays). It’s not a claim that I’d readily make if I wanted others to take me at all seriously.

Somebody could well say “Hey, I want to kill you, and I’m a terrible human being who doesn’t care about anybody else besides myself.” This would probably be a reasonable thing for a terrible human being to say (since they’ve willfully thrown reciprocation out the window), but what would not be reasonable is for the person to claim that they were acting righteously by unjustifiably killing people. The fact that some people happen to be wicked doesn’t nullify morality.

In every case I’ve ever encountered involving self-contradictory moral systems, the system is self-serving in the extreme. F’rinstance, on another forum that I frequent there is one particularly dreadful poster who will repeatedly claim that he has a moral right to post whatever opinions he wants (no matter how asinine), but that others are morally obligated to not post opinions that are different than his. This is because, as you say, he doesn’t care about being irrational–so long as he gets what he wants out of his “moral system”, he’ll make up any sort of moral system whatsoever no matter how unreasonable or irrational. As one might expect, this same poster is a laughingstock–quite a few people have him on their “ignore” lists, and those who don’t wile away their free time by taunting him.

By making irrational (and unjustifiable) claims in a discourse, one violates reciprocity (assuming that the other participants are making rational, justifiable claims counter to yours)–claiming that an inferior justification is actually equivalent (or superior) to another participant’s justification will demonstrate an inability to offer anything to the discourse (except, perhaps, for amusement). If I say “My empty beer can is the greatest basketball player because I say so,” then all I’ve managed to demonstrate is that I believe that my opinion is better than everybody else’s solely by virtue of the fact that it is my opinion. When attempting to justify morals, you sacrifice rationality at your own risk.

I do agree that reason alone doesn’t determine morals, though. Emotion also plays a strong role–there are certain “moral” emotions that morality attempts to classify/account for. For example, when somebody maliciously harms us in some way, we tend to feel righteous indignation (moral outrage). Were it not for this feeling of indignation, it is unlikely that we would bother to draw a distinction between “murder” and “killing.” Also, moral obligations tend to fall outside of the realm of pure reciprocal behavior–clearly it is wicked to unjustifiably take another’s life (since this violates reciprocity), but is it also wicked to not give to charity? This question can’t be answered with a simple “Of course it’s wicked, such an action blatantly violates reciprocity,” since the person giving charity (presumably) does not expect any charity in return–the exchange is one-way, not reciprocal. Most such obligations are more subject to emotions than to pure reason, since reciprocation alone does not provide the answer.

116

—It certainly seems unreasonable for somebody to claim that their will is absolute.—

Uh, why?

—It’s not a claim that I’d readily make if I wanted others to take me at all seriously.—

Why would that matter? No one took anti-slavery people seriously for a long time. What others do or do not take seriously is not necessarily relevant to what is or isn’t moral.

—what would not be reasonable is for the person to claim that they were acting righteously by unjustifiably killing people. The fact that some people happen to be wicked doesn’t nullify morality.—

You’ve dumped the baby into the tub before the bathwater. You can’t start talking about “morality” and “wicked” before we’ve even established what is moral and what is wicked, and this situation, there’s obviously a disagreement. You certainly have no grounds to assert that it’s “not reasonable.”

—In every case I’ve ever encountered involving self-contradictory moral systems, the system is self-serving in the extreme.—

So?

—This is because, as you say, he doesn’t care about being irrational–so long as he gets what he wants out of his “moral system”, he’ll make up any sort of moral system whatsoever no matter how unreasonable or irrational.—

I realize how frustrating that might be… but the subject of morality IS frustrating. And things just aren’t so easy: you can’t just reject someone’s claimed moral system on the basis of moral judgements of your own! That bypasses the very subject at hand.

117

Perhaps wicked is not the correct term to use here.
Better would be to say that some people simply do not conform to the morals of their society.
I think, It is a wrong premise to say that an irrational murderer, as in the baby killing example, has his own moral on the case.
Having different morals or the absence of certain morals isn’t the same as not complying to an existing moral.

Moral codes are group codes, there will allways be those that do not identify with the group or simply don’t care what the group thinks. It is exactly those people we call immoral.

Untill not so awfully long ago, it was acceptable for people to sit in a train and shoot at buffalo with repeater rifles. We cannot say that those people were immoral. The moral code that it is wrong to hurt animals didn’t exist yet. They had different morals from us.
If I went out and did something like that today, then I would be immoral. I would be breaking the moral codes of my society.

What is moral (or rather immoral) is a group code and what morals you have depend on the group (or society or enviroment) you grew up in. The irrational baby killer would probably be immoral in any group.

So, I would say there is a difference between not conforming to morals and having different morals.

A complicating factor is that there are groups that place themselves outside our society and have their own moral codes.
Stealing or mugging or killing need not always be immoral for some, if it is justifiable within their group or milieu.
The problem with this category is that we, the rest of society, do not accept them as being different from us. They walk among us and sure as hell interact with us. Thus we judge them by our morals.

118

This is exactly my point.
Murder is morally relative and completely subjective.
You(loin) seem to be thinking that even though the people who shot at buffalo back then were morally wrong even though they didn’t know it.
This is not true.
In the objective nature world, the buffalo have no value, the only moral value they get is from the person acknowledging them.
You see my point as to how objectively there are no moral values and that subjectively the person who becomes a moralist can basically choose whatever moral tenets he wants without being immoral.

Basically what you stated above was tin can = basketball player is just as irrational as murder = morally justifiable.
When it all depends on the subjective view of the moralist.

119

loinburger

Of course I would be upset about this! What has that to do with the fact that moral statements ultimately reduce to “because I say so”? So what if the murderer says so; I don’t.

In what way does the proposition “I like to beat babies” contradict “I do not like to be beaten”. Should I also say, “I like Lima beans; therefore, to ensure consistency, everyone else must like them, too?”

I expect people to behave in all sorts of ways different from me, doing things I would never even think of doing, and yet they are still not immoral for it. Do I deserve special treatment? Well, I am ultimately responsible for myself, so yes, to me, I am a very important person.

Special? —Under what value system? If it is my own then the answer should be perfectly clear. :slight_smile:

[By the Way—Welcome to the boards, loinburger and olav!]

120

I think what eris is saying, in his own indominatable and eye-popping example-filled way, is that in order to establish the relative merits of two different value systems, we need a value system to compare them. Without some kind of Ultimate Arbitor (i.e. God), there is no way to step outside this endless recurrsion.

One cannot completely describe a system from within that system. Goedel showed us this. Each of our own individual value systems fall within the same universal system by which we must relate to eachother. You cannot say that erl is wrong to beat babies, since you have no way of univerally demonstrating that his value is wrong.

This, note, is an entirely different kettle of fish to the practical matter that in order for a society to function, it is necessary to create laws. Long experience have taught us which laws allow our society to flourish and vice versa and it makes sense to impose the one that encourage positive growth. But there is no way of objectively proving that this state of affairs is morally correct.

pan