Morality . . . where do you think it comes from?

[erislover]

kabbes! I’ve missed you! Excellent summary.

I think an appeal to practicality is where most moral arguments end. Some of the more serious ones which are more or less agreed upon without debate are often just supported by their repeated assertion, or by appealing to some other principle which is just supposed to “obviously” be right or wrong, of course dodging the question entirely.

coax, I am still shakey on your use of “subjective”. Where there can be agreement, I think, there can be inter-suibjectiveness, and I think that’s as good as “objective” as we’ll ever get. We attempt to teach people how to behave, how to gauge moral estimations, and so on, and so I think morality is as subjective as language is (which is, not much). I agree that there is no final standard, however.

[coax]

I agree.
And that’s all I have to say basically

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by Apos *
Uh, why?

In any kind of debate, would you take a justification such as “I am by definition correct” to be reasonable? Let’s say you’re debating basketball, and somebody says “Steve Kerr is the greatest basketball player because my will is absolute.” Would you honestly say that this is as reasonable a justification such as “Wilt Chamberlain is the greatest basketball player because he was excellent at scoring points”? The second justification is clearly superior to the first by virtue of the fact that there is no relation between the supremacy of will of a debator and the greatness in basketball of Steve Kerr, while there is a relation between the point-scoring abilities of Wilt Chamberlain and the greatness in basketball of Wilt Chamberlain.

Moral debates are no different. Somebody may be able to justify something to themselves using any kind of contradictory/irrational/whatever justification that floats their boat, but there’s nothing inherently special about moral discourse that allows unreasonable justifications to suddenly carry the same weight as reasonable justifications.

Why would that matter? No one took anti-slavery people seriously for a long time. What others do or do not take seriously is not necessarily relevant to what is or isn’t moral.

It’s not so much a question of being taken seriously, it’s more a question of being rational. I might well participate in a debate in which nobody takes me seriously–this might be because the other participants in the debate are close-minded (in which case they would likely resort to unreasonable arguments in order to dismiss me from debate), or this might be because I’m being irrational (in which case the other participants would be able to resort to reasonable arguments in order to dismiss me from debate). If I’m being irrational, then it’s my own damn fault if nobody takes me seriously. If I’m being rational and everybody else is being close-minded, then it’s their fault.

You’ve dumped the baby into the tub before the bathwater. You can’t start talking about “morality” and “wicked” before we’ve even established what is moral and what is wicked, and this situation, there’s obviously a disagreement. You certainly have no grounds to assert that it’s “not reasonable.”

The key words were “reasonable” and “unjustified.” Unjustified claims are not reasonable, by definition.

So?

So that’s not morality. Morality involves standards, and purely self-serving systems cannot be standards–they aren’t exensible.

I realize how frustrating that might be… but the subject of morality IS frustrating. And things just aren’t so easy: you can’t just reject someone’s claimed moral system on the basis of moral judgements of your own! That bypasses the very subject at hand.

Why are moral debates so different from any other kind of debate that justification suddenly means nothing whatsoever? In any debate that isn’t on morality, an irrational justification would be ignored or be made a laughingstock–it’s self-evident that irrational justifications aren’t reasonable. I can’t claim that my empty beer can is the greatest basketball player–it’s not reasonable. Why, then, do justifications get thrown out the window in moral debates? Why is it that suddenly people can make any kind of moral claim whatsoever, irrational or not, and be “justified” in their beliefs? It’s nonsensical. If somebody unreasonably uses the terms “meter,” or “great in basketball,” or “delicious,” then we’ve got no problem saying “That’s an unreasonable use of that term–a ‘foot’ is not equal to a ‘meter’ (or) that beer can cannot play basketball (or) that rotten fruit, which you admit tastes terrible, is not delicious.” But when people unreasonably use terms such as “wicked” or “righteous” it’s suddenly a case of “Oh, well the terms are completely subjective, so I suppose that your opinion that murder is moral is just as good as my opinion that murder is immoral.”

[erislover]

loin, morality is an attempt to prescribe behavior. If you say that one should use rationality in judging morality, then you’ve already used a moral judgment in asserting moral judgments. Morally speaking, why is this so? What justifies rationality with respect to morality? And why is it irrational for me to value myself more than I value others?

Much to develop there.

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by erislover *
loinburgerOf course I would be upset about this! What has that to do with the fact that moral statements ultimately reduce to “because I say so”? So what if the murderer says so; I don’t.

It’s not simply “because I say so.” You say that action A is immoral because you become morally indignant when action A is performed (I dunno, let’s say that action A is the murder of your loved ones), just like you say that food item B is delicious because it tastes good. It’s reasonable to think that everybody has similar reactions to action A and food item B, at least until you discover otherwise, so reciprocating your taboo on action A is a reasonable attempt at behaving morally, and serving food item B is a reasonable attempt at serving delicious food. (I think that liver and onions are delicious, but I’ve learned that others do not share my opinion, so clearly many food items are “delicious” to one person and “repugnant” to another–as a result I don’t serve liver and onions to guests. However, I’ve yet to find anybody who wants to have their loved ones murdered, so in many cases actions that I would call “immoral” would also be called immoral by others.)

In what way does the proposition “I like to beat babies” contradict “I do not like to be beaten”. Should I also say, “I like Lima beans; therefore, to ensure consistency, everyone else must like them, too?”

“I like to beat babies” doesn’t contradict anything–you’re merely stating a preference. “It is morally correct for me to beat babies” contradicts your taboo on others beating you–you become righteously indignant when others beat you for no good reason, so it’s reasonable to assume that others would react similarly.

It’s also reasonable to assume that everybody else likes lima beans, unless you learn otherwise. In the case of liver and onions, f’rinstance, I quickly learned that others don’t like liver, so it became more reasonable for me to assume that I was the exception and not the rule–others clearly didn’t share my tastes with regards to liver.

[By the Way—Welcome to the boards, loinburger and olav!]

Thanks. Just found this place from another forum–they all recognized me too readily there. Sometimes it’s better to go where everybody doesn’t know your name.

[greck]

People are not born with morality, it is learned, rather we are born with the potential for morality, then learn about it.

the process by which is is learned cognitively is best explained(IMO) by Kohlberg

and by attachment theory:

Each of us needs to be attached to another human being (at least one) in order to live.
We become attached by having our needs met during our infancy.
This is how we learn “love”

The threat of the removal of which is the basis for morality.

in simplistic terms it works like this: “if mommy says it’s wrong, it’s wrong, because i couldn’t take it if she removed her love, she’s all i have,”

where morality comes from:
its a product of cooperation between our potential and our experience.

We have the potential to learn empathy but it needs to be taught and validated by those upon whom we depend for survival in our formative years.

for the sake of participating in the ongoing debate:
there are no moral absolutes, although if the nazis had succeeded we might have some.

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by kabbes *
I think what eris is saying, in his own indominatable and eye-popping example-filled way, is that in order to establish the relative merits of two different value systems, we need a value system to compare them. Without some kind of Ultimate Arbitor (i.e. God), there is no way to step outside this endless recurrsion.

That’s where I disagree. Human language may have many ambiguities and contradictions, but it’s still pretty darn good as a system for classification (and justifying one’s classifications). There isn’t any kind of Ultimate Arbitor as to who is the greatest basketball player, and it may not be possible to determine whether Wilt Chamberlain or Michael Jordan is the greater basketball player, but that doesn’t mean that my beer can is as great a basketball player as Chamberlain or Jordan. It may not be possible to determine whether moral system A is better than moral system B, but it’s still possible to determine that they’re both better than moral system C whether or not there’s any kind of “ultimate truth.”

One cannot completely describe a system from within that system. Goedel showed us this. Each of our own individual value systems fall within the same universal system by which we must relate to eachother. You cannot say that erl is wrong to beat babies, since you have no way of univerally demonstrating that his value is wrong.

Universality isn’t necessary for objectivity. I think that we can agree that not every basketball player is equal, even though “greatness in basketball” is a completely man-made term.

But there is no way of objectively proving that this state of affairs is morally correct.

As I’ve said, I don’t believe that we can ever have a perfect system of morality, but we can still strive for excellence in a system of morality. I can’t prove that system of morality A is perfect (more likely I’d wind up proving that it was imperfect), but I might still be able to prove that system of morality A is objectively superior to system of morality C.

Originally posted by erislover
We attempt to teach people how to behave, how to gauge moral estimations, and so on, and so I think morality is as subjective as language is (which is, not much). I agree that there is no final standard, however.

Wait just a minute. Do you mean to say that you think that morality is objective? Then what are we arguing about?

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by erislover *
loin, morality is an attempt to prescribe behavior. If you say that one should use rationality in judging morality, then you’ve already used a moral judgment in asserting moral judgments. Morally speaking, why is this so? What justifies rationality with respect to morality? And why is it irrational for me to value myself more than I value others?

Morality is an attempt to prescribe moral behavior, it isn’t a general prescription of behavior. If you tell a kid “Don’t play in the street,” you’re not necessarily saying “You are wicked if you play in the street and righteous if you don’t play in the street,” you’re more likely saying “You are stupidly taking an unnecessary risk if you play in the street, and you will live a longer and healthier life if you don’t play in the street.” Same thing holds true with “Don’t eat those mushrooms because they are poisonous,” or “Don’t use a meter stick to measure an object to eight decimal places,” or “Use a jackhammer to break up that concrete rather than a sledgehammer.” Saying “An unjustified argument is unreasonable” is in no way making a moral claim, any more than saying “A piece of repugnant food is not delicious” is making a moral claim.

[Apos]

—In any kind of debate, would you take a justification such as “I am by definition correct” to be reasonable?—

I might not… but that’s beside the point. Whether you can justify it to others doesn’t necessarily make a moral view wrong.

—Let’s say you’re debating basketball, and somebody says “Steve Kerr is the greatest basketball player because my will is absolute.” Would you honestly say that this is as reasonable a justification such as “Wilt Chamberlain is the greatest basketball player because he was excellent at scoring points”?—

The problem is: moral debates ARE different from regular debates. No, this case is not justifiable… but it is simply not analogus to “Steve Kerr is good because my will is absolute.” Moral discussions are frustrating like that, because there doesn’t seem to be any good basis on which to a priori reject such a view that doesn’t presume an alternative moral view.

—If I’m being irrational, then it’s my own damn fault if nobody takes me seriously.—

Sure, but what does that have to do with morality?

—The key words were “reasonable” and “unjustified.” Unjustified claims are not reasonable, by definition.—

But these aren’t just any sort of claims: they are moral claims. Presuming that they must be reasonable to be right is not itself very convincing.

—So that’s not morality. Morality involves standards, and purely self-serving systems cannot be standards–they aren’t exensible.—

They are only self-serving in your opinion. The fact that victims think killing is wrong might well seem self-serving to those that like killing, but that’s hardly a valid reason to object to the moral standard.

—Why, then, do justifications get thrown out the window in moral debates?—

It’s not that they necessarily get thrown out the window: they just can’t get inserted in prior to the statement of fundamental moral value. That’s the problem.

— But when people unreasonably use terms such as “wicked” or “righteous” it’s suddenly a case of “Oh, well the terms are completely subjective, so I suppose that your opinion that murder is moral is just as good as my opinion that murder is immoral.”—

If you are using words like “wicked” and “righteous” as moral terms with objective meanings that determine what is and is not moral, then you are simply begging the question. For this to work, you need to be able to define what is and is not moral BEFORE you start using those words, to give them an operational meaning. But you can’t claim exclusive control over them if other people have different ideas about what is moral (and hence different ideas about what is wicked or righteous).

[robertliguori]

The problem with the basketball metaphor is that we can measure basketball. Unless we can agree on a way to measure morality, the statement “I believe that X is immoral” is the same as “I believe that chocolate is tasty”: completely subjective. What is morality? Greatest good for the greatest number? KYFHO? Every man for himself? God, country, and Microsoft? The fact that we cannot agree on a common frame of reference is precluding any real progress here. Of course, if we could agree on a common frame of reference, there would be no debate.

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by Apos *
I might not… but that’s beside the point. Whether you can justify it to others doesn’t necessarily make a moral view wrong.

It certainly causes the view to be of dubious value. If you complete reject the opinions of others regarding morality, then you’re communicating with them in bad faith – you’re implying that you are going to reciprocate by giving their opinion due consideration, when in fact you are a priori rejecting dissenting opinion. Holding onto an irrational opinion in the face of superior justification for an alternative opinion is a case of communicating in bad faith.

The problem is: moral debates ARE different from regular debates. No, this case is not justifiable… but it is simply not analogus to “Steve Kerr is good because my will is absolute.” Moral discussions are frustrating like that, because there doesn’t seem to be any good basis on which to a priori reject such a view that doesn’t presume an alternative moral view.

How/why are moral debates different from any other kind of debate? You’ll have to back that claim up in order for me to accept it or consider it. I see no reason why one debate on a man-made system (like morality) is so vastly different from another debate on a man-made system (like basketball).

Sure, but what does that have to do with morality?

How do I know that my morals are superior (or equivalent) to everybody else’s? I can assume all I want, but how do I know, how can I justify my position? If I don’t know/can’t justify that my morals are superior (or equivalent) to everybody else’s, then how do I know that I’m behaving morally?

It comes down to rationality – I can either attempt to justify why my morals are excellent/adequate (which requires rationality) through discourse (internal or, preferably, external), or I’m left with an a priori assumption that I’m somehow better at forming morals than everybody else (perfectly equipped to do so, in fact), or I’m left with an a prior assumption that all moral claims are equivalent. The first of the a priori assumptions is only valid when accompanied by the a priori assumption that I’m some kind of infallible deity-like creature (because otherwise, by extending this assumption to cover all people, the first assumption becomes equivalent to the second assumption). The second of the a priori assumptions is false in that objectivity is possible in man-made terms (otherwise the terms would have been rendered meaningless long ago and dropped from the language).

But these aren’t just any sort of claims: they are moral claims. Presuming that they must be reasonable to be right is not itself very convincing.

Like I said above, you’ve got to justify your claim that moral debates (and terms) are somehow different from all other debates (and man-made terms). “Because it’s so” is not an acceptable justification – your claim that debates and justifications over the rightness/wrongness of moral claims are meaningless does not extend to cover debates and justifications over the rightness/wrongness of claims regarding the nature of morality itself. The current debate is not a debate over the righteousness/wickedness of any particular moral claim, and is not covered by your appeal to meaninglessness.

They are only self-serving in your opinion. The fact that victims think killing is wrong might well seem self-serving to those that like killing, but that’s hardly a valid reason to object to the moral standard.

Self-serving is not a meaningless term that can be applied at whim. It means “Serving one’s own interests, especially without concern for the needs or interests of others.” “It is moral for me to murder because I want to murder” is a self-serving moral system. “It is immoral to for anybody to murder because nobody wants to be murdered” is not a self-serving moral system.

It’s not that they necessarily get thrown out the window: they just can’t get inserted in prior to the statement of fundamental moral value. That’s the problem.

What’s this “fundamental moral value”?

If you are using words like “wicked” and “righteous” as moral terms with objective meanings that determine what is and is not moral, then you are simply begging the question.

I am using them as moral terms with objective meanings in much the same way that I am using the term “great” as it applies to the game of basketball as a term with an objective meaning. Wicked means “Evil by nature or in practice,” not “Things I don’t like.” Righteous means “Morally justifiable,” not “Things I like.” Somebody who claims that something is righteous so long as you can get away with it is misapplying the term, for example, because “righteousness” applies to the nature and intent of an action, not to its efficacy or practicality. Saying “This action is righteous” is equivalent to saying “This action is morally justifiable,” not “This action pleases me for no apparent reason” or “This action makes me rich” or whatever.

I fail to see how correctly using an objective term constitutes “begging the question”.

For this to work, you need to be able to define what is and is not moral BEFORE you start using those words, to give them an operational meaning. But you can’t claim exclusive control over them if other people have different ideas about what is moral (and hence different ideas about what is wicked or righteous).

The words were created to help determine what actions are righteous/wicked, just as the term “delicious” was created to help determine the flavor of food and just as the term “meter” was created to help determine the length of objects. You don’t have to taste every single food on the planet before you’re allowed to assign the term “delicious,” nor are you required to know the lengths of all objects before describing them in terms of “meters.” Similarly, you don’t have to determine the morality of all actions prior to assigning the terms righteous/wicked to actions. They’re units of measurement, nothing more.

Nor have I claimed exclusive control over the terms. I’ve never claimed that my system of morals is perfect – on the contrary, I’ve explicitely stated that I don’t believe that a perfect system of morals is possible. This means that disagreement as to what I consider righteous/wicked is inevitable.

[Apos]

—It certainly causes the view to be of dubious value.—

How so? It’s a moral view!

—Holding onto an irrational opinion in the face of superior justification for an alternative opinion is a case of communicating in bad faith.—

What superior justification are you offering that doesn’t simply beg your own moral opinion into play?

—How/why are moral debates different from any other kind of debate? You’ll have to back that claim up in order for me to accept it or consider it.—

How were you planning to “back up” a claim that rests on moral value?

—I can assume all I want, but how do I know, how can I justify my position? If I don’t know/can’t justify that my morals are superior (or equivalent) to everybody else’s, then how do I know that I’m behaving morally?—

What a good question!

—It comes down to rationality—

What a useless answer! Look: what is rational or irrational about values?

—The first of the a priori assumptions is only valid when accompanied by the a priori assumption that I’m some kind of infallible deity-like creature (because otherwise, by extending this assumption to cover all people, the first assumption becomes equivalent to the second assumption).—

Why would an infalliable deity-like creature necessarily have a “correct” moral view? And don’t tell me it’s because it’s infalliable: that’s in some ways like saying I’m an infalliable chooser of my favorite color.

—The second of the a priori assumptions is false in that objectivity is possible in man-made terms (otherwise the terms would have been rendered meaningless long ago and dropped from the language).—

Nonsense: plenty of people think that objective morality is a non-cognitive concept: but just because something is poorly thought out is no guarantee that it’ll be dropped from language, especially when it is so central to many people’s beliefs.

—Like I said above, you’ve got to justify your claim that moral debates (and terms) are somehow different from all other debates (and man-made terms).—

It’s pretty simple: because there is no way to demonstrate that my moral view is correct (or that yours is wrong). We can only do something like that by begginging the question. We can all agree what “good basketball playing is.” But if we can’t all agree on what is “good,” how can we measure it?

—Self-serving is not a meaningless term that can be applied at whim.—

It’s application here seems to be… ahem… a little self-serving.

—It means “Serving one’s own interests, especially without concern for the needs or interests of others.” “It is moral for me to murder because I want to murder” is a self-serving moral system.—

It might be: so? Why does that make it false? The person who’s wants are moral isn’t necessarily the reason they are so. That god’s will is morally absolute is pretty self-serving to god… but that doesn’t prove that god’s will is morally absolute. This, again, is your own random, unjustified opinion: that moral principles which seem self-serving to you just can’t be the legitimately true moral principles.

—Similarly, you don’t have to determine the morality of all actions prior to assigning the terms righteous/wicked to actions. They’re units of measurement, nothing more.—

Yes, but units of measurement based on some pre-conception of what is right and wrong. You can’t have it both ways. You can’t both use them in an objective, already defined sense, AND assert that they in any way help prove your case.

[Olav]

robertliguori:

“The fact that we cannot agree on a common frame of reference is precluding any real progress here. Of course, if we could agree on a common frame of reference, there would be no debate.”

Yes there would, since we are here debating whether moral has objective existence: a group of people is not any more objective than a single person.

loinburger:

“and it may not be possible to determine whether Wilt Chamberlain or Michael Jordan is the greater basketball player, but that doesn’t mean that my beer can is as great a basketball player as Chamberlain or Jordan. It may not be possible to determine whether moral system A is better than moral system B, but it’s still possible to determine that they’re both better than moral system C whether or not there’s any kind of “ultimate truth.””

In my opinion that analogy is flawed: most people would say that in a conversation on basketball it would be irrelevant to mention the beer can, since a beer can is unable to play basketball, but manifestly, it would not be irrelevant to mention moral system C in a conversation on moral systems.
An analogous situation would rather be to try to determine who is better at basketball of Jordan or loinburger (objectively, I mean) - which is impossible.
– And lastly I will add that it actually is impossible for you to decide which is best at basketball of Jordan and your beer can - objectively.

Anyway, kabbes point decides the debate definitely: something inside a system cannot describe the system completely - far from it, actually. For instance; any kind of value judgement is invalid objectively.

“Like I said above, you’ve got to justify your claim that moral debates (and terms) are somehow different from all other debates (and man-made terms).”

They aren’t. It is impossible to debate most things.

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by robertliguori *
The problem with the basketball metaphor is that we can measure basketball. Unless we can agree on a way to measure morality, the statement “I believe that X is immoral” is the same as “I believe that chocolate is tasty”: completely subjective. What is morality? Greatest good for the greatest number? KYFHO? Every man for himself? God, country, and Microsoft? The fact that we cannot agree on a common frame of reference is precluding any real progress here. Of course, if we could agree on a common frame of reference, there would be no debate.

The only way to effectively measure morality is through debate – everything else tends to require some kind of (often dubious) a priori assumption, while debate requires only the (IMO justified) assumption that debate over the man-made terms “righteous” and “wicked” is no different than debate over any other kind of man-made term. The fact that there are disagreements as to what is and is not moral doesn’t change the fact that morality exists and can be objectively measured – a consensus would be nice, but it isn’t required and probably isn’t possible. Similarly, the fact that there is disagreement as to who is the greatest basketball player doesn’t change the fact that “greatness in basketball” exists and can be objectively measured.

*Originally posted by Apos *
How so? It’s a moral view!

So? How/why are all moral views equivalent?

(And you accuse me of begging the question…)

What superior justification are you offering that doesn’t simply beg your own moral opinion into play?

A rational justification is always superior to an irrational justification. I feel like I’m beating my head against a wall here…

How were you planning to “back up” a claim that rests on moral value?

Through justification, and assessment of differing justifications. The same way I’d “back up” any other kind of claim, for example, a claim regarding the greatness of a particular basketball player.

Now your turn. Justify that all moral claims are equivalent.

What a useless answer! Look: what is rational or irrational about values?

Is my beer can the greatest basketball player of all time? C’mon, I really really feel like it is!

Why would an infalliable deity-like creature necessarily have a “correct” moral view? And don’t tell me it’s because it’s infalliable: that’s in some ways like saying I’m an infalliable chooser of my favorite color.

If moral views are not equivalent, then an infallible deity-like creature would be able to pick the best ones. If all moral views are equivalent, then the second a prior assumption is in effect.

Nonsense: plenty of people think that objective morality is a non-cognitive concept: but just because something is poorly thought out is no guarantee that it’ll be dropped from language, especially when it is so central to many people’s beliefs.

I suppose that “plenty of people” can’t be wrong…

It’s pretty simple: because there is no way to demonstrate that my moral view is correct (or that yours is wrong). We can only do something like that by begginging the question. We can all agree what “good basketball playing is.” But if we can’t all agree on what is “good,” how can we measure it?

We can all agree what a good basketball player is? Then please enlighten me – what, exactly, makes a good basketball player “good”? What weights do you assign to the different qualities of a basketball player in order to determine how good he/she is? Are your weightings the same as everybody else’s (does everybody assess basketball players in the exact same way)?

How about another term: “Courage.” What are the qualities of a human that make him/her courageous, or perhaps cowardly? What weights do you assign to the different qualities of a person in order to determine the exact level of courage being displayed by said person? Are your assessments the same as everybody else’s?

The point here is that we can’t all agree as to what, exactly, is a good basketball player. We can’t all agree as to what, exactly, is a courageous person. This doesn’t by any stretch of the imagination mean that we can’t measure these qualities – it simply means that we’ve got to be prepared to justify our measurements (as opposed to a measurement done with, say, a meter-stick – the fact that you measured an object in meters is sufficient since everybody agrees to the length of a meter). Why, then, do you claim that righteousness and wickedness cannot be measured without precise definitions? Defining the definitions of “greatness in basketball” or “courageousness” or “morality” is half of the job of applying them – you use the term as at first seems best (“Greatness in basketball is solely a measure of point-scoring capability” or “Wickedness is solely a measure of how much moral outrage an action causes me”), and you then reassess and reapply the term as time goes by so as to better be able to pigeonhole actions/objects (“Hmm, being able to work well with a team is also an important factor in being great in basketball” or “Hmm, sometimes I feel moral outrage when it isn’t appropriate to do so – apparently intent is also an important factor in being righteous/wicked”). Morality, simply put, is the measure of how much altruistic help or malicious harm a particular person or action will cause, and the exact methodology of assigning weights to people/actions must be constantly reworked in order to insure accurate assessments – inaccurate assessments will result in harm to oneself (in the form of physical harm, or mental anguish, or whatever have you).

It’s application here seems to be… ahem… a little self-serving.

Fine, find a dictionary with a definition that you prefer, and then share your new defintion. I can’t help the fact that you aren’t using terms correctly.

It might be: so? Why does that make it false? The person who’s wants are moral isn’t necessarily the reason they are so. That god’s will is morally absolute is pretty self-serving to god… but that doesn’t prove that god’s will is morally absolute. This, again, is your own random, unjustified opinion: that moral principles which seem self-serving to you just can’t be the legitimately true moral principles.

Interesting that no matter how many times I repeat my justifications, I’m still being “random and unjustified” regardless of the fact that you’ve yet to offer a counter-argument better than “because I say so” or “many people agree with me” or “I don’t believe in the English language, so your dictionary is meaningless to me.”

Yes, but units of measurement based on some pre-conception of what is right and wrong. You can’t have it both ways. You can’t both use them in an objective, already defined sense, AND assert that they in any way help prove your case.

You’d have a point if people didn’t have any kind of pre-conception of what is right and wrong (if they never felt moral outrage, for example). Since people generally don’t live in a vacuum and so they are capable of feeling such emotions, you don’t have a point.

[loinburger]

*Originally posted by Olav *
In my opinion that analogy is flawed: most people would say that in a conversation on basketball it would be irrelevant to mention the beer can, since a beer can is unable to play basketball, but manifestly, it would not be irrelevant to mention moral system C in a conversation on moral systems.
An analogous situation would rather be to try to determine who is better at basketball of Jordan or loinburger (objectively, I mean) - which is impossible.

It’s not impossible at all. Jordan is better at scoring baskets, he is a better team player, he is a better rebounder, and he is better at making assists. He is better at lay-ups, fade-aways, and free-throws. There is not a single area of basketball in which I am in any way better than Jordan. Somebody attempting to claim that I was a better basketball player than Jordan (or even an equivalent player) would not be self-evidently wrong (as would be the case with the person claiming that the beer can was better), but their justification would inevitably be vastly inferior to any counter-argument. It would take a great leap of faith for somebody who really understood the term “great” as it applies to basketball to claim that I was a better player.

– And lastly I will add that it actually is impossible for you to decide which is best at basketball of Jordan and your beer can - objectively.

The beer can can’t even play basketball – the fact that it is filled with beer and made out of aluminum has no causal relation to making the beer can great at basketball. Claiming that I’m one of the greatest basketball players would be extremely difficult to justify, but claiming that a beer can is one of the greatest basketball players would be impossible to justify.

Anyway, kabbes point decides the debate definitely: something inside a system cannot describe the system completely - far from it, actually. For instance; any kind of value judgement is invalid objectively.

And my point is that you don’t need to describe a system completely in order to be objective. Mathematics cannot be described completely, but (given our definitions of the symbols 2, +, =, and 4) the maxim 2+2=4 is objectively true. It isn’t absolutely true because we have to postulate the uses of those symbols, but so what – once the symbols are presented, they can be objectively applied. You won’t be able to measure the length of an object to infinite decimal places, but that doesn’t render the term “meter” null.

They aren’t. It is impossible to debate most things.

Which leads to the question, “then why are you in this debate?” I’m not trying to be facetious – it’s a serious question. Why engage in a debate if debates are meaningless?

[coax]

loinburger, what you seem to missunderstand about all this is;
No one is disagreeing with you on the fact that when most people agree that murder is never morally justified, and that when those people agree on a common moral schema, that moral schema is somewhat objective, * but only in their objective world*.
See it all comes down to the definition of the word ‘objective’.
When a group of people form a society, or whatever, they make their own objective world, where rational and irrational statements and meanings are formed.
Inside this objective world they can form their own moral codes of conduct, their own views and whatnot.

But what happens when an alien race comes from outer space, would they adjust to this moral code?
Maybe they did find murder is always morally justified, for whatever reasons they have come up with.
And maybe the citizens of that society have accepted that they can be murdered at any time, and they’re ok with that.
They also have their own objective ‘level’, where our objective views would be totally irrational.
My point is, the big sphere that surrounds these two worlds, that’s the ‘real’ objective moral truth.
In this sphere there are no real moral values, because any given world inside this sphere can make up their own objective worlds, where totally original moral codes can be formed.
None of these moral codes are any less rational than any given other.

Now you may ask, how can we apply this to the real world that’s outside our windows?
Because actually, this large ‘real’ objective sphere isn’t as big as you think.
There are many small objective worlds on earth, and they have changed through time.
It all depends on where you are and who you ask.

My final point is, take any given two people from any given two spheres, and you could measure objectively who would be the greatest basketball player, because those are real objects, and real actions, of which unless you are in another dimension where logic is not consistent like it is here, one could not measure who was the greatest player.
As where morals are something that is formed in a society based on their experiences, their evolution, and their emotions(and believe me, those things would NOT be alike in any given small objective sphere), this is not something completely logical, nor is it something that one can see or feel from anything other than ones subjective world.
Which imo oblirates any meaning to the word ‘ultimate moral truth’.

And that ladies and gentlemen, has been my point all through this discussion.

[loinburger]

Originally posted by coax *
loinburger, what you seem to missunderstand about all this is;
No one is disagreeing with you on the fact that when most people agree that murder is never morally justified, and that when those people agree on a common moral schema, that moral schema is somewhat objective, * but only in their objective world.
See it all comes down to the definition of the word ‘objective’.
When a group of people form a society, or whatever, they make their own objective world, where rational and irrational statements and meanings are formed.
Inside this objective world they can form their own moral codes of conduct, their own views and whatnot.

AFAIK I’ve never claimed otherwise. I said from the beginning that morals don’t exist within a vacuum, that somebody who manages to mature completely outside of society would be completely amoral.

But what happens when an alien race comes from outer space, would they adjust to this moral code?

That was addressed in those Card books. If two different species are able to communicate, then it’s possible for them to adjust their moral codes to more closely mesh with each others’. If they cannot communicate, then the only possible result (as Card saw it) was the annihilation of one or both species.

Maybe they did find murder is always morally justified, for whatever reasons they have come up with.

Murder means “unlawful/unjustified killing.” I’m not making this up – check a dictionary, you’ll find a definition similar to this one. The aliens might disagree with us as to what constitutes a lawful/justified killing, but they would not have a term for “murder” that is fundamentally equivalent to ours and still claim that murder can be justified.

And maybe the citizens of that society have accepted that they can be murdered at any time, and they’re ok with that.
They also have their own objective ‘level’, where our objective views would be totally irrational.

If there is such a major disparity between terms as overarching as “rational” or “logical” then the alien species would probably be best classified as varelse rather than raman.

My point is, the big sphere that surrounds these two worlds, that’s the ‘real’ objective moral truth.
In this sphere there are no real moral values, because any given world inside this sphere can make up their own objective worlds, where totally original moral codes can be formed.

Fair enough. Morals don’t exist in a vacuum, we’re in agreement there.

None of these moral codes are any less rational than any given other.

Using our definition of the term “rational” (which is the only one worth using, since a completely alien definition would require such a severe reworking of our worldviews that it would be either impossible to use or meaningless once used), a self-contradictory moral code is irrational.

Now you may ask, how can we apply this to the real world that’s outside our windows?
Because actually, this large ‘real’ objective sphere isn’t as big as you think.
There are many small objective worlds on earth, and they have changed through time.
It all depends on where you are and who you ask.

This was more true in the past than it is now. Globalization has lessened the disparity between “us” and “them.” Furthermore, things as fundamental as basic logic (A != ~A) do not vary between societies – self-contradictory moral codes are irrational the world over.

My final point is, take any given two people from any given two spheres, and you could measure objectively who would be the greatest basketball player, because those are real objects, and real actions, of which unless you are in another dimension where logic is not consistent like it is here, one could not measure who was the greatest player.

This would first require that both people/societies understood the object of the game of basketball. A completely non-competitive society would probably place absolutely no emphasis on whether a player’s actions actually helped the team win the game – perhaps the most enlightened player (or whatever) would be the greatest basketball player to such a society. A society that emphasized brute force and aggression might not care whether a player won the game, but would place greater emphasis on fouling out of the game early on.

As where morals are something that is formed in a society based on their experiences, their evolution, and their emotions(and believe me, those things would NOT be alike in any given small objective sphere), this is not something completely logical, nor is it something that one can see or feel from anything other than ones subjective world.

As I say above, the difference between “greatness in basketball” and “righteousness/wickedness” is not so great as you make out.

Which imo oblirates any meaning to the word ‘ultimate moral truth’.

I never claimed that there is any such thing as an ultimate moral truth – I claimed exactly the opposite. My point is that the existence of ultimate moral truth is irrelevant – objective truth is possible with or without ultimate truth.

[kabbes]

If only morality were as one dimensional as a number line! We may indeed be able to recursively define “4” using the identity and the additive operator and hence declare that 4 > 2. However which is greater of these: (3,2) or (2,3)? What about (2, 3, 3, 3) and (3, 2, 2, 2)?

You declare rationality to be the basis of judging moral systems. However it is your value system that decides that rationality is the arbitor! What about Terrorist X that decides that God is the arbitor?

Under the faith system that he has (which, incidentally may well be correct - again Goedel applies to show us that we cannot prove or disprove the presence of a super-system being from within the system), it may not only permissable but morally good to kill those who do certain sins? We have a clash of moral systems with neither party able to agree and no way for a neutral third party to decide between them. “Rationality!” shouts Loinburger. “God!” screams the terrorist.

How do you even decide whether rationality is the correct way to judge?

pan

[Olav]

“There is not a single area of basketball in which I am in any way better than Jordan.”

(All this will probably seem a trifle silly, but I believe it is all valid.)
How can you be sure a priori? You’d have to write something akin to a comparisment table, where “loinburger” was written at the top of one column, and “Jordan” at the top of another: below these there would be rows where different basketball categories were written, for instance “lay-up ability”, “dribling ability”, and in each of these categories you and Jordan would get a certain amount of points.
You would quickly run into four difficulties: 1) How detailed should the table be? For instance, should you make distinctions like: “ability to shoot from 2 meters”, “ability to shoot from 1,99 meters”.
2) How many points shall each category be worth? For instance, shall the maximum number of points possible in “lay-up ability” be 1000 000 000 points, while it shall be 10 points in “dribling ability”?
3) Who shall decide how many points you and Jordan should get for each category?
Now imagine you find some obscure category in which you are better than Jordan; you give yourself 1000 points, Jordan 1, sum up the points from the other categories and find out that you are the better player.
4) Because you have to decided what to do about problems 1), 2), and 3), the table will partly be based on your personal opinions and therefore invalid objectively.

You would run into the exact same problems if you tried to rank moral systems.
But I agree with the other debaters here that with morality the situation is even more difficult than with basketball. Because, if the creator of basketball had deviced a method to figure out who is best (for instance; “the person who scores most often”), that would be objectively valid. But no one else than that person is allowed to do that. Now, I bet no person would ever call themself the creator of morals, so no one would ever be allowed to rank things there.

“claiming that a beer can is one of the greatest basketball players would be impossible to justify.”

What does it take to play basketball? If I placed the beer can in front of the basket, and then threw the ball so that it rebounded from the beer can and landed in the basket, would the beer can then be playing basketball?
…You are in no position to say yes or no to this question.

No, you are not allowed to claim that the beer can is the world’s best basketball player, because you are not allowed to claim anything of that sort.

“And my point is that you don’t need to describe a system completely in order to be objective.”

That depends on the system you are dealing with.

“Which leads to the question, “then why are you in this debate?” I’m not trying to be facetious – it’s a serious question. Why engage in a debate if debates are meaningless?”

It’s fun, of course, and it doesn’t seem meaningless.

[coax]

Heh ok, one thing at a time.

Posted by loinburger
Murder means “unlawful/unjustified killing.” I’m not making this up – check a dictionary, you’ll find a definition similar to this one. The aliens might disagree with us as to what constitutes a lawful/justified killing, but they would not have a term for “murder” that is fundamentally equivalent to ours and still claim that murder can be justified.

I agree, the point was, if the aliens didn’t have a term such as ‘murder’, in our sense of the word, and this act was performed daily on their planet, would it still be immoral for the people on that planet?
That is basically my point.

This would first require that both people/societies understood the object of the game of basketball. A completely non-competitive society would probably place absolutely no emphasis on whether a player’s actions actually helped the team win the game – perhaps the most enlightened player (or whatever) would be the greatest basketball player to such a society. A society that emphasized brute force and aggression might not care whether a player won the game, but would place greater emphasis on fouling out of the game early on.

You missed my point, which was that when a player throws a ball into a basket, or he does a lay-up, all these actions are real, measurable objects moving that one can compare logically and rank as such, the point isn’t whether or not everyone knows the game, I said any given person from any given sphere.
I’m trying to get the point out that morals are not measurable in that many people can see it differently based on their history.
If another race had another game, they wouldn’t be playing basketball anymore, now would they?

Morals will exist everywhere in all spheres, and it will be the same, basketballl will not.

But to conclude, it seems like we’re looking at this in basically the same way except some small disagreements, so I think I’m gonna quit now, since everything I think I’ve already posted my opinions on.
But feel free to post a reply and I’ll read it and maybe reply if it’s something new.