Except that there’s no indication that Shakey does this. Shakey is a physical device that manipulates electromagnetism. Shakey doesn’t process edges, we see it as doing so.
I don’t think it’s a codeword for anything - I’m using the explanation of life in terms of physical processes as an analogy for attempting to explain consciousness in terms of physical processes. As for “primary” vitalism sources (ie. written by vitalists, I assume - Dennett’s essay is “secondary” in this respect) , your Google is as good as mine: Wiki. Rupert Sheldrake and Henry Bergson flirt with it - see their web pages.
Shakey takes the light from the camera and associates a number for each tiny part (x1y1, x2y1 … x1000y1000, say) for the visual field (the equivalent of the action potential at different parts of the retina, say). These levels then undergo a thresholding process (eg. IF x2y1-x1y1>0.5 THEN EDGE=1 ELSE EDGE=0 ) leaving only edges (ie. ones at specific co-ordinates in a sea of zeroes). Then, for any 2x2 square array, more than 2 ones represents a VERTEX. A “box” is simply when there are 3 coincident VERTICES in the visual field. How is this not a process, and surely the action potentials from our retina (or, indeed, cochlea or skin) are “electromagnetism” too?
When vitalists say that behavior is indicative of, but is not, life itself, what do you suppose the word ‘life’ refers to?
It is a process, but there’s no judgement. As far as “Shakey” is concerned, the signals could represent priests entering the number of angels on different-sized pins, optically. The judgement that what “Shakey” is doing is evaluating visual concepts is made by, and relevant only to humans, within our consciousnesses. I doubt Shakey or a fly wandering around “know” or care two hoots about that electromagnetic activity.
The lan vital - the mysterious and unobservable “vital force” which permeates living things and is absent from dead things, but which has nothing to do with the actual processes and mechanisms of the processes, reactions and activity of the cells themselves. Like I say, I’m not really in a position to argue on vitalism’s behalf because I’m not a vitalist! I’m only saying how widespread and well respected vitalists were and setting forth the similarity between their arguments and those of nonphysicalists today.
I’d call that a No True Scotsman fallacy: the robot judges whether or not it’s looking at a “box” based on electromagnetic optical inputs, but humans make true judgements (even though the action potentials in their retina, optic nerve/chiasm/tract and lateral geniculate nucleus are every bit as “electromagnetic”).
I agree, but most people aren’t interested either! Explaining and understanding things scientifically requires vastly advanced cognitive processes far more complex than these simple judgement mechanisms such that, of course, only humans have so far demonstrated any ability in this respect (since they’re the only beings with such an enormous prefrontal cortex). But this is irrelevant to our discussion of what counts as a judgement mechanism: I never said that Shakey the Robot “understands” the processes which allow him to distinguish between boxes and non-boxes. But then, I could explain Shakey all day to my mother, and she wouldn’t understand it either. 
You’re confusing the solution with the trigger. The solution is “elan vital”, as far as what provides life. But what does ‘life’ mean, to a vitalist?
“True” judgement?
Shakey doesn’t make a judgement any more than my hand judges whether my drink is cold. Signals from my hand sensors transmitted to the brain, consciously reveal to me whether it is.
I bet Shakey doesn’t even know what it’s doing. In fact, there is no Shakey. Shakey is the label given to a bounded stimuli within our consciousnesses.
I repeat, I think you’d be better asking a vitalist: as a guess, I’d say they’d spread their arms, look around and say “You know, plants and birds and germs and us – life! Not just what the plants and birds and cells and us happen to be doing, but whatever it is which I’m full of but which my corpse is devoid of.”
Yes, the No “True” Scotsman fallacy (ie. it’s merely an irrelevant distinction made out to be highly significant).
But if your drink weren’t cold, the A-delta nerve ends in your hand wouldn’t transmit the “heat escaping skin quickly!” signal back to the brain in the first place, and so there’d be nothing to “judge”. (I thought you’d adopted whatshisname’s sensible idea that the brain and the connections to it are what constitutes “mind”? And if your drink was hot, you’d actually move before your brain had time to do any “judging” due to how quickly the signals propagate up the various nerves.) Shakey’s chips and RAM receive inputs just as our brains do. It’s the IF-THEN-ELSE processes which the chips and our brains carry out which yield discriminatory outputs.
I don’t even know what I’m doing most of the time. And if there’s no Shakey despite my ability to go over to the MIT museum and clonk him on the carapace with my knuckle, maybe there’s no “me” either. I’d hate to question your mental health, but you would then be talking to yourself.
Tim: I bet you can call your school of thought rational, because disagreeing with it sure isn’t. Just like reading my own thoughts, thanks!
But, on physicality: The more I think about it, the less sense does it make to me. I’ve always been a strict materialist, and I don’t ever think I’ll give up my belief in the universe as 100% logical (and determined), but the materialism bit is starting to seem a bit irrelevant.
Of course, it’s easy to concieve of material causality because we know we can set up a machine and just let gravity or some other law of nature get things going, but claiming that everything must have a material cause is like saying that God created the universe, and let’s not bother about who created God. After all, matter is every bit as mysterious as a “soul” or whatever you call your mental aspect of the world.
You might say matter is something with substance. From where does this substance come? How can matter move about without non-matter to move in? What defines non-matter from matter? How can there be two fundamentaly different kinds of matter? If it isn’t, how can matter cause the diversity in the world?
I don’t know if I’m getting my point across, but I’d say stick to exploring the logic governing the universe without assigning attributes to matter or establishing a fundamental reality before you know what it is.
Oh well, it probably boils down to matter and consciousness being two manifestations of the same reality, and have we heard that before.
I’d guess, it would be what we today identify as ‘consciousness’
In both cases, it’s the brain that’s the “judger”, not the hand, which is an instrument.
Shakey’s an assumed entity based on perceptual categorization into a bundle, when there’s no such distinction made with consciousness. I believe you have a self because it’s analogous to mine.
Hmm, I don’t think so. You’re entitled to your guess, of course, but vitalists would just as easily point to the difference between live and dead animals, plants or single-celled organisms when they tried to tell you what “life” was, and they certainly wouldn’t say that plants and amoebae (nor probably even chimps) were conscious.
And, of course, I’d say that the brain is an instrument in both cases.
I make such a distinction, ie. I label you “conscious” based on the responses I perceive on the screen from you.
Actually, I believe Shakey “just about” has a self, too – in a similar way to animals or severely malformed-brained humans. But when Shakey is switched off, I believe that pitifully poor excuse for a ‘self’ disappears, just like when animals or human (of any cognitive function) die, since those processes stop.
I’m trying to get caught up with the thread, so I’ll just reply to things as I read them. Sorry if they’ve already been addressed further down the page.
By “ideas”, I mean the information content of those ideas, whereas by “feelings” I mean the actual sensations we experience when thinking those ideas – the “qualia”, I suppose, although I’ve only just learned the term.
We could write a detailed description of what a sunset looks like on a piece of paper, and (if sufficiently detailed) it might contain the same information content as is encoded in our brain when we see that sunset – but we wouldn’t say that the writing on the paper contains the sensation (qualia) of viewing a sunset. Those are things I can’t right down (e.g., what the color red “looks like”).
Right, but my point is we can explain properties like temperature and pressure based on the collective behavior of individual molecules. That is, even though a single molecule in a gas doesn’t have a temperature, we can connect temperature to the average kinetic energy of molecules in the gas. In general, the principles of thermodynamics are statistical laws resulting from the physics of molecules.
In this sense, molecular level physics “explains” the macroscopic physics. But there doesn’t seem to be any “molecular level consciousness” which explains macroscopic consciousness – at least, none that we could possibly detect.
Well, I’ve always thought of the phases of matter (solid, liquid, gas, plus more esoteric stuff like plasma and Bose-Einstein condensate) as the quintessential example of an emergent property, at least within physics. But they’re still explicable based on properties of constituent elements. It’s possible “emergence” is used in a different sense in other fields, though – I don’t really know. But I would think a “physicalist” picture of consciousness would still want to (need to?) explain it in terms of microscopic properties.
I don’t think this is quite analogous. It’s a little hard to say, because I’ve never heard a very clear definition of what we mean by life. It seems to mean, basically, “the thing that all animals and plants and fungi and bacteria and protazoa have, and that everything else doesn’t have.” But let’s say life means something like “The ability to grow, consume food, reproduce, etc.” All of these functions that more or less define life are physical processes (i.e., motions of physical objects) which we can observe with our eyes. And even in the 19th century we understood that there were organs inside the human body that were moving about, that somehow added up to “life”. We could cut a person or an animal open and see these for ourselves. And so a clever person could have speculated that if we could looked closely enough, we might see that these organs contained their own constituent parts whose collective motions resulted in the motion of the organ as a whole. Sure, they aren’t alive, but they’re doing a little piece of the function that is life. And even before the invention of microscopes and other technology for studying the very small, microbiology was at least observable in principle.
You might say that the only reason I think consciousness is any different is because we haven’t yet observed the microscopic causes of consciousness. But I think there’s more to it then that. Life (at least as I’ve defined it here) is a set of mechanical processes which we observe with our eyes. So even if I didn’t know there were cells and DNA and so forth, I could speculate that if those things existed then it would be in principle possible to observe them growing, reproducing, etc. But we can’t directly observe consciousness by physical means. We can observe brain activity, but the only way to observe that there is consciousness associated with it is to actually ask the person that brain belongs to and see what they say. (I’m buying into the suggestion that consciousness can be perceived by studying the commentary of the conscious person themselves.) Even if we shrunk ourselves down to the size of a molecule, we’d never be able to observe the properties of the molecule which, we’re hypothesizing, collectively add up to consciousness – not unless we can ask the molecule how he’s feeling.
To summarize my point:
I’m not saying: “How can consciousness be explained based on the behavior of constituent elements, when those elements themselves are not conscious?” If so, this would be analogous to saying “How can life be explained based on the behavior of constituent elements, when those elements themselves are not alive?”
I am saying: “The observation that consciousness is based on the behavior of constituent elements seems impossible to make even in principle, since our only means of observing consciousness seems to break down below a certain scale.” Whereas we have numerous means of observing that something is alive, which work at very small scales. Sure, eventually objects are smaller than the wavelength of light and can’t be observed visually, but there are still other methods of observation, e.g. bouncing things off of them. The point is “life” can be broken down into a bunch of physical processes, and these processes (growth, reproduction, etc.) can be observed (at least in principle) at any scale.
Whereas the only physical process that seems to be associated with consciousness is that it “describes how it feels to be conscious”, and this isn’t something that can be observed, even in principle, at small scales. If we’re willing to assume that consciousness is nothing more than brain activity, then it could be observed at small scales, but I’m not ready to make that assumption.
I guess in that way it is a little like the 19th century view of life, in that 19th century thinkers might have felt that life had some component beyond just the observed physical processes. But I think I have better reason to think that about consciousness. I have direct awareness of the feelings (qualia, I suppose) associated with consciousness – feelings I can’t detect by any physical means other than asking someone if they have them. (In contrast, I don’t detect any non-physical component of life, other than the fact that I’m conscious – which I assume is not common to all life forms.) Dennett’s arguement doesn’t convince me that these feelings don’t exist, and if they do exist the fact that they can’t be detected in a scale-independent way seems to be a problem for a physicalist picture of consciousness. Maybe there is nevertheless an underlying physical cause of it all, but it seems that that cause would be unobservable even in principle.
Which is why I asked for primary sources. I’ll try to look them up today evening.
Well, so would I. I meant “the generator of consciousness” and presumed that to be the brain, for the purposes of this discussion.
Yeah, but why would my responses indicate consciousness?
Do you believe that Shakey is conscious?
But Dennett doesn’t try to convince you that feelings don’t exist, only that they don’t exist independent of the brain. It’s your reluctance to really try your hardest to go right ahead and imagine that that brain activity – that processing of sensory signals in working memory – is what “feelings” is. Again, look at what I said elsewhere about encryption. If we ever did make a silicon computer which convinced us that it was conscious, all we could phsycially see in its chips and memory would be electronic activity. The impossibility of us being it itself is no more mysterious or fundamental a flaw to physicalism than not being able to be a single cell either – in both cases we can only observe behaviour and make our judgements based on that alone.
Since I cannot be you (any more than I can live an amoeba’s life), your responses and behaviour are the only means I have of judging whether or not you are, in your words, “analogous” to me. Ditto for judging chimps, pigeons, bees and robots, and plants, dead things and switched-off robots.
I consider that “consciousness” is a continuum, and I place my minimum threshold somewhere near Shakey, so just about, yes. However, if by “conscious” you mean “able to use language and do science”, then no (and some humans aren’t either).
You are answering “why do use my responses to test consciousness?”. I asked, “why do my responses indicate consciousness?”. I’ll assume that, unless corrected, your answer is that because certain of my behaviors are analogous to yours, and you associate those behaviors as dependent upon your consciousness.
Of course, the problem here is that you only have a sample size of one.
Then I’ll try to correct you as best I can, since I’m not sure I understand the question “Why do my responses indicate consciousness?”, nor even whether I’d answer in the affirmative since it seems like something of a category error. Certain of your behaviours are similar to the behaviours I’d display if I was being judged and, yes, those behaviours are a result of this process which is (perhaps in an old fashioned “folk psychology” way) being called ‘consciousness’ in this thread. Of course, that’s no guarantee that we both “have” this whatever-you-call-it, it’s just the best I can do.
That’s a fact, but I wouldn’t call it a problem as such - if complex brains evolved from stardust, such a fact would be inevitable since that brain couldn’t be whatever it looked at.
Why do you deduce, based on the behaviors observed, that I am conscious? More precisely, how do you know that consciousness isn’t epiphenomenal?
You don’t have any other frame of reference to compare with; assertions of physicalism are just as speculative.
I don’t think that answers the question; it seems so evident to me that I’m trying to figure out where you’re coming from. Is there truly a difference (in kind) between the information associated with an “idea” versus information associated with “feelings”? What is it? How does one (infallibly) distinguish between them (from a third-party standpoint)? Are they not part and parcel of the same overarching apparatus?
And we can connect connect “consciousness” to brain (or CNS in lower animals) function. But it seems to me that temperature might be a flimsy exemplar in this instance, used just to get the point across. Instead, take weather – is it acceptable to “explain” a storm front in terms of molecular physics? How do we detect such a thing without simply describing the patterns of the molecules involved? From an outside standpoint, what’s the difference (between “explaining” a storm and “explaining” consciousness)?
Physicists are pretty good in this regard (that is, to my knowledge, they don’t generally use the term “emergence” sloppily). Not so in lots of other fields. If that’s the way you’re using it – a macrostructure directly dependent and traceable to the microconstituents – then OK, I have no beef with that.
It merely seems the most likely of the alternatives given that it seems unlikely that I am “special” in any naturalistic sense. I might very well be wrong, and you’re not. (Heck I could even be a zombie for all I know!)
Like I said, I don’t know anything for sure. I’m only seeking to explain phenomena parsimoniously. Epiphenomenal ectoplasm looks as unparsimonious as the elan vital to me.
That tautology pretty much follows from the definition of ‘frame of reference’ in this context. Again, if brains did evolve from stardust then an inability to become another frame of reference would be inevitable. If that’s a ‘problem’, it’s shared by any other science or endeavour – it’s rather like saying that it’s a ‘problem’ that I can’t travel back in time or read minds.
Straight assertions are, yes – they’re not very helpful at all. But the method of cognitive science is to take what we agree is physical and ask what more is necessary to understand subjectivity by considering “what it would be like to be” a biological computer made of cells and sensory organs.
How do you measure this ‘likelihood’?
So, it’s an aesthetic judgement?
Why?
The spread of the problem doesn’t make it any less of one.
What “we” agree is physical? Furthermore, Kuhn might have something to say about the integrity of the scientific consensus.
The proper question is “why does any subjectivity be?”.
We need not measure the likelihood we personally ascribe to a statement’s truth – when the jury deliver a verdict in a civil court “on the balance of probabilities”, they are not asked to provide their measurements thereof. I am a one-man jury in the trial of the sentence “I am not a special case for explanatory purposes”, and I consider it more likely true than false. I may be wrong.
Yes – I prefer science over other epistemologies, and Ockham’s Razor over other bloated ontologies. Your preferences may, of course, vary.
Because a brain cannot be in two spatial (or temporal) locations at once: my brain cannot realistically become yours - that’s just how spacetime is.
Well, that’s another aesthetic judgement, really. I don’t consider my lack of super powers a problem, just a fact of life.
Yes – you know, molecules, rocks, cells, computers, that kind of thing. Of course, the solipsist or radical idealist disagrees, which is why I try to avoid wasting time talking to them.
And I could call Kuhn a dickhead, occasionally lucid though he was. I do not deny that we might all be wrong about *anything[/]i, or even everything.
Actually, I think the proper question is “could a biological computer operating such and such processes lack ‘subjectivity’?” I don’t think people who answer “of course it could!” really imagine hard enough. (Heck, the solipsist can’t even imagine it in other people!)