I don’t see the assertion that ‘everything is alive’ in the links. In fact, as you originally said, it is stated that there are two categories of matter and it says so explicitly & unambigiously in the last excerpt I quoted. Do you have a cite for vitalism saying “everything’s alive”?
Animism is the position that everything contains the anima sensitive mentioned in all those vitalism links. Like I said, the two categories of matter was a 17th Century categorisation which vitalists could no longer hold after proof of an ancient, fossil-free lower-layered Earth appeared. They opposed, and thus oppose, emergentism with regards to life. How does one oppose emergentism but allow a non-life to life transition, exactly?
So vitalism = animism? Because animism is nowhere mentioned in your Wolfram links. Animism seems to be the same as panpsychism given the Wikipedia description: “More simply, the belief is that “everything is alive”, “everything is conscious” or “everything has a soul””. So ‘life’ is being equivocated with consciousness, which I made clear, was the opposite of my assumption when I was arguing for the disanalogy between vitalism and anti-physicalism.
= a subset of animism, yes - the anima is the “life” in vitalism (based on Aristotle’s De Anima).
The Wolfram was just a quick Googled reference for Stahl - by “the links I just provided” I meant the Stanford links in #77:
Which you seem to agree with here:
Personally, I still wouldn’t say that panpsychism and vitalism are identical any more than pansychism and pantheism are identical: Vitalists call the anima the “life” element, panpsychists call it the “consciousness” element, pantheists call it the “god” element, hunter-gatherers call it the “spirit” element etc. But if you’re happy to accept the term “vitalist” to describe your position, great – I think that that might even be more useful to our audience than “panpsychist” in understanding your philosophy quickly and clearly in these debates.
As I say, I think our (or at least, my) confusion here regarding vitalism is caused by the change in the hypothesis heralded by the end of vitalism as a viable philosophy in the 19th century. Vitalism did posit non-living matter until it became clear from the fossil record that living organisms have not always been around, leaving two options:[ul][li]Life emerged from non-life, since life is effectively physical processes comprising a spatio-temporal arrangement of matter, energy and forces. This option remains the unanimous consensus in science and philosophy save for a tiny handful of eccentrics.[/li][li]Life has always existed, even in the fossil-free era, since what vitalism previously considered non-alive (ie. rocks, sunlight etc) actually is, even if it doesn’t grow, metabolise or do anything we usually think of living things doing.[/ul]Thus, when I said whay back in #29 that “[Vitalists] certainly wouldn’t say that plants and amoebae (nor probably even chimps) were conscious” I now realise that I was only referring to those pre-19th century vitalists, not the few eccentrics who remained thereafter by denying emergentism.[/li]
So, thank you Gyan. In this thread you’ve forced me to learn more about vitalism and how it was forced to change when fossil-free lower strata were discovered to become even closer an analogue to panpsychism. Am I to assume that it thereafter became so close that you would even describe yourself as a vitalist? You know, of course, that I’d consider that something of a Reductio Ad Absurdans, but I think it would nevertheless help others understand where you’re coming from.
Furthermore, just out of interest, would you accept equivalence between vitalism and other canons of animism, such as pantheism or re-incarnation?
Like I said, the Wikipedia entry for animism equivocates life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.
That, technically, shouldn’t be a problem, as entities with “anima” could simply have been introduced afterwards.
Anyway, it did not posit non-living matter. It demarcated non-living matter, based on behavior. Here’s the quote again with my emphasis: The proposed explanation for the difference between organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory.
Then what does it mean for those things to be alive?
Yes, but like I said, that page also equates life and consciousness with the soul, which lives on in heaven or via reincarnation, or the spirit in primitive everything-has-its-own-little-god animism common to hunter-gatherers. Do you subscribe to them too?
No, I don’t think they could from a naturalistic perspective (of course, you can introduce God here but even then, he’d have to be creating things continually, even now!). Do have a read about emergentism, to which (your?) vitalism and panpsychism are fundamentally opposed.
How can one demarcate something as Y without positing Y?
If everything is alive, no meaning need be proposed – after all, I could ask you what it means for rocks and sunlight to be conscious. This is what confused me about your position before: You said that you ascribed consciousness to me because I was, somehow, “analogous to you”. But under panpsychism, everything is “analogous to you” – rocks, corpses, atoms, the lot! I would have understood your position much more quickly if you’d said “I ascribe consciousness to you because I ascribe consciousness to everything”.
Those terms are ill-defined. I’m only pointing out that animism is vague enough that it could be identical to panpsychism depending on which statement is considered as definitional (“everything is alive”, “everything is conscious”, “everything has soul”). If these terms are considered equivalent, as they seem to be, then to be alive is to be conscious is to have a soul. In which case, animism is panpsychism. Vitalism, OTOH, divides stuff into two categories.
Why? God can do whatever it wants.
Interiority, like ours. The contents are irrelevant.
I’m presuming that if I were to meet you, I would see that you have a basic humanoid appearance with one or more eyes, ears…etc. Since I look in the mirror and notice isomorphic features in me, I assume that you also have a counterpart consciousness.
Analogy has nothing to do with panpsychism. If consciousness is non-emergent, then everything is conscious. I only assume that rocks are ontological entities, and hence conscious, because they seem so in my consciousness.
But there is utterly compelling evidence that consciousness is physical and that fact can be observed experimentally.
Probably the best examples consist of people who have undergone physical damage to parts of their brains and have thus lost or were otherwise effected in part – and only part – of their consciousness. These people continue to “experience” nearly all mental phenomena just as they’ve always done but with one or two notable exceptions. Consider, off the top of my head, the man who underwent some limited kind of brain damage and subsequently had no problem recognizing people except to insist that his parents were identical impostors merely pretending to be his parents (yet would recognize them as genuine when he talked to them over the phone). Or those suffering from what is called hemi-neglect wherein their consciousness alone precludes them from paying attention to what is on the non-dominant side of their visual field. That is to say that there is no damage to their visual systems that produce these effects and rather that they are purely a matter of consiosness.
Similar cases of brain damage leading to consciousness damage are far too numerous to downplay, and their significance is overwhelming: they are proof that consciousness is physical.
Surely you don’t believe that “describability” is necessary, do you?
If we could hypothetically create some kind of vastly sophisticated electrochemical “cable” between the neurons (etc) of one brain and connect it to the appropriate neurons of another brain (and spinal chord, etc, etc, etc), I don’t see any reasonable grounds for doubting that that second brain would consciously experience pretty much the same things as the first with similar impressions of qualia and so forth. The second person could then experience the same “redness” as the first, even if that second person was blind.
Assuming for the moment that this is true, would that convince you of the physicality of consciousness?
As are all terms when one gets down to it – after all, what is a debate but a disagreement upon which entities fall within the bounds of a given label?
Yes, and I’m only pointing out that if one is cavalier enough to consider that vitalism and panpsychism are identical, there’s no reason not to consider other canons of animism similarly identical.
As is polytheism and prehistoric spiritism, as that abstract states. Consider those positions “noble” if you like, but you would be way out on the philosophical fringe (not that there’s anything wrong with eccentricity, of course!).
Not any more, I’d suggest – the discovery of fossil-free lower strata and vitalism’s opposition to emergentism changed vitalism irrevocably, IMO.
Because new species are still appearing. Of course God could be continually creating them despite well understood mechanism of genetic mutation, but to posit so would be to ignore Ockham’s Razor completely in favour of a much more bloated ontology. To oppose emergentism is to take the position that life could not naturally appear from non-life.
Hmm, that sounds distinctly tautologous to me – surely a vitalist could similarly answer “to possess the elan vital, like we do”?
But if you assume everything has a counterpart consciousness, it doesn’t matter what I look like. Again, “analogy to you” is irrelevant – you assume consciousness in me because under panpsychism it’s impossible not to have it.
That’s what I’m arguing – it was a non sequitur of you to bring up “analogy to you” in the first place given your panpsychist position.
Rocks seem conscious to you? Surely you’re simply defining rocks to be conscious, and whether they “seem” it is irrelevant?
Yes, but the relevant terms are lot more “flexible” than the definition of “sphere” or “three”.
Who’s equated them? I haven’t.
Don’t bring up these extranous points. I only linked to that abstract to show that animism and panpsychism are considered equivalent, not my endorsement of the abstract.
Well, it’s not “vitalism” anymore. You were arguing for the analogy between the doctrine which opposed emergentism of life from non-life and that which opposes emergentism of consciousness from that without. The demarcation of life/non-life was based on observation; the demarcation of conscious/non-conscious is based on assumption; so the analogy doesn’t hold. Doesn’t matter what some academics include under the rubric of “vitalism” today.
But we have experience of consciousness, not of elan vital, unless the terms are synonymous.
Cart before horse. I assume consciousness in you because of analogy. I don’t see the case for emergentism, so I then assume a panpsychist position.
Clarification: I said, “I only assume that rocks are ontological entities, and hence conscious, because they seem so in my consciousness.” i.e. seem to be ontological entites, hence assumed as such, and hence conscious.
Is ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ any more flexible a term than ‘consciousness’ (especially under panpsychism), really?
Then what did you mean by “the Wikipedia entry for animism equivocates life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.”? Are you sure “equivocates” was the correct word to use there?
Then polytheism and reincarnation are considered similarly equivalent to panpsychism. You can hardly blame me for pointing out the status of those positions these days.
Unless, of course, one simply assumes that everything is alive, like modern vitalists. Again, it’s perfectly OK for you disagree with academia today: after all, panpsychism is pretty much a dead philosophy there, too.
Consciousness is experience – like I asked before, could you be conscious without experiencing it? That’s why I see a tautology – a vitalist could say “But we possess elan vital”.
Ah, so you call me “conscious” based on observations of my properties and behaviour, and then (given your opposition to emergentism) assume that everything must be conscious? That sounds precisely like vitalism today, agreed?
So, like I asked, their behaviour or observed properties are irrelevant (beyond their status as sensoria), yes? You are defining the set of “conscious entities” to be “everything which I detec via my senses”, agreed?
As this happens to be the current thread on consciousness, I figured this is the place to add an aside that might be of interest. I just came across a book review for Searle’s latest book, Mind, which sounds excellent.
Hmmm, I’ll withold judgement until I’ve read it - saying on the first page that “all philosophies of mind are false” does not augur well IMO. It seems like he wants to propose problems (like his Chinese Room) but then, when eminently reasonable solutions to those problems are set forth, put his fingers in his ears and say la la la I can’t hear you. I don;t know what it’s like to be a bat, but I’ve seen the Monty Python argument sketch plenty of times, thanks.
If you’re after a genuine, practical recommendation of mine, Digi, I’ve just read Growing Up With Lucy by Steve Grand: an immensely enjoyable and readable journey into actual practical connectionism we discussed before. His robot orang-utan, Lucy, can point at bananas without specific prompting, regardless of distance or orientation. Of course, those outside AI research mightn’t consider this to be particularly impressive, but I suspect you’ll be inspired by his innovative approach.
Yes, I should say that I disagree with Searle. However, he certainly is worth reading, if only to establish where it is one agrees or disagrees with him. Furthermore, it sounds like he covers huge amounts of ground in an accessible (and cohesive) way. I’m particularly interested in reading his refutations of materialism – as I’ve said before, I can never quite get those criticizing it to put their objections in terms I can understand. I’m hoping that the single author treatment at least means that the language and ideas expressed remain consistent throughout – too often, it seems to me, a major stumbling block is simply due to incompatible verbiage.
Thanks for the tip; sounds like it’s right up my alley. I’ll obtain that one sometime soon.
From that review, it seems liek he just trots out the same old thought experiments - Bats, Mary, Chinese Room etc. - in which the ‘problem’ is clearly that some part of the mind-computer is disconnected (A sonar sensor is not connected to my brain, a red wavelength sensor is not connected to Mary’s brain, there are no connections between the Chinese symbol and the associated memory or concept). A physicalist description of the brain processes called “consciousness” can hardly get very far if one insists on arbitrarily fucking bits of it up.
Yes, given that consciousness is known firsthand.
That animism = panpsychism, not vitalism = panpsychism. BTW, can you link to a description of the modern conception of vitalism?
No, polytheism is panpsychic, but it deals with other features as well. Animism simply says that everything is conscious, which is what panpsychism says. Where did you get that reincarnation includes panpsychism? Reincarnation is about continuation of the soul. Doesn’t necessarily mean that everything has a soul or is alive.
It’s your choice if you wish to retain the term “vitalism” for the modern mutated descendents of vitalism, but vitalism is just the doctrine that life doesn’t emerge from non-life. The similarity between panpsychism and vitalism is the opposition of emergence. The difference is that “elan vital” is arbitrarily supposed, but consciousness is known firsthand.
Once the distinction between life/non-life became blurred, there were two options for vitalists,
decide that
1)everything is alive (due to elan vital)
2)nothing is ‘alive’ in a metaphysical sense (& there’s no elan vital) but a subjective distinction is retained.
Modern Science went the second route. The same’s not possible for consciousness since its existence is not posited ad hoc, but is known.
No. Exactly. So what would it mean to possess “elan vital”?
Yes, except 1)what’s been discarded is old vitalism 2)elan vital is still ad hoc.
Above, you are arguing that panpsychism is as valid as (old) vitalism.
Actually, it is emergentism that is analogous to old vitalism. Here’s how:
There are 3 possibilities
1)Nothing is conscious
2)Everything is conscious
3)Some things are conscious
The first is false because I am conscious. Given that consciousness can’t be experienced, emergentism is arbitrary by picking the 3rd option, and saying
1)All processes are physical.
2)Yet only some processes lead to experience (despite an emergentist being unable to observe experience in anything else).
No. Every entity that exists, detected or not.
But believers in souls surely say that they know they have a soul first hand?
And the anima is the “life” in vitalism, and the “soul” in theism, and the spirit in primitive spiritism. I thought you agreed that these terms were equivalent to consciousness?
Like what? How, and why, do you disntiguish yourself from a polytheist?
And that everything is alive, and has a soul. Would you call yourself an animist?
But since the soul under animism is eternal and non-emergent it must continue under pansychism, such that I will either wake up in heaven or be reincarnated as a conscious atom or something, yes?
Agreed. So would you call yourself a vitalist?
Could one not say that consciousness is arbitrarily supposed, ie. it’s just what we’re calling these brain processes which processes sensory input in working memory?
But you are one of only a tiny handful of eccentrics who don’t see a distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, as in a corpse or rock. Modern Science is near-unanimously physicalist regarding consciousness, ie. nothing is “conscious” in a metaphysical sense – there are just computational processes in physical hardware and that’s what we call “consciousness”, just as “life” is what science calls other phsyical processes. Just because we agree that both life and consciousness are explicanda (ie. “somethings”) doesn’t make either one inexplicable by reference to physical processes.
Exactly! The vitalist would say it’s impossible not to possess elan vital. Thus there is no substance in your distinction “Ahh, but consciousness is experienced while elan vital isn’t”, since the vitalist could just as easily say “Ahh, but elan vital is possessed, see?”.
No, I’m arguing that they’re all as ludicrous as each other, but let’s continue …
Agreed, and the same three options apply to “alive”, “pink”, “British” or, indeed, any adjective whatsoever.
Agreed, just as I could say I am alive, pink and British and so 1) is false for those adjectives.
(Tautologically) Can’t not be experienced, you just agreed …
Guess what? All adjectives are arbitrary – language is a means of arbitrating. If some things are “alive”, “pink” or “British”, it is arbitrary to suggest that some things are “dead”, “blue” or “Greek”. Most reasonable people look at the history of the universe and say “clearly, I was not conscious before my conception, and thus my consciousness emerged over time”. I’m afraid I still don’t really understand why you don’t, but I’m all for diversity.
And how do you ascertain whether or not something exists, if not via sensoria?
And, of course, all kinds of things aren’t directly observable by third persons. Just because only some processes lead to, say, encrypted computer files, one doesn’t propose that everything has some fundamental essence of encryption, or something. Like I sadi, the ‘privacy’ aspect of brain function is really as mundane as our not being able to time travel, yet we can still do history.
But I don’t know what they mean by soul, but ‘consciousness’ is pretty clear.
But that doesn’t make vitalism = animism, anymore than it makes vitalism = theism.
No, I said that the WP entry for animism equates them.
Not much of a description of modern vitalism. Any primary or focused sources?
Everything can be conscious without having Godhood or causative powers.
If the terms are equivalent to consciousness, only then, yes.
No. All panpsychism indicates is that everything is conscious. Other features are extranous to the definition.
I outlined the difference as well, so no.
The term is arbitrary, the phenomenon is not. It’s all we are: conscious. How did you become aware that consciousness is a set of brain processes?
On the contrary, I see a distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Which is why I oppose emergentism. I don’t see a distinction between the consciousness status of a rock and an alive dog because I can’t observe the consciousness or lack thereof, in either.
What does this even mean? Explain what it would mean to be conscious in a metaphysical sense.
And this is not the stated reason, so straw man.
To which I repeat: So what would it mean to possess “elan vital”?. What it means to be conscious is direct knowledge.
Of others, not my own.
I don’t need to ascertain anything. Anything that happens to exist, is conscious. I am not preparing a catalogue of existing things.
Except that we consciously decide to create encryption algorithms and encrypt files, and thus label only those as encrypted. If we were to discover some unknown files from a salvaged hard drive, and then claim that only certain files are encrypted because their headers indicate encryption processes known to us; then that’s equivalent in one sense to the physicalist position. Other files may be encrypted, but we only call those files encrypted whose structure parallels the output of our known encryption methods (this is equivalent to the ‘consciousness in others by analogy’ test that I was referring to).