National Recognition, Taiwan vs. Palestine

Great Debates
1

Hypothetical: a U.S. President sometime in the next ten to twenty years begins making statements in favour of (and moving for legislation in furtherance of) one of the following:

A. Official recognition of Palestine as an independent state, with borders to be set by treaty; or
B. Official recognition of Taiwan as an independent state, with territorial waters to be set by treaty.

I’d like to put aside any specific commentary regarding President-Elect Trump’s contact with Taiwan and what his motivations might have been (though obviously it was that contact that gave me the idea for this thread). Suffice it to say that the hypothetical president can articulate plausible reasons why (A) or (B) should be pursued as a matter of American foreign policy and dispense with decades-long fictions that the current status is only a temporary one.

In both cases, the key opponent is a regional nuclear power (Israel and China, obviously) who could, even with conventional forces, invade and essentially destroy the disputed territory at will.

In the specific case of Palestine, the issue is inextricably linked with religion-based terrorism. For Taiwan, though, not only is China powerful enough to strike directly at the U.S. if it wanted to, both China and Taiwan are major economic powers and the disruption of either will have a far greater global impact than Israel/Palestine. Though the U.S. has limited direct military commitment in keeping Israel and Palestine from going back to war, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 could require the U.S. to intervene to protect Taiwan from China, presumably with the Seventh Fleet.

The military and economic stakes, I gather, are considerably higher with Taiwan, but possibly because of that, both China and Taiwan are more motivated to not go to war over it (I’m guessing) because of what they have to lose. Could a potential Palestinian state keep its hardliners on a similar leash and manage to maintain a shaky peace with Israel (and Jordan and Egypt)? Further, a de facto “State of Palestine” is already recognized by many U.N. members, far more so than Taiwan’s claim of being the official Republic of China.

So would U.S. recognition of Palestine (where the economic and military stakes are lower but there is greater international attention, some of which is increasingly distrustful of Islamic politics) be more or less disruptive than recognition of Taiwan (where the international political interest is much more narrowly constrained, but the military and economic issues are larger).

I fully accept that my understanding of the two regions (at opposite ends of Asia) is limited, so anyone with direct knowledge of either sphere is invited to comment.

My personal take on the issues is that the hardliners in China and Israel are the primary barriers, but the ones in China might be more responsive to an economic argument (i.e. menacing Taiwan costs more than it gains), their Israeli equivalents are driven more by religious fanaticism and the notion that scripture promises the entire region to them. China might be amenable to negotiation and Israel less so, and as China continues to develop, Taiwan becomes less significant to them economically (and people who were alive in 1949 eventually all die off), while the future for Israel and Palestine is more demographically bleak with the most religious elements of either society more likely to have the largest families, gradually outnumbering more secular segments.

I’m leaning toward religion making Israel/Palestine gradually more intractable while money makes China/Taiwan gradually more solvable.

Thoughts?

2

The biggest difference I can see is that on the one hand, Taiwan has always been a close friend to America, while our relations with China, though close, are consistently uneasy, and on the other hand, Israel has always been a similarly-close friend to America, and it’s Palestine that we’re on uncertain terms with.

3

Interesting idea for a thread, Bryan. My very first thought, though, is that Taiwan doesn’t want to be independent, so your scenario for that isn’t realistic. Taiwan’s official position, like the PRC’s, is that there is one China, not two. Sure, there is a significant movement in Taiwan supporting independence, but what would it mean for the US to take a position contrary to that of the actual Taiwanese government?

As for Palestine, what does it mean for “borders to be set by treaty”? As far as I understand, if Israel and Palestine could decide on that, the US would be happy to support it. So maybe I don’t understand your proposition because it sound completely mundane to me-- that is, the main controversy revolves around borders, and the right of return. What, in your scenario, is the US’s position on the right of return?

4

Doesn’t the People’s Republic of China refuse diplomatic recognition of any country that extends diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China government?

5

I just figured the hypothetical president’s position was that the disputants could work out a national border (with other countries like the U.S. aiding in the negotiations) and once set, would be locked in place like any conventional national border. It’s my understanding the issue is still in flux, which makes the problem more difficult than China/Taiwan since the latter is conveniently an island (with a few much-smaller islands around it).

I would presume that once national borders are set, anyone who is currently on the Palestinian side is effectively granted citizenship in the new Palestinian state, and both Israel and Palestine are entitled to control their borders, including limiting access by people who are now considered immigrants rather than returns. At the very least, right of return to Israel would not apply to someone who wasn’t born in Israel, i.e. born outside of the territory Israel would be claiming.

I’ll cheerfully admit my own limited understanding of the issues in either Near-East or Far-East Asia.

I get that Taiwan’s official position is that it should be running all of China, but is there serious belief anywhere in Taiwan that this is feasible or likely?

6

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be quite more likely than not to fail. China’s amphibious capability is very limited, Taiwan has invested for decades in anti-ship and anti-air capabilities aimed precisely at thwarting an invasion, its islands of Jinmen, Matsu and the Pescadores (situated next to China and in the middle of the Strait, respectively) serve as something of an invasion trip-wire, especially given Jinmen’s artillery and MLRS capabilities meant to hamper a Chinese invasion force in its own backyard. Islands are, due to their geography, naturally difficult to invade, as the invader must proceed either by air or by sea and the defender only needs to destroy a sufficient number of transport ships or aircraft at sea or in air to render the invasion untenable. Furthermore, Taiwan could very well muster much more force at the invasion point of attack (say, a Chinese invasion beachhead at the port of Taichung in central-western Taiwan, a frequently touted invasion sccenario), and thus threaten the beachhead’s survival.

The Taiwan Relations Act is intentionally vague and does not commit the U.S. to the military defense of Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack. The most frequently touted line in the Act is the part about the U.S. selling defensive arms to Taiwan, and even that is not always upheld or adhered to.

U.S. recognition of Taiwan would probably be less of a splash than some people envision; China might impose trade sanctions or some diplomatic measures of retaliation but that would die down too. Some people paint such a scenario as the end of the world, thinking China would go to war, but I really think it would be a much more muted response than envisioned, and that China’s bluffs can usually be called much more frequently than thought.

7

Virtually nil; this view is probably held by less than 1% of the Taiwanese populace. If the figure is any more than that, it probably reflects the very elderly generation, which will not be around much longer.

The polling data in Taiwan can be interpreted any number of ways, but usually the vast majority support “status quo,” a sizable minority support independence, and a small minority support unification with China.

This poll, for instance, shows 21% support for independence and 9% support for unification.

Another poll - probably worded differently - has 51% support for independence, 15% support for unification, and 25% support for status quo.

And another poll shows that if push came to shove and “status quo” was not a viable option any longer, that the preference was 60% for independence and 22% for unification.

What constitutes “independence” is usually the subject of lengthy semantics and nit-picking in Taiwan, in which the media and politicians invent new ways to beat around the bush to avoid saying the explosive, politically-dynamite “I” word.

“Independence” can be taken to mean what Taiwan already is, a de facto independent country, with its own currency, government, military, flag, way of life, etc.

It can also be taken to mean formal, de jure independence, in which Taiwan declares independence, (presumably then fights off a Chinese attack in response) and becomes a fully-fledged formally independent country in the style of the 13 Colonies vs. Britain.

It is politically suicidal, however, these days, for a politician in Taiwan to openly advocate that Taiwan submit to China and become part of China again. So what the KMT (the pro-China party in Taiwan) does is that it plays a word game: It claims that Taiwan is already de facto independent and that there is therefore no *need *to declare independence. The DPP (the anti-China party) used to be more supportive of formally declaring independence, but has since then moderated its stance to become more in line with the KMT’s official line; namely, that Taiwan is already de facto independent.

There are two traps a Taiwanese politican can fall into: Advocate unification, and you get accused of maitai, “selling Taiwan” out to China. Advocate independence, and you get accused of provoking a war. So a lot of Taiwanese politicians spend energy dancing around words to avoid bad nuances.

8

Polling data is meaningless. What matters is the official position of the government. There is no point in “supporting” something that the official government of Taiwan doesn’t support, if our idea is to align ourselves with that government in opposition to the one in Beijing. It would be like the government of Taiwan deciding they supported CA seceding from the Union.

9

Recognizing Palestine would piss a lot of people off, and make a lot of others happy but I don’t see it having any huge economic repercussions. More fighting breaks out in the ME? What, it’s Tuesday?

Recognizing Taiwan could probably have global economic repercussions, and I don’t think Taiwan itself is ready for it.

10

The U.S., to a degree could probably push Israel back into serious negotiations with Palestine. The long term prospects of a Palestinian state are dim, but not impossible. Liberals in Israel favor the two-state solution. I actually disagree with the point that the major reason for Israel’s move away from public support for the two-state solution in recent years to the religious extremist in Israel, I frankly think it’s the religious extremist PLUS the moderate Israelis are just plain tired of trying. There’s a grim recognition that maybe it is just time to build more walls and encircle more people and force Palestinians into a small manageable area. It’s not something that’s been arrived at lightly.

Israel is no saint and the list of its misbehaviors is long, but Israel is far more rational than Palestine. Arafat literally had a deal before him that would’ve basically created a workable two-state solution, and he turned away. Since that time it’s been impossible to make significant progress because the moderate leadership in Palestine cannot control the people who want to shoot rockets into Israel, and without that ability to control the elements committing violence, Israel has little reason to treat with them.

That being said, Palestine and Israel are both small and probably reasonably susceptible to pressure from concerted efforts by larger powers. Israel has shown itself to be the more reasonable party (during previous periods of reconciliation, Israel has for example actually started to dismantle settlements–that’s all over now, but Israel at least is willing to step down from the Mexican standoff), and perhaps with enough pressure and incentives Israel might be willing to agree to another road map in which they start pulling back some of their settlements in exchange for Palestine stopping attacks. Except perhaps this time Israel might have a willingness to “ignore” minor attacks that the Palestinian authorities likely will not be able to stop. It’s then theoretically possible that with enough period of deescalation you could get to a point where Israel recognizes Palestine as a state.

UN recognition isn’t as significant a deal, as you can see with regions like South Ossetia or Transnistria it really doesn’t matter what the UN thinks in situations like this where you have occupied territory and no one is willing to get military involved on either side.

While I agree the religious issues make it hard to get to a solution, remember that there are a decent population of Muslim Israelis with full legal rights in Israel proper, who get votes and seats in the Knesset. I really don’t think it’s impossible that Israel and Palestine eventually come to some resolution. I don’t have any optimism that I’m talking about anything in the next ten years or even next thirty, but I think a U.S. President willing to put skin in the game (for example a peacekeeping mission to keep the peace in Jerusalem for example) could push Israel and Palestine into it. We just haven’t ever had one willing to do that–because it will cost money and American lives, and inject us into an extremely dangerous situation.

Now, I actually gravely disagree with your opinion on Taiwan/China, and think you fundamentally misunderstand China. China has a deep opinion on what constitutes “Greater China”, and it’s hard to overstate how many Chinese buy into this concept. It’s a matter of essential, intractable national pride. They view the territories of Greater China (particularly Taiwan) as no different than how you or I see Maine or Florida. Even in private conversation, they will not refer to Taiwan as a foreign country.

This is 100% not an issue driven by old hardliners who were around before 1949, this is a current, widely supported position of extreme national important to PRC Chinese. I literally believe that there is no scenario where the PRC will ever accept Taiwanese independence. I do not know what PRC would do if a U.S. President recognized independent Taiwan as a country, I don’t think we’d be in a shooting war, but I think we’d very likely devolve into a Cold one. I genuinely believe Chinese leaders and even its people would be willing to suffer grave economic consequences and significantly curtail its relationship with the United States over this matter, which itself would likely send the world into an economic depression and result in a generational long shift from the world we know today. You’d likely see the Russia-China axis grow far closer/stronger, with closer economic ties.

I think the U.S. President recognizing an independence Taiwan would be the gravest error we’ve made as a country in international relations probably since Madison let the western expansionists push him into a declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812.

11

Are the PA and Hamas of one mind about wanting recognition? Are there significant one-state factions who regard it as weakening their broader claims or their asserted right of return?

12

And I used to live in its official capital – Nanjing – which is located on the mainland a couple hundred kilometers west of Shanghai.

I’ve always thought that the clever thing for Taiwan to do would not to declare its independence from mainland China, but to grant independence to mainland China.

13

I like that idea. These stupid political charades have accomplished nothing so far.

The China v. Taiwan issue is a family spat compared to the blood feud between Israel and Palestine. The OP is correct that it is in the best interest of China and Taiwan both to maintain the uneasy peace, family members can one day kiss and make up. But Israel and Palestine haven’t figured that concept out so far and more likely will end up in full out war some day out of spite, they have no common tie and any talk of peace between them for a better future can evaporate as suddenly as soon as they can find an excuse to attempt to destroy the other, likely ending up in the end for them both.

14

Ha! Nice!

15

I think Martin made a good case for why Taiwan Independence is a serous hot button issue that is best left alone. I would simply add that American recognition of an independent Taiwan is putting the cart before the house. Best we wait until they make a move before we decide what we should do. I’m not seeing Taiwan declaring independence in the near future, and so it’s not something we need concern ourselves with.

16

I think there should first be a nation to recognize … if we can say Taiwan is a mature Republic, then her government serves the needs of Them the People … so there is something already there which most normal people would recognize as something that could be called a nation …

Palestine would fall far short of this … it’s run by Hamas who are best described as murderous butchers … Those the People live under terrorists, terrorized into obedience … there’s nothing in the savagery that can ever be remotely recognized as a nation … I can see why the Ottomans were so strict …

Taiwan and Red China will work out their differences in due time, and it should be a Chinese solution … Palestine as a nation will have to wait until Those the People learn to govern themselves, because right now they can’t seem to do that in any meaningful way …

17

Recognition of other states has never depended on whether they have governments that serve the people, or governments that oppress the people. The only issue is whether they have effectively established their independence, and are seeking recognition. Palestine fails on the first ground; Taiwan on the second.

18

Those aren’t the only issues. Governments need to have a reason to recognize them, too. Especially if you’re the US, the biggest kid on the block. We’ll recognize whomeve we damn well please.

19

This topic has me wondering 2 things:

  1. Before Trump’s election, there was actually a sizable amount of support for Taiwan, and opposition to China, from the political left in the US. Now it seems that a lot of that has dissipated by way of taint-by-association, because if Trump supports Taiwan, then that makes support of Taiwan a bad thing. Makes me wonder if perhaps the campaign against ISIS will come under criticism from the left (the left largely didn’t object to Obama’s anti-ISIS war.)
  2. Suppose that Hillary were president (since Trump is too unpredictable for this hypothetical), and China launched a massive military attack on Taiwan out of the blue - absent any Taiwanese declaration of independence or anything of that sort. What are the betting odds that the US would have intervened, militarily, against China? 40%? 15%? 78%?
20

I don’t see any particular benefit in trying to make the discussion partisan, personally.