I prefer to think of it as iteration.
Regardless of whether or not Iran can develop, intends to develop or already has developed nuclear warheads, it must be observed that the Iranian regime, in spite of continuing to uphold its fanatic rhetoric, is one you can do business with, at least to a certain level and at least temporarily. Their main goal of getting their hands on nuclear weapons - if that indeed is their intention - is the same of Israel and other nuclear countries: deterrence. Their philosophy is: Is Israel can have them, then why can’t we? I understand that the West will not trust an ayatollah regime with nuclear weapons, but neither should they Israel. In fact, Israel’s conduct and military history betray a worrisome suicidal tendency, in addition to the whole “Never-again” thing which is used as a moral pretext to its ferocious determination to get it what it wants, both politically and militarily, by any means necessary.
I understand that Israel always markets itself - and is so recognized - as a modern country and an eternal ally of the West, but its self-designation as a Jewish state doesn’t really make it much different from Iran’s designation as an Islamic republic, at least morally and ideologically speaking.
Iran is not North Korea, and should not be pushed underground into becoming one.
Two things:
- Thou shalt not bomb nuclear reactors that are in operation.
- Thou shalt not attack countries which may be in possession of nuclear warheads.
But can we get Israel to either abandon nukes or join the NNPT?
No.
AFAIK, Israel has never really started a war. You can quibble about the start of the Six-Day War if you like but it’s a pretty long stretch to “suicidal tendencies”. That is not to say I have a favorable view of Israeli foreign policy generally.
You forgot the Zeroth Law:
- Thou shalt not get nuked.
Why not?
Pretty sure I heard Netanyahu on Meet the Press say that the proposed deal would mean that Iran is not subject to any restrictions after 10 years.
As far as we know, that’s false, right?
Pretty much. I would recommend reading the National Interest article that I cited in post 94.
ISTM that there may be some confusion over what the criticism of the sunset provision is, which means that some of the criticism of this criticism is itself misplaced.
ISTM that the criticism is being interpreted to be “the US has agreed that Iran can do whatever it wants after 10 years”, which is incorrect, as many have noted. But I think the real - or at least more significant - sunset-based criticism is understanding of the fact that few international agreements of this sort are written to last forever, and that the treaty can be renewed at that time. The real criticism is based on two assumptions. 1) that Iran is at a uniquely vulnerable point at this particular time, and will likely be less flexible 10 years down the road, and 2) that the treaty itself does not require any significant (if any at all) dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program but just suspends it in place. It’s the combination of these two aspects that is the problem. Because if the program expires after 10 years, then it should at least require some dismantling so that it would actually retard progress to the bomb in a meaningful way. And if it just suspends things in place, then it should rightfully be a lot longer. Because as it is, the criticism goes, all Iran needs to do is wait 10 years and if the price of oil is higher then etc. then just flip the switches back on, and the US will have much less leverage to stop them then.
It’s possible that these assumptions can be disputed, and I’ve not followed the details of the treaty all that closely. And it’s also possible that this is the best deal you can get at this time anyway. But ISTM that this is at the heart of the criticism, and simply pointing out that there is no agreement that Iran has no restrictions after 10 years is simplistic and misses the point.
Well, here’s what Netanyahu said:
You understand “all the restrictions” to actually mean “all the restrictions [except for all of the IAEA restrictions in place for every member of the NPT, including intensive monitoring and reporting safeguards]”?
Hard to say for sure. But his larger point was:
I incline to think his second sentence was meant in the context of the first. And the issue of “breakout time” seems to have been his main criticism of the agreement, throughout the interview.
Sure. By “all restrictions” he might be referring to economic sanctions. Or he might be referring to other additional restrictions imposed as consequences for Iran’s violation of the NPT.
But I think most people hearing him say “It just lifts all the restrictions on Iran” will understand that to mean that Iran will not be subject to any ongoing legal or practical restrictions on their development of nuclear weapons, which is manifestly false.
It strikes me as very similar to “You can keep your plan.” Interpreted literally, and as interpreted by most people, a lie. More knowledgable listeners would know from the context not to interpret it literally or without the context of the rest of the speaker’s comments, but that doesn’t really save it from being misleading.
Very possible.
That’s why I added the “or at least more significant” words to my original post. I can’t say that no-one who criticises the “sunset” aspect of the treaty is overstating his case. But the core of that criticism has validity to it, and it’s a mistake to try to rebut the entire issue by focusing solely on overstatements.
I think more can happen in ten years than Netanyahu and the other critics allow. For one, Lockheed is promising to have commercially-viable fusion reactors available. If that really happens, that would be a game-changer, since that technology cannot be used to make fissile material but can be used for civilian nuclear energy. We could easily see, say, a shift in control over unstable Russia. That would also be a game-changer in terms of the sanctions and responses available to us if Iran tried to make a run for the bomb. I’m sure there a dozen other near-to-medium-term trends that would impact whether Iran is in a better or worse position.
True, Iran might be in a better position as to oil. But I think the fair evaluation asks whether, given all the trends including oil, Iran is more likely than not to be in a better position. I haven’t seen much discussion of that more wide-ranging question.
Sure. He described the Iran of the 1970’s, for instance, as if nothing has changed since. Understandable, since his approach to governance requires scaremongering and demonizing all his neighbors, resulting in force being the only approach he can consider (even if he doesn’t sing “Bomb, bomb Iran”), but the reality-based community needs to contain him.
Iran of the 70s was run by the Shah. I think you meant 80s.
The overthrow was in 1979. 
Why can’t the Israeli voters contain him?! :mad: