Good points.
Again, this is a gross and foolish mistake to make. Two-thirds of the frontline tank strength of the Panzer Divisions that Germany overran France with in 1940 were Pz.kpfw I and Pz.kpfw II. They were most certainly not restricted to reconnaissance roles, they were the primary front line tanks. 23% of the Panzer Divisions front line tank strength in Barbarossa a year after that on June 22, 1941, were still Pz.kpfw I and Pz.kpfw IIs. And the Pz.kpfw II wasn’t armed with machine guns, it had a 20mm autocannon. The facts of their successful use don’t lie. They were the workhorses that were responsible for defeating Poland, France, the Low Countries, Yugoslavia and Greece. The lesson to be learned isn’t that 2/3s of Germanys tanks didn’t matter and weren’t used; that is very clearly not the case. The lesson to be learned is that superior German tactics, doctrine, organization and strategy made effective and decisive use of these tanks that you want to write off as unimportant and not even include in German tank counts even though they were the great majority of the tanks used in frontline roles by the Panzer Divisions. This is a patently absurd position to take.
As far as large rifles being able to penetrate their armor, that was the case of almost every tank up to 1940 - and even beyond. You’re neglecting to mention that those ‘large rifles’ were anti-tank rifles, either using very powerful and oversized ‘standard’ rifle caliber rounds - for example the Polish wz. 35 anti-tank rifle used a 7.92×107mm DS round rather than the 7.92x57mm Mauser round - or used much larger caliber rounds than infantry rifles, up to 20mm, the very caliber of the gun on the Pz.kpfw II. The Schürzen armored skirts that appeared on German armor from 1943 was put there to stop Soviet anti-tank rifles disabling German tanks.
At the time of the German invasion of Russia in 1941, the Russian 14.5 mm PTRD and PTRS anti-tank rifles could penetrate the side armor of all of Germany’s tanks. Even the side armor of the Panther could be penetrated at very short ranges.
To increase protection against anti-tank rifles, 8 mm steel sheets, Schürzen (skirts) were hung on rails along the side of the tanks. These steel sheets caused the shots to tumble, preventing them from penetrating the tank’s armor. The Schürzen were divided into sections, allowing a single section to be easily replaced if damaged or lost.
And just to add, the armor protection of the early models of the Pz.kpfw III and IV wasn’t much better than that of the Pz.kpfw II. The Pz.kpfw III Ausf A - C: was 15 mm all around, the Ausf D - G: 30 mm all around, which is all models in service in 1940. The Pz.kpfw IV was even worse, the Ausf A had only 14.5mm on the front plate of the chassis and 20mm on the turret front. The Ausf B - D only increased the frontal armor protection to a maximum of 30mm, and only on the glacis plate.
Operation Barbarossa used over 3,600 tanks across a 2,000-mile front. The Pz.Kpfw. I , a light tank armed only with machine guns, was obsolete by 1941 but still utilized in early Barbarossa stages for reconnaissance, training, and command purposes before being quickly phased out due to ineffectiveness against Soviet armor.
As for it’s armor-
The Panzer II was designed before the experience of the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39 showed that protection against armour-piercing shells was required for tanks to survive on a modern battlefield. Prior to that, armour was designed to stop machine gun fire and high-explosive shell fragments.
Then there is the PKW1
The Panzer I’s performance in armored combat was limited by its thin armor and light armament of two machine guns, which were never intended for use against armored targets, rather being ideal for infantry suppression, in line with inter-war doctrine. As a design intended for training, the Panzer I was less capable than some other contemporary light tank designs,
By the time of the battle for France, Germany had about 1000 PKW3, 4 and T38 tanks, tanks that were capable of tank vs tank action. But yes, the Germans still had a lot of Pkw 1 &2 and used them. They were obsolete by 1940, but since Germany only had 1000 battle tanks (including the Czech T38) they used what they had.
They made only 35 of those, before upping the armor to 30mm (1937) then 80mm later.
Has anyone else mention the novel “Munich” by Robert Harris? I recommend it. It give the reader a feel for the place and time. What it lacks is an accounting of Chamberlain’s background, his time in the tropics, the blows that fate delivered to him.
I will look into it.
One factor I haven’t seen brought up (though I haven’t caught up yet) is the fact that before the German annexation of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia was one of the leaders of Europe in tank production. They had some of the best heavy tanks around, while the Germans mostly had extremely light Panzers. By taking Czechoslovakia without a fight, Germany not only got hundreds of heavy tanks that outclassed anything it had made up to that point, it also gained the ability to produce heavy tanks in large quantity.
It’s not just a year of German factories making tanks, it’s Germany getting all the Czechoslovakian factories (especially Skoda), new and better tank designs to use until it could bring online the Panzer 3 and 4 later in the war, and so on.
Further, a year is not exactly that short a period of time. German rearmament picked up in earnest with Hitler’s rise to power in 33, so going from 5 years to 6 years is not an insignificant increase, especially given the way that wartime production tends to ramp up meaning that what was produced in the sixth year outweighs what was produced in the fifth - even before you consider the addition of annexed Czechoslovakian factories.
A quarter of German tanks during the invasion of France had been made in Czech factories, either before or after the annexation. They were the best quality tanks in use at that time. So the annexation of Czechoslovakia did significantly boost Germany’s ground warfare capacity.
Maybe the extra year let England catch up in the air and stop Germany at the Battle of Britain, but the argument is that without Czechoslovakia and those tanks, Germany never takes France and thus can never launch an air war against Britain. I don’t know if it’s true or not, but I do see a strong argument for the idea that Germany would have failed if it had to fight for Czechoslovakia.
I must be missing something, but how would it guarantee that? The Soviets did eventually go to war with Hitler, which is what made the war last the length it did in the real world.
Maybe much shorter is an understatement, but remember that in the first couple years of the war, Russia was not only not fighting Germany, but actively assisting it by providing oil and other raw materials, and allowing goods to cross its territory, greatly decreasing the efficacy of Britain’s naval blockade. And by the time they did go to war, Germany no longer had a Western front to worry about. It seems likely that Germany would not have held out as long in a universe where the Soviets followed a more sensible policy.
I think an alliance between Britain, France, and Russia would have shortened the war. It would have meant that any war Germany got involved in would have been a two front war, which the Germans were worried about.
While Germany did end up fighting both France on the west and Russia on the east, it did so in two separate time periods. When the war turned back to Germany having to fight on both fronts simultaneously, the war ended within eleven months.
But by this same token, the Allies could have forced Germany into a Russia-less two front war… If they stood with Czechoslovakia.
Considering the state of the Red Army when they eventually did fight the Nazis, I’m not sure if they’d have been able to fight an expeditionary war beyond Poland (which they presumably aren’t going to annex half of in this timeline). I wouldn’t have gambled on the chance of pulling them in if it meant sacrificing the Czechs.
psst look at my post on April 15. But I appreciate the backup though. laugh.
I would also like to add a couple more points. It wasn’t just a year, it was 1.5 years. (March 1938 to September 1939) The German military built up far more than France or British did in those 1.5 years. The Army went from 600,000 to 3.5 million men.
The German army was only reconstituted in March 1935. Before this it was a police force that was severely restricted in the weapons and training they were allowed. (Yes, there was a Tank school the Germans jointly operated with Russia in Kazan from 1929-1933 but it’s numbers were very small.)
I think even more than the increased numbers is the time taken to train the army. Germany won so decisively early in the war not because they had better tanks but they had better training and tactics. The Wehrmacht is not going to be nearly as proficient in 1938 as they would later become. They used original 100,000 men to from 1935 to train to 600,000 and then used that 600,000 to train the 3.5 million that came after. Take away that training time means the German army will not longer have as much of a training advantage.
Considering the Red Army Purges were from 1937-38 I think the Red army is going to be MUCH MUCH worse off if the war kicks off in 1938. Particularly, if they are tried to use as an offensive force as attacking takes a lot more skill then defending.
Hmm, good point.
Every participant in WWII was utterly unprepared for the Pandora’s box they collectively opened. Some were getting better & others were happily committing internal suicide.
IMO the whole dynamic was so unstable that pronouncements about how it might have unfolded on another start date are simply fantasy. Might unfold as someone says; most likely won’t. Too many free variables to corral analytically.
Well, yes and no, some educated guesses can be made.
Not really when the size disparity between the armies is so huge. France kept conscription after WWI so they had a pool of over 5 million men who had undergone at least one year of military training and they had an active duty roster of 900,000. The contributions of the British and the Czechoslovakians are just going to push the size disparity to absurd levels.
The German army only had 600,000 men who had undergone military training. The Treaty of Versailles prevented any other Germans from getting training. The disparities here are just too massive to be overcome.
I don’t think it is a coincidence that the German’s went from 100,000 men before 1935 to 600,000 men in 1938 to 3.5 million men in September 1939. Each step was a 6 fold increase as the active duty force trained the new recruits.
More than two years if you factor in the Phoney War. Britain and France weren’t ready in 1940, let alone 1938.
Heck, it’s possible that starting the war in 1938 would have made no difference at all! Maybe the phoney war would just have lasted a year longer while everyone geared up to start fighting.
Sure, as long as we ignore all the differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia. (Or in other words not really as the differences are stark.)
- Poland is ideal tank country with mostly flat terrain. Czechoslovakia border was highly mountainous with large well fortified forts in the few choke points Germany would have to use to invade.
- Poland’s army was a calvary and infantry force. They had less than 130 medium tanks. The meme of Polish Cavalry charging German tanks is admittedly overdone but there is a reason it exists. Czechoslovakia has one of the best tank forces in Europe. It like Germany had correctly organized it’s Army into Infantry, Motorized, and Tank Divisions. In 1938 it actually has more medium tanks than Germany does.
- The Czechoslovakia airforce is much better than Poland’s but admittedly is still going to have trouble with the Luftwaffe.
- The Czech arms industry dwarf’s the Polish one. Also it isn’t just bigger but much more modern.