I don’t believe the evidence supports you on this. From the beginning, the Government urged the Czechs to give into German demands. It was due to British urging at the very beginning of the crisis that the Czechs agreed to Sudeten autonomy (Germany’s original demand). Then, as soon as the Germans upped their demands to Sudeten annexation, you had the BBC censoring Harold Nicholson, and the Times (which was so close to the Government it was almost an official mouthpiece) editorializing in favor of just that. At the same time, you have Chamberlain and Lord Halifax drawing up a timeline for the handover of the Sudeten. As early as the middle of May, Chamberlain was calling for Sudeten independence in off the record conversations with the press.
I’ll go through the whole series of events if you want, but nothing seems to suggest that “if they could have prevented it by non-millitary means they would have.” Nothing seems to suggest that the Government had any interest at all in preventing the annexation. Their attitude seemed to be more “we don’t really care what happens to Czechoslovakia so long as it doesn’t lead to a wider war.”
You can still make the argument that Britain had a moral imperative to help Czechoslovakia. The UK and France were the two preeminent European powers. That very status, you could argue, gave them an obligation to help keep the peace in Europe. What’s more, Czechoslovakia was a democracy, the only one in Eastern Europe. As aggresive proponents of democratic values, you could argue they had an obligation to help a fellow democracy under threat. What’s more, Britain was a leading power in the League of Nations, which had as its very purpose the prevention of aggression by strong states against weaker ones through collective security. Heck, it was the British who drew the borders of Czechoslovakia in the first place. Didn’t they have an obligation to protect their creation?
All this doesn’t even address the practical failures of British appeasement, not the least of which that failing to confront Germany over Czechoslovakia meant that Germany was emboldened to continue their aggression, the world prestige of Britain was damaged, and the Soviets, now fearful that Britain and France would be unreliable against Germany, were starting to consider making a seperate non-aggression pact.
No, the OP was a pretty straightforward question…“Why did the Czechs go along with Munich”, and everyone answered pretty much the same way, i.e. “Because they didn’t feel strong enough to resist Germany alone”. The question of whether Britain acted rightly during the Czech crisis, however, is a GD.