Nietschze: The Anti-American Philosophy?

Actually, one could make a strong case (and Allan Bloom DID make a strong case, in The Closing of the American Mind) that Nietzsche’s ideas have WON in the United States, just as they have elsewhere. That a kind of nihilism is pretty much par for the course in America, as it is elsewhere.

The difference is, Americans embraced a wimpy, watered down version of what Nietzsche said.

When Nietzsche proclaimed, “God is dead,” he MEANT it to be a terrifying proposition. After all, if your whole society, your whole culture, your whole sense of morality were built on Christianity, then the collapse of belief in God SHOULD mean chaos and panic and a complete redefinition of everything you ever believed.

In America, though, that didn’t happen. If anything, people took the “news” of God’s demise rather nonchalantly. The result was not chaos or even a serious re-evaluation of our society. Rather, the result was a casual relativism. “Oh, God doesn’t exist? Well, that’s okay. All that means is, I do my thing, you do your thing, and I’m Okay, You’re Okay, and who’s to say what’s right and wrong? Lah dee dah!”

Thing is, even if the USA is, on paper, the most religious Western society, you’ll find that most self-proclaimed American Christians are namby-pamby relativists, too. They’ve pretty much bought into the notion that… well, not that God is dead, but that He doesn’t really matter very much, that He doesn’t really care what we believe or how we live, and that, if there’s a Heaven, almost everyone will get into it. (Sort of “God isn’t dead, but he’s not at all well… and while we’ll miss him a bit, we won’t let it get us down if He’s gone. Because, really, isn’t it more important to be nice than to be good?"”)

Faith in America is a mile wide, but an inch deep. Right about where Europe was when Nietzsche first started writing.

Whatever is the actual meaning of Nietzsche’s message, it is most definitely not nihilism.

Sure it is- it just so happens that his nihilism is not what most people think it is.

No, with regard to nihilism, Nietzsche was not proclaiming it, he was diagnosing it, as something pervasive (but overlooked) in contemporary European culture. By “transvaluation of values,” he meant we should change our values, not that we should have none at all. At least, that’s how I read this:

Is this correct, wintertime and olivesmarch4th? You two seem to be our resident experts on Nietzsche.

Interesting. Please, explain.

In support of this – and for astorian:

The original (Die Genealogie der Moral), for verification:

Definitely not an expert, but your cite sounds about right.

BrainGlutton, here is an English translation of the quote from Ecce Homo from a previous post.

That statement actually still leaves it rather ambiguous, as to whether what Nietzsche really means by the “Overman” is nearer to Parsifal or to Borgia. (Is it any clearer if you speak German, I wonder? Probably not.)

I don’t think you’re taking it back far enough.

Yes, “if your whole society, your whole culture, your whole sense of morality were built on Christianity, then the collapse of belief in God SHOULD mean chaos and panic and a complete redefinition of everything you ever believed.” But I don’t think it was. We knew all along that our society in general and personal morals in particular weren’t built on giving away one’s worldly goods and turning the other cheek when attacked; armed revolution by enthusiastic property owners led to a government said to derive its just powers from the consent of the governed, sure as “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States” and “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”.

We were ***always *** in a position to say that our assorted justifications stand regardless of any religious underpinning; even back in the 1700s, it did Thomas Jefferson no injury for a neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God, since he already knew it neither picks his pocket nor breaks his leg. (Of course, he was ready to break your leg if you tried to pick his pocket; like the rest of the Founding Fathers, he liked being rich and had no problem with hitting folks.)

We never really cared back then. Why the heck would America start caring circa Bloom?

When he wrote the Zarathustra, we can be absolutely sure (for once) that he didn’t intent his Übermensch to have any similarity with Parsifal at all – at least not the Parsifal he was referring to: the hero of Wagner’s last music drama.

Wagner had introduced the young student Nietzsche to the idea of the Dionysian (damn, I misspelled this word continuously in previous posts) and professor Nietzsche’s book The Birth of Tragedy endorsed not just the composer’s romantic and irrational ideas but interpreted the ecstatic quality of (his) music as the heart of the Dionysian spirit.

The academia of his time dismissed such an idea as confused romanticism and Nietzsche’s career might have derailed even sooner than it did if the influential Wagner hadn’t supported him publicly.

Nietzsche, however, distanced himself from Wagner after he had seen him in his circle of passionate admirers during the first “Bayreuther Festspiele” and sought refuge in the Bavarian Forest to start writing Human, All to Human that already shows a provocatively anti-Wagnerian attitude and introduces the well-known redefinition of the Dionysian that deals with the positive affirmation of life through the acceptance of death and pain.

Nietzsche claimed that Wagner had started with a revolution in his mind but betrayed his, well, their ideals when he sided with the Wilhelmine Empire and tainted the public discourse with his antisemitism, catholicism and romantic hero worship.

And though Nietzsche changed his mind on many occasions, he couldn’t overcome his disappointment with the hero of his youth and kept the distance for the rest of his life.

The consequences were quite harsh for Nietzsche: his early Wagnerian attitude had isolated him from the academia, his enmity towards the composer estranged him from the influential Wagnerians. Any chance of academic or public influence he might have gained otherwise during his productive years was pretty much gone. OTOH, many of his readers consider his position between the influential forces of his time the main reason for his unique approach and his ability to look beyond the present.

Anyway, that he mentioned Cesare Borgia in connection with the Übermensch fits, imo, insofar as he was the role model for Niccolò Machiavelli’s Principe, a manual for anyone who seeks to gain power in the world by using “any means necessary” without a qualm to realize his will.

I’m curious: Why does Bloom use the name The Closing of the American Mind for a process which, even if it happened exactly as he describes it, was actually an opening of the American mind?

I must agree that’s a very unfortunate development-the rise of ecumenicalism and universalism has become a virus that has infected even the Evangelical denominations.

Because (sorry, I don’t know much about Nietzsche, but do about Bloom), Bloom’s argument in the book is that the universities abandoned the search for objective truth for a kind of shallow relativism. The mind of higher education is closed because it’s no longer willing to ask and consider the fundamental questions that have made up western philosophy from the beginning (i.e. What is truth? What is beauty? What is the nature of the divine? How does one lead a “good” life? What does “good” mean?", etc.) In fact it says these questions are fundamentally unanswerable, and what matters now is not what people think about things, but how they feel about things. As he put it in the book’s introduction:

But AFAICT, that’s pretty much exactly what Nietzsche recommends; if such questions are fundamentally unanswerable, then a search for objective truth is missing the point – since, after (negatively) tearing apart any “thou shalt” justification like a lion, the next (positive) step comes not from looking for some answer out there but from providing your own:

It’s, y’know, existentialism.

Or, as Sartre would put it a couple of generations later, if the human condition is a case where existence precedes essence, then it’s folly to go looking for such an essence in the realm of objective truth; the whole point is that no such answer is out there, because it’s up to you: “I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values. That does not mean that he wills it in the abstract: it simply means that the actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedom itself as such … if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, to say that we invent values means neither more nor less than this; that there is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose.”)

And Bloom talks a lot about Nietzsche…he spends about two chapters on him…“Values”, and “The Nietschzeanization of the Left and Vice Versa”. Bloom has a problem with those implications of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and even more so by what he sees as the “hijacking of Nietzsche by the Left”, and what he sees as the existentialists and the critical theorists squeezing Nietzsche into a Marxist mold. As he puts it:

That sounds more like he’s got a problem with jettisoning Marxist stuff to avoid conflict with existentialist thought in general and Nietzsche’s philosophy in particular. AFAICT, he’s not on about them squeezing Nietzsche into a Marxist mold; he’s saying the mold yielded when philosophers didn’t fit it, pointing out that dropping economic determinism as vulgar Marxism (which, as he puts it, is Marxism) would be hopelessly problematic even before adding in talk of “the sacred” – at which point, he says, the game is surely up.

Bloom is a fool or a liar, then, if he says such questions are no longer asked in academia. The present state of affairs is more open-minded than an age when the teachers only pretended to pose those questions because they already had all the “answers” ready to present and defend.

He was neither. But he was a classicist, and he was a man who lived in a time that that the western canon and the idea of the liberal arts were being challenged. And he’s right that classics and philosophy departments aren’t really in high standing, and the critical theorists have taken over the universities. Interestingly enough, I was just listening to an interview with Victor Davis Hanson, where he was pretty much making the same complaint. You really need to read Bloom’s book, though, rather than my brief summary of it.

That may be so, but it is neither (1) a “Closing of the American Mind” nor (2) an instance of “nihilism.” Quite the reverse, on both counts.

There are certainly people who would agree with you, most notably, Lawrence Levine, who wrote a response to the book in praise of multiculturalism and the expansion of the canon. But I still recommend reading Bloom’s book so that you can see his argument for itself, rather than relying on my futile attempts to explain it.