The percentage of abortions related to incest is irrelevant. Sam’s proposition would require all children to acquire their parent’s consent before being allowed an abortion. This would place the minority of children impregnated through incestuous relations in the impossible position of either having their father’s child, confronting him with evidence of his crime (and thereby risking greivous bodily harm and maybe even death), or going to the police (which carries similar risks).
What right does anyone on the legislature have to require anyone to put themselves in harm’s way like that?
If there were a way to distinguish in advance which pregnancies were caused by incest and which weren’t then maybeSam’s argument would hold water but until then his proposal remains unworkable.
The statistical rarity of abortions related to rape is highly signficant to any argument based upon such rare instances. Uncommon special cases don’t nullify a generally-workable rule. I don’t know why you think they do. If a religious person argued that there is sufficient basis to ban all abortions because any particular pregnancy might lead to the birth of the Messiah, or to the guy who is going to invent cold fusion (either of these is I suppose possible), would you agree that such tiny possibility was (in itself) sufficient basis to ban all abortions? I wouldn’t. Then why is a (different) tiny statistical possibility sufficient basis to allow all abortions, as you suggest?
By the way, how does going to the police or to a juvenile court judge or the like “carry [a] similar risk” of grievous bodily harm or death? The police are going to beat her for her sins, or something?
The Legislature “puts people in harm’s way” all the time – everytime it changes penal policy or allows parole or restricts gun ownership or authorizes the building of a nuclear power plant or permits (or restricts) genetically modified foods – all of these legitimate legislative actions may increase (or decrease) the citizenry’s exposure to injury or death, conceivably, and perhaps in a far greater degree than restrictions on abortion will lead the (tiny) number of incest victim pregnant girls to be harmed or killed (any statistics on what proportion of the tiny number of such pregnancies are, in fact, punitively attacked by their father/victimizer? Thought not.).
The incest deal was a hijack all along – a pretty telling one, as when statistically-negligible special cases present the best argument for or against a particular policy, you know someone’s grasping at straws.
I suspect the proposal Sam made could have been better expressed.
I would phrase it, “get the parent(s) consent except in extraordinary circumstances like incest. In those extraordinary circumstances, go directly to a judge.”
It seems eminently reasonable to me. Abortion (I hope we can all agree) is a significant decision, and our society seems to have achieved a consensus that minors, by and large, should not assumed to be able to make life-affecting decisions without the input of the people most likely to act in their best interests. I don’t see why we can’t allow for extraordinary circumstances like incest without abandoning the general principle that grown-ups tend to make better decisions than teen-age girls. Especially when those teen-age girls have already demonstrated that their decisions about sex have not had desirable consequences.
This parental consent stuff is all a complete hijack. The question to Bricker was whether he would provide legal assistance to a girl not wanting her parents informed. Since Bricker is opposed to all abortions, whether parental consent laws are good policy or not is completely irrelevant. The question concerns to what extent he would provide legal assistance for people to do things he is morally opposed to. And that question is actually somewhat relevant to the OP, unlike the last dozen posts.
It’s not completely irrelevant, because his opinion on the substance of the law has bearing on whether he would represent someone in contradiction of his views.
Perhaps I didn’t make myself clear. I’m saying that parental notification should be required, UNLESS the child can make a case to a judge that she can’t go to the parents. This could be for lots of reasons: A history of child abuse in the family, a personal circumstance such as the pregnancy being due to the father raping her, or whatever. We can codify as much of this as we want, and choose how much we want to leave to the discretion of the judge. Whether the parents would have to be notified after this depends on the nature of the circumstance. If the judge feels that the home situation is simply hostile and threatening, then perhaps not.
A charge that the father raped her would have to be followed up, of course. For several reasons: one, to prevent anyone who wants an abortion from simply claiming that Daddy did it, and second because a person who rapes children should be charged. In fact, I could argue that this requirement might actually result in the arrest of a bunch of rapists who otherwise get away with it. So if the charge is made, the child can go into protective custody while DNA tests are carried out. If the DNA test is positive, the child gets the abortion, and Daddy gets to go to jail.
The main point is that if my daughter gets herself pregnant at age 12 or 13, I as a parent have a right to be notified of this. Hell, my daughter can’t get a tattoo at that age without my permission, she damned sure better not be able to get an abortion without me even being informed.
Do all the folks who think a minor child should need parental consent before obtaining an abortion also believe that if the parents think their minor child should not give birth to a child at such a young age, they should be able to force their child to have an abortion?
Not really. At issue is whether Roberts work on the Romer v. Evans case indicates anything with regards to his views on jurisprudence. Bricker has opined that it’s not indicative that Roberts is in any way sympathetic to the interpretation of Equal Protection put forward by his lawfirm in that case. As an analogy, Bricker pointed out that his doing pro bono criminal defense cases doesn’t make him pro-crime in any sense whatsoever.
So far, so good. Then Blalron opened up the can of worms that has hijacked the thread, but I think his question is relevant. The hypothetical he posed is different from pro bono criminal defense work in that one might think that even the guilty deserve a fair trial, and hence good legal assistance, but not think that people pursuing civil suits or challenging statutes (as in Romer v. Evans) have the same right to counsel. That is, the accused in criminal cases have the resources of the State coming after them, and that is largely why we think they have a right to counsel - the resources of the State are overwhelming in comparison to the resources of most individuals, and with no legal counsel an individual can be railroaded, etc. However, civil law, such as in Blalron’s hypothetical, is a different kettle of fish. It’s not the helpless girl against the State. The considerations which make us think that accused criminals have a right to counsel, even if they can’t pay for it and even if they’re plainly guilty, simply don’t apply in this case. It’s entirely appropriate to ask Bricker if he would provide legal assistance contrary to his moral convictions in such a case. If he would not, that would indicate that there might, after all, be some connection between what sort of pro bono work a lawyer does, and what his views on jurisprudence, etc, are. What Bricker thinks of notification laws and the like is only at issue to the extent that Blalron is assuming that Bricker would support them, given his well-known strong pro-life views.
That is why this is all irrelevant to the thread. The hypothetical assumes that Bricker does in fact think that the girl should just tell her parents, and is asking if he would provide legal assistance to her in order to help her avoid doing that in spite of thinking that she shouldn’t.
Please…Mather was a New England intellectual who who argued in favor of science and civil rights. You think the Bush administration would nominate him?
Ah, right. That’s a much more palatable proposal. It was the word ‘overrule’ in this sentence “…but in extreme cases an arbitration judge can overrule the parents if necessary” in your first post that confused me. Sorry for the misunderstanding.
If this is the case, I demand you immediately resign your membership, as the Constitution gives you no right to post on message boards. You have freedom of speech and of the press, certainly; those are guaranteed. But you have no defined right to use the Internet. Therefore you may be deprived of this by any reasonable means, without any protection, and I raise the objection that your attitude is not one which should be encouraged here.
If you continue to post, I will assume that you believe that there are legitimate grounds to believe in “penumbras and emanations” such as the one which implies that Internet message boards are legitimate means to exercise your freedom of speech.
I didn’t recognize it as such for several reasons.
One, what the heck does your demand that I not speak have to do with constitutionality? If you’re going for a clever analogy, try one that involves the government telling me I can’t speak. It was and is always the case that I can be “deprived” of the right to speak in a private forum for any reason, so the Constitution doesn’t even come into it. Like a lot of people who don’t understand the Constitution, your ignorance apparently extends to not even understanding to whom it applies.
Second, no one who espouses original intent jurisprudence believes (as you seem to pretend they do, or must) that it is inconsistent with technological evolution. If someone invented a new printing press, or began printing on mass-produced paper, an original intent proponent would not be logically required to say that the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of printed expression didn’t extend to that type of expression, nor would he be bound to embrace a “penumbra” theory in order to hold that it did.
The third reason your attempt at wit fundamentally fails is that whereas the Internet didn’t exist in 1789 or 1865, abortion and sodomy (and laws against them) did. That the Framers were silent about the Internet (while guaranteeing closely analogous printed expression rights) is not damning as to a right of Internet expression. That they failed to spell or suggest anything close to a right that would extend to ban abortion or sodomy laws is considerably more damning to an argument made by those such as the liberal New England weenie Souter in discovering (suddenly) that the Framers had guaranteed the right to that which was banned at the time of the framing.
Maybe try some knock knock jokes, they might be less out of your depth.
How so? Yeah, it was a snark, but one intended to convey to Semper Fi that a thoroughly defensible and Constitutionally protected right by one definition is something seen as a “right” (in quotation marks, and with the ironic meaning of his Souterian allegation) by someone else’s definition.
I see nothing intrinsically equivalent to printing and publication in the running of a Website, even one resembling the Straight Dope Message Board. By extension, the right protected by freedom of the press is that which is protected by the “freedom to post” … but that is about as textualist as Wickard vs. Filburn.
Oh, puh-leeze. In the context of the full comments, their “praise” for the Constitition is clearly the eqivalent to dropping “some of my best friends are black/Jewish/gay/whatever” into the middle of a bigoted screed in a pathetic attempt to retain social acceptability.
By this logic, we ought perhaps to consider what percentage of the population would sell weapons to terrorist organizations. If the percentage is as vanishingly low as serious people know it to be, then perhaps there really isn’t any need to have a law against it.