I’ve been thinking about this for a while and can’t come up a good answer.
We know that NK has the ability to make nukes, and we know that NK has missile technology, and while we don’t think they’ve worked out how to miniaturize their nukes so they can be fitted onto their missiles, the general consensus is that eventually they will figure it out. So what happens once they reach that point and they have a reliable long range nuclear delivery capability?
So after decades of economic hardships NK decides to teach the US a lesson and launch a few, let’s say 5, nuclear tipped missiles toward the West Coast. The US would pick up the launches immediately since NK has no way to take out our satellites and we could track the missiles as they approach the US mainland. Forgetting for a moment that a retaliatory strike would be launched that would destroy most if not all of NK, given the current state of our nuclear defenses how likely is it that the US could knock out each one of those 5 incoming missiles?
Does the US have an ‘Iron Dome’ system like Israel that covers the entire country? Would we likely take at least one nuclear hit somewhere on the West Coast in this scenario? I would like to think that we could defend ourselves against one or two incoming missiles, but what about 5? I realize that taking out missiles that are in flight isn’t easy to do.
If North Korea launched nukes, they’d probably launch them at Japan or South Korea since they are easier targets.
South Korea just set up a THAAD system. There are several laser based systems to help shoot down artillery shells and missiles as well. I have no idea how effecting things like Iron Beam or THAAD are against ICBMs.
The US had the patriot system in Iraq that shot down SCUD missiles, but a SCUD is not an ICBM.
The US is in the process of deploying a limited ABM system for exactly this purpose. After decades of work and 100’s of Billions of $, there are claims that the ABM missiles might have a 50% kill rate. They are certainly not as good as the Air Force would like-just better than anything else. A good summary: http://www.cfr.org/missile-defense/ballistic-missile-defense/p30607
As I understand it, the two main systems today that would intercept such a North Korean ICBM attack would be the Navy’s SM-3 from Aegis destroyers, and also the Army’s(?) ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska.
That would be a yes. You can check out Wiki for the SM-3 missile. It is capable of exo-atmospheric intercept up to and including low orbit satellites. If a destroyer is parked off NK, intercept would be within capability.
Actual capabilities are classified but most test data is made available because the manufacturers want to toot their own horn/continue with program/funding.
Maybe we can bring down 50%, maybe only 50% of the NK missiles work. Just hope that the percentages match up.
ICBMs apogee is around 1200 km. Which is actually higher than objects in LEO (100 to 600 km). So I would like a cite that SM3 can shoot down actual ICBMs rather than shorter range weapons.
I’m guessing a severe response would probably be deemed justified by the PTB even if no lives were lost in the North Korean attack. But…maybe not if the missiles failed so badly that they only fell into the Pacific relatively close to the Korean Peninsula. Interesting question…at what point is an attack deemed threatening enough to justify an immediate nuclear retaliation?
North Korea is unlikely to launch an actual nuke because they know they will be destroyed if they do. Through inaction we’ve allowed them to maintain an endless stalemate by developing nuclear weapons. Whether or not we can shoot their missiles out of the air (we can’t) doesn’t matter. We either allow them to maintain their slave state, or we destroy them in what will be a very bloody war, now or after they fire a missile, the results will be the same.
SM-3 is several different missiles in various stages of testing and deployment. In general you are right the SM-3 Block IB (currently latest deployed) really cannot intercept ICBMs successfully. The Block IIA (in testing) supposedly has some limited ability to intercept ICBMs.
North Korea will eventually have a functional nuclear missile system. North Korea will also eventually finish collapsing under the weight of its own corruption and incompetence. The latter eventuality will almost certainly come to pass before the former one will, especially since the only thing delaying it so far is continued support from China, which will grow sparser the more threatening North Korea becomes.
China supports North Korea because (a) they always have, they were an ally, and (b) they don’t want the USA and its allies on their border - NK is a nice buffer, and any glasnost-reunification would mean the dominant South would be on their border - and we’re not talking vast tracts of deserted land like the steppes, Himalayas or the Burmese Jungle.
Should NK launch, I assume the US response would be to flatten anything that looked like a military site, then most likely outsource the hand-to-hand combat to the Chinese; “you want to keep the buffer? Take the place over and take complete control”. Let China do the same job the Americans did in Iraq, and figure out how to run a different country… anything they come up with will be more lax than current regime, and that will allow enough cross-border activity that the demands to unify will get louder and louder.
NK will not launch because of “USA equals Great Satan”. All that posturing and propping up cardboard enemies is for internal consumption. Creating a state of crisis is a way of ensuring hostile energies are not focussed on the regime itself, and to distract internal factions that might be considering making their move. We have this mistaken image that the dear/great/fat leader is in complete control. Rather, it is like riding a tiger; there are several factions, all looking for their opportunity to make alliances and take power. If you don’t demote or execute the wrong person, they gain stature; purge too many, and you simply drive your other enemies together.
That would be the reason for a launch - things are getting so dicey at home, that starting an all-out war is preferable - it puts the troops in motion to somewhere else, it gives an excuse to move things around and distracts from the factions’ ability to coordinate a coup. We should be most worried when things start to seriously deteriorate in Pyongyang.
As for “can we stop them”? That’s not the question. the question is “is it possible that we might”? As long as it’s a possibility, it’s the deterrent. The only thing worse than going out in a blaze of glory, is going out with a fizzle of ignominy because your last grand gesture failed completely.
This is what the arms race is and was all about. The other superpowers may have been able to play the game, but the secondary players couldn’t keep up. We saw this in the Falklands war, where the British despite the handicap of distance easily took out the Argies. We saw it in the initial attack on Iraq - twice.
Ease up. No one (especially me) claimed an SM-3 could shoot down an ICBM at its apogee. Please read my post again. A destroyer of the coast of NK was the gist of the statement. Boost phase intercept is the term to search and probable course of action.
Please read the Wiki on the SM-3. Provides the cites and test data regarding intercept of complete missile bodies and re-entry vehicles.
In a nuclear war a destroyer off the coast of North Korea is going to stop worrying about shooting down an ICBM and start worrying about not being destroyed themselves, because if the NORKs really are going to nuke the CONUS, then they are not going to be sporting enough to let a destroyer take pot shots at at their missiles without trying to take it out.
That destroyer’s sole purpose will be to shoot down an ICBM. And if a nuclear war is brewing, that destroyer will get a lot of support from the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Navy and the South Korean Navy. It’s not going to be all by it’s lonesome. Hell, that destroyer may end up being the safest place to be (somewhat joking of course).
A U.S. destroyer would absolutely put a much higher priority on taking out a North Korean missile during its boost phase (that is potentially being launched at the U.S. or one of our allies) than its own safety. That’s kind of the reason we have a military. :rolleyes:
That said, a U.S. destroyer actually has little to fear from the North Koreans. Their Navy has no blue-water capability, and their vessels are antiquated. I’m not aware that their air force has any notable ASUW capability against naval targets, either. (Also note that a U.S. destroyer, such as the Arleigh Burke-class of guided missile destroyers, is capable of shooting back at attacking aircraft.) Even if they were going to lob a nuclear missile at one of our vessels, they would have to find it first.
One other thing to throw in on SM-3 is claims by some anti-ABM experts that SM-3 Block II/IIA ‘limited’ capability against ICBM’s is being deliberately understated to reduce political tension with major nuclear powers (Russia in particular) over its various deployments. Some independent analysts say Block IIA’s could effectively defend against ICBM’s in terminal phase when launched from ships in port or along the coasts of the US, as well as a boost phase intercept capability when deployed much nearer to the ICBM launch points.
OTOH there have been findings in the other direction, as in Government Accountability Office questioning the (boost phase) capabilities of even the now abandoned further improved SM-3 Block IIB in boost phase intercept of Iranian ICBM’s headed for the US, when launched from ‘Aegis Ashore’ sites Romania/Poland.
SM-3 Block II isn’t operational, though neither is it likely the NK’s have 5 workable nuclear tipped ICBM’s yet.
