Full text of sanctions resolution available here:
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/14/sanctions.text.reut/
According to news reports, an earlier draft of this resolution would have allowed inspections of ships going to and from the DPRK on the high seas, but China balked. That is consistent with my read of the final resolution, which does not contain any language which, IMO, would allow such inspections, at least not without the cooperation/permission of the nation where the ship is registered.
First question: Does anyone disagree with this? In other words, does anyone read this as allowing high seas inspections?
China shares a border with the DPRK. I’m aware that there is (or at least was) active cross-border trade. Russia also shares a border with the DPRK, but it’s relatively small and remote from Russia’s manufacturing and population centers.
Second question: Do you expect real efforts by the Chinese to enforce this resolution with thorough border inspections? Initial news reports on this issue seem contradictory. How about the Russians?
Third question: Assuming that the Chinese and Russians enforce this with more than just window dressing, I can see this resolution may hamper (somewhat) North Korean efforts to purchase and maintain the high-level conventional weapons systems that are the subject of this embargo. Beyond that, though, I don’t see this resolution as accomplishing much. Even if 95% of the exporting nations in the world faithfully try to prevent ships from leaving their shores with luxury goods bound for the DPRK, Kim is still going to get his caviar and bigscreen TVs. All Kim’s agents have to do is charter a ship, load the desired luxury goods at another location along with some food supplies, and have that ship travel to some third world nation with a minimum of effective customs or law enforcement. Unload some big boxes there, and then travel to the DPRK. How’s anyone going to prove that the cargo unloaded there contained anything other than the permitted food? Same thing for nuclear supplies, plus see question 4.
Fourth question: Who was selling the DPNK nuclear supplies pre-resolution? If the answer is that no one was openly doing so (in other words, such sales were clandestine), then how does the resolution accomplish anything in this regard?
Fifth question: Kim announces, tomorrow, that one ship is leaving North Korea with missiles and a nuclear device. Five ships leave port the next day. Nothing to be done, right? (How a few boxes from the ship could then find their way ashore in Iran, or Lebanon as one of those Korean ships passes near the Middle East is, I trust, obvious.)
Am I missing something, or does this resolution do little other than annoy?