Well shit. You learn something every day. Not only did I not know that - I had never even heard of the Ibadites! :o
I lived in Oman every summer for six years and didn’t know that. Well, I knew they were Ibadis, but not that Ibadis weren’t Sunni.
Cladistiacally, was the split from the Sunni or Shi’a side? If the former, wouldn’t that make it a type of Sunni Islam?
From the linked Wiki.
I misunderstood the use of “third split”, thinking it meant it came after the Sunni/Shi’a split (which I assumed was 1st). All this lumping and splitting is making me positively dizzy!!
That’s a little contentious, but certainly arguable. One could say that Sunni and Shi’a originated immediately after Muhammed’s death when Abu Bakr was elected Caliph by the majority based on Sunnah ( tradition ) over the objections of the minority of Shi’at Ali ( “the partisans of Ali” ), who thought Ali should get the job based on family ties and his significance as the first male convert to Islam. But at that time despite some religious overtones, these were more political factions and ideologically they weren’t really distinct sects with different religious practices.
When open civil warfare broke out during Ali’s Caliphate ~25 years later, the folks that would become the Kharijites were initially aligned with Ali, but split with him shortly thereafter ( the whole Arbitration of Siffin mess ). In that context you could argue that the Kharijites were offshoots of the Shi’a. But still none of the three were well-differentiated in any religious sense yet. Hence the argument that the Kharijites differentiated first, taking a firm religious stance before the other two had yet really sorted out their ideology.
But regardless of who came first they are basically regarded as one of three primary Islamic sects, distinct from the Sunni and Shi’a. In the final days of the Ali’s Caliphate and the Umayyad period the more extreme Kharijite factions were the grand rebels of Islam. They attempted to assassinate the main factions leaders of the civil war ( succeeding only with Ali ) and one faction later led a massive rebellion in North Africa that helped critically weaken the late Umayyad state.
Nobody ever hears about the Ibadis today because there aren’t very many of them, they mostly live in a quietish backwater, and they mostly practice a quietist faith. Kinda like the Is’maili Shi’a, once also linked to medieval extremism. But the Omani Ibadis did play a significant role in the early modern period. They were the folks that drove the Portuguese from large sections of East Africa in the 17th century, establishing a loose empire of sorts there centered on Zanzibar.
It’s also where our phrase “Bad Asses” comes from. 
It seems to me that the position of some people here is that we should use the sanctions to cripple Iran and destroy their regime (what could go wrong with regime change in Iran?). If we try to use these sanctions to get anything more than nuclear non-proliferation, we will stand alone and the sanctions on Iran will be about as effective as the embargo on Cuba was.
The embargo on Cuba has been very effective. They are one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere. Given their love of supporting revolutions abroad, it was a very effective policy at keeping the resources they could spend low.
Same goes for Iran and all the revolutions they support abroad, as well as their nuclear program. They came to the table because it was starting to hurt. Good. Hurt them more.
This was not the goal. Why would the goal have been to make Cubans poor? The goal was to motivate change, and it failed utterly in this.
Why? How would this make things better for anyone? Making people hurt is a terrible goal for international political-economic policy.
In the case of IRan, the whole point of sanctions is to deny them the resources to do bad things.
In the case of Cuba, that was just a side benefit.
No deal would mean less sanctions (since other countries would abandon them), but even if it meant more sanctions, Iran would be much more likely to “do bad things” (if you include getting a nuclear weapon a bad thing). The point of the deal is for Iran to agree to things that eliminates and/or delays their ability to get nuclear weapons.
The main goal failed utterly, and I don’t think hurting people is a “side benefit”. Yes, Castro stayed poor and weak, but I think there was a much greater likelihood of change had we been interacting and trading with them for 50 years.
Possibly. We’ll find out soon enough. The China model shows that economic prosperity and exposure to Western stuff can sometimes only strengthen a regime.
As for sanctions, yes, Iran would have less sanctions but US sanctions alone are pretty stiff if we apply the sanctions to companies that trade with Iran. Most companies prioritize the US market over Iran’s.
Since we had 50 years of the other option, the best that Cuba sanction supporters can hope for is that lifting sanctions is also totally ineffective.
If it makes Cuba wealthy and strengthens the dictatorship, then it’s less than ineffective, it’s actively bad.
“Strengthens the dictatorship”? That’s not really how these things work. If you are a dictator, you are either (1) in power, (2) seeking asylum in Libya (or presumably some other place nowadays), or (3) dead.
The dictatorship couldn’t be stronger - it’s lasted for decades. Poverty strengthens them, apparently. Maybe some prosperity can help the people, and maybe weaken the Castros.
Is it your contention that China’s government is more secure and/or totalitarian today than it was in 1979, when the economic reforms began?
Israelis have a time-horizon for caring about being nuked that extends beyond a decade.
It frankly astonishes me how quickly people are comming to believe in the infallibility of such things as “mutually assured destruction” and “anti-missile defences”.
Again, the Israeli concern is not of a rational Iranian nuking of them - neither country has, from any conceivable rational POV, anything to gain from an exchange of nuclear weapons!
The concern (which one can well argue is misplaced) is the fear that the Iranians, who have people in positions of power who talk a lot about destroying Israel for basically irrational reasons, may (just conceivably) actually believe in what they say - and that such persons are not motivated by ratiopnal concerns such as the fear of the certainty of Israeli retaliation. Indeed may welcome it.
If such persons were to use a nuke, they would not use it in a missile - they would more likely smuggle it in somehow using a low-tech method (a ship would be easiest - sail a freighter with a nuke on board into an Israeli port). There would be littlle Israel could do to avoid that.
That’s nonsense, though. No-one in Israel has any incentive, rational or otherwise, for nuking Iran. Unfortunately the reverse is not true.
This isn’t a symmetrical situation at all.
The Israelis fought wars against both Hamas and Hezbollah , so I’m not sure how one states they are “no threat”. True, they are not powerful enough to pose an existential threat to the country as a whole; but they can certainly kill Israelis, and have.
Right. By any objective measure, Hamas and Hezbollah are far greater threats to Israel than al-Qaida or ISIS ever were or ever will be to the United States - and yet, you don’t see *us *invading countries half-way 'round the world.
We’ll “accept” the threat of terrorist as soon as you do.