Nuclear deal with Iran

[elucidator]

29 leading U.S. nuclear scientists praise 'unprecedented' Iran deal

Anybody else see this?

29 Leading U.S. Nuclear Scientists Praise ‘unprecedented’ Iran Deal

Of special note…

…The letter also noted that the deal bans research on nuclear weapons “rather than only their manufacture,” adding that contrary to criticism that Iran will be allowed to pursue nuclear arms without constraint after 10 years, the deal "includes important long-term verification procedures that last until 2040, and others that last indefinitely.” …

So, if this isn’t so, then Haaretz made it all up. But then, so did the NY Times

29 U.S. Scientists Praise Iran Nuclear Deal in Letter to Obama (Published 2015)

29 U.S. Scientists Praise Iran Nuclear Deal in Letter to Obama

OK, so maybe we can discount “they made it all up”? What’s left? They don’t know what they are talking about? They are in cahoots with Iran?

On the other hand we have experts of our own, such as adaher, who states unequivocally:

The answer is that this deal makes it easier for Iran to develop nukes, and a heck of a lot easier to increase their campaign of global terrorism.

Perhaps we can ask why? Perhaps we can inquire after the level of expertise that supports this assertion? We can look these guys up, see where they got their academic creds, see where they got their hands on experience.

So, addy, a Ph.D. in nuclear physics? Years of experience in arms control negotiations? Or what, exactly?

[John_Mace]

@adaher

America’s embargo against Cuba is blamed for their poverty.

@Hiker

What makes you think that an American embargo would have the same effects on Iran as it apparently did on Cuba?

A better question is: What makes you think that the US embargo is to blame for Cuban poverty, as opposed to their continued refusal to give up on a communist economic system?

[Donald_Rump]

@adaher

The answer is that this deal makes it easier for Iran to develop nukes, and a heck of a lot easier to increase their campaign of global terrorism.

Reviving this because The National Interest addresses the “easier to develop nukes” argument against the deal very neatly:

The most straightforward argument against the deal is that it will achieve the opposite of what it intends and increase the likelihood that Iran ultimately acquires the bomb. This could purportedly occur in a variety of ways: Iran could simply wait until the restrictions under the deal expire and then sprint for the bomb; Iranians could use the increased resources from the lifting of sanctions to jumpstart a covert weapons program; or they could abandon the agreement openly, banking on the fact that international opposition would be slow to remobilize. None of these arguments make much sense.

First, even after the restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program expire under the deal, the Iranians will not be “free” to build nuclear weapons. Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which explicitly bans the development of nuclear weapons. Were Iran to race for the bomb in some distant point in the future, they would be violating their pre-existing international commitments and would become the certain target of sanctions and likely target of American or Israeli military strikes.

Second, critics argue that Tehran might covertly violate the agreement, perhaps using its increased financial resources to fund a sophisticated weapons program. This is possible, and certainly more likely than Iran openly violating the agreement. However, the deal gives the international community unprecedented, increased access to the Iranian nuclear program, including monitoring its supply chains. Thus, the likelihood of detecting a covert Iranian program is higher under the deal than without a deal. This makes the threat of military action more credible.

Third, it is possible that in the aftermath of a deal, Iran might conclude that the international coalition against its nuclear program would be slow to remobilize. As a result, Iran might simply wait a few years and then openly violate the agreement, banking on a sluggish response. Yet this sort of Iranian action would be so brazen as to almost ensure a strong response. Iran would not only be violating the NPT but also its agreement with the P5+1, and the deal explicitly includes a mechanism for quickly re-imposing sanctions in such a scenario. Even if a full international coalition were slow to mobilize, there would be nothing to stop the United States or Israel from taking unilateral military action, if necessary.

For good measure, here’s the bit of the article that addresses the “increase their campaign of global terrorism” criticism, as well:

Even if one concedes that the deal is a boon for nonproliferation and reduces the odds of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, one might nonetheless worry that it would embolden Iran, either because international opposition to the regime in Tehran would weaken, or because Iran would have more money to funnel towards its conventional military forces or its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, or Palestine.

This is perfectly reasonable concern, although the CIA apparently doubts that Iran would significantly step up its funding of proxy groups. But it is crucial to keep in mind that avoiding an emboldened Iran is precisely the purpose of preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The acquisition of nuclear weapons often leads states to change their foreign policy behaviors in more activist directions. While financial resources certainly play a role in determining how much havoc Iran wreaks regionally, an even more important determinant is its ability to deter significant retaliation for its actions. Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be virtually immune to conquest or regime change, thereby allowing it to act much more aggressively if it so desired, much like Pakistan has after acquiring weapons in the late 1990s. In other words, if the goal is to prevent an emboldened Iran, keeping nuclear weapons out of Tehran’s arsenal should be the most important aim of all. The deal negotiated by the P5+1 serves this interest.

I would be very interested in any rebuttal that deal opponents on this board can put forth in response to these points.

[adaher]

Easy. The article basically waves away the idea that the international community would be slow to respond to Iranian cheating. A strong response if Iran cheats is “certain” and military action against Iran “likely”. Very unlikely. The deal should probably be supported because at this point it actually is better than any likely alternative. But the international community’s will to keep Iran from the bomb is pretty much gone. An Iranian bomb is not only now acceptable to Russia and China, but to the West too, including the American President.

When Iran cheats, there will be hemming and hawing and “give the deal a chance to work”, and perhaps more talks to discuss getting Iran to abide by the terms it already agreed to. That’s what happened in Iraq, it’s what’s going on in Syria, and it will happen with Iran.

[Ravenman]

@adaher

But the international community’s will to keep Iran from the bomb is pretty much gone. An Iranian bomb is not only now acceptable to Russia and China, but to the West too, including the American President.

I have no fucking clue what planet this is coming from.

[iiandyiiii]

@adaher

Easy. The article basically waves away the idea that the international community would be slow to respond to Iranian cheating. A strong response if Iran cheats is “certain” and military action against Iran “likely”. Very unlikely. The deal should probably be supported because at this point it actually is better than any likely alternative. But the international community’s will to keep Iran from the bomb is pretty much gone. An Iranian bomb is not only now acceptable to Russia and China, but to the West too, including the American President.

When Iran cheats, there will be hemming and hawing and “give the deal a chance to work”, and perhaps more talks to discuss getting Iran to abide by the terms it already agreed to. That’s what happened in Iraq, it’s what’s going on in Syria, and it will happen with Iran.

Even if this is so, it’s not an argument against the deal, since without the deal all this stuff will be worse and harder to handle.

[Donald_Rump]

@iiandyiiii

Even if this is so, it’s not an argument against the deal, since without the deal all this stuff will be worse and harder to handle.

Right. I don’t follow your logic, adaher. Your earlier post said that this deal makes it “easier” for Iran to develop nukes. I took you to mean, “easier” vs the status quo of no deal. So according to you, the deal makes it harder to mount an effective international (or unilateral) response to Iran trying to develop nukes?

On the contrary, clearly the JCPOA makes it easier, in at least two ways: 1) granting international legitimacy to such a response and 2) much better insight into what Iran is actually doing, given the inspections regime that will be in place even if it’s not fool-proof.

[adaher]

NOW, yes. We shouldn’t have had the talks to begin with. The status quo should have been maintained.

Ravenman, your faith in the international community’s spine is adorable.

[Steken]

@adaher

The status quo should have been maintained.

How?

[adaher]

By never initiating talks.

[Hiker]

@adaher

NOW, yes. We shouldn’t have had the talks to begin with. The status quo should have been maintained.

Ravenman, your faith in the international community’s spine is adorable.

The talks were called 5+1 for a reason. There would have been a deal even without the US. Your country would just not have had a say in shaping it.

[Donald_Rump]

@adaher

But the international community’s will to keep Iran from the bomb is pretty much gone. An Iranian bomb is not only now acceptable to Russia and China, but to the West too, including the American President.

Is it fair to say that your only basis for saying this is that the agreement permits Iran, as a face-saving measure, to retain a token peaceful program as opposed to having insisted on total dismantlement? How is agreeing to a token peaceful program the same as saying that an Iranian bomb is acceptable?

Given that Iran’s hardliners believe that Rouhani & co. have humiliated Iran by conceding too much to the wily Americans in the JCPOA, and are thus fighting tooth and nail to kill the deal, do you think there’s any chance that diplomacy could have produced a deal wherein Iran dismantles every bolt and nut in its nuclear program?

Do you prefer resorting to a military solution rather than trying the JCPOA?

[Steken]

We Europeans weren’t happy with the status quo, though. The same is true for China, Japan, South Korea and a bunch of other countries. It was a crappy situation for most of the world, and most of the world wanted out of it.

How were you planning to convince us to go along with your plan?

[adaher]

Britain, France, and Germany had been talking to Iran since the Bush years without us and committing to nothing. Without US involvement, those talks would have continued to amount to nothing.

[adaher]

@Steken

We Europeans weren’t happy with the status quo, though. The same is true for China, Japan, South Korea and a bunch of other countries. It was a crappy situation for most of the world, and most of the world wanted out of it.

How were you planning to convince us to go along with your plan?

Sure, the status quo sucked. If the US wouldn’t go along, you’d have two choices: the status quo, or just break the sanctions and let Iran have the bomb. That might still end up being the choice.

[iiandyiiii]

@adaher

NOW, yes. We shouldn’t have had the talks to begin with. The status quo should have been maintained.

That wasn’t in the cards. Without the deal there was no chance at maintaining the international sanctions.

[iiandyiiii]

@adaher

Sure, the status quo sucked. If the US wouldn’t go along, you’d have two choices: the status quo, or just break the sanctions and let Iran have the bomb. That might still end up being the choice.

There was no chance at the status quo. The status quo was ending no matter what the US did.

[adaher]

So I was right that the international community is willing to accept an Iranian bomb. Otherwise, US intransigence would keep international sanctions in place.

[Steken]

@Donald_Rump

Iran’s hardliners believe that Rouhani & co. have humiliated Iran by conceding too much to the wily Americans in the JCPOA

Truth. I was checking out a Shi’ite forum, and was amused to see an Iranian hardliner write something like “if our government accepts this humiliating deal with the Americans, I’ll move to Lebanon!” Guess that’s the Iranian hardliner version of the American “if our politicians do x, I’ll move to Canada!”

[Lobohan]

@Ravenman

I have no fucking clue what planet this is coming from.

The planet where Adaher assumes by fiat that the administration is wrong even in the face of enormous conflicting evidence.