Nuclear deal with Iran

[Terr]

@iiandyiiii

The deal seems to go along way to dismantle the nuclear weapons program.

No, it doesn’t. All of Iran’s nuclear program infrastructure is preserved and the centrifuge research can continue.

I’m pretty sure “anytime, anywhere” inspections have never happened ever anywhere – no country would allow inspectors access anywhere in the country with zero notice. Scientifically, the 24 days does not provide nearly enough time to actually eliminate the signs of violating the deal.

As I documented already, it’s more than 24 days - it can easily drag to 70+ days.

Even if this deal is not perfect, I still don’t understand how rejecting it is better, unless one is more interested in keeping Iran from joining the international community than from actually preventing them from getting nuclear weapons.

As I said, there is nothing at all that could possibly turn you against the deal.

[iiandyiiii]

@Terr

As I said, there is nothing at all that could possibly turn you against the deal.

Well if you’re just interested in this sort of nonsense, then there’s nothing at all that could possibly turn you towards the deal, because you think Obama is a secret Muslim terrorist-loving atheist Communist homosexual anti-Christ.

[Terr]

@iiandyiiii

Well if you’re just interested in this sort of nonsense, then there’s nothing at all that could possibly turn you towards the deal, because you think Obama is a secret Muslim terrorist-loving atheist Communist homosexual anti-Christ.

I already pointed out what would make me support the deal, so you’re factually incorrect.

You, on the other hand, say that even if the agreement to inspections from IAEA is a pathetic ruse, since Iranians will be doing the inspections, and not independent inspectors, you still support the deal. Which shows, pretty much, that nothing will turn you away from the deal.

[iiandyiiii]

@Terr

I already pointed out what would make me support the deal, so you’re factually incorrect.

And I pointed out what would make me oppose the deal.

You, on the other hand, say that even if the agreement to inspections from IAEA is a pathetic ruse, since Iranians will be doing the inspections, and not independent inspectors, you still support the deal. Which shows, pretty much, that nothing will turn you away from the deal.

No I didn’t. I said that if the agreement to inspections from the IAEA is accurately described by your link (which does not include the descriptor “pathetic ruse”) then this deal is still better than rejecting the deal, since even these reduced-value inspections are better than no inspections and no sanctions.

[iiandyiiii]

If evidence came out that the international community (including our allies in Europe) opposed the deal and would cooperate with the US on sanctions upon rejecting the deal, then I would oppose the deal.

Terr, on the other hand, seems to operate on the assumption that Obama supports the global caliphate and seeks to destroy the infidels.

[Terr]

@iiandyiiii

reduced-value inspections are better than no inspections and no sanctions.

“Reduced-value” is “no-value”. What value is there in Iranians collecting samples and doing the inspections, exactly?

[iiandyiiii]

@Terr

“Reduced-value” is “no-value”. What value is there in Iranians collecting samples and doing the inspections, exactly?

The IAEA would be able to determine whether these samples and inspections are legitimate, presumably. That’s a lot better than nothing, especially considering how miserable past attempts at deception from the Iranian government have been.

[Donald_Rump]

Terr’s criticisms of the deal, including the issue of “anytime, anywhere” inspections and restrictions on access to Parchin, are addressed in Jeffrey Lewis’ rebuttal of Chuck Schumer in Foreign Policy.

Chuck Schumer’s Disingenuous Iran Deal Argument

“Anytime, anywhere” would clearly make this a better deal. But saying that the absence of “anytime anywhere” inspections makes this a bad or flawed deal is unhinged IMO.

Schumer starts by repeating the claim that “inspections are not ‘anywhere, anytime’; the 24-day delay before we can inspect is troubling.” This would be very troubling if it were true. It isn’t. The claim that inspections occur with a 24-day delay is the equivalent of Obamacare “death panels.” Remember those? A minor detail has been twisted into a bizarre caricature and repeated over and over until it becomes “true.”

Let’s get this straight. The agreement calls for continuous monitoring at all of Iran’s declared sites — that means all of the time — including centrifuge workshops, which are not safeguarded anywhere else in the world. Inspectors have immediate access to these sites.

That leaves the problem of possible undeclared sites. What happens when the International Atomic Energy Agency suspects that prohibited work is occurring at an undeclared site? This is the problem known as the “Ayatollah’s toilet.” It emerged from the challenge of inspecting presidential palaces in Iraq in the 1990s, which — despite the U.N. Special Commission’s demands for immediate access — the Iraqis argued were off-limits.

Far from giving Iran 24 days, the IAEA will need to give only 24 hours’notice before showing up at a suspicious site to take samples. Access could even be requested with as little as two hours’ notice, something that will be much more feasible now that Iran has agreed to let inspectors stay in-country for the long term. Iran is obligated to provide the IAEA access to all such sites — including, if it comes down to it, the Ayatollah’s porcelain throne.

But that’s not all. The Iran deal has a further safeguard for inspections at undeclared sites, the very provision that Schumer and other opponents are twisting. What happens if Iran tries to stall and refuses to provide access, on whatever grounds? There is a strict time limit on stalling. Iran must provide access within two weeks. If Iran refuses, the Joint Commission set up under the deal must decide within seven days whether to force access. Following a majority vote in the Joint Commission — where the United States and its allies constitute a majority bloc — Iran has three days to comply. If it doesn’t, it’s openly violating the deal, which would be grounds for the swift return of the international sanctions regime, known colloquially as the “snap back.”

This arrangement is much, much stronger than the normal safeguards agreement, which requires prompt access in theory but does not place time limits on dickering.

What opponents of the deal have done is add up all the time limits and claim that inspections will occur only after a 24-day pause. This is simply not true. Should the U.S. intelligence community catch the Iranians red-handed, it might be that the Iranians would drag things out as long as possible. But in such a case, the game would be over. Either the Iranians would never let the inspectors into the site, or its efforts to truck out documents or equipment, wash down the site, or bulldoze buildings, etc., would be highly visible. These tactics would crater the deal, with predictable consequences. (Schumer also takes a shot at the snap back. Say what you will about the probability of getting all parties to agree to reimpose sanctions, but agreements like this have never had such an enforcement provision before.)

Even if nefarious Iranian runarounds could be hidden, these efforts, over the course of a few weeks, would not suffice to hide environmental evidence of covert uranium enrichment. Schumer even admits as much. But, he insists, other weapons-related work, like high explosive testing without any nuclear materials, might go undetected.

This, too, is a specious objection. For comparison, opponents of this deal have spent enormous amounts of time demanding access to Iran’s Parchin facility, where precisely this sort of weaponization work appears to have taken place between 1996 and 2002. That was more than a decade ago. There is a certain tension between the claim that a few weeks is much too long and that access to a site 13 years after the fact is absolutely necessary. A person might get suspicious that these arguments aren’t to be taken at face value.

The simple truth is, some aspects of weapons work are hard to detect — no matter what. So what’s the alternative? To not prohibit that work? To permit Iran to do things like paper studies on nuclear weapons development because it’s hard to verify the prohibition? Again, that’s crazy. The Iran deal defines weapons work in far more detail than any previous agreement. That’s a good thing — and those of us who are skeptical of Iranian intentions should welcome it, not use it to attack the deal. The law insists that drug dealers pay their taxes. They don’t, but every now and again the feds put a gangster away for tax evasion. (Ask Al Capone.) Western intelligence services have shown considerable ingenuity in acquiring documents from Iran’s nuclear program. Even if it’s not guaranteed they would do so in the future, the prohibitions in the deal create additional opportunities to stop an illicit weapons program.

[Terr]

@iiandyiiii

The IAEA would be able to determine whether these samples and inspections are legitimate, presumably.

How?

[elucidator]

You don’t know? But of course you know, you know everything about this deal!

The Tools Inspectors Can Use to Catch Iran's Nuclear Hijinks

…“This is not a process which has 100 percent transparency,” explains Anthony Cordesman, defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There are very good reasons why the IAEA doesn’t go out and tell you everything they’re doing.” Or there’s really one great reason: The less information Iran has about the inspections, the less equipped it will be to undermine them…

[iiandyiiii]

@Terr

How?

Science.

[Kolak_of_Twilo]

@iiandyiiii

Science.

C’mon, you know no right thinking conservative believes in that.

[YogSothoth]

@Terr

How?

Just because you don’t understand it, doesn’t mean its useless or not occurring. Experts from the IAEA and the Obama Administration, along with the ones from the other 5 nations in the P5 + 1 have said they can figure out if Iran is violating the deal. Until you become an actual nuclear scientist, you will NEVER know. So it doesn’t matter how, they know how and they’re the ones doing the inspection. The real question is: do you trust that they know what they’re doing? If not, I doubt evidence will convince you, but if you want to keep pretending to be an expert while being ignorant of the processes that actual scientists use to verify these claims, then you will either ignore this question or give a wishy washy answer mixed with some insults

[TonySinclair]

I’m going to watch Fox News tonight, and have a drink every time they mention any of these points:

• this is not the result of Kerry’s bumbling and naive negotiations; it’s a separate understanding between the IAEA and Iran, and that’s why it wasn’t shown to Congress, any more than Iran’s trade deals with Russia.

• this is not about Iran’s nuclear facilities, which will be inspected by non-Iranians. It’s about a military complex where Iran’s most high-tech weapons are developed (although there is a suspicion that some nuclear-related research went on there over ten years ago). No country, and especially not the US, would let international inspectors into its top-secret weapons facilities.

• it is almost impossible to conduct nuclear research without external signs. If those signs are detected, we DO have the right to send international inspectors there, under the terms of Obama’s deal. If Iran refuses, that constitutes a breach of the deal.

I expect to remain cold sober.

[TonySinclair]

@YogSosoth

Just because you don’t understand it, doesn’t mean its useless or not occurring. Experts from the IAEA and the Obama Administration, along with the ones from the other 5 nations in the P5 + 1 have said they can figure out if Iran is violating the deal. Until you become an actual nuclear scientist, you will NEVER know. So it doesn’t matter how, they know how and they’re the ones doing the inspection. The real question is: do you trust that they know what they’re doing?

It’s worth noting that from November 2002 to March 2003, the UN inspectors under Hans Blix were on the ground in Iraq, and quickly determined that almost everything the CIA had suspected about Iraq’s alleged WMD sites was wrong. The Bush Administration refused to believe them, and invaded anyway, to the cheers of Fox News types who thought Blix couldn’t find his ass with a flashlight. After two years and billions of dollars, Bush reluctantly admitted that Blix had been right.

[Terr]

@iiandyiiii

Science.

So you have no idea then.

[Ravenman]

@Terr

How?

I’m assuming they have some kind of verification method.

Are you starting from the assumption that if Iran takes samples, and they are clean, but there’s no evidence they are actually from Parchin. Maybe they aren’t samples of something at all, but bite-size Twix bars. Do you believe the IAEA is either obligated or inclined to give Iran a clean bill of health based on those samples?

[Terr]

@Ravenman

I’m assuming they have some kind of verification method.

Are you starting from the assumption that if Iran takes samples, and they are clean, but there’s no evidence they are actually from Parchin. Maybe they aren’t samples of something at all, but bite-size Twix bars. Do you believe the IAEA is either obligated or inclined to give Iran a clean bill of health based on those samples?

What choice do they have? “We don’t like these samples, send us others.”. Rince, repeat.

Tell me, Ravenman, seriously, do you expect that Iranians are stupid enough to self-incriminate?

[elucidator]

Not speaking for him, but I have every confidence that the Iranians are not smart enough to produce an atomic weapon without leaving “fingerprints”. Not at all sure anyone is.

More importantly, even if they were, they could never be sure. They would have to depend on being sure that all the other nuke scientists only know what the Iranians know, and nothing more.

Besides which, aren’t you already assuming that they are stupid enough to risk a disastrous war they cannot win? In order to produce a weapon they cannot effectively use?

So, why ask us how stupid we think they are?

[Ravenman]

@Terr

What choice do they have? “We don’t like these samples, send us others.”. Rince, repeat.

Have you ever heard of the term “concrete thinking?” It is when a person describes the world as a series of objects that interact in predetermined ways. Concrete thinking is the opposite of abstract thinking, in which the world can be described with ideas and concepts, not simply objects.

I ask if you’ve heard of this because you’ve just come up with a great example of concrete thinking. IAEA asks for a sample and gets a Twix bar. Then they have to reject it and ask for another sample. They get a pile of sand. So they have to ask for another sample, etc. In your world, this concrete thing, the IAEA, only operates in a few modalities that you have determined. Although the subject matter is more complex, this is the sort of reasoning that one expects from grade schoolers.

If one thinks more fully about the issue, one could easily recognize that the concept of the IAEA is not to ask for samples until a particular result is achieved, like a machine might do. Instead, it is an agency charged with carrying out a mission, which is the idea of verification. Verification isn’t a mechanical act of putting a sample into a computer and getting a yes/no answer. It’s an abstract concept that includes laboratory work, but also an evaluation of process. If the IAEA asks for a sample of a particular bit of reactor fuel, for example, and gets matter that doesn’t meet its expectations, a sophisticated thinker can conclude that Iran is cheating because failure on process is as much a violation of verification as is a positive lab result.

To put it in simpler, everyday terms, if you are summoned at work to take a urine test, and you submit a sample that is either adulterated or the testers believe didn’t come from you, you fail the test even if the lab result doesn’t show drugs in your system. Do you understand that? Your work doesn’t have to play a game of asking you for another sample because last time you gave them a cup of lemonade. Just because your work may afford you the right to fill your urinalysis cup in privacy, without a lab technician actually watching you produce it, doesn’t mean that there are no consequences if the sample you provide is deficient or suspicious.

Tell me, Ravenman, seriously, do you expect that Iranians are stupid enough to self-incriminate?

Here’s a shocking thought: what if they carry out their end of the deal? Then the U.S. and the West wins. If they get caught cheating, then it means a return to sanctions and quite possibly war. And as I explained very carefully before, cheating doesn’t necessarily mean being caught with the smoking gun. If Iran plays games with inspections, that is just as much cheating as anything else you can come up with.