China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, USA, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey. (“Who’s next?”)
A Permissive Action Link is a security device preventing unauthorized arming or detonation of a nuclear weapon. The technical details of such systems are classified, but clearly all states benefit from knowing that they are in control of their own nuclear weapons and so are the other guys.
According to the above article, PALs were completely installed on all American nuclear weapons by 1987. However, that still leaves a lot of nuclear weapons out there, and concerning them the aggregated information in the article is more sporadic: in the 1970s France and the Soviet Union developed their own systems (assisted by US “guidance”), in the 1990s China asked the USA for the technology but was denied, as was Pakistan in the 2000s, and it is stated that the UK and Pakistan are known not to use PAL technology.
My question is simple: going through the list, which states are currently known (at least with a degree of probability) to use technological means to restrict would-be General Rippers from exceeding their authority? Furthermore, would there be any rational reason for a state not to use them, or to use them but keep that fact a secret?
So far as my knowledge goes, EVERY Non-Proliferation treaty member whom actually has nukes, uses PALs in some form or another. I would expect non-treaty powers to use some form of PALs as well, as they make too much sense to NOT use them.
After all, no one wants General Ripper in their own back yard…
Possibly North Korea is detonating their nukes as fast as they can make them so maybe they’re an exception. We don’t know for sure what Israel has but if they have bombs assembled and ready to use I’m sure they’ve got safety devices on them.
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey do not have nuclear weapons. They participate in NATO’s nuclear sharing program. This means that they train in the use of nuclear weapons and have weapon systems that could deliver nuclear weapons. But the actual nuclear weapons (and their PALs) are kept by American forces in peacetime. Only in the event of a war would they be released to the other countries.
You would think so, but let’s look at what is known.
Even though the need for PALs was recognized early on, the reason that it took until 1987 for the USA to complete deployment is that the military resisted them, arguing a lack of flexibility and fears that a decapitation strike or malfunction in time of crisis would prevent the use of nuclear weapons.
As for the UK, the BBC article (from 2007) quotes the Royal Navy as arguing
Note that there is nothing to suggest that the Royal Navy ever changed its mind.
In short, we really need to go through and consider each state on the list. I am willing to stipulate that the USA (naturally including its weapons based in other countries), Russia, and probably France are using PALs in the field. There is evidence that British Trident SLBMs are not equipped with PALs. That leaves China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel.
Any PAL-equipped weapon can’t be used in a doomsday second- or third-strike retaliation after their home country government has been comprehensively destroyed.
As such, PALs are for countries with very, very robust multiply-survivable command and control systems. And who think they’re bigger enough than, or far enough away from, their expected adversaries so complete destruction of their C3 is implausible.
DPRK’s question was about states = national governments. USAF’s *de facto *mutiny on PALs is a different category of situation.
The rational reason(s) not to use them is pretty obvious and clear. It’s certainly arguable whether the benefits and drawbacks net to positive or negative.
Reasons not to use them are:
Definitely reduces or eliminates your “dead hand” final retaliation deterrent.
May, due to PAL device malfunction, increase your dud rate. Perhaps massively so.
Definitely increases the bureaucratic complexity. Unless all weapons are set to a single code known only to HQ, you’ve got to keep track of the PAL code on each individual weapon and ensure you know which individual launch vehicle (aircraft, silo, or sub) has which individual weapons which need which individual codes. That’s a lot of basic inventory control that has to be done perfectly or you’ve dudded the weapon.
Definitely increases the C3 complexity. With PALs, you’ve got to transmit them accurately. The likelihood of messages getting garbled in transmission or reception is more or less proportional to message length. Recognize that some messages flow directly from top-level HQ to the individual actors in the field. Others may be copied and retransmitted several times as they work their way through the layers of organizational command.
Definitely increases operator complexity. operators need to enter the code correctly. Under rather high stress conditions. Depending on the weapon, entering an invalid PAL may permanently dud the weapon. Are you sure that’s the right code? Are you sure you’re sure that’s the right code?
The benefits are also simple
It becomes impossible for an unauthorized detonation except in the presence of a separate malfunction. Depending on the details of the system, that may or may not prevent launch of the un-PALled warhead towards the target. Which may be nearly as devastating an unauthorized act.
Which risk does the state government want to minimize? Reasonable minds may differ.
I agree I don’t see a specific advantage to keeping the use of PAL secret at the state level. There’s no first-order deterrent theoretic reason secrecy helps. “If you have it, say so” seems a harmless enough policy. The second-and third order effects are more ambiguous.
IOW, a blanket policy of secrecy on everything even remotely nuclear avoids the chipping away that always happens when stuff is half-classified. Folks say a little more than they ought. And for the bad guys, the first step to gathering an enemy’s secret tidbit is recognizing the secret tidbit exists to be gathered. Telling the world you have PALs is telling them there are codes to be stolen, you eschew “dead hand” etc.
Having a policy that absolutely everything everywhere all the time is never public info is the other approach. With the advantage of simplicity and consistency.
The last British nuclear gravity bomb did have a built in safety feature…a key.
Well, also, strictly speaking, like many nuclear gravity bombs, the weapon normally couldn’t detonate at all, even with the key, unless properly deployed from an aircraft, activating a number of speed/acceleration/hydrostatic etc. sensors.
PAL codes/combinations are different from launch codes/authorizations. Unlocking or enabling a weapon is not an authorization to launch; it’s a security feature to discourage, disrupt and/or delay unauthorized access to a warhead/device. At least from my US Army direct experience with tactical nukes.
[note: US Army no longer (1993) has tactical nukes] I’m old!!
I’m not seeing where the Letters would preclude a PAL device on a weapon.
I have no knowledge of British procedures. As you suggest, having a letter and PAL codes in the same place would not be prudent. Perhaps separate safes? Or no PALs?
My reference was to ancient US Army procedures were unlocking a weapon and launch authorization were different steps.
