Ontological indigestion

Great Debates
1

Okay, I’m going to preface this by saying that I do not intend to start a debate here, and I apologize if this OP is more appropriate elsewhere. But my situation is this: I’ve recently been introduced to the ontological proof for the existence of God, which I find exhausting in the fact that a) it strikes me as a ridiculous word game, and b) I’m at a loss to critique it.

Before anyone rips me to shreds, I’ll let you know that I did in fact do several Googles about the subject and came up with a plethora of information–a plethora of very academic text steeped in the philosophical jargon that would take me months to get comfortable enough with that I could then go back and read the various refutations of St. Anselm’s “proof”.

If this has previously been discussed on SDMB, feel free to point me in the right direction and be done with me. What I’m really looking for is a kind of layman’s terms for what constitutes the best refutation of the ontological argument.

Not familiar with the subject?, look here.

2

Yeah, we did kick the Ontological argument for the existence of God around a while back. Have fun!

3

It’s full of holes.

1) God is defined as the being than which none greater is possible.
This use of the term ‘being’ prejudices the argument, insofar as a ‘being’ is something which exists. At this stage in the argument, this has not been established. One might equally well say ‘defined as the abstract , mythical and foolish idea of a being than which none greater is possible’.

As an aside, note that every religion views God as more than simply ‘than which none greater is possible’. So even if the argument were to succeed, which (as we will see) it does not, it would not establish the existence of the Christian God (as typically described) or any other God. It would not, for example, establish that God is loving or something with which we can have a personal relationship through prayer.

**2) It is true that the notion of God exists in the understanding (your mind.) **
This is an unsupported assertion. It is debatable whether a human mind can actually accommodate the notion of something which is infinite. Also, the writer does not say whose mind, or which mind, is referred to. The notion of God (as typically presented for consideration) does not feature in my mind. Quite the opposite.

**3) And that God may exist in reality (God is a possible being.) **
Again, an unsupported assertion. It is far from necessarily true that a ‘being than which nothing greater can exist’ is, in fact, possible.

**4) If God only exists in the mind, and may have existed, then God might have been greater than He is. **
This is semantically unsound. The writer seeks to refer to ‘existence’ as an attribute which a thing can either have or not have, much as a thing can either have or not have ‘softness’. This is flawed. ‘Existence’ is not an attribute or a quality. When we say something ‘exists’ we mean it has an attribute or quality.

Putting this another way, the writer is inviting us to compare two items: a God which exists only as an idea and a God which exists both as an idea and an independent reality. This is semantically evasive. The former doesn’t exist at all!

Finally, note the self-contradictory nature of the final clause and its use of the verb ‘to be’: “then God might have been greater than He is”. Paraphrasing: “then the being that doesn’t exist might have been greater than he is”. Which is nonsense.

  1. Then, God might have been greater than He is (if He existed in reality.)
    The notion that ‘to exist as an independent reality’ is ‘greater’ than ‘to exist only as a concept’ is unsupported and by no means self-evident. One could argue that the word ‘greater’ is meaningless in this context.

In simpler terms: clause (4) of the argument is meaningless, because if something does not exist it makes no sense to refer to ‘it’ and other qualities it might potentially have had.

The argument as a whole is flawed because it treats ‘existence’ as an attribute which a thing either possesses or does not possess, just like ‘softness’. But existence is not an attribute a thing may have or not have. It is the quality of having attributes.

4

Wow, both the earlier thread and this incredibly non-PhD-in-philosophy-user-friendly reply are both very insightful and very helpful. Thank you very much.

:: prints up ianzin’s reply ::

5

All right, then, suppose that God does not exist. As the Universe endlessly cycles closer to perfection, God evolves into existence, at some point in the distant future. Being God, he is not bound by the constraints of time, therefore He exists now. Therefore, God must exist unless it is impossible that He could.

Please be assured, before you post to advise me, that I am aware that the Gospel According to Elucidator is hooey. All theology is hooey! Using the rational mind to analyze spiritual concerns is sheer nonsense.

6

Just for fun then…

The two halves of your suggestion contradict one another - in the first half time does apply to God and in the second half it does not apply. If God exists outside of time it makes no sense to refer to him coming into existence (i.e. positing one time at which he doesn’t exist and a later time at which he does).

Not necessarily. Whether a statement can be assessed rationally depends on its form, not its subject matter. For example, “We know the bible is true because God says so, right there in the bible” is a cliched example of circular reasoning, and its truth can be rationally assessed in this light (even though it pertains to a spiritual matter). However, “I know my communication with God is real because I feel it in my heart and every fibre of my being” is not capable of rational evaluation. It is a statement of faith, and can be appraised in terms of human spiritual or emotional faculties, or the distubed psychology of those who feel the need for a big invisible friend, but its truth or otherwise lies outside rational evaluation.

7

True, a statement like that is not logically disprovable, but you could certainly have a rational discussion of the implications of that sort of epistemological claim. For example, what if someone else makes the same claim, only their Message from God says soemthing completely contradictory, or maybe even evil. A person who does not have that sort of subjective faith could have a rationalistic discussion with someone who does about how the non-believer is supposed to make sense of these claims, in light of the many different and frequently contradictory things which subjective faith is used to support.