I know this isn’t GD, but can I ask for a cite or source for this?
I’m not endorsing casdave’s post in it’s entirety, but you do know that Montgomery was in charge of all land forces on D-Day and afterward?
EJs Girl
I know that Wiki is variable in its quality, however, read this link, especially the part about Montgomery as a strategist, and also the criticisms of him.
His methodical approach using his resources carefully, ensuring massive local superiority and combined arms techniques is something that is used today, far more than the purposeful thrusting strategy of many of his US contemporaries.
You could almost say that he was a ‘cost effective’ general, got things done well within schedule with the least damage to his own units with high attrition to the enemy.
This really isn’t surprising given that he always had much more limited resources that the US army, and even when he was in overall command, his thinking about how to respond to counter movements by the Axis was usually correct.Its this forward planning that caused him to ensure he had the back up resources before making a move, which his superiors often found frustrating.
The British stall at Caen is often cited as a failing, yet this is where the majority of Axis armour was, right in front of British lines, its true wether by design or intent that this drew in Axis forces, and in particular much of their most experienced and best equipped units.
He would be best described as a ‘grinder’, make the enemy pay dearly for the least outlay - not sexy or glamorous but effective and these methods were seen widely on the Eastern front from Zhukov, except that Monty was far more careful of his men .
Monty was not really the showbiz general that Patton was, nor Eisenhower, these two certainly had eyes on things with other agendas in mind, politics, fame.
Much of his methods of morale building are widely used today, in fact the system of brieifng and information is being used in Afghanistan. Telling your men what and more importantly why you are doing things is not not something that came to most General staff back then, but today to do otherwise is almost unthinkable, and Monty’s methods were a huge change in military leadership style at the time.
Not perfect, but you could hardly say that he made any serious mistakes, only set objectives that he knew his army could get - Market Garden was probably the only time he overeached, a percentage player choosing his time to make his move.
That would be a reasonable issue except that Montgomery wasn’t fighting against the Americans. He was fighting against the Germans and the British were often better supplied than the German forces they were facing.
It’s not an UK/US divide: Eisenhower was the same kind of methodical general. It’s often a good quality in a general. But Montgomery’s caution did cause him to miss some opportunities: Caen, the Falaise Gap, Antwerp, and Market-Garden are examples of this.
The US could, if they chose, afford to be more able to accept losses and I believe it was part of their military philosophy that you reduced overall losses by taking the risks sooner and shortening the war.
The British , wether or not they were better supplied than the axis, felt they could not commit to great loss - we had lost a generation in a previous conflict, unlike the US, we simply found it too difficult to do that again, and so soon after the previous time. Monty learned many lessons in WW1.
That meant you had allies with differant outlooks, one that wanted to push on, the other that wanted to move steadily and that is always going to lead to differant interpretations of abilities.
It wasn’t just a psychological thing with the Brits about casualties,the U.K.had been at war since 1939 and had taken the casualties year after year.
This from a not particulary large population.
Before D-Day units were disbanded and cannibalised to bring other units up to strength,age limits for men to become available for front line service were revised as were levels of fitness.
Britain was at that time,not surprisingly suffering an acute manpower crisis.
Monty may have claimed that he beat the Germans in Africa, but he was doing so at El Alamein with a plan prepared by Auchinlek. Montgomery would give Auchinlek no credit- he (Montgomery) was a person who liked publicity and would not bear criticism.
It should be born in mind that 11 Allied (often Dominion ) Divisions fought at El Alamein while 82 Russian divisions were fighting on the Eastern Front at Stalingrad. To the Germans, Africa was a sideshow.
What I don’t understand-a good general should have a back-up plan, and Monty did not. Also, the film hints that British airborne surveillence had pcked up the presence of the German panzer divisions; and that Monty ignored the information-is this true?
The whole idea of a British strike into Holland didn’t make a lot of sense to me-Holland is far away from the north Rhine cities, and the terrain is lowlying and marshy-and the germans could flood the land .
Operation Market Garden was a sideshow that diverted resources and had only a limited chance for success.
Utter garbage.
Auchinleck had absolutely nothing to do with the preparation of the El Alamein battle plan. The battle took place eleven weeks after his removal as Army Chief for the Middle East and seven weeks after Rommel’s final fling in Egypt which resulted in the defeat of his forces at Alam El Halfa.
The original Alam El Halfa plan as envisaged by Auchinleck, and mainly devised by his deputy Dorman-Smith, was to be based on a high level of mobility of Eighth Army forces who were expected to charge back and forth between ‘Forward’, Main’ and ‘Rear’ positions if attacked. Nothing like playing to the strength of your opponent.:rolleyes:
The Alam El Halfa ‘Auchinleck Plan’ was so over complicated and idiotic that Montgomery tossed it in the bin after one look at it and devised his own plan.