Pascal's Wager Revisited

Great Debates
1

In this thread (in which I argued that the sheer number of different religious faiths, combined with the fact that most people’s beliefs are based solely on how they were raised, “proved” that most people’s beliefs were likely incorrect), somebody suggested that I “weigh that against the expected payoff (a la Pascal’s Wager) and tell what strategy I come up with after the math.”

Now, it has been many years since I studied Pascal and his wager, so I may be a bit rusty on the specifics, but I do remember being able to completely discredit it to my own satisfaction at the time. Rather than hijack that thread, I thought I’d post my response here instead.

If memory serves, Pascal’s wager was essentially as follows:

Now, assuming that I haven’t completely misrepresented Pascal’s argument, here’s my response. Basically, I think that all of his assumptions are false, or at least not verifiably true, To wit:

Assuming there is a 50/50 chance that God exists:

Why assume that there is a 50/50 chance that God exists? Given the complete lack of empirical data to prove his existence, and given the many counterarguments to his existence (the existence of evil in the world, the fact that different people have claimed to receive conflicting messages from God, the fact that many so-called “miracles” have been proven to be the result of natural forces or merely delusions, etc.), maybe there is only a one in a million chance that God exists, or perhaps a one in a billion chance. Of, perhaps even a zero chance that God exists. Pascal’s wager could just as likely be used to prove the rationality of believing that a flock of pink elephants will fly into my window one night and grant my heart’s fondest desires. Since it’s possible, then according to Pascal the safest best is to believe in them just in case, right?

Assuming that the reward for believing in God (if he exists) is eternal salvation:

What proof is there that believing in God will automatically result in eternal life, let alone eternal salvation? Different religions have different beliefs, and not all religions believe in an afterlife. Assuming there is a God of some sort, maybe he has simply created us as playthings and has no desire to let us return to his presence. Or maybe the whole purpose of life is to enjoy ourselves fully while we can, since the rest of eternity will be mind-numbing boredom as we sit on a cloud and strum a harp all day long.

Assuming that the penalty for NOT believing in God (if he exists) is eternal damnation:

Who is to say that the penalty for NOT believing is eternal damnation. Again, assuming there is a God of some sort, maybe he really doesn’t care what we do here on earth. Claiming that all nonbelievers will have eternal torment and misery is pretty cruel and heartless when you think of all the BILLIONS of people who are raised in societies where a belief in God is not taught. God is the one who decides where somebody will be born, so why would he then condemn that person to Hell for never hearing about him?

Assuming that there is no downside to believing in God even if he doesn’t exist:

Who’s to say that there is no downside to believing in a non-existent God? Perhaps if you are a born again Christian who thinks that it is enough to simply 'accept Jesus into your heart" to be saved, then this assumption is valid. The religion in which Iw as raised, however, tought that God demands a life of self-sacrifice and obedience; no premarital sex, no alcohol, 10% of your income donated to the church, significant amounts of time devoted to performing various tasks (attending meetings, visiting other members, preparing lessons, performing sacred ordinances, etc.) If you beliueve that all of this is required of you to gain the promised reward and there ISN’T really a God, you will have essentially wasted your entire life.

An additional downside to believing in a nonexistent god is the sacrifice of my capacity to rationally distinguish between what is real and what is fantasy. If I’m willing to believe in God simply because it’s a “safe bet”, then why not also believe in UFOs, psychics, ghosts, etc.? Maybe the UFOs will only rescue those who believe in them when the day or Armegeddon is at hand. Or maybe the TV psychics can only convey messages from the loved ones of whose who believe in psychic powers. Or maybe ghosts only visit those who are willing to see them? Forcing myself to believe in something for which there is no evidence and plenty of counterevidence can only diminish my ability to think rationally.

Then the only logical course of action is to believe in God:

Basically, I think the argument boils down to “the theoretical reward is so great, and the cost to play is so minimal, that it is in your best interest to play.” I suppose an analogy could be made, perhaps, to one of those multi-state lotteries where the prize has risen to $300 million and the chance of wining is 1 in 100 million. If the tickets are only $1 each, it only makes sense to play, since the potential gain is enormous and the potential loss is trivial.

However, I don’t think that analogy is really accurate. For a closer analogy, you would be required to sell everything that you own in order to enter the lottery with the same 1 in 100 million chance of winning. And if you lost (which is likely), your whole life would be ruined as a result

To sum up, since there is really a very small chance that God exists (not 50/50), and since there is no guarantee that God would reward belief with eternal life if he did exist, and since there’s no guarantee that God would reward disbelief with eternal damnation, and since the penalty for believing in a nonexistent God is potentially very high, the only logical thing is to not believe in God.

Any commnents and/or corrections are welcome…

Regards,

Barry

2

God will know whether or not you really believe, and if you claim to believe in God only as a hedge just in case there is one, God will know and He will get you for it.

3

Well, that’s what I always thought as well, but I had a religion profesor who swore that if you acted liked you believed long enough, you would eventually come to believe. In fact, I think Pascal made the same argument somewhere along the line: Just keep going to mass, taking communion, etc., and eventually you will believe.

I tried that route for 20+ years before finally giving up. And that’s 20+ years of my life I would dearly love to get back…

Barry

4

“You can fool some of the people all of the time …”

A. Lincoln

5

From where I sit, you’ve managed to make the wager seem ridiculous. The 50/50 logic can be applied to almost anything if the binary nature of things can be assumed. But, as with most things worth the time to consider them, there’s a whole universe between 0 and 1. And a whole passel of Maybe.

What has always baffled me is the leap from the question of the existence of God to all the attributes associated with that supposed Being. As it appears to me, giving at least some possibility to the existence of some Power or Force or Prime Mover or Whatever says basically nothing about what that Entity wants or expects human beings to do or be or even believe.

That part of it all seems totally human in origin.

Just the resolution of the basic God/Not-God issue seems trivial when compared to the major issues of how our species can expect to improve itself and to lengthen its life expectancy.

And I really like the way that the “no downside” issue is addressed in the OP. It matters much how we waste our thoughts. And if we spend a large portion of what could be productive considerations on the silly and unlikely, we are sinning against our own lives.

I’d say that the Wager, as presented and dissected in the OP, is a joke disguised as some real issue. And it’s really not all that funny a joke.

6

As a Christian, I find Pascal’s Wager to be an immoral proposition. It would be better for someone who does not believe to honestly not believe than to lie to themselves about it. Indeed, honest disbelief would jeopardize their souls less than would pretense of belief.

7

Pascal’s Wager is predicated on a false dichotomy. It presumes that the only two choices are monotheism and atheism. It does not account for polytheism or non-theistic religious models. It also presumes that there is only one possible model for monotheism. What if you believe in God but you believe in the wrong God. There really is no safe choice.

8

Hmmm… so far it seems like everybody actually agrees with my critiques of the wager. Isn’t there anybody here who wants to defend the wager? Maybe it’s all just a straw man argument after all… :frowning:

Barry

9

On behalf of Pascal (yes, I’m channeling him, why do you ask?) I’d like to put in some remarks.

First off, the basic (translated) text of the wager I’ve Googled up here, thought nr. 233.

Furthermore, you must read it in context.

  1. The mathematics of chance was just being discovered, Pascal was one of those involved, so he was using some geeky reasoning for theological purposes. His estimate of the chances involed may seem silly to us, but we have the benefit of several centuries of mathematical development.

  2. In his day and age mostly everyone acted as if they did believe. That makes it much easier to go through the motions, and also helps to get a more deeply ingrained belief.

  3. Pascal was a Catholic. While I’m not sure about the specifics at his time, AFAIK being a good Catholic is not as tightly connected to actually, deeply believing as it is with protestant denominations. The religious wars at the time were AFAIK mostly connected with people acting on their beliefs, not with questioning them about what they really thought (except if you had written down suspicious things). (someone whose more at home in 17th century Europe please correct me where I’m wrong).

  4. Pascal didn’t really believe for most of his life, but really wanted to. His Pensees were not meant for publication but were only found after his death. The wager may well have been meant solely as a means to convince himself, being a mathematician.

FTR, I’m not convinced for exactly the same reason Diogenes the Cynic said (the SDMB poster, not the actual philosopher of course).

10

This was precisely Pascal’s argument. He acknowledged that the Wager provided no logical reason to believe, but that they provded a hedonistic motive that, if acted upon enough, would before long become pure and sincere.

11

If everyone accepted that there was a 50/50 chance that God existed, Pascal’s wager would have been more like, Heads or Tails?

12

It could be even worse. Given that we can assume nothing about the psychological disposition of a God, there is a non-zero chance that believing in God will make It punish me with eternal hellfire, whereas not believing will guarantee me a place in heaven. Sure this would seem to us like bizarre and inexplicable behavior on the part of the Divine Being, but mere mortals cannot hope to comprehend the mind of God…

13

I was once in an argument about the fundamental flaw in the wager, which got quite heated until we realised that if we each had our own favorite flaw, it didn’t really matter which was msot fundamental :slight_smile:

That one involved some probability theory here, which I won’t go into. Suffice it to say, I’m not dissing Pascal, but you can’t make the argument work without assuming your result or something nowadays…

Instead I’ll use the pink unicorn argument :slight_smile: (Pretty much what TMcA said)

  1. A pink unicorn who sends you to hell if you believe in God and heaven if you don’t is as possible as God.
  2. Therefore by the same argument, if Pascal’s Wager makes sense, you should not believe in God.
  3. Contradiction.

So the argument’s nonsense. (_Why_it’s nonsense is interesting itself. Maybe later.)

As an aside, in the discussion of how, if you think it’s best to believe in God, to do so, I’d say (a) try and brainwash yourself into it by pretending to and living your life like it and (b) try and persuade other people - you can at least save them.

14

I would go even further. While it seems unlikely that a real supreme being would do the hellfire thing no matter what, if there were a being that wanted to reward people or keep souls around for a while, I would find it more likely that it would appreciate an honest skeptic who used his or her brain to be realistic about the nature of the universe given the information available, than that the god would be impressed by somebody who bought into a lot of religious hocus-pocus. Thus, tiny as the chance might be, an atheist might actually have a better chance of getting into heaven than a person who believed based on absurd evidence.

15

At least some philosophers have written in defense of Pascal’s wager. (It’s article 68 on the list of publications.)

16

As I said in the thread from whence this thread came, Pascal should have known better.

17

Uh? How can we tell if any of the several references for Article 68 “defend” Pascal or not, they seem like generic treatises on the subject? Is there a link to Article 68?
Hang on, I know, if there is an Article 68 and we believe in it then…

18

It’s there on the linked page, in the list of articles. I’ve quoted the relevant portion below.

You might not have access to any of the volumes where this article can be read, unless you have a university library nearby. I own a copy of Reason and Responsibility, 10th edition, so I have read the article and can confirm that it does defend Pascal’s wager. If you want, I can read it again and try to summarize the authors’ main points.

19

If you have the time and motivation, yes, a summary would be appreciated.

20

Okay, here goes.

Pascal’s original payoff matrix:



             God exists      God doesn't exist
         |----------------|---------------------|
Believe  |    infinity    |       -20           |
         |----------------|---------------------|
Don't    |   -infinity    |        20           |
         |----------------|---------------------|

-20 is an arbitrary value given to the inconveniences a believer must
endure in living according to God’s wishes, while +20 corresponds to
the fun that a non-believer can enjoy, not being bound by the
confines of religion.

The expected utility (EU) of theism, according to this model, is
0.5*(infinity) + 0.5*(-20) = infinity, while the expected utility of
agnosticism or atheism is 0.5*(-infinity) + 0.5*(20) = -infinity.
Pascal thus contended that, although theism could be construed as
irrational on the basis of evidence, it is prudentially
rational (i.e., in one’s best interest) to believe in God.

Most of the traditional objections mentioned in Lycan and
Schlesinger’s paper have been pointed out here.

[ul]
[li]“My beliefs are not under my control.” (cf. David Simmons)[/li]Reply: sure they are, in the long run. Modifying one’s
behavior can have a surprising effect on even the stubbornest
skeptics. Attend church and partake in the rituals; hang out with
religious people and Christian apologists; stop reading philosophy and
avoid discussion with cynics and secular humanists.
[li]“The wager is cynical and mercenary; God would not reward a[/li]believer whose decision to believe was based mostly on self-interest.”
(cf. Dogface) Reply: of course He wouldn’t, just like
that. Pascal argues that our goal should be to abandon our cynicism
and eventually become believers, if we can. The historical
origins of a person’s belief should have no bearing on God’s decision
to reward or punish the believer. People are reported to be saved as
a result of deathbed conversions, if their new belief is in fact
genuine.
[li]“The probability of God existing is hardly as high as 50%.”[/li](cf. godzillatemple) Reply: that doesn’t matter, even if
the probability is one in a million, the payoffs are still infinite,
should God exist. “All right, then, the probability that God exists
is zero. I’m certain there is no God.” Reply:
how certain? You need to provide a very compelling argument to
demonstrate conclusively that no God, even remotely similar to the
traditional conceptions of Him, can exist, and it would have to be
better than most philosophical arguments. (There aren’t many
philosophical arguments that assert their conclusions have probability
1, i.e., absolute certainty)
[/ul]

Of the other serious objections, only the many-gods objection has
appeared in this thread so far. The many-gods objection holds that
Pascal had in mind a very specific sort of god–basically the
Christian God who rewards His followers with infinite bliss and damns
opponents or even neutrals to eternal damnation–while countless other
gods with different personalities are logically possible.

Lycan and Schlesinger’s first natural response to this objection
claims that all the various possible gods are not equally
probable. (If we allow an infinite number of possible gods, then it
is not even mathematically possible to impose a uniform,
normalizable probability distribution among them–just ask
ultrafilter.) They say it is intuitively “far more likely that
the Christian God, the God of the Jews, or Allah exists, than that
there is a vindictively shy god or a god who rewards all and only
those who do not shave themselves or a god who wears pink bowties that
light up.” They claim that empirical evidence, though pathetically
far from convincing, exists, “in the form of partially checkable
scriptures, historical reports (made by ostensibly intelligent and
impartial observers) of divine manifestations, and the like.”

Now the skeptic will counter: “how are we to choose between the gods of
the major religions? Why should we believe in the Christian God
rather than Yahweh? (These deities may well be considered identical by
theorists, but their worship is not; they respectively require
incompatible conduct.) For that matter, why should we believe in
either of those rather than Allah, or in one or more of the Hindu
gods?”

Considerations that Lycan and Schlesinger propose to decide the
appropriate object of worship:

[ul]
[li]Empirical evidence may still be of some help. If one examines the[/li]historical record closely, a stronger case might be made for one of
the major gods than for another.
[li]The details of the respective payoffs should be considered. Other[/li]things being equal, one should opt to worship the god who promises the
most attractive afterlife and/or the most awful form of damnation.
[li]Having considered empirical evidence and respective payoffs, one[/li]should strive towards the lowest common denominator in terms of
tolerance. Some gods are insanely jealous, others refuse salvation to
any but the adherents of some crackpot sect, while still others admit
salvation to any person who leads the right sort of life with the
right sort of attitude.[/ul]

Balancing these considerations, while challenging, is not unlike the
comparison shopping we do in our daily lives. While it is probable
that we might guess wrong, “a significant chance of infinite success
offset by a greater chance of infinite failure is still better odds
than no chance of success supplemented by a still
greater chance of failure…”

Lycan and Schlesinger provide a second, deeper response to the
many-gods challenge that relies on the special nature of the reward
and its relation to the religious seeking experience itself.
Specifically, the reward is not unrelated to the quest, but is instead
an outgrowth of the quest, a fruit of one’s labors as a believer.
They point out that “theists in every age have anticipated the
dissolving of their narrow selves in the ecstasy of a God-centered
life here on earth and, more to Pascal’s point, their eventual smooth
translation into a disembodied existence in holy felicity–an eternal
love of the Divine. … According to classical theologians, one who
has spent one’s life as a passionate servant of the Lord will have
developed and perfected one’s soul adequately to have acquired the
capacity to partake in the transmundane bliss that awaits in the
afterlife. The suitably groomed soul, when released from its earthly
fetters, will bask in the radiance of the Divine presence and delight
in the adoring communion with a loving God.” A final passage from the
article sums up this post: “It is the crux of our problem that for
more than one deity there is an eternal and hence infinite payoff.
Still, the very nature of the sublime gratification the believer
aspires to ensures that its quality will vary with the character of
the deity he/she bets on.”

All quotes taken from:
Lycan, William G. and George N. Schlesinger. “You Bet Your Life:
Pascal’s Wager Defended.” Reason and Responsibility, 10th ed.
Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, eds. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999.