This debate seems to be centering on the cost of belief. Cost is a very subjective thing. It is related to what we value, and I’m sure everyone will agree, values are subjective.
I think, I’m not sure, that Pascal is trying to put an absolute value on life. I had this whole wager concept since I was a little boy, long before I heard of Pascal. How I thought is as follows:
Either there is an afterlife, or there isn’t. If there is no afterlife, then all is meaningless. We are but material objects, and life has no better value than a hydrogen atom. Thus all our subjective values are meaningless (equal to zero), i.e. money, property, beliefs, good works or bad works.
If there is an afterlife, then life has meaning. Thus however subjective our values may be, it does have a value greater than zero.
So back again to the two scenarios: either there is an afterlife or not. And another premise, if you believe in X, then you get the afterlife.
If you believe in X, and there is no afterlife, then nothing is lost, since believing in X had no value anyway. If there is an afterlife, then you win.
Therefore there is an absolute value to life, being either zero or greater than zero.
I feel that on these grounds, Pascal is right. The premise of his that I object to is that believing in God is the ticket to the afterlife. If there is an afterlife, we will all get there, no matter what (Beeruser’s theory: we all inherently have a ticket.) If there isn’t, there’s nothing we can do about it.
There’s always another beer.