On the 50th anniversary of that disaster, I drove to another city to see a “live screening” of this documentary. I haven’t seen it in any other format anywhere else, although I haven’t looked that hard.
I’ve also read this book, which is very good. This evening, I had wondered who the elderly woman was on the news, with Nancy Kerrigan, and she was Dr. Tenley Albright, the 1956 Olympic gold medalist who lost many friends in the crash.
True, but note the other comments that there was usually a second controller to handle the helicopter traffic. I think just the one controller was somewhat overloaded–and if there had been a second controller he probably would have done this–or perhaps told the helicopter pilot to take a sharp left turn now.
Pilot explains the air traffic control audio from the American Airlines collision.
I find it helpful to have all the aviation codes explained.
This pilot thinks the helicopter saw the plane behind him and not the plane the controller wanted him to observe. That lead to the collision. That’s only speculation.
The ATC clearly told the helicopter to pass behind the plane. I don’t see how they could be faulted. The helicopter, as the far more maneuverable vehicle, was responsible to avoid the crash. It looks to me like a case of studentitis - waiting for instructions instead of taking responsibility for making an emergency decision. Acknowledging, of course, that it’s early days and we don’t have all the information, that’s how it looks to me from where and when I stand.
There has been discussion about, ‘Why was the helicopter crew even training there?’ I just want to note that rivers are frequently used for VFR navigation. Also, there are routes through controlled airspace for VFR flights. For example, LAX has a VFR corridor at midfield where ‘little airplanes’ can pass over the airport. (It’s midfield because that’s where the ‘heavies’ are still on the ground.) In the helicopters, I transited LAX airspace off of the coast, maintaining the required 100 feet or below – i.e., below the height of the bluff. (I liked it a lot, I must say.)
I was going to post that video. It is speculation but I expect he is correct. It puts the blame pretty much on the helicopter pilot.
Not sure why there is a hang up on the term “training.” Any time it’s not a real world mission or a maintenance test flight then it’s training. So for most units in the Army that’s almost every flight. Just flying through controlled airspace is training. It’s been a few decades but I was a left seater in scout helicopters. I flew training flights between Mainz and Frankfurt. I flew training flights along the Hudson to look at Manhattan. I had a training flight because my pilot wanted to follow the old Roman wall in Germany. Army pilots are just sitting around waiting for missions. They fly whenever they can. It’s all training and it helps keep up their skills as pilots and aircrew. They may have had a specific training objective or maybe they were just flying to maintain crew skills.
I don’t think “being the more maneuverable vehicle” per se is what makes the helicopter responsible to avoid the crash. Indeed, I would expect all pilots are responsible to “avoid the crash” if they can. Rather, as you note, the helicopter had been directed to keep out of the path of the airliner and failed to do so. But if, hypothetically, the airline pilots had seen that a collision was imminent (not that I expect they did) and done nothing to avoid it, merely being less maneuverable would not relieve them of the responsibility of avoiding collision.
I suspect the real issue won’t be the helicopter waiting for instructions so much as (1) failing to maintain a visual on the aircraft it said it had a visual on (if it ever really did—as noted it might have mistakenly picked out another aircraft) and (2) when the ATC saw that the two aircraft were approaching a collision, not giving clear directives on how to avoid a collision, but instead acting passively, either asking suggestive questions or giving vague instructions (like “pass behind that aircraft” which necessarily assumes the helicopter pilots actually see the aircraft) rather than something like a positive instruction to “immediately alter course to 180 and reduce altitude to 200 feet to avoid collision.”
ETA: Oh, and (3) that maybe it was a bad idea for the helicopter pilot to request, and the ATC to authorize, the pilot to take responsibility to maneuver to avoid collision visually at night in an area of heavy traffic and significant background lighting that would have made such visual deconfliction much more difficult. One lesson might be that such visual deconfliction should not be permitted under such conditions.
I didn’t hear the American Airlines pilot in the air controller audio.
I’ve listened to near misses audio analysis on Youtube. I usually hear both pilots talking. There’s a head on a swivel attitude. They’re very sensitive to what’s happening in the air space.
I’m not blaming anyone. A lot of things went wrong for this tragedy to happen. It will be a long investigation.
As explained in the video linked a few posts up, this flight had already been given clearance to land, so there was no reason for them to talk during the portion we hear.
Sorry – I see, from your much greater experience than mine, you’re suggesting the CRJ pilot maybe should have said something, when he overheard ATC having to remind/request clarification/confirmation from the copter pilot regarding “maintaining visual.” Good point! Certainly not the CRJ pilot’s fault (as far as we know at this time) – the copter pilot was so confident he had the correct plane in sight – but that sure would have helped.
That’s one of many reasons airliners have two pilots. One is the pilot flying, the other is the pilot monitoring. AIUI one of the functions of the PM is radio communications.
Also, to point out the obvious, helicopters are low and slow and not extremely visible at night. IME a light on the tail and one on either side of the fuselage is the norm. A RJ pilot on short final with a Blackhawk approaching at 90 degrees doesn’t have much of a chance of seeing it.
I’m not a pilot, but I used to make the visual sectionals so I kind of understand them. There’s a reporting point of HAINS POINT just east of DCA. It seems to say that 1500 is the recommended altitude. That doesn’t make any sense since there are maximum altitudes of 2-300 just north of there. Is the 1500 the recommend altitude or does it mean something else?
When I was flying helicopters in Southern California, we had our own frequency. Helicopter pilots are expected to make periodic position/altitude/direction broadcasts in case there are other helicopters in the area. (Also helicopters are expected to fly to the right of freeways/roads/rivers/tracks/etc.) Departing, we’d be on the tower frequency. When were exiting Class D airspace, we would call the tower, let them know where we were exiting their airspace, and in form them we were changing frequencies (to the helicopter frequency). Returning, we change to the tower frequency and make contact before entering Class D airspace. We’d also turn to Tower or Approach for permission to transit Class C or Class B airspace.
Those videos shown to me that the jet was completely blameless. Too far into its descent, too low and slow and too close to landing to do anything. It’s possible that there was an ATC mistake but much more likely pilot error in the helicopter.
I am predicting that within not-too-many years (10, 20, 30?), we will have ATC humans replaced with computer programs. Theoretically, such programs would take into account all known factors, compute possible conflicts, and issue commands to prevent accidents like this, removing the volatile human aspect.
I’m sure this won’t eliminate all disasters, but future disasters will be different. Maybe those same computer programs can use them to improve the system. Isn’t that what AI is all about?
