They also didn’t have an Identification, friend or foe (IFF) system in place.
For something to be possible, it take not only the equipment but also recognition of the problem and training, something which was lacking as you note. As you said, it may have been technically possible for P-40s to defend against bombers flying at that altitude, but not on the morning of December 8th.
3. But if Hawaiian AF fighters had risen to meet the meet the incoming PH raid in numbers they too would probably have been heavily engaged by the Zero escort, which certainly did exist, 45 in the first wave 36 in the second (albeit not as big as the 87 Tainan/3rd AG Zeroes accompanying the missions over Luzon Dec 8). The PH Zeroes met no opposition at first, so went immediately to strafing. That allowed P-40’s taking off later to pick off a few attack planes without interference.
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The Zeroes were not tasked with flying escort but rather had their own targets. They had not even practiced flying escort for this mission. This did not happen in other attacks, but it was an issue for PH.
This could have been problematic had the US been up flying over the fleet, especially with the torpedo bombers who were flying “low and slow.”
Although there was a large contingency of US fighters in Hawaii (which I quoted earlier), a rather high percent of them were not in flight condition that morning. Something like 55% of the 99 P-40s were down for maintenance, since the had just gotten off an extended state of high alert. In wartime, then the maintenance would have been done at night, for example to boost the number of operational planes.
Again, as you said, general unreadiness for war and peacetime thinking.
Alt-hist fans tend to neglect such factors in their scenarios. It’s easy to assume that a simple warning would somehow provide the defenders with the hard earned knowledge and experience they had later in the war.
However, the Japanese were also working with some key disadvantages. There were some potentially disastrous flaws in the PH plans which would have caused the loss of many more planes and aircrew, and could have really reduced the US losses.
Although some officers in IJA were still very much enchanted with the idea of strike north, (we’re looking at you, Kwantung Army) as well as some in the Army General Staff, this was not universal.
At this stage of war preparations, it was not the cabinet but the Imperial Conferences where the important decisions were being made.
There were also the very important “Liaison Meeting between the Imperial General Headquarters and Government.”
in the early summer of 1941 (after Operation Barbarossa), there were a series of these meetings to determine the course of Japanese preparations for war and actions.
The sole person at these events to attempt to push the Japanese into war against the Soviets was not anyone from the IJA, but rather Yōsuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister.
This attempt to persuade the military to attack the Soviets was met by strong pushback from the Army Chief of Staff, Sugiyama.
Tojo, the War (Army) Minister was silent on the matter but certainly didn’t push for making preparations for war against the USSR.
Hotta’s book is an interesting read for people interested in the dynamics of the convoluted path Japanese leaders took as they stumbled into the disastrous war against the US and Britain.
There situation in Japan in 1941 was extremely complex. There was no clear, strong leader, the Prime Minister had only limited power and was not over the military, the General Staffs of the Army and Navy were independent of the War (Army) Ministry and Navy Ministry, and these military ministers were not subject to cabinet oversight but also nominally reported to the Emperor. The military was divided between rivaling factions, some of which wanted to overthrow the emperor and install his brother.
So, some of the agreement for moves such as reinforcing Manchuria against the Soviets was to build up support from the various factors, and not necessarily as support for the cause itself.
The decision to invade into the southern part of French Indochina (which directly lead to the crippling US sanctions) was pushed by the IJA in order to cut off resupplying the KMT army. That move came back to bite them in the ass.
Another major problem with going to war against the Soviets was because of the quagmire in China, and the huge number of troops, equipment and material that was sucking from Japan. Leaders in the Ministry of War believed Japan didn’t have sufficient numbers to support these two wars simultaneously.
There also wasn’t a clear economic advantage of taking Siberia, and instead the case was that it was to protect against a potential enemy. The invasion of South East Asian did offer the potential for the all-important natural resources.
A book I highly recommend to understanding Japanese is “Japanese Society” by Chie Nakane. It’s probably dated by now (published 1970) but it explains Japanese social structures better than other sources. I worked for a company in Tokyo which could have been used as a case study for that book.
Understanding Japanese society, including honne and *tatemae *
do help in appreciating the situation in 1941.
I still don’t see the validity of this particular point v what I said. There were 45 Zeroes in the first wave. There was a more or less cohesive formation as the first wave approached Oahu. If the US Army had managed per its intent and plans to launch an intercept formation on radar warning to meet the raid as it approached the island, the Zeros would surely have engaged them, and at least seriously distracted them, in contrast to the later small scale attacks by US fighters which took off later after the Zeroes had gone to strafing airfields. So those later minor successes can’t necessarily be ‘scaled up’ to a situation where a larger number of Army fighters got off the ground before the raid arrived. The Zeroes also did attack the random airborne US a/c over PH when or shortly after they arrived (small civilian, B-17’s arriving from West Coast, SBD’s arriving from Enterprise). They would engaged airborne enemy a/c they encountered, not requiring special ‘tasking for escort’.
The Zeroes which accompanying the Luzon raids, those which didn’t see US fighters, also went down to strafe. Low altitude ground fire then accounted for perhaps 3 of their 7 total losses. The ones which saw the formations of P-35’s and P-40’s attacked them, shooting down or causing write off of probably 7 P-35/40 for perhaps 4 (seems at least 3) losses of their own losses, not as productive as strafing, but OTOH thoroughly occupied those US fighters.
I was searching to find how the P-35 compared to the P-40 and found this on Wikipedia:
"In January 1942, five surviving P-35As attempted to fly to Bataan from Lubao Airfield, but two were shot down as they attempted to land, and a third was destroyed in place when no volunteer could be found to fly it. "
‘Actually not’, what? I made several statements. One was that the IJA force in Manchuria was built up in a major way following the 1939 Nomonhan incident, which is beyond dispute. And there was a further buildup launched after the German invasion of the USSR. This showed in concrete terms that Japan was seriously considering attacking the USSR now that it was under attack by Germany.
I didn’t say support was universal in fact I said the opposite. But it seems the main point of contention within the Army was military feasibility based on how much the Soviets had actually weakened their forces in the Far East to counter the Germans.
Yes, which is why it’s not definitive to quote any given meeting or process in byzantine Japanese system. But it was (Per Coox in Nomonhon, chapter 43 is devoted to this period) the Army General Staff’s plan written just after the German invasion to mobilize to 22 divisions in the Kwantung Army, mobilization order July 5, decide on hostilities by August 10, and commence combat operations no later than Sept 10, footnoted to AGS records. Yes it as agreed in the July 2 imperial conference not to intervene in the USSR ‘for the time being’, despite the hawkish stance of Privy Council Pres Yoshimichi as well as Matsuoka, and Coox describes Tojo as ‘seemingly inclined toward the AGS concept’.
But the mobilization order part of the plan was approved by the emperor and issued in early July. And as often the Kwantung Army operated semi-independently to use that order to build toward the 22 division force in the AGS plan although the war ministry was initially opposed to more than 16, but by later in July supported continuation of the mobilization to 24 divisions in the Kwantung Army. It is called the ‘Kantōkuen’ (acronym for Kantōgun tokubetsu enshū, Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers) mobilization.
So I don’t believe it can be said at all ‘actually not’ to a serious Japanese plan to invade the USSR after the German invasion. Concrete preparatory action was taken in pursuance of a concrete plan. Obviously Japan ultimately decided against launching that attack. ‘Go north’ lost strength as the crisis with the Western powers escalated, and nobody said it ever had unanimous support. But it was not an idle abstract suggestion of Matsuoka only.
Yes this triggered the oil embargo August 1 which resulted in the definitive rejection of ‘go north’ around the time of the AGS plan’s original deadline for deciding, August 10. But the moves in Indochina weren’t intended to scotch ‘go north’ by causing an oil embargo.
You are discussing here whether it would have made sense for Japan to attack the USSR. I didn’t say it would have. And, though there was a clearer initial goal (breaking the oil embargo), to the ‘go south’ war by the time it was chosen, that war didn’t turn out to make any sense either. Nor was there a clear goal or any ultimate sense to the ever expanding war in China in the years prior.
In a quirk of history, while everyone agrees the P35A was not a match for the Navy Type 0 in air combat, no P-35 was ever shot down outright by a Zero.
The ‘table of organization’ fighter strength of the FEAF Dec 8 was 3*18 plane sdns of P-40E, 1 of P-40B, 1 of P-35A but there were spare a/c around. So the P-35’s were not that major an element. However the whole P-35 force made contact with the enemy Dec 8 whereas the P-40B sdn was mainly caught on the ground at Clark, 20 of 23 a/c destroyed or seriously damaged on the ground, and some 3rd FS (P-40E) were destroyed on the ground at Iba, other elements of that squadron engaged along with one element of 21st (P-40E), 17th (P-40E) didn’t.
As mentioned, all 18 P-35’s were hit though only one a known immediate write off. Others though were not repaired before being destroyed on the ground in subsequent raids. Six P-40’s appear to have been shot down or written off from air combat damage. The US officially credited 1 Zero to P-35 and 6 to P-40. The two Japanese air groups lost 7 Zeroes but there are two apparently separate and credible accounts of Zeroes hit by AA crashing on or near Clark. At least one Zero was lost to a P-40 per a Japanese first hand account; 3 others disappeared during air combat near Clark, not over the field. The Zeroes claimed 15 confirmed in the air 7 probable and 1 ‘forced to crash land’.
The combats resumed in similar vein Dec 10, 7 P-40’s known downed by Zeroes for 4 Zero losses to all causes, no outright losses of P-35’s but shot up. Later on, with the US fighter force mainly neutralized, one P-35 on a recon mission was shot down by an Army Type 97 fighter December 20, and on December 24 4 P-35’s engaged Zeroes shooting down one (confirmed in Japanese accounts) for one P-35 crash landed on return. The combat career of the P-35.
On paper the P-35 was around 60mph slower in level flight than the P-40E and had a much lighter armament, 2*.30cal and 2*.50cal v 6*.50cal. It did have theoretically lower wing and power loading (wing loading no higher than Zero 21), ie more potential for climb and maneuver, and a better set up of its engine for higher altitude flight. In practice though the particular a/c in FEAF had high hours on their engines which no longer produced full power, whereas the P-40E’s were brand new (though some problems because of that also). Some of the P-35’s didn’t have oxygen equipment, radios were faulty, etc.