With respect to logic, though, is that really correct? I would not expect that it would be acceptable to have two diverging conclusions from two mutually agreeable premises. I would think that this would invalidate the chain of logic, even if it appears correct by the rules.
Well, there’s a difference between validity and soundness. An argument is valid if all its inferences follow from its premises; it is sound if it is valid and its premises are true. In this case, the theist and the atheist disagree about the truth of the premise. Nevertheless, both make valid arguments.
I have to say this is one of the reasons why you just can’t have an intelligent conversation with someone who is a trained philosopher or logician. They speak their own language, which has nothing to do with our world.
You can use al logic you want, but to accept the possibility of something doesn’t make it so.
Philosophy suck ass. :o
Yes Lib, I know what you meant by “possibility” in your proof. What I’m trying to explain to you is that when other people say “I accept the possibility that God exists” they may not mean “metaphysical possibility”. If they don’t, the proof you posted is irrelevant to the discussion.
If the premise is not an accurate translation of the other person’s beliefs then it doesn’t matter if the proof is formally valid. Of course, it’s often easy enough to intimidate people who have no training in logic by saying things like “Find a logical fallacy in the above proof or shut the fuck up”, but if your proof isn’t sound then no amount of intellectual bullying can change that. It only serves to make people hate philosophy and philosophers.
But the proof is sound in my opinion because the alternative premise is untenable. I’ve already apologized for my rudeness, so I don’t know why you’re hitting on that again. No one has asked why I flew off the handle, but in case you are interested, it was because the OP was doing the same thing you keep accusing me of doing — presuming a position of intellectual superiority for the purpose of dismissing opponents as idiots. I felt that I was giving the OP a taste of his own medicine. Not the right thing to do, as I’ve already admitted. Still, that’s the reason.
And here I thought the OP was saying that his friends were stupid because every time they heard strange noisee in their houses, they automatically assumed they were made by ghosts, rather than by rattling pipes, creaky floors and the like. I had no idea the OP was questioning the validity of a rational expression of God.
Color ME surprised. I guess I just wasn’t reading broadly enough.
If my friends heard a creak and immediately thought “GHOST!” instead of “CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE AND/OR HUMIDITY!” I would probably think, “What a stupid, squirrely fuck.” Does that mean I agree with the OP, kinda agree with the OP, or deny any possibility of the existance of God? I’m kind of unclear…
In my first post, I quoted what I was responding to:
Not everything that is supernatural is necessarily ridiculous, and those of us who believe in a supernatural deity are not necessarily “stupid idiots”. Nor ought we necessarily to STFU.
Libertarian, I’ve now seen this modal argument go past several times, and have decided why it fails to convince. The purely mechanistic aspects are not in dispute - in S5, <>A -> A as you show. As you seem to have acknowledged, it is just as true that <>~A -> ~A. So the terms of the argument simply shift on to talk of possibility. I think it’s here that the argument falls apart - not through falsehood in and of itself, but by exploiting the quite natural confusion that arises when talking about modal “possibility” with people who aren’t modal logicians. The honest debater is unwilling to show themselves to be closed to any possibility, but in the epistemic sense. “Sure,” they say, “it’s possible that God exists.” The (metaphysical) argument is then sprung upon them, neatly equivocating the two forms of possibility. When challenged one can of course say (as you do) that it ought to be obvious that the metaphysical form is what’s meant, but dress it up in enough jargon and the distinction is again likely to be missed by all but the modal logician.
The modal argument simply shifts the question onto one of metaphysical possibility, something which seems to me no more clear than the question of existence in the first place. If I follow correctly, your assertion that <>~G is “untenable” rests solely on your equating “that which necessarily exists” with “supreme being”, something which again I find open to question. In essence, it seems rather like an exercise in begging the question, obfuscated to the point of painful excess with some rather pointless proofs.
Yeah, I was just about to post what Dead Badger said, but he beat me to it.
Or in my own words: your proof, as far as I understand it, is so counterintuitive as to be nonsensical to me.
Is that statement in English or Logic? If it is possible for something to exist, it’s possible for it not to exist as well. That’s what possible means, as distinguished from necessary.
If I flip a coin, it is possible that it will be heads. That does not mean it’s impossible for it to be tails.
A reasonable point of view, Dead Badger, although I disagree.
As I see it, the dishonesty comes from the opposing side. If I call a man a “stupid idiot” for believing in the supernatural, then I am declaring that a metaphysical question is epistemic when it isn’t. There is a difference between saying that someone is wrong for asserting, “It is possible that it is raining outside” (an epistemic possibility) and saying that someone is stupid for asserting, “It is possible for it to rain outside” (a metaphysical possiblity). That’s why my first response was to remind the OP that a cow is a bovine, but a bovine is not necessarily a cow. If he limited himself to the epistemic claim that there are no ghosts to the best of his knowledge, I would have no complaint. But he crossed over into metaphysics when he declared categorically that people who believe in the supernatural at all are “stupid idiots”.
Right, but if it absolutely must be not heads — N(~g) is true — then it absolutely cannot possibly be tails — ~N(~g) is false.
In my mind, though, there is no disagreement about the premise, they are just worded differently.
It is possible god exists
It is possible god doesn’t exist
Two different ways to say the same thing, if you ask me. They should not result in two different conclusions.
I meant heads, not tails. Sorry.
Wasn’t it clear to you that when he said ‘supernatural’ he meant ghosts? It was fairly clear to me.
But they are different.
It is possible god exists = ~N~g
It is possible god doesn’t exist = ~N~~g = ~Ng
where ~N~ = possible (not necessary not).
“It is possible god doesn’t exist” is the same as saying “It is not necessary that god exists”.
Well, if that was fairly clear to you, then I cannot imagine why you need ask me that question. It should be abundantly clear to you that it wasn’t clear to me.
Heck, I think I already did post what Dead Badger said, but he said it more betterer so that’s all right.
'Twas a rhetorical question.
When you put forth a premise that something is “possible” you immediately suggest that there is an alternate possibility. If you want to be intellectually honest, you have to examine those alternates, and treat them with the same validity as your initial premise.
You seem to suggest that an alternate premise is unacceptable. If you do not accept that what you propose is “possible” might not be true, how can you say you’ve proved anything?